What IS Realistic Firepower and is it in CM?

[Paul Lakowski]

Is this related to the reports that only 1 in 8 or 10 soldiers actually aimed their rifles in actual combat?

I recal when we discussed this decades ago it was concluded that in most cases the soldiers couldn't 'see' their enemy but knew the general direction of fire...so shot back in that direction.

[Jeff Duquette]

Paul Said: I recall when we discussed this decades ago it was concluded that in most cases the soldiers couldn't 'see' their enemy but knew the general direction of fire...so shot back in that direction.

I think the “art” of suppressive fire still had to be ingrained in individuals. Perhaps there is the natural tendency to react in a manner such as: “if I can’t see who is firing at me why would I bother firing my weapon”. That is certainly one way of looking at it. But from the DePuy quote I provided above, there seemed to be the need for most riflemen to be coursed into firing by NCOs and officers even within units with relatively high esprit de corps. Marshall’s high side 25% figure was apparently based upon his after action interveiws with ARMY Airborne Units, Rangers, and MARINES.

With respect to David Grossman’s conclusions from “On Killing”, the lack of firing is a function of the rifleman’s inherent morals ingrained from birth. A sort of “Thy shalt not kill” approach to the phenomena.

Just a side note: It is my personal opinion that this phenomenon is not peculiar to the fighting character of the US GI, but is perhaps a manifestation of common battlefield psychology. Tweak the ratio slightly here and there and I suspect that all armies were seeing similar ratios of fire from their respective riflemen.

Further Reading on the Subject:

“On Killing” by Lt. Dave Grossman

“Battlefield Tactics of the Civil War” by Paddy Griffith

“Men Against Fire” by SLA Marshall

For some scything rebuttal on the subject:

“The Deadly Brotherhood, The American Combat Soldier in WWII” by John McManus

[Guest Rollstoy]

For what it is worth:

In the last self-defense class (Ju-Jitsu) we were told that a guy with a knife is potentially more dangerous than a (non-professional) with a gun, because man seems to have a natural inhibition to pull a trigger. So while the gun is certainly the more effective weapon, one is more likely to be attacked by the one with the knife.

Regards, Thomm

[Dan Weaver]

It seems like this debate always generates the same pious references to Marshall and Depuy. Did anybody else ever study the problem of election and preterition among the infantry?

[Jeff Duquette]

Actually there are several other studies initiated in Korea and Vietnam by folks other than Marshall. In addition I indicated several alternative sources above which have apparently drawn heavily on non-Marshall sources. Grossman seems to be kind of “in vogue” at the moment.

McManus is also a big opponent of Marshall’s teachings. McManus is a scholar and doesn’t seem to have ever had any combat experience. He draws his conclusions from interviews with WWII vets. Unfortunately for us these interviews were being conducted some 40 to 50 years after the fact. This in my mind may taint McManus's work.

Marshall was a veteran soldier with perhaps more insight into battlefield psychology based upon personal experiences. In addition, Marshall’s post-combat debriefings were typically being conducted within hours or days of a battle.

Incidentally Gen. Gavin apparently came out publicly after “Men and Fire” was released in 1947 and basically said SLA Marshall was full of ****.

Personally I don’t think Marshall or DePuy’s finding can be ignored. Perhaps the bottom line stats could be questioned (i.e. no doubt there is a certain amount of fudge in the 10% to 25%). But as already indicated, the US ARMY, which initiated numerous changes in training methods following WWII, took Marshall’s work quite seriously.

The heart of the question, at least as it pertains to we mouse clicking cyber generals, is how might Marshall and Depuy’s findings affect tactical level wargames?

[SenorBeef]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

OK, whether any of this is realistically covered in CM was the next obvious question, which Terence (as usual) had the sense to ask. I think the answer is "yes". I ran a test to see about this, which I will relate.

So the conclusion is that the CM morale system will definitely show firepower well below "everyone firing", especially with lower quality troops. If one always fights veteran vs. veteran, then one is indeed likely to get distinctly "un-Marshall-an" outcomes. To me, this only underlines a point I keep repeating every chance I get, that the most realistic fights in CM come when the force mix is green and regular, not all vet, or vet and regular. The good command delay system also matters in fights like that, too.

He wasn't asking that - a platoon, in CM, can partially panic - but he was wondering if individuals in a squad panicked.

In my observations, the squad either ALL fire, or no one fires. Theres no in between, and no account taken for the individual soldier. I suppose that abstraction is realistic enough at higher levels - because platoons will be partially effective, rather than squads - but at lower levels (platoon and company), that can create unrealistic situations.

