Use of CAS is gamey recon ? (Well, kinda sort of :-)

[Guest Big Time Software]

Tero wrote;

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As I have said before I have no objection to the implementation of CAS in CM as it is except for that it is 100% on target. At least for once I can say there is a feature that is TOO perfectly modelled in CM<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But this is simply not true. CAS in CM is far from being "100% on target". I have seen planes bomb nothing. Sure, they were trying for something, but when bombs strike 200m away... it is kinda hard to say that they are "100% on target". And what happens when a plane strikes a friendly unit? "100% on target" in this case means "100% on the WRONG target".

But more importantly... sometimes CAS doesn't even show up on the battlefield. This simulates the plane not finding anything to bomb or not even finding the right area to target (i.e. didn't even find the playing area in the virtual big world around it). And if the weather isn't perfect, the chances of CAS showing up is dramatically reduced.

So if this whole discussion is based on CM having some sort of "100% on target" problem, whatever point you are trying to make is based on falwed information. CM's CAS is far from 100%.

This is why I NEVER, EVER, in even ONE game I have played bought CAS. I would much rather buy artillery. At least I know what I am getting for my money.

In conclusion, whatever information is gained by CAS is of dubious value. As a "game flaw" it comes up so very few times it is hardly something that is a serious problem. The other problems with spotting happen on a turn by turn basis in every game, so it seems to be a silly waste of time discussing this issue that happens maybe once in 100 games.

Steve

[This message has been edited by Big Time Software (edited 01-10-2001).]

[CavScout]

It is not "gamey" because all units fire on "real" targets. If one wants the CAS to drop ordnance on "none" targets you would need to have other units do the same. Need to have your Panther unload some HE into a tree line that the TC thought held infantry.

Cav

------------------

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, 'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

"AS far as Steve and BTS (mostly Steve) are concerned, you are either a CM die-hard supporter, or you are dirt. If you question the game, implementation, or data models they used, you are some kind of neo-Nazi wanna-be, and become an open target for CavScout, SlippySlapDragon, and all the other sycophants who hang on Steves every word."-- Jeff Heidman [comp.sys.ibm.pc.games.war-historical]

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 01-10-2001).]

[Guest wwb_99]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Yes. But as it is "only" 12,7mm it does not count as heavy ordnance. Even if you have 8 of them aboard. I think even the 20mm does not count as heavy ordnance.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Reportedly, the 8 .50s on a P-47 were capable of flipping a mark IV on its back when fired next to it. That is a lotta high velocity steel jacketed rounds hitting in one place at one time.

WWB

------------------

Before battle, my digital soldiers turn to me and say,

Ave, Caesar! Morituri te salutamus.

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

I would not say wrong, what I would say is we have one web site with a well written article suggesting that despite what everyone was writing at the time and afterward everyone was wrong, causualties were huge, and CAS never hit anything.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

British tests during the war on captured tanks are in accord with old Nicks work, very few tanks were killed by airpower. He’s not a lone voice shouting in the wilderness.

[Terence]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Terence:

>When I see the strafing and bombing start, I think "Something is over there, and its interesting enough for the jabos to look at. Hmm, wonder what it is."

But would you act on it if you knew there was a, say, 50% chance the Jabos hit a bogus target instead of a valid target ?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Someone is sure to quibble with the 50% figure, but I do take your point. I think, actually that it would make a difference to me:

Right now, I will make every effort to check out an area where the CAS attacks, and be on guard to see what might come from there.

If I knew they might be bombing shadows, I probably would still try hard to check the area, but not as hard. My alertness to the area would not be different, though.

[This message has been edited by Terence (edited 01-10-2001).]

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

Not to mention the page has a definite German slant anyway.

And lastly... 20mm rounds may not be heavy ordinance... but try telling that to the tank crews that get repeated straffe on their flank.

Joe

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So a work, which removes the Germans most 'valid' excuses for losing vs. the 'unprofessional' hoard of Allies, is obviously biased towards Germans. Now it’s the Allied ground forces which posses the lion share of defeating the German 'super army' not its Airpower.

2cm guns meeting 3cm armour at crazy angles will not defeat it, think about how hard it would be to hold those 4x2cm cannons on a moving panzer while people are returning fire if your Tiffies moving at +450km/h.

[tss]

Gotta start nitpicking...

tero wrote:

The Finns used artillery pieces left over from the 1870 war during Winter War for crying out loud !

Actually, oldest Russian field guns in Finnish use were of the 1877 gun family: 87 mm cannon (87K77), 107 mm battery cannon (107K77-ptrik) (battery cannon essentially means that it was designed to be a field gun), 107 mm siege cannon (107K77-piirk), two different models of 152 mm heavy cannon (152K77-120p and 152K77-190p, the XXXp is the weight of the barrel in old Russian units, "puuta" in Finnish), and two heavy coast mortar models (229M77) and (279M77).

Of those models, 107K77-piirk, 152K77-120p, 152K77-190, 229M77, and 279M77 were used also in the Continuation War.

- Tommi

[Banshee]

I always enjoy (not) when my CAS repeatedly bombs and strafes the one tank that I happen to have already taken out with my tanks and guns, but leaves all the others ones alone , my only hope is that the CAS misses and the bombs land next to something still working

btw, I still don't see the argument "against" CAS that started the thread, could someone lay it out for me?

------------------

Veni, vidi, panzerschrecki

[Guest Big Time Software]

Bastables wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>British tests during the war on captured tanks are in accord with old Nicks work, very few tanks were killed by airpower. He’s not a lone voice shouting in the wilderness.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I for one dispute this, if for no other reason that it implies that TAC strikes were not very effective. There is a mountain of evidence to dispute this. Not only from studies, but from first person acounts. Heck... in 5 years of combat Rommel was taken out of action by what... MGs from a plane

So I guess there could be debate about what percentage of major AFVs were knocked out by planes, but it was still a significant number. On the Eastern front there were more than a few pilots that scored double digit kills on AFVs. Let us not even think about Rudel

And of course one has to look at the use of airpower SINCE WWII. If airpower had such a minimal effect on ground combat, why has airpower been increasingly brought into the forefront of conventional land battles? The Gulf War probably saw more AFVs knocked out from the air than from the ground. So clearly WWII set this ball rolling.

Steve

[Polar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So a work, which removes the Germans most 'valid' excuses for losing vs. the 'unprofessional' hoard of Allies, is obviously biased towards Germans. Now it’s the Allied ground forces which posses the lion share of defeating the German 'super army' not its Airpower.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, the whole page is essentially about German forces, and German reports of losses and their causes.

Again, the vast majority of ground attack was done against rear guard and supply, and minimal effort was put into the ground attack versus tanks.

I'm not saying that the CAS was an uber killer, but it was effective. More effective than a tank? No, if it was we wouldn't need tanks!

But lets look at those numbers he posted again:

Tanks destroyed by CAS - 9

Tanks Destroyed by "Ground Weapons" - 20

Tanks Abandoned by crew - 11

Ok... so... if, say, 5 tanks were destroyed by artillery, leaving 15 for infantry and Tanks, and say, 4 tanks were destoryed by infantry assault that'd mean that bonifide tanks only killed 2 more tanks than CAS did.

Furthermore, how many of the abandoned tanks are could be atributable to CAS attacks? Unknown? A few maybe?

CAS is the only stat that is a common denominator in his findings. All other stats are lumped together into "Ground Weapons", "Abandoned", and "Unknown". When you start actuall breaking up those other numbers, the CAS starts looking quite a bit more effective in comparison to each individual facet of the combined arms assault.

Lets actually break these numbers down:

Lets say that of the 20 killed by ground weapons the breakdown is as follows:

Infantry - 3

Tanks - 10

Artillery - 4

ATG - 3

Probably weighs too heavily of the Tanks IMO... but lets move on

Abandoned (11) - assumed immobile and indefensable

Damage caused by:

Infantry - 2

Tanks - 3

CAS - 1

Artillery - 2

ATG - 3

Still... probably not far off... just gave one to CAS because my guess is that if CAS can destroy 9, they should be able to disable 1.

Ok... now Unknown (6)

Infantry - 4

Tanks - 1

CAS - 0

Arty - 0 (you can usually tell when it's been around )

ATG - 1

Gave it to Infantry, because I can invision a surrender to infantry as a probable likelyhood of a good tank being abandoned.

Even still, lets helkp out the tank... make it 2/3/0/1 respectively.

Now, lets look at the REAL numbers.

Tanks lost: 46

Breakdown as follows:

Lost to: Number:

-------- -------

Tanks 16

Arty 6

Infantry 7

ATG 7

CAS 10

Even under conservative estimates CAS comes up second in total kills... not bad for a force that is VASTLY VASTLY VASTLY outnumbered by every one of the other categories.

His numbers lie, and that is all their is to it.

Joe

------------------

"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

Well, the whole page is essentially about German forces, and German reports of losses and their causes.

Again, the vast majority of ground attack was done against rear guard and supply, and minimal effort was put into the ground attack versus tanks.

I'm not saying that the CAS was an uber killer, but it was effective. More effective than a tank? No, if it was we wouldn't need tanks!

But lets look at those numbers he posted again:

Tanks destroyed by CAS - 9

Tanks Destroyed by "Ground Weapons" - 20

Tanks Abandoned by crew - 11

Ok... so... if, say, 5 tanks were destroyed by artillery, leaving 15 for infantry and Tanks, and say, 4 tanks were destoryed by infantry assault that'd mean that bonifide tanks only killed 2 more tanks than CAS did.

Furthermore, how many of the abandoned tanks are could be atributable to CAS attacks? Unknown? A few maybe?

CAS is the only stat that is a common denominator in his findings. All other stats are lumped together into "Ground Weapons", "Abandoned", and "Unknown". When you start actuall breaking up those other numbers, the CAS starts looking quite a bit more effective in comparison to each individual facet of the combined arms assault.

Lets actually break these numbers down:

Lets say that of the 20 killed by ground weapons the breakdown is as follows:

Infantry - 3

Tanks - 10

Artillery - 4

ATG - 3

Probably weighs too heavily of the Tanks IMO... but lets move on

Abandoned (11) - assumed immobile and indefensable

Damage caused by:

Infantry - 2

Tanks - 3

CAS - 1

Artillery - 2

ATG - 3

Still... probably not far off... just gave one to CAS because my guess is that if CAS can destroy 9, they should be able to disable 1.

Ok... now Unknown (6)

Infantry - 4

Tanks - 1

CAS - 0

Arty - 0 (you can usually tell when it's been around )

ATG - 1

Gave it to Infantry, because I can invision a surrender to infantry as a probable likelyhood of a good tank being abandoned.

Even still, lets helkp out the tank... make it 2/3/0/1 respectively.

Now, lets look at the REAL numbers.

Tanks lost: 46

Breakdown as follows:

Lost to: Number:

-------- -------

Tanks 16

Arty 6

Infantry 7

ATG 7

CAS 10

Even under conservative estimates CAS comes up second in total kills... not bad for a force that is VASTLY VASTLY VASTLY outnumbered by every one of the other categories.

His numbers lie, and that is all their is to it.

Joe

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

His numbers are taken from British army after battle reports in their examination of captured Panzers, where are you numbers from? And you're going on record on saying that the British study is a pack of lies? Also the British studies note that air attacks are the easiest to identify, your attempts to turn unknown and disabled kills into CAS kills is a problematic at best because it’s just based on your assumptions and contrary to British on site reports.

[This message has been edited by Bastables (edited 01-10-2001).]

[Banshee]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

Even under conservative estimates CAS comes up second in total kills... not bad for a force that is VASTLY VASTLY VASTLY outnumbered by every one of the other categories.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think one flaw in your logic is with unknown and abandoned tanks. Mechanical breakdowns aren't taken into consideration, and the German machines had many mechanical issues. A mechanical breakdown during a retreat would cause the abandoment of the vehicle. So the unknowns and abandoned vehicles really cant be counted towards CAS or any other branch.

------------------

Veni, vidi, panzerschrecki

[This message has been edited by Banshee (edited 01-10-2001).]

[Polar]

I am taking my numbers from THEIR numbers.

THEY state that CAS was responsible for 9, and "Ground Attacks" were responsible for 20... but how they break down that 20, and the rest of the numbers is a guess.

I am not saying that those numbers are lies... they are very possibly completely accurate... what I DO point out is that those numbers are skewed in their reporting, and in how the writer is using them.

Again, of the 17 tanks destroyed by things other than CAS and "Ground attacks" I only gave 1 attributable Tank to CAS.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>your attempts to turn unknown and disabled kills into CAS kills is a problematic at best because it’s just based on your assumptions and contrary to British on site reports<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Even if you take out the Abandoned/Unknowns, you are left with 9 attributable to CAS, and 20 devided up between Anti-Tank guns, Infantry, Artillery, and Tanks. I attriguted only 1 of the 17 to CAS anyway... so it's a moot point. If I gave 0 to CAS they would still fall at #2.

Given that you are deviding 20 four ways, you are not left with the impression that CAS was all that ineffective. To the contrary, fully dependant of the breakdown of that 20, CAS could still possibly end up with more attributable kills than ANY "Ground Weapon" depending on how that 20 is devided.

You play with the numers... if you give half the kills to tanks, that leaves 10 for Arty, Infantry, and ATGs... making CAS #2 more than likely.

In any event, CAS would most likely be either the #1 or #2 Tank killer based on those numbers.

MOre to the point, and soley on a fairness point of view, he throws around casualty numbers that span various time periods far too flippantly. It is just an obvious case of twisting the data to fit a hypothesis... or messreading the data and drawing the wrong hypothesis.

I ask you, Bastables, assuming that the British numbers are impecable (as they most probably are) how do you see the Breakdown of the 20 "Ground Weapons" to 9 CAS that proves CAS was ineffective?

Given the fact that actuall CAS forces were GREATLY outnumbered by the infantry, tanks, artillery, and ATGs that were accomplishing the same task...

Joe

------------------

"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[This message has been edited by Polar (edited 01-10-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Polar (edited 01-10-2001).]

[Polar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Banshee:

I think one flaw in your logic is with unknown and abandoned tanks. Mechanical breakdowns aren't taken into consideration, and the German machines had many mechanical issues. A mechanical breakdown during a retreat would cause the abandoment of the vehicle. So the unknowns and abandoned vehicles really cant be counted towards CAS or any other branch.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed... but it only accentuates my point if you drop them from my tallies as I gave all but 1 to the other branches.

Joe

------------------

"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

I am taking my numbers from THEIR numbers.

THEY state that CAS was responsible for 9, and "Ground Attacks" were responsible for 20... but how they break down that 20, and the rest of the numbers is a guess.

I am not saying that those numbers are lies... they are very possibly completely accurate... what I DO point out is that those numbers are skewed in their reporting, and in how the writer is using them.

Again, of the 17 tanks destroyed by things other than CAS and "Ground attacks" I only gave 1 attributable Tank to CAS.

Even if you take out the Abandoned/Unknowns, you are left with 9 attributable to CAS, and 20 devided up between Anti-Tank guns, Infantry, Artillery, and Tanks. I attriguted only 1 of the 17 to CAS anyway... so it's a moot point. If I gave 0 to CAS they would still fall at #2.

Given that you are deviding 20 four ways, you are not left with the impression that CAS was all that ineffective. To the contrary, fully dependant of the breakdown of that 20, CAS could still possibly end up with more attributable kills than ANY "Ground Weapon" depending on how that 20 is devided.

You play with the numers... if you give half the kills to tanks, that leaves 10 for Arty, Infantry, and ATGs... making CAS #2 more than likely.

In any event, CAS would most likely be either the #1 or #2 Tank killer based on those numbers.

MOre to the point, and soley on a fairness point of view, he throws around casualty numbers that span various time periods far too flippantly. It is just an obvious case of twisting the data to fit a hypothesis... or messreading the data and drawing the wrong hypothesis.

I ask you, Bastables, assuming that the British numbers are impecable (as they most probably are) how do you see the Breakdown of the 20 "Ground Weapons" to 9 CAS that proves CAS was ineffective?

Given the fact that actuall CAS forces were GREATLY outnumbered by the infantry, tanks, artillery, and ATGs that were accomplishing the same task...

Joe

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Twisting the facts? You're the one using one figure out of many to support your belief, you're the one turning unknown and disabled kills into CAS kills based on your personal beliefs and napkin calculations that airpower was the war winner. You’re the one who begins with ad-hominen attacks upon the person doing the research because in your unsubstantiated opinion he’s a German biased writer. If you feel so strongly about his work write to the bugger and express you personal dis-taste for anything so obviously pro German in giving back the Normandy battle victory to the Allied ground forces. As of yet Polar you've proved nothing besides your own view on CAS effectivness in the time period CM represents.

Oh I don't see anything wrong with CAS in CM it seems to match up with the British reports and Nicks work quite well.

[This message has been edited by Bastables (edited 01-10-2001).]

[Slapdragon]

To help out I am going to go to the afrotc section of our library here where I check out lots of interesting things and try to find the citations for the studies. One was written by General Spaatz, another is a history by Robert Finney, and then their are these tan manual studies called interesting things like, "Effectiveness of tactical close air support in the Korean Conflict 1950-53 report to the commanding General". I will see what I can dig up before classes start.

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

To help out I am going to go to the afrotc section of our library here where I check out lots of interesting things and try to find the citations for the studies. One was written by General Spaatz, another is a history by Robert Finney, and then their are these tan manual studies called interesting things like, "Effectiveness of tactical close air support in the Korean Conflict 1950-53 report to the commanding General". I will see what I can dig up before classes start.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks Slap.

[Polar]

First Bastables... thought you were stable enough to realize the the Pro-German thing was a joke... guess not.

And again, you are dodging my question concerning the numbers he cited... is CAS was responsible for 9, and 20 were the result of "ground weapons" what does that say about CAS -vs- any particular anti-tank platform? Since CAS is specific, and "Ground Weapons" is general....

What's the matter, affraid of what you might find?

Joe

------------------

"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[Polar]

And BTW, I have never said that CAS was an Uber tank killer... but it was a major difference in the war... and a pretty good TK and the guys own numbers show it.

Joe

------------------

"I had no shoes and I cried, then I met a man who had no socks." - Fred Mertz

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Gen. Bayerlein, 12 SS Panzer, account of the effect of interdiction fighter-bombers on his division in a single day, June 7, 1944. The day after D-Day, this example shows the effect on a Panzer division trying to close to the front but not yet in action.

"By noon it was terrible; every vehicle was covered with tree branches and moved along hedges and the edges of woods. Road junctions were bombed and a bridge was knocked out. By the end of the day I had lost forty tank-trucks carrying fuel, and ninety other vehicles. Five of my tanks were knocked out, and eighty-four halftracks, prime movers and self-propelled guns".

By this account, it was the light armored and unarmored vehicles that suffered the lion's share of the losses. Tanks were not invunerable to the fighter-bombers, but they generally survived while the lighter vehicles did not. The overall losses, in one day (certainly a "surge" day for sorties, to be sure) are enourmous, perhaps a quarter of the vehicles in his entire division.

Numerous reports show German infantry divisions taking two weeks to reach the battlefield from Brittany, averaging no more than ten miles a day, in night marches along secondary roads to avoid fighter bombers.

That is undoubtedly the main effect of WW II tac air. The German forces lost operational mobility behind the front and were attrited strongly whenever they attempted any rapid road movement. A related issue would be the inability of other support vehicles to properly supply the tanks. Thus Bayelein lost much of his POL and ability to move it in that one day of strikes. The loss of prime movers and half tracks certainly meant less ability to maintain the tanks, supply spare parts, repair damaged tanks, etc.

When the battle turned mobile again after the breakout, there are credible German reports that half of all tank losses were due to mechanical failures. Without immediate logistic support and forced to move over the fighter-bomber hunted roads in the mobile fighting, many of them were undoubtedly abandoned as soon as anything broke down, since the prospect of fixing them was negligible, owing in no small part of the successes of tac air.

But the accounts of the actual battlefield fighting and CAS proper, as opposed to interdiction missions, are much less clear and the accomplishments of tac air definitely less impressive on that score. One hears far more about the omnipresent allied artillery.

In the Normandy fighting and breakout battles, it seems a typical U.S. infantry battalion on the front line was often supported by ~5000 shells per day. Per battalion. There were fewer tac air sorties than that flown over the entire continent. I do not mean to suggest arty killed more tanks, but it undoubtedly delivered far more close fire support by an enourmous factor.

As for a comment by another fellow that air supposedly destroyed more tanks in Desert Storm than ground arms, I am afraid that is simply not the case. The ground arms did most of the physical destruction of armor - air had certainly destroyed Iraqi morale and logistics utterly and the entire case was "overdetermined", to be sure.

For whatever it is worth...

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Polar:

First Bastables... thought you were stable enough to realize the the Pro-German thing was a joke... guess not.

And again, you are dodging my question concerning the numbers he cited... is CAS was responsible for 9, and 20 were the result of "ground weapons" what does that say about CAS -vs- any particular anti-tank platform? Since CAS is specific, and "Ground Weapons" is general....

What's the matter, affraid of what you might find?

Joe

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

‘On 8 July 1944, a total of 112 Panthers were reported as total write-offs as a result of combat in Normandy. By 27 July, the number of total write-offs had increased by only 19 to a total of 131 Panthers. The British analysed Panthers captured in Normandy from 6 June to 7 August 1944 to determine how they became casualties. Of 82 Panthers examined, 36 were by armour piercing shot, 7 by hollow charge projectiles, 7 by artillery high explosive shells, 6 by rocket projectiles from aircraft, 2 by cannon from aircraft, 6 destroyed by crew, 3 abandoned and 13 due to unknown causes.

British examination of 96 Panthers captured from 8 to 31 1 August 1944 revealed the cause of their loss as 1 by armour piercing shot, 1 by hollow charge projectiles, 1 by artillery high explosive shells, 2 by rocket projectiles from aircraft, 1 by cannon from aircraft, 44 destroyed by crew, 30 abandoned, and 6 due to unknown causes.

By the beginning of September, the 1./Pz.Rgt.24, 11./ Pz.Rgt.33 and 1./Pz.Rgt.1 5 were the only units left with Panthers on the Western Front. The I.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 15 with the 1 1.Panzer-Division was occupied in opposing the drive following the Allied landing in southern France. For all practical purposes, the rest of the Panther-Abteilung had n been wiped out during the retreat through the Falaise Gap and attempts to escape across the Seine River’. (Jentz 1997 Pg 147)

What you’ve done Polar is taken a small sample and attempted to prove a point, with only 39 Panzer losses out of the Hundreds lost in Normandy through the 3 months that the campaigns ran its course, bit like the reasoning to include the bovine sponge or 8,8cm guns that can hit tanks 22km away, they’re known as statistical outliers or anecdotal evidence. Aka you’re massaging the information out of an entire body of work to prove your point.

‘Up to 27 July 1944, the number of Panzers lost as total writeoffs was reported as 60 StuG, 224 PZ.Kpfw.IV, 131 PzKpfw.V, 23 Pz.Kpfw.IV, and 12 Flakpz.38t for a total of 450. This was not a substantial increase over the 349 reported as lost by 8 July 1944.

The British analysed Panzers captured in Normandy from 6 June to 7 August l944 to determine how they had become casualties. Of 110 Panzers examined, 53 were caused by armour piercing shot, 8 by hollow charge projectiles, 9 by artillery high explosive shells, 1 by mines, 7 by rocket projectiles from aircraft, 3 by cannon from aircraft, 7 were destroyed by crew, 4 were abandoned and 18 were due to unknown causes.’ ( 1996 Jentz)

‘After the Allied breakout from Normandy, an enveloping attack trapped most of the Panzer-Divisions in the Falaise pocket from which very few Panzers escaped. The shape that the Panzer-Divisions were in was reflected in the Panzer operational status report for the evening of 21 August 1944: 10.SS-Pz.Div. - No Panzers, 12.SS-Pz.Div. - 10 Panzers, 1.SS-Pz.Div. - No report, 2.Pz.Div. - No Panzers, 2.SS-Pz.Div. - 15 Panzers, 9.SS-Pz.Div. - 20 to 25 Panzers, 116.Pz.Div. 12 Panzers, 21.Pz.Div. - Still in combat.

British examination of 223 Panzers captured from 8 to 31 August 1944 revealed the cause of their loss as 24 by armor-piercing shot, 1 by hollow charge projectiles, 4 by artillery high explosive shells, 7 by rocket projectiles from aircraft, 1 by cannon from aircraft, 2 by bombs, 108 destroyed by crew, 63 abandoned, and 13 due to unknown causes.’ (1996 Jentz) These were the tanks left on the field after the fighter bombing at Falaise which is held up as the text book situation for fighter-bombers, apparently a number of the Fighters were 'scoring' off of abandoned hulks.

[Guest Big Time Software]

OK, knock off the hostility of this thread will be closed.

Bastables... If I am not mistaken the USAAF provided most of the CAS missions in the war, especially in Normandy. So looking at a British report in a British sector is likely to not be very representative.

CAS was not decisive, but it was very significant. Not only against rear areas, but against frontline vehicles not currently employed in combat. It also made movement by day highly risky, so just the fear of CAS made the Germans modify their entire doctrine.

Doubler, in his book "Closing With The Enemy" writes:

"...American air power in the summer of 1944 was not yet prepared to support ground forces."

So this would lend support for your position, since it looks like the British had poorer tactical control and fewer support assets. However, Doubler also writes:

"...by the Spring of 1945 American tactical air power had become a key player in ground combat. During fighting in France and along Germany's western borders in 1944, senior air and ground commanders came to realize that air power was a key ingredient in achieving victory in ground operations."

So I suggest that your opinion, based on this very early Normandy BRITISH report, is not representative of the Allies in general, but especially not over the course of the rest of the war.

Doubler gives this example of effectiveness of CAS:

"Fighter=bombers were also effective against German target of opportunity, and aircraft played a major [my emphasis] role in the defeat of the strongerst German counterattack of the hedgerow fighting. On 11 July the Panzer Lehr launched a major attack against XIX Corps, but by nightfall American air and ground units had prevailed. IX TAC alone claimed a total of 22 German tanks destroyed."

I checked some refferences very quickly, but found not established tank strength for Lehr exactly. But by my estimates they probably only had 100 or fewer tanks availabe by this time, which would mean that CAS knocked out about 20% of the tanks. I suspect it could have been even more.

The Mortain offensive was, by every single account I have ever read, decided by CAS. In fact, it has been held up as the first example of air power having made a decisive impact on a land battle. Yes, the land based forces and other factors played a huge role, but the losses inflicted by CAS and, as importantly, the confusion within German formations it caused, was the key element in the battle. Allied and German accounts are very clear on this.

To say that CAS was decisive against armor in France would be wrong. To say that it was ineffective would be baseless.

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Bastables...

I have consolodated the numbers from the last two examples so that they read:

53 by tank fire (72%)

10 by aircraft (14%

9 by artillery (14%)

So this means that about 14% of the total of the above were killed off by CAS alone. Not bad. Dunno how to count the 8 Hollow Charge kills, as these were likely PAT kills, not tank kills.

The next example is even more interesting:

24 by tank fire (63%)

10 by aircraft (26%

4 by artillery (10%)

Even if you give the tanks the one recorded Hollow Charge, CAS knocked out 1 tank for every 2.5 tanks knocked out. Not bad.

So I guess I don't understand what all the discussion is about? CAS was clearly an important factor in knocking out armor, as well as doing things that no tank could ever do for the war effort (i.e. striking fear and damage far in the rear at any moment). Was it a decisive weapon system? No. Was the tank by 1944/45 a decisive weapon system? I also say it was not. Combined arms was decisive, and airpower (CAS included) played a major role in that combined arms equation. And 55 years later it is probably even more so.

Steve

[Guest Big Time Software]

Ooooo...

My bad! I see I assumed that "AP" meant "tank". What was I thinking

So out of the numbers above, a certain number that I had listed as "tank" were likely to have been AT guns instead. This would lower the total kills acheived by motorized armored vehicles with AT guns (tanks, TDs, ACs, etc), thus bringing it even closer to other branches of service in terms of overall impact.

Oh... and also keep in mind that the single biggest killer of tanks were the crews that manned them Germans were forced to abandon a LOT of vehicles for a bunch of reasons. So I gues the über weapon was Hans the tank commander

Steve

[Bastables]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Ooooo...

My bad! I see I assumed that "AP" meant "tank". What was I thinking

So out of the numbers above, a certain number that I had listed as "tank" were likely to have been AT guns instead. This would lower the total kills acheived by motorized armored vehicles with AT guns (tanks, TDs, ACs, etc), thus bringing it even closer to other branches of service in terms of overall impact.

Oh... and also keep in mind that the single biggest killer of tanks were the crews that manned them Germans were forced to abandon a LOT of vehicles for a bunch of reasons. So I gues the über weapon was Hans the tank commander

Steve<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That’s what I thought, with enemy tanks coming a close 2nd but apparently some still believe that the most effective tank killer was Allied air power, this is patently false. Your aggregates would seem misleading when ignoring the abandonment issue. Perhaps you should indicate that they ignore the abandoned tanks or recalculate them.