Early war Russian tank crew experience

[André]

Greetings

The Russian tank formations suffered horrible losses during the early part of the war. There were of course many reasons for this. The Russian fielded mostly T-26 and BT-7 tanks early in the war, both armed with a 45mm gun. These tanks were not really that bad, compared to their counterparts at the time. What it really boiled down to was the lack of experience among the tank crews and higher command. Many of the tank crews had never driven a tank before, maybe only a couple of times. Excersises were indeed few and far between. The Russians simly had so many tanks that it would be impossible to train all the crews.

During Barbarossa the Russians lost a good portion of their old tanks. This lead the way for full production of the T-34 and Kv-1 models. One can almost say that the Germans did them a huge favour, destroying their old less useable stuff.

It was not untill 1943 that the Russians modernized their tank crew training programmes. They finally realised that tank crews did indeed have to be fully training in order to work properly on the battlefield. From 1943 and onwards the Germans encountered better and more prepared tankers than before.

In the early war phases of CM2, Russian tankers should mostly be of conscript or green quality. It will be interesting to see how it will work out in the CM2 engine. Will the veteran German tankers kick the crap out of the conscript Russian tank hordes?

Lets wait and see.

Heinz

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

My favorite 1941 Russian tank combat story…The Tale of “Ivan Whittmann”. How a single tank threw a monkey wrench into the workings of the mighty Panzerwaffe.

From: “Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia”, Dept. of the US Army, July 1953.

II. The Armored Roadblock (June 1941 )

When Germany launched her attack against Russia on the morning

of 22 June 1941, Army Group North jumped off from positions along

the border separating East Prussia from Lithuania. On D plus I

the 6th Panzer Division, which was part of Army Group North,

was ordered to occupy the Lithuanian town of Rossienie and thence

to seize the two vehicular bridges across the Dubysa River north-

east of the town (map 17). After Rossienie was taken the division

was split into Combat Teams R and S, which were to establish two

bridgeheads, Combat Team R being assigned the bridge nearest

Lydavenai, a village situated almost due north of Rossienie. By

early afternoon both columns had crossed the river and contact was

established between the two bridgeheads.

Mopping-up operations around its bridgehead netted Combat Team

R a number of prisoners, about 20 of whom, including a first lieuten-

ant, were loaded onto a truck for evacuation to Rossienie. One Ger-

man sergeant was placed in charge of the group.

About half-way to Rossienie the truck driver suddenly noticed a

Russian tank astride the road. As the truck slowed to a halt/the

prisoners pounced upon the driver and the sergeant, and the Russian

lieutenant lunged for the sergeant's machine pistol. In the struggle

that ensued, the powerful German sergeant freed his right arm and

struck the lieutenant such a hard blow that he and several other Rus-

sians were knocked down by the impact. Before the prisoners could

close in again, the sergeant freed his other arm and fired the machine

pistol into the midst of the group. The effect of the fire was devas-

tating. Only the lieutenant and a few others escaped; the rest were

killed.

The sergeant and the driver returned to the bridgehead with the

empty truck and informed their commanding officer that the only

supply route to the bridgehead was blocked by a heavy tank of the

KV type. The Russian tank crew had meanwhile severed telephone

communication between the bridgehead and the division command

post.

The Russian plan was not clear. In estimating the situation, the

bridgehead commander felt that because of the encounter with the

tank an attack against the rear of the bridgehead was to be expected;

accordingly, he organized his force immediately for all-around de-

fense. An antitank battery was moved to high ground near the

command post, one of the howitzer batteries reversed its field of fire

so as to face southwestward, and the engineer company prepared to

mine the road and the area in front of the defense position. The tank

battalion, which was deployed in a forest southeast of the bridgehead,

prepared for a counterattack.

During the rest of the day the tank did not move. The next morn-

ing, 24 June, the division tried to send 12 supply trucks from Rossienie

to the bridgehead. All 12 were destroyed by the Russian tank. A

German reconnaissance patrol sent out around noon could find no

evidence that a general Russian attack was impending.

The Germans could not evacuate their wounded from the bridge-

head. . Every attempt to bypass the tank failed because any vehicle

that drove off the road got stuck in the mud and fell prey to Russians

hiding in the surrounding forest.

On the same day, an antitank battery with 50-mm. guns was ordered

to work its way forward and destroy the tank. The battery confidently

accepted this mission. As the first guns approached to within 1,000

yards of the KV, it remained in place, apparently unaware of the

German movement. Within the next 30 minutes the entire battery,

well camouflaged, had worked its way to within firing range.

Still the tank did not move. It was such a perfect target that the

battery commander felt that it must have been damaged and aban-

doned, but he nevertheless decided to fire. The first round, from about

600 yards, was a direct hit. A second and a third round followed.

The troops assembled on the hill near the combat team's command

post cheered like spectators at a shooting match. Still the tank did

not move.

By the time that the eighth hit was scored, the Russian tank crew

had discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim,

they silenced the entire battery with a few 76-mm. shells, which

destroyed two guns and damaged the others. Having suffered heavy

casualties, the gun crews were withdrawn to avoid further losses. Not

until after dark could the damaged guns be recovered.

Since the 50-mm. antitank guns had failed to pierce the 3-inch

armor, it was decided that only the 88-mm. flak gun with its armor-

piercing shells would be effective. That same afternoon an 88-mm.

flak gun was pulled out of its position near Rossienie and cautiously

moved up in the direction of the tank, which was then facing the

bridgehead. Well camouflaged with branches and concealed by the

burned-out German trucks lining the road, the gun safely reached the

edge of the forest and stopped 900 yards from the tank.

Just as the German crew was maneuvering the gun into position, the

tank swung its turret and fired, blasting the flak gun into a ditch.

Every round scored a direct hit, and the gun crew suffered heavy

casualties. Machinegun fire from the tank made it impossible to

retrieve the gun or the bodies of the German dead. The Russians had

allowed the gun to approach undisturbed, knowing that it was no

threat while in motion and that the nearer it came the more certain

was its destruction.

Meanwhile, the bridgehead's supplies were running so low that

the troops had to eat their canned emergency rations. A staff meeting

was therefore called to discuss further ways and means of dealing

with the tank. It was decided that an engineer detachment should

attempt to blow it up in a night operation.

When the engineer company commander asked for 12 volunteers,

the men were so anxious to succeed where others had failed that

the entire company of 120 volunteered. He ordered the company to

count off and chose every tenth man. The detachment was told about

its mission, given detailed instructions, and issued explosives and

other essential equipment.

Under cover of darkness the detachment moved out, led by the

company commander. The route followed was a little-used sandy path

which led past Hill 400 and into the woods that surrounded the loca-

tion of the tank. As the engineers approached the tank, they could

distinguish its contours in the pale starlight. After removing their

boots, they crawled to the edge of the road to observe the tank more

closely and to decide how to approach their task.

Suddenly there was a noise from the opposite side of the road, and

the movement of several dark figures could be discerned. The Ger-

mans thought that the tank crew had dismounted. A moment later,

however, the sound of tapping against the side of the tank was heard

and the turret was slowly raised. The figures handed something to the

tank crew, and the sound of clinking dishes could be heard. The

Germans concluded that these were partisans bringing food to the

tank crew. The temptation to overpower them was great, and ,it

probably would have been a simple matter. Such an action, however,

would have alerted the tank crew and perhaps have wrecked the

entire scheme. After about an hour the partisans withdrew, and the

tank turret was closed.

It was about 0100 before the engineers could finally get to work.

They attached one explosive charge to the track and the side of the

tank and withdrew after lighting the fuse. A violent explosion ripped

the air. The last echoes of the roar had hardly faded away when the

tank's machineguns began to sweep the area with fire. The tank

did not move. Its tracks appeared to be damaged, but no close exam-

ination could be made in the face of the intense machinegun fire.

Doubtful of success, the engineer detachment returned to the bridge-

head and made its report. One of the twelve men was listed as

missing.

Shortly before daylight a second explosion was heard from the

vicinity of the tank, again followed by the sound of machinegun

fire; then, after some time had passed, silence reigned once more.

Later that same morning, as the personnel around the command

post of Combat Team R were resuming their normal duties, they

noticed a barefoot soldier with a pair of boots under his arm crossing

the bivouac area. When the commanding officer halted the lone

wanderer, all eyes turned to watch. The colonel was heard asking

the soldier for an explanation of his unmilitary appearance. Soon the

sound of their voices became inaudible as the two principals in this

little drama engaged in earnest conversation.

As they talked, the colonel's face brightened, and after a few minutes

he offered the soldier a cigarette, which the latter accepted, visibly

embarrasssed. Finally, the colonel patted the soldier on the back,

shook his hand, and the two parted, the soldier still carrying his

boots. The curiosity of the onlookers was not satisfied until the order

of the day was published, together with the following extract from

the barefoot soldier's report:

I was detailed as an observer for the detachment that was sent

to blow up the Russian tank. After all preparations had been made,

the company commander and I attached a charge of about double

the normal size to the tank track, and I returned to the ditch which

was my observation post. The ditch was deep enough to offer

protection against splinters, and I waited there to observe the effect

of the explosion. The tank, however, covered the area with sporadic

machinegun fire following the explosion. After about an honr,

when everything had quieted down, I crept to the tank and examined

the place where I had attached the charge. Hardly half of the track

was destroyed, and I could find no other damage to the tank. I

returned to the assembly point only to find that the detachment had

departed. While looking for my boots I found that another demo- I

lition charge had been left behind. I took it, returned to the tank,

climbed onto it, and fastened the charge to the gun barrel in the

hope of destroying at least that part of the tank, the charge not

being large enough to do any greater damage. I crept under the

tank and detonated the charge. The tank immediately covered the

edge of the forest with machinegun fire which did not cease until

dawn, when I was finally able to crawl out from under the tank.

When I inspected the effect of the demolition, I saw, to my regret,

that the charge I had used was too weak. The gun was only slightly

damaged. Upon returning to the assembly point, I found a pair

of boots, which I tried to put on, but they were too small. Someone

had apparently taken my boots by mistake. That is why I returned

barefoot and late to my company.

Here was the explanation of the missing man, the morning ei-

plosion, and the second burst of machinegun fire.

Three German attempts had failed. The tank still blocked the

road and could fire at will. Plan 4, calling for an attack on the

tank by dive bombers, had to be canceled when it was learned that

no such aircraft could be made available. Whether the dive bombers

could have succeeded in scoring a direct hit on the tank is ques-

tionable, but it is certain that anything short of that would not have

eliminated it.

Plan 5 involved a calculated risk and called for deceiving the

tank crew. It was hoped that in this way German losses would be

kept to a minimum. A feint frontal attack was to be executed by

a tank formation approaching from various points in the forest east

of the road while another 88-mm. gun was to be brought up from

Rossienie to destroy the tank. The terrain was quite suitable for this

operation; the forest was lightly wooded and presented no obstacle

to tank maneuver.

The German armor deployed and attacked the Russian tank from

three sides. The Russian crew, clearly excited, swung the gun tur-

ret around and around in an effort to hit the German tank

kept up a continuous fire from the woods.

Meanwhile, the 88-mm. gun took up a position to the rear of the

tank. The very first round was a direct hit and, as the crew tried

to turn the gun to the rear, a second and a third shell struck home.

Mortally wounded, the tank remained motionless, but did not burn.

Four more 88-mm. armor-piercing shells hit their mark. Then, fol-

lowing the last hit, the tank gun rose straight up as if, even now, to

defy its attackers.

The Germans closest to the tank dismounted and moved in on their

victim. To their great surprise they found that but two of the 88-mm.

shells had pierced the tank armor, the five others having made only

deep dents. Eight blue marks, made by direct hits of the 50-mm.

antitank guns, were found. The results of the engineer attack had

amounted to only a damaged track and a slight dent in the gun bar-

rel. No trace of the fire from the German tanks could be found.

Driven by curiosity, the Germans climbed onto the tank and tried to

open the turret, but to no avail. Suddenly, the gun barrel started

to move again and most of the Germans scattered. Quickly, two

engineers dropped hand grenades through the hole made by the hit

on the lower part of the turret. A dull explosion followed, and the

turret cover blew off. Inside were the mutilated bodies of the crew.

The Germans had come off poorly in their first encounter with a

KV at this point of the front, one single tank having succeeded in

blocking the supply route of a strong German force for 48 hours,

[General Petrovsky]

Wow that was a great war story man, thanks.

[Skipper]

> Many of the tank crews had never driven a

> tank before, maybe only a couple of times.

> Excersises were indeed few and far

> between.

Which storyteller is that from?

> During Barbarossa the Russians lost a good

> portion of their old tanks. This lead the

> way for full production of the T-34 and Kv-

> 1 models.

The only problem being that during 1942 they did not build any KVs at all, and only a handful of T-34s. Instead they were busy building lowly T-60s, T-70s etc.

Overall, another ill-informed impression.

[Schugger]

Matthew, that was an awesome read. Thanks for sharing.

[Micheal Wittman]

Ah Yes a good Morning read,

But Ivan Whittman you say... gee he bears a close resemblence to the German tank Commander "Micheal Wittman" who was confirmed to have 138 armor kills and 140

vehical kills..........

It's must be a small world

[Keith]

The Russian tank crews performed poorly in 1941 due to outdated theories on armored warfare and because of the lack of radios (which of course caused a lack of coordination). They used tanks in much the same fashion as the defeated Western powers did - in unsupported packets.

There is a certain mythology surrounding the fighting qualties of the Russian army during WWII that were propogated by over reliance on primary German sources. These sources tended to be revisionist in nature and nearly always attributed Russian successes to vastly overwhelming numbers rather than any battle finess. The mythology is that the Russian soldier was primative, tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, and subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities.

Here is a article written by David Glantz for the US armies foreign studies institute that can give some perspective on these mythologies: http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/e-front.htm

[André]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> Many of the tank crews had never driven a

> tank before, maybe only a couple of times.

> Excersises were indeed few and far

> between.

Which storyteller is that from?

> During Barbarossa the Russians lost a good

> portion of their old tanks. This lead the

> way for full production of the T-34 and Kv-

> 1 models.

The only problem being that during 1942 they did not build any KVs at all, and only a handful of T-34s. Instead they were busy building lowly T-60s, T-70s etc.

Overall, another ill-informed impression.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

"For the second half of 1941, only a little more than half of the planned output of tanks was managed, the total production for 1941 beeing 6521 machines(2996 of the T-34)"

"The road to Stalingrad" by John Erickson

ISBN 0-75380-253-8

Skipper, would you call 2996 T-34 tanks "a handfull"?

Heinz

[armornut]

The Tank in Ridgeways story was a KV 2 belive it or not..... :eek:

[Commissar]

As much as I love Soviet armor and weaponry, early Soviet tank crews should be pretty poor in quality. The only problem is of course play balance. Just as some have pointed out how unfun it will be for a German player to face overwhelming hordes of T-34s, IS-2s, etc, etc; it will equally be unfun for the Soviet player to field units with crews that are better at bailing out and running than fighting. The historical scenarios should be as close to accurate as possible. Quick battles and multiplayer is a different story however. It would seem a lot will depend on how BTS ultimately models Soviet and German leadership advantages/disadvantages and quality of crew training throughout the various war years. The German Army of '45 was definitely not the German Army of '41. The Soviet Army of '41 was not the same beast the Soviet Army became in '44/'45.

However BTS handles it, I think we should keep in mind that CM2 will be evolutionary and not revolutionary so you shouldn't expect anything dramtically different from CM1 (although it has already been stated that CM2 will most definitely not be a mere rehash of CM1 with a Soviet TO&E and OOB). If it is dramtically different and more accurate (however you want to define it), great. If not, also fine.

Out of curiosity, what was the average life span of a Soviet tank crew over the years? I remember reading some article but can't remember the details. I remember that during the Cold War, the NATO tankers were figuring that the average tank in battle had a life span of a few minutes to just a few seconds. Not very comforting.

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: Commissar ]

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: Commissar ]

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

Armornut said: “The Tank in Ridgeways story was a KV 2 belive it or not”

There is a photo of a destroyed KV2 at the tail end of the write-up in “Small Unit Actions During The German Campaign in Russia”. The Photo's caption is unclear as to weather it is the same vehicle described in the above tale…it simply reads “Soviet KV tank demolished by the Germans, July 1941”. The action actually took place on the 23 and 24 of June 1941. It certainly seems possible that it could have been a KV-2.

The study does go on to suggest that there was a fair amount of variability in Soviet Tank Crew quality and Soviet abilities at both tactical and operational levels of armour combat during 41-42. Some of the accounts suggest a fair amount of brilliance in Soviet crews was seen at times. Other units were very much armed mobs…little training, poor leadership, and scant understanding of the equipment they were operating.

Heinz 25th PzReg Said: "For the second half of 1941, only a little more than half of the planned output of tanks was managed, the total production for 1941 beeing 6521 machines(2996 of the T-34)"

Agreed…a handful seems an extreme under exaggeration of production figures. Steven Zaloga in “Red Army Handbook” indicates the following figures for 41 and 42:

T34 production in 1941 was 3,014 machines

T34 production in 1942 was 12,553 machines

KV1 and KV2 production in 1941 was 1,353 machines

KV1 and KV1S production in 1942 was 2,533 machines

Total KV and T34 Production 41 – 42 was 19,433 machines

Production of Lighter tank Models by the Soviets in 41 – 42:

Combined T40 + T50 + T60 production in 1941 was 1,907 machines

Combined T40 + T50 + T60 + T70 production in 1942 was 9,553 machines

Total Light Tank (T40 through T70) Production for 41 – 42 was 11,460 machines

[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: Matthew_Ridgeway ]

[von Lucke]

Something like 90% of the conscripts called up in 1941 died during the war --- the Soviet army lost in manpower (killed and captured) the equivalent to the entire German attacking force within the first 18 months of the war.

The Red Army of 1941 had a lot in common with the French Army of 1940: On paper, and in theory, they where the most powerful armies on earth. In practice, their out-dated tactics and un-tried leadership put them on a level below their out-numbered attacker.

In the early 1930's the Soviet Army was on the tactical and technological cutting edge (you think the T-34 sprung out of thin air?). Unfortunately, Stalin's purges of the officer corps from '38-40 stripped the Red Army of it's ablest leaders just at the time the Motherland would need them most. There was also a tragic lack of career NCO's to form training cadres and fulfill basic admin needs --- further diluting the officer ranks.

To complicate matters further, in 1940 Stalin tried to increase the size of the Red Army by a third --- calling up large levies of untried troops. (Untried and resentful --- memories of the forced collectivization in Ukraine were still fresh). On top of which, the Red Army was in the midst of a major rearmament program begun about the same time. (Can you say "total chaos"?)

Many of the tank crews pressed into service in 1941 had never even seen indoor plumbing, let alone an internal combustion engine, and many of the Soviet tanks lost during those early months came from mechanical breakdowns --- with nobody to fix them, and limited means to recover them, they where left were they broke down.

Those that did make it into combat tended to do so under the initiative of a good platoon officer --- and in the Red Army Tank Brigades, that meant leading by example: "Do as I do Commerades! Follow me!" The Germans referred to this as the "Mother Hen leading her 4 chicks". Aim for the first tank and the rest would be lost (and scratch another competent officer from the list).

The Red Army of '42-'43 was another story. They learned from their mistakes, updated their doctrine, re-orginized TO&E's to more effectively utilize available equipment, and moved that equipment where it was most needed. And unlike ther Germans, they still had reserves of manpower to call on --- especially since Japan had made it clear that an "officialy unofficial" cease-fire would be in effect. But more importantly, Stalin let go his death grip on how the army was employed and let the new crop of battle-tested officers take over.

To quote Steven Zaloga:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In four years of war the Red Army completely reinvented itself. The rifle divisions were smaller and leaner, but with a higher ratio of close-support weapons. Their weakness in artillery reflected not a lack of faith in that arm, but rather a decision to centralize their assets on a scale never seen before, including the creation of entire artillery corps for the support of selected operations. The mechanized forces where well-balanced units, with heavy assault guns providing at least some of the high-explosive firepower normally the responsibility of artillery.

Although not immediately successful, consolidation of the armored troops into a Corps structure yielded powerful formations capable of deep penetration and sustained combat. Their inability to hold terrain led to the creation of mechanized corps, and these two complementary forces were consolidated into powerful tank armies. Employment of these massed forces was invariably accompanied by heavy losses, due in part to a continued Soviet inability to deploy mobile, responsive artillery, but, altogether with increasing competence and confidence on the part of their commanders, they were sufficient to steamroller the opposing German forces<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Jeff Duquette]

Excellent post Von Lucke. Based upon my own reading I reckon I would have to agree with all of your points…and the S. Zaloga quote was just extra icing on the cake

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

The following report by the 3rd Panzer Division, based upon its combat experience in the spring and summer of 1942 touches on a lot of what has been bated about on this forum over the last few weeks regarding Soviet Tank Crews, and Soviet Armour combat practices. For those with longer attention spans; From Jentz, “Panzer Truppen Vol 1” pg 232 – 233.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the following report, the commander of the 3-Panzer-Division passed their knowledge on to the other Panzer-Divisions preparing for the major summer offensives: Combat Experience of the 3.Panzer-Division – Summer 1942

The Russian infantry is poor. They won't attack without accompanying tanks. Nothing has changed in regard to how they attack. The attack still always occurs in herds. In spite of attacks being beaten back, the attack will again and again be repeated in the same fashion without achieving any other results. The Russians can no longer withstand a concentrated German Panzer attack. He panics and abandons his position. This very clearly occurred during the battles by Charkow and also on the Kertsch peninsula. However, it should be clearly emphasized, that this only occurs as a result of massive Panzer attacks. During attacks at company strength, after he has recognized the low number of Panzers, he immediately gets back into his hole and stubbornly defends against the following infantry. During successful German breakthroughs, it has continuously proven to be necessary to relentlessly chase the opponent, even at night. He has mastered the concentration of large bodies of troops especially at night, so that when the attack is renewed in the morning a new defensive front must be broken through. The Russians have become very insensitive in the flanks.

The Russian tank forces are good. The level of training is also good. A Russian first lieutenant tanker captured near Charkow stated that the Russians feel that they are superior to the Germans in tanks. Use of the German Hohlraummunition (shaped charge shells) was known to the Russian first. However, the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the longer gun (which wasn't used near Charkow) was unknown to the Russians that came from Charkow. The captured officer's description of the organization of the Russian Tank Brigade is the same as other documents available by the Division. Command occurs by radio down to the company commander, within the company by flag signals (yellow flag held up - follow in a row; red flag held up - spread out; red flag swung side to side - enemy tanks, take positions).

The Russian tank crews are very sensitive to being fired at, even from weapons that can't harm him. He is almost always turned around and retreats when fired at from the flank by 3.7 cm and 5 cm anti-tank guns or the 5 cm Kw.K. L42 tank guns. In several cases he turned back when hit in the flank by heavy machinegun fire. In all cases, hardly any damage could be found on the tanks that had been fired at.

Because of the small amount of radio equipment and the lack of ability to observe to the side, the Russians have not been able to lead a concentrated tank attack. Therefore, at first only four tanks appear, while gradually the others follow by and by. He is a master in recovering tanks.

He knows that Germans breakthroughs in depth are conducted with long, large road columns. In many cases, therefore, he has successfully stopped the advance with two or three T34s positioned on a commanding height or even dug in. Well camouflaged, these are first identified after they open fire. The positions are chosen so that they can't be approached from the flanks. In every case, scouting for detours has cost so much time that contact with the opponent was lost. After several experiences, the current commander of the 3-Panzer-Division decided that advances would not be made on the larger roads but that these would be left free at first.

New weapons that have appeared are the British Mark II tank and an American tank. The 7.62 cm anti-tank/anti-air-craft gun was widely used. A Russian 12.7 mm anti-tank rifle with a two-man crew has newly appeared. It is recognizable by its very long barrel with a lifting support about 1.5 meters high. The bullet penetrates the sidewalls of our Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV. Ranges at which it can be fired are not known. The gunners have been instructed to fire at the glass blocks in the commander's cupola. Panzer-Regiment 6 lost six Panzer commanders because of this during the last battles.

While attacking with infantry it is necessary that coordination between the Panzers and infantry be exactly timed. Either the infantry advance in front to draw enemy fire so that the enemy weapons can be effectively engaged by the Panzers, or the infantry follow at about 300 meters directly behind the Panzers. This interval must be held and may not become longer or it results in fire from the recovering enemy making the advance of the infantry significantly more difficult. In addition it is at least as much the task of the infantry to combat enemy weapons as it is the task of the Panzers. The best experiences have been achieved in combating enemy tanks through cooperation between the Panzers and the Flak. Especially noteworthy is the fact that when Flak engage ground targets the 8.8 cm Flak guns present a very large and immobile target. It is in our interest to especially pay attention to the local defense of these Flak guns from enemy tank attacks.

This one is particularly interesting

The rumors that the Russian armor quality has become poorer are emphatically denied. But it is admitted that the penetration ability of armor-piercing shells is better in the warm part of the year than in the cold. According to the opinion of the experts, this is exclusively due to the differences in temperature.

It is strongly emphasized that every Panzer attack must absolutely follow prelaid plans, with the exception of the pursuit of retreating enemy. Artillery preparations are necessary, with Stukas joining in. Of vast importance for the Panzer- Regiment is medium-range frequency radio contact with the rear elements. It is a useful suggestion that the infantry and the Panzer on the same assignment use the same medium-range frequency so that they can hear the other's battle reports.

Panzer-Regiment 6 proposes that the turret numbers of the commander's Panzers be redone in a more subdued form. With the numbers as presently displayed, the regiment has lost many commanders. The first and second uniform of the commander was shot up; also the third uniform already has a considerable number of holes. The Russians understand and demonstrate great skill in seeking out and knocking out the commander's Panzers. Especially the Pz.Bef.Wg. which is identified by the frame antenna on the rear, is presently the target of his concentrated fire. Because of this the commander of Panzer-Regiment 6 transferred to a normal Pz.Kpfw.lll. Further, the regiment believes it more suitable that the commander and adjutant ride in one Panzer, instead of the commander and signals officer. The commander gains so much time for directing the battle and observation. His intentions are given to the adjutant in catchwords who converts them into radio language and transmits them. The signals officer rides in a second Panzer and monitors the radio traffic or follows further behind the commander's Panzer to maintain contact with the division on medium frequency or with aircraft on radios sets on their frequency.

Henceforth, Panzer-Regiment 6 is supplying its Pz-Kpfw.II with 2 cm Sprenggranaten. With this they possess a weapon that is very effective in combating enemy infantry. Their armor-piercing ammunition is no longer effective because of the increased thickness of the enemy armor. In battles against enemy tanks, it has been shown time after time that calmly waiting and letting the opponent come into close range is better than a showy attack. Besides a large number of knocked-out enemy tanks, no large number of our own are lost. A showy attack results in large losses to ourselves in addition to its possibility of success. This becomes very evident if the successes of the 3. and 23.Panzer-Divisions are compared. Slowly feeling out the front and flanks with the main force on the flanks, sector by sector, is most suitable. When possible, scout on foot and guide the Panzers on foot into selected positions, especially those for the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the long 7.5 cm Kw.K.40 tank gun.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Skipper]

QTE

T34 production in 1941 was 3,014 machines

T34 production in 1942 was 12,553 machines

KV1 and KV2 production in 1941 was 1,353 machines

KV1 and KV1S production in 1942 was 2,533 machines

UNQTE

Oops... Boy, was I wrong!

As they say, "you live a century, you learn a century... you die a fool."

By the way, does Zaloga quote production figures of SUs?

[Skipper]

> Many of the tank crews pressed into

> service in 1941 had never even seen indoor

> plumbing, let alone an internal combustion

> engine

In what way was it different from the tank crews pressed into service in the following five years? The former had one to two years to train (and train they did), the latter normally had a few weeks crash course. Simple machine repairs are a relatively easy skill. If you have spares and time.

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

another good one **punt**

[André]

This might be the KV-2 from your story Matthew.

Notice the hits it has taken on its turret side. Does it look like a penetration?

Heinz

[rexford]

Passages from jentz panzertruppen Vol.1 indicate that T34 would turn and run after side hits from anything (even MG bullets if they made enuff noise), and lack of radio's resulted in penny packet attacks where a small pack advances, to be followed here and there by others.

Will this be in CM2?

[Panzer_Meyer]

A friend of mine from High School is Russian. His Grandfather was a tank driver later a tank commander through out the entire war.

In the Finnish war he drove a tank and later in in the Patriotic war he commanded a tank.

His Grandfather died 4 yers ago. I visited his house and my friend has pictures of his grandpa and all his medals. He has a huge collection of medals. And quite a few pictures from WWII.

I'll try to get hold of him, and ask him if I can scan those pictures in or something.

By the way, AWESOME story ridgeway. What book is that from???

[GriffinCheng+]

I read the comics version from a Japanese comic books called "Monster on the Road". Intesting story. And iirc, there is no clue whether this tank was simply lost its way or being sent to slow the Germans.

Griffin.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Matthew_Ridgeway:

My favorite 1941 Russian tank combat story…The Tale of “Ivan Whittmann”. How a single tank threw a monkey wrench into the workings of the mighty Panzerwaffe.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>