[Spook]

Originally posted by SenorBeef:

He wasn't asking that - a platoon, in CM, can partially panic - but he was wondering if individuals in a squad panicked.

In my observations, the squad either ALL fire, or no one fires. Theres no in between, and no account taken for the individual soldier. I suppose that abstraction is realistic enough at higher levels - because platoons will be partially effective, rather than squads - but at lower levels (platoon and company), that can create unrealistic situations.

Actually, I don't think we can make the assumption that ALL men in the squad fire (leastways, all firing together with some fixed effect) when we see the 3D squad model firing. In past discussions on this issue ('99-'00), Steve of BTS related that the weapon fire values (and the summed squad firepower) are only RELATIVE fire values (compared to other weapons), and are not thrown into some precanned combat results table. As such, the fire values are subject to a host of factors like terrain or unit morale. And unit experience IS a modifier to the "final" value as also by BTS's earlier assertion.

So the "end effect" is probably as Jason described; with higher proficiency/morale, the relative fire value becomes higher, thus giving the effect that "more men are firing." Similarly, each "morale check" level like alerted/cautious/shaken/etc. will bleed down the fire value. What is left as a deliberate unknown, however, is just how much more increase to the fire value is from each increased level of proficiency.

[RMC]

I've always accepted Marshall's finding in a general way since my grandfather confirmed it once by stating that out of a 12-man US squads "3 or 4" men might be "worth a ****."

(1/C/338RCT 85th ID)

I've read Grossman and am reading Burke now. The dichotomy between the two works is impressive. Either we're all a bunch of moral beings who can't kill or we're blood thirsty killing machines.

Personally I think the truth lies somewhere in between and that there are many reasons why troops don't fire their weapons. Inhibition, cowardice, opportunity, perceived effectiveness of fire to name a few.

Nice thread too.

[badinfo]

For what its worth, I had to learn to use suppresive fire, my first few ftx's I didnt shoot much because I couldnt see anything to shoot at and old hunting habits were hard to break. When my sqaud leader noticed I had many unfired blanks at the end of the "combats" he was very quick to encourage me to shoot in the general direction of the opfor, whether or not I could see anyone

[Jeff Duquette]

Good stuff badinfo.

It has been stipulated by Marshall that crew served weapons were less prone to inactivity during firefights. As RMC suggested one possible reluctance on the part of riflemen to fire may have been somewhat motivated by individuals feeling of inadequacy regarding their personal weapons. On the other hand individuals armed with a light machine gun capable of firing 600 to 1200 round per minute may really be under the impression that their actions are really influencing events.

Than again it has also been suggested that individual riflemen tend to be somewhat more isolated at times and therefore lack the stimulation\courage associated with being close to fellow soldiers. A courage in numbers kind of thing…perhaps a herd mentality.

Crew served LMG's on the other hand typically have several men operating relatively close together. In the case of German squad level tactics, the squad leader also tended to operate closely with the LMG section of the squad. Double whamie in this case…strength or courage in numbers plus the squad leader is right on top of you directing your fire.

Than again with respect to squad level automatic weapons, perhaps the importance of the weapons fire warranted squad & platoon leaders in drawing the more aggressive men toward servicing this weapon. Put the natural fighters in the position where their inherent aggressiveness will do the squad\platoon the most good.

Perhaps the ideal Squad make should have been 11 men organized into two sections. Each section is built around a squad LMG or BAR. Assuming each squad typically produces 3 to 4 real fighters in addition to the squad leader (which jives well with DePuy and Marshall general numbers) 3 or 4 is just about right for the number of LMG gunners and section leaders for a two LMG\BAR squad. The rest of the folks can carry ammo boxes and extra barrels

[This message has been edited by Jeff Duquette (edited 04-02-2001).]

[SenorBeef]

Originally posted by Spook:

Actually, I don't think we can make the assumption that ALL men in the squad fire (leastways, all firing together with some fixed effect) when we see the 3D squad model firing. In past discussions on this issue ('99-'00), Steve of BTS related that the weapon fire values (and the summed squad firepower) are only RELATIVE fire values (compared to other weapons), and are not thrown into some precanned combat results table. As such, the fire values are subject to a host of factors like terrain or unit morale. And unit experience IS a modifier to the "final" value as also by BTS's earlier assertion.

So the "end effect" is probably as Jason described; with higher proficiency/morale, the relative fire value becomes higher, thus giving the effect that "more men are firing." Similarly, each "morale check" level like alerted/cautious/shaken/etc. will bleed down the fire value. What is left as a deliberate unknown, however, is just how much more increase to the fire value is from each increased level of proficiency.

Experience is given extra firepower based on their better accuracy and such. The morale state effects the entire unit as a whole - I suppose you could abstractly say that it represents individual men panicking - but it affects the combined firepower, individual weapons don't "blink out".. You don't have a panicked LMG gunner causing the squad to lose its 40 (whatever) FP, you have an entire squad going to cautious, and perhaps, as a whole, losing 40 FP semiarbitrarily. The way the system works lowers firepower abstractly, and its effects can be said to represent individual indecisiveness.. but its not modelled as such, as far as I know.

[Jasper]

I seem to recall that Patton was a proponent of 'marching fire'. That as soldiers advanced they would fire their weapon from the hip. Made the unwashed riff-raff feel better about themselves etc etc.** Do I recall right?

I observe that the reason for the changes in training wouldn't necessarily be that 20% of the soldiers fired their weapons. I wonder if the changes were to lessen fire discipline? But I digress. There would be a problem if the SAME 20% of soldiers would be doing all the firing. But if that 20% is rolled around more or less evenly amongst the troops, then what's the problem?

I was watching a show about the Navy seals, and there was a small unit of five men beating a hasty retreat. The last guy in the line would spray the foliage with fire, then turn and find a position in back of the line. Meanwhile the new last guy would spray the foliage with fire. . . In that case only 20% of the soldiers would fire their weapon at any one time.

** I use the term 'unwashed riff-raff' to make the point that, during times of conscription, the military doesn't have the luxury of picking and choosing it's soldiers, but has to use citizen-soldiers pretty much as they come. I think of myself as a proud member of the 'unwashed riff-raff'.

[RMC]

Jasper,

I think the studies were pointing to the same 20-25% being "active" participants all the time. It wasn't based on a specfic moment in time but a particular battle or action.

Interesting that you bring up Navy Seals. I'd be willing to be that special troops like those would suffer from this phenomenon much less than line units if they experience it at all. Those troops are very carefully selected and most if not all carry automatic weapons. That was the point Dupuy was making about selection of troops. In a mass army such selection is impossible so you end up with this non-firing phenomenon.

Another thing worth considering leaders' use of weapons. In my time as a platoon leader, I rarely had a chance to actually use my weapon in training. In any action I was to occupied with trying to control the chaos and talk on the radio. I never had time to actually look for and engage targets.

I forgot to mention this before, but some of the combat lessons books published by the US Army that pre-date Marshall's work mention the need for leaders to constantly direct soldiers to fire. I am away from my sources so I can't quote. If this thread survives to the end of the week I can get quotes.

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

Jasper Said:

I seem to recall that Patton was a proponent of 'marching fire'. That as soldiers advanced they would fire their weapon from the hip...

I think you recall right…at least the terminology (dunno about the firing from the hip thing…sounds kind of John Wayne’ish). "MARCHING FIRE" was not technically a Pattonism’. More accurately "Marching Fire" was part of official ARMY tactical doctrine. At the squad level, a unit fired until suppression was achieved. Once suppression was achieved the squad would advance. DePuy elaborates on the problems associated with "Marching Fire": The side effect of marching fire was that once the squad halted firing in order to advance, the enemy is no longer in a suppressed condition. The concepts of a firing element combined with the simultaneous movement of a manuevering element and “Overwatch” were concepts of the future. "Overwatch" during WWII was something unofficially adopted by various US Infantry units as the war in Europe progressed. On the job training so to speak.

Conversely WWII German Infantry training for the attack stressed fire combined with movement. At the squad level the LMG section covers the Rifle sections advance. Than the roles are reversed in a leap-frog action.

[This message has been edited by Matthew_Ridgeway (edited 04-02-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

To SenorBeef -

Six of one, half dozen of another. The combat system is not deterministic in the first place. Everything ends with a random "roll" for effect of the shot. It makes no difference, mathematically, whether you roll to see how many fire and then give some deterministic outcome to the result, or pretend everyone fired and roll randomly for the outcome.

In fact, up to minor changes in the variance (which you could reproduce artificially by altering the "dice" or "outcomes" of the last role), there is no difference between random then random, and determininstic then random, and random then deterministic. Either way, it "composes" to a random determination of the effect of the fire.

It is all in the to-hit roll, in other words. I mean, you don't have to roll to see if someone's sock is wet, and then to see if that makes him more or less inclined to shoot, and then whether or not he does, and then whether or not he shoots high, and then whether or not he shoots to the left, and then whether he zeroed his rifle properly, and then whether it went through an empty fold in somebodies clothing or whatnot. You just roll it all into a ball (pardon the expression) and roll to see what the firing unit does.

The point of my test, though, was to see how non firing works in CM in practice, because there does need to be something more than everyone having the same chance to do the same thing. I mean, there has to be variance, spread, fire dominance effects, so that how much or how little people or firing, can "snowball".

That is not an issue of where you make the random roll, it is an issue of the scale of the effects of non-firing. Because, see, if everyone just fired with a random roll, then you'd expect the symmetry in how the two sides were treated, to result in many combats that were bloody nearly-even exchanges. And that is not the same kind of randomness - effectively, that alone would give is a lower overall variance, because of so many to-hit rolls, washing out the "breaks" of the random chances.

And what my test found, was that the implied amount of firing going on over a whole firefight, had to differ by a factor of 3-5 times. Which is not "washing out", not low variance. It is a high variance, snowballing thing, because of the moral system and the way that links to propensity to fire.

The point is that who fires how much, is definitely central to CMs model of infantry fighting. Which I think is just as it should be.

Incidentally, in the subject others are talking about, don't overlook the fact that crew served weapons generally have much greater range, and in addition can often be expected to have an impact even by area fire, on unseen enemy. Not being close enough, and not seeing enemy, are definitely among the factors making for less firing.

A related psych point there, though, is that typically LOS improves dramatically with greater personal exposure. The safest spots in combat can't see anything. The places that can see things are not at all safe.

In the unit histories, one often hears of the NCOs, at the moment of contact, reporting that they were spending all of their time "positioning individual men in locations from which they could return effective fire." What does that mean? It means they have their heads down, and don't know where the enemy is, so they aren't firing. And the sergeant has to run right next to them, and say "go to that bush right there, and watch your right front". And then the man will do it.

But half of them, without such close direction, will stay in safer spots and not do much. Or they will do things besides shoot, like carry things and run messages, etc. They are not looking for the most dangerous spot, from which they can see the most of the enemy, and shoot the most effectively. The thing is, the natural fighter portion of the unit, *are*.

[Jeff Duquette]

Jason Said:

In the unit histories, one often hears of the NCOs, at the moment of contact, reporting that they were spending all of their time "positioning individual men in locations from which they could return effective fire." What does that mean? It means they have their heads down, and don't know where the enemy is, so they aren't firing. And the sergeant has to run right next to them, and say "go to that bush right there, and watch your right front". And then the man will do it.

Again with the DePuy on my part…but it is interesting seeing his comments with regard to encounters between American and German Infantry. DePuy observed that German Officers and NCO’s tended to shout a great deal during firefights. Directing and encouraging their men via yelling at the tops of their lounges…”Place fire on that segment of the hedge”…“You men advance up to that ditch” etc. etc.

According to DePuy WWII US Infantry involved in firefights tended to be somewhat “vocally suppressed”. What happened to the blood curdling rebel yell? Reinvented apparently during the Korean War.

SLA Marshall, “Men and Fire”:

Could one clear commanding voice be raised — even though it be the voice of an individual without titular authority — they would obey, or at least the stronger characters would do so and the weaker would begin to take heart because something is being done. But clear, commanding voices are all too rare on the field of battle. So they wait, doing nothing, and inaction takes further toll of their resolve. More grievous losses will no doubt come to this band of men in time, but as a company this is the worst hour that they will ever know.

[SenorBeef]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

To SenorBeef -

ect..

I was trying to contest your point.. I was just trying to say that you didn't answer the question that the original poster posed, exactly. In any case, overall, the effects of suppression, on a large scale, are realistic, but when analyzing things in more detail, things are completely abstracted at the squad level. Anyway, I was just trying to clarify the original point.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

To Senor Beef - I get you, and the point is well taken. The mechanics of it are indeed dealing with suppression effects up at the squad level, and individual firing stuff is only modeled in the random firing rolls.

To Jeff - I think the idea of shouting having much impact is probably overblown. In reports from Nam, you find things like a newbie talking to his sergeant - "I've never been shot at before. Is this what it sounds like?" Reply from the veteran sergeant "yes, this is what is sounds like. We are being shot at." The punch line? They were screaming at the top of their lungs to be heard, despite being within 5 yards of each other.

Combat is loud...

[GriffinCheng+]

OT:

Can anyone recommend any good book on "Gurkhas"?

Griffin.

------------------

"When you find your PBEM opportