Peter White

Very well stated. It is common misconception that it should be rare to see rare events. No, rare events happen all the time. We expect particular rare events happen only once in a long while. Let's take an extreme, everyday example: any state lottery. What are the odds that a particular combination of numbers will be chosen? Roughly 1 in ~20 million. But it happens twice a week in California. Does that prove the lottery is rigged? Of course not.

Thanks, Kingfish. That pretty much explains what I have seen. Like the tank that fires 5 smoke rounds on the same line when I give it a long range spot. I guess smoke curtains aren't available.

Getting mortars into place on the offense is quite a chore. A FO can run along with the infantry. Better, because a Weary FO still can do his thing. I am playing All Or Nothing, (possible minor spoilers...) ...and getting those 3" mortars into position takes a long time. At least the ones that walk. The Allies get a lot of different artillery to play with. Other observations: (1) 3" mortars on board mortars are accurate enough to pop light armored vehicles with 4-5 shots at 500m. (2) 3" off board mortars are only accurate enough to find a full platoon. (3a) The naval guns are AMAZINGLY accurate. It seems like the spotting round with land within 30-40m almost every time. (3b) Due to the timing of the spot round, and the relatively slow ROF, it is easy to control the pace of fire and not waste lots of rounds. (3c) 5.5" is a big blast and just a few rounds take out a soft target. Not many more to knock the track off a tank. (~9 rounds, 2 within 20m) (3d) Too bad you can't take fight within arms reach of your navy all the time!

How does one get a tank to smoke a general area with its smoke ammo, and not fire 4-6 smoke shells at the exact damn piece of dirt (if its gunner is accurate)? Did I miss something?

I am more of a Varro myself. I like to create what appears to be an irresistible concentration of firepower, order my tanks and infantry support vehicles to cross paths and bump into each other, and leave myself wide open to counteratttacks.

Of course, it is not a uniquely Japanese to consider honor and duty over one's own personal judgement. It is a cultural trait known many places to varying degrees. The testimony only indicates that these particular values are common in Japan today; presumably they were in the past as well. Midway was a pretty solid plan. It is only through great luck that the results were so very lopsided. If IJN had had the good luck, Midway would have been theirs and any significant US offensives would have been set back 12+ months. At least Yamanto put together a plan that even with 20-20 hindsight had a reasonable chance of fulfilling its immediate goals. If were to "reroll the dice" on the exact same scenario, it could have been 3 US carriers on the bottom and the IJN celebrating. Not that that would have changed the eventual outcome of the war. Changing subjects, personally, I consider the conspiracy theories to get Pearl Harbor bombed ludicrous. There were many suspicions of an upcoming Japanese offensives because the British and Dutch possessions were easy pickings. They needed the oil because of US sanctions. Going from the carrier fleet going into radio silence to an attack on Pearl Harbor is a big leap. The real problem of intelligence is sifting through stacks of data to find useful information. With the benefit of hindsight, one can always dig up a few random scraps of data that give the right answer. Knowing which 99% of the data to ignore is easy after the fact. Tongue firmly in cheek, there are very few surprise historical events that could not be predicted in from reading the history books. Furthermore the conspracy theorists do not answer the question of why FDR did not have his cake and eat it too. Running a few early morning airbase drills and repositioning a couple submarines, would have reduced the lopsidedness of the attack while still successfully embroiling us in a war.

A medium machine gun with a good field of view, preferably in a building, will slow down his infantry and tempt him to bring forward a tank or two. If you can anticipate the route of approach and hide an AT gun in some trees behind the MG, you can pop his tank. Of course a MG + AT gun is hardly an insoluble problem with infantry alone, so you will need to hide some supporting infantry of your own. Don't give away their position too early or they may be casually routed by HE shells from the tanks. Beware that if you cluster your defenses, a savvy player will hit you with artillery, HE or smoke. I would guess your opponent's success with a simple infantry screen plus cheap tanks will guarantee he will pursue those tactics until you punish him for it. Consider also splitting some squads and spacing them on a treeline as bait. A number of "Infantry?" bogeys will also tempt him to push forward his tanks to soften them up before cleaning out the area with infantry.

One obvious strategic difference between typical CM experiences and real life is that CM scenarios tend to be roughly balanced. I suspect one of the most nerve-wracking questions for any commander making contact with an enemy force is whether there are any really nasty surprises he does not know about. Or how aggressively he should exploit suspected weakness? Is it a trap? Is he the hunter or the hunted? When I play CM, I automatically *know* that if I "play well", I can probably "win". That is perhaps the most valuable information you can give a commander. If we could channel the spirit of McClellan, his hindsight on the matter might be interesting.

I think most behavior, even that which are usually labelled "insane, irrational" acts, can be adequately explained as rational behavior based on incomplete information and/or narrow perspective. IMO, to understand evil you must understand why people often _choose_ to have incomplete information and avoid broad perspectives. That is a big topic in itself. To paraphrase a reporter who had interviewed Hitler in the 30s: "Hitler has the most complete library, all of it unused; he has made up his mind on everything." Contrast this with Socrates who constantly claimed he understood very little. The Oracle at Delphi consequently labelled him the wisest man in the world. I suspect Hitler had good reason to believe that his domestic enemies were more dangerous to him personally than Stalin's army. At least in 1941 and 1942 that made sense; therefore a guns & butter policy was reasonable. It may have made even more sense once the war turned for the worse. After all, there were assassination attempts were there not?

Yeah, maybe. I have the opposite complaint, though; tanks too interested in saving their own skin when they should stand their ground. I was playing Chambois, and I had set up 4 Shermans and 1 Firefly to be clustered on top on the hill with beautiful hull down firing positions on the city, as the German tanks came out in a disorganized mess. I was not pleased when a couple of my Shermans decided the action was too hot and tossed smoke. I am sure those tankers we pleased when I ordered them to push through the smoke and slug it out anyway. As least a gun damaged tank might be drawing fire that might be aimed at a healthy tank. That seems like a legitimate tactic.

I have a naive question: If the non-tracked half of a half-track has tires, shouldn't it be trivial for a squad to immobilize the thing? From 5 feet or 75 feet, I would think 2-3 veteran soldiers could accomplish this feat almost instantly, much less a squad.

Uber weapon? If you have good LOS on a wide kill zone is certainly very useful. At least in Valley of Trouble, it is easy to panic the crew with a little aritillery fire. And if you are clever, just one mortar team will do the same job; with a higher ROF, a single lucky mortar round will suppress the IG crew sufficiently to decide duel.

My personal opinion is that NScoot would be micromanagement. I think a more appropriate order would a 'Defensive' order. "Get out of there if you are outgunned!" The net effect would be to modestly increase the probability the tacai retreats a unit when in danger.