1941

[Skipper]

I think many people here would read the following text (written by Alexey Isaev, translation mine).

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So, what happened in 1941? Let's begin with traditional question "Plans of the sides". Military plans of Germany and USSR were, traditionally for superpowers, offensive, aiming to frustrate opponent's deployment and to crush his army under the most favourable circumstances. The mere existance of offensive plans is not unusual, plans of countries who began WWI in 1914 were offensive, too. Offensive plans are easier to carry out. By striking first we impose our will on the opponent, forcing him to use forces asigned for his own offensive to parry the strike.

Building a stable defence across hundreds of kilometers, even using permanent fortifications, is generally a non-trivial task. It is very difficult to determine where opponent will strike, and thus line up own troops with sufficient density. On the contrary, striking first, we could concentrate our troops on tips of strikes, leaving only the minimum number of troops on secondary directions.

To carry out military plans in XX century such thing was necessary as a strategic deployment. Ie, troops for the operation (milions of people, tens of thousand trucks with ammo and equipment) had to be moved through the country's road network to the border. This process is not fast, and depends upon a throughput capacity of opponents' railroads.

Actual condition of railroads in USSR is illustrated by the following figures (in pairs of trains per day):

District before 1941 planned opponent

Low Baltics 87 216 1923

Western 120 166 216

Kiev 132 266 362

Odessa 28 96 91

'Planned' capacity means the capacity after modernisation of railroad network according to the plan for 1941. The figures are quoted from the document TsAMO f.67 op 165389 d.1 pages 68-85. Published in Terra, Vol. 14.

For reader's guidance, to carry through one rifle division per day, capacity of 48-50 pairs of trains was required. Ie, the bigger the throughput capacity and the shorter the redeployment distance, the faster is the strategic deployment.

While the troops needed for the operation are being pushed through railroads to the border, the border is covered by so-called covering armies. Density of these troops (30-50 km per division, deployed in one echelon) is not sufficient for any serious defensive or offensive actions. They can only cover the border during the period of deployment and concentration of troops from small-scale attacks to capture bridgeheads, favourable locations etc.

Based on WWI experience, it was thought that from the beginning of war until the beginning of active combat actions (ie, planned operations), there will be a period of deployment and mobilisaion. Realities of WWII were such that there was no such period.

Germany carried out mobilisation and deployment secretly, and delivered a blow on an opponent who was not yet deployed (ex, Poland, whose plans, buy the way, were also offensive). Therefore, taking into account experience of war in Poland, USSR also carried out various actions for secret mobilisation (calling reservists up), deployment of troops (relocation of divisions, corps and armies from internal military districts to the west). In May 1941, directives were issued to relocate armies formed in internal districts. These armies were: 21A (66 rc, 63 rc from Volga district; 45 rc, 30 rc, 33 rc from Orel district), 19A from North Caucasus district (34 rc, 67 rc, 25 mc) and 16A from Baikal district. In reality, deployment of these armies was not finished - in may, 34 rc of 19 A was relocated to Kiev district, 16A was relocated from East Siberia just before the beginning of war.

If those May directives were carried out, there was a chance to deploy ahead of Germans. The problems were lack of information about opponent's real plans, and a huge length of soviet railroad network.

Intelligence about Germans was contradictory (see Meltyukhov about it), and on May 31, 1941 Wehrmacht forces were not yet apparently grouped against USSR (120 divisions in the East and 120 in the West). Only when in the beginning of June german buildup in the East continued, the threat has become clear. Urgent actions were taken to complete deployment (relocation of Second Strategic Echelon troops from internal districts). 21 A began to redeploy to Gomel. On June 14 redeployment of rifle corps' formed in special districts in spring 1941 (including 31 rc, in which Lyudnikov's 200 rd, mentioned by Suvorov, was a part of).

Simultaneously, political steps were taken to delay Germany's strike. Simply speaking, soviet leadership was trying to win time for completion of strategic deployment. If it was possible to delay germans for two weeks, there would be a chance to have on the border covering armies, corps' from special districts and armies from internal districts. In that case, it would be possible to carry out defensive and offensive operations against Wehrmacht.

Most profitable would be to inpose own will on the enemy and strike first, advancing from Belostock and Lvov salients, encircling germans between Bug and Vistula. But completed strategic deployment would allow successful strategic defense, too.

So, why was summer 1941 disastrous? Defensive plans have nothing to do with it. Incomplete strategic deployment was the problem. With incomplete deployment, defensive plans would have the same catastrophic result.

What was an incomplete deployment? It is when 19 A, that was, according to 1940 plans, supposed to defend on the tip of Kleist's 1st TG strike, was partially still in Northernm Caucasus, and partially reached Kiev. It is when 20 A, that was assigned to defend the same area according to Vatutin's notes of 13.06.41, is still in its own districs, hundreds of kilometers away. It is when, instead of those two armies, Sokal salient on Southern Front is defended by a SOLE 124 rifle division. Which was rolled out to a pancake by five german divisions.

It was the same stopry in the area of Brest, on Western Front. Outnumbering 4 A fivefold, germans happily broken through the front and went quickly on towards Minsk. This happened for the same simple reason that troops assigned for defending Brest area were still in railroad cars near Minsk, again hundreds opf kilometers away from the border.

Both examples are given for those places where, according to its defensive plans, RKKA was to defend, thus securing the center of "Cannes". At planned strike locations, also only covering troops, withd ensity 30-50 km per division, were present. Again for the reason that rifle division and corps' assigned for offensive actions either marched towards the border (Lyudnikov's 200 rd) or moved by rail to the special districts (13 A, tat was supposed to strike on Warszaw).

Only mechansed corps' were ready, but they were unable to do anything without infantry support. This is why the strongest 4 mc was threaded down by german infantry division around Lvov, the same thing happened to 8 mc at Dubno, to 15 mc at Radekhov. The problem was not german superiority in tanks, but their overwhelming superiority in infantry.

Specific figures at Western Front are as follows. Defensive zone of 3 A was 120 km wide, 10 A - 200 km and 4 A - 150 km wide. On the average, there was 36 km per division, in 3 A - 40 km, 10 A - 33 km, 4 A - 37.5 km.

For comparison, let's take troops densities at Kursk. 13 A defended on 32 km front, particularly 15 rd - 9 km, 81 rd 10 km. 8 km behind them, there were 6 Grd on 14 km front and 307 rd on 10 km front. 148 rd - 7 km; 8 rd - 6 km; 6 km behind themthere was 74 rd on 14 km front.

Additionally, 20 km behind the front, there were also 17 Grc, 70 Grd, 75 Grd and 18 Gsc.

On the rest of the front (over 200 km), there were another 17 rifle divisions and 4 rifle brigades.

[skip]

At Voronezh Front area, loaction of german strike was not exactly determined, and even with these densities of defending troops the defence was pierced, and germans managed to cut 35 km into soviet defensive formations. Situation was recovered by counterstrikes of 1 TA and 5 TA.

It is easy to see that densities of troops at soviet border on 22 June 1941 were several times less than at Kursk. It was due to the problems with strategic deployment.To prepare for defence (or offence), it was necessary to line up at the border covering troops, formations from special districts, and formations from internal districts. With incomplete deployment, with three echelons, containing slightly more than 50 divisions each, and separated from each other by hundreds of kilometers, RKKA was not ready either for defence or for offence. "Unpreparedness" of soviet troops in 1941 is in this factor. Enormous work was done to raise country's readiness to war, but undeployed army was not ready to the german strike.

Density of troops was not sufficient for defence or offence, germans outnumbered each of the three soviet echelons - border armies, line of rifle corps' from special districts and armies from internal districts moving by rail. On 22.06 only 83 echelons of soviet troops arrived at their destinations, 455 were on the way and 401 were not yet loaded (!!!).

It also necessary to note that RKKA was not even fully mobilised. This is why many mechanized corps' (15 mc, 19 mc, Rokossovsky's 9 mc) were not yet supplied up to full strength with trucks and tractors from civil sector. Because of this, they actually were nothing more but rifle corps' heavily reinforced by armor, but without cartage. And of course, they were inferior to germans in mobility.

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[Skipper]

Strange... On a board that generates 200 posts about ROF of ISU-152, one would expect this to cause a dicsussion.

[Guest Babra]

I made it through the first paragraph and decided it was too long.

[SenorBeef]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

Strange... On a board that generates 200 posts about ROF of ISU-152, one would expect this to cause a dicsussion.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was an interesting read. I don't have any huge depth of knowledge to discuss, though.

[JasonC]

On the whole I agree, the Russians were caught before they were fully mobilized. Which just pushes back the question, however. And leaves the same general conclusion I've maintained previously, that the political surprise was effectively total. Stalin thought they had a deal. The endless reports suggesting otherwise were mostly discounted. Personally, I think the fact that the decision was a blunder of the first order is a large part of why Stalin did not expect it.

The Russians certainly knew there was a war risk with Germany, but they thought the Germans would attack them if the Brits made a peace - and that the Brits wanted them to get in simultaneously. After the Balkans campaign, there may well have been more awareness of the risk, but that was not time to do very much. The Russians were making their agreed deliveries under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, by train, up until 2 hours before the invasion. Even after it started, Stalin's at first hoped some sort of concessions might buy the Germans off.

This is not a popular view of the events on either side, because it highlights #1 the Russian political leadership's incompetence, and #2 the unprovoked and premeditated nature of the attack. The first contradicted contemporary propaganda from the Russians about Stalin's pretended wisdom. The second contradicted Hitler's propaganda about a "pre-emptive strike", which was based on selling the notion that the Russians were about to attack themselves. Neither was interested in a truthful account of the affair, which makes one look evil and the other dumb.

[Freak]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Neither was interested in a truthful account of the affair, which makes one look evil and the other dumb.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This gives me one of those sick evil chuckles.

Interesting stuff Skipper.

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

Strange... On a board that generates 200 posts about ROF of ISU-152, one would expect this to cause a dicsussion.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Never even noticed it. People do leave their computers on the weekend, you know....bump it again on Monday and see what happens (though I'm with Babra - too long).

[Guest Babra]

I hope a certain Asgardian someone took special notice of those rail capacities and their implications

[edgars]

I suggest you guys read the book by Viktor Suvorov - "Ledokol" (Ice Breaker?). He studies the subject DEEEEP.

[Tero]

>Strange... On a board that generates 200

>posts about ROF of ISU-152, one would expect

>this to cause a dicsussion.

You used the wrong bait.

Is the article saying Stalin was preparing to invade Germany or not ? There is no punch line.

Try posting the article at the RMZ board

http://network54.com/Hide/Forum/116312

You WILL receive a very diffent kind of response. I quarantee you will get shouted down, not silenced to oblivion.

[ 06-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Herr Oberst]

Or try reading "Russia at War" by... oh some British Diplomat who was there through the whole thing.

My own take on the matter? Stalin was trying to buy time, any way he could. Materials at first, then territory and bodies. The planned displacement of the Russian industry to the east had been on the drawing board. And still it was a near thing...

[Skipper]

> I suggest you guys read the book by Viktor

> Suvorov - "Ledokol" (Ice Breaker?). He

> studies the subject DEEEEP.

Thanks, but no thanks. Suvorov is good reading, but he is dead wrong on key things. Mainly: Stalin did not plan to incite the war since early 30-s, USSR cannot be blamed for Hitler's rise to power, and Barbarossa was not a response to soviet mobilisation (it was the other way around).

> The first contradicted contemporary

> propaganda from the Russians about

> Stalin's pretended wisdom.

That's just another extreme point of view. Stalin was extremely intelligent, but this doesn't mean he was 100% rational, let alone incapable of misjudgements.

In that case, as it seems to me, he firmly believed that countermeasures against german deployment left them no chance of success, and that therefore germans will not make the move. With hindsight, this belief seems irrational. However, it is not that simple - there were many warnings of imminent German strike in May and early June - and Germans didn't move.

On one hand, Stalin misjudged germans, on the other hand, Hitler misjudged russians. The end result is well known.

> The planned displacement of the Russian

> industry to the east had been on the

> drawing board.

I always thought it was a total improvisation. Do you have any sources that support your opinion?

> And still it was a near thing...

By the way, I for one am not sure that germans ever came close to winning that campaign - definitely not in November 1941, and probably not in August 1942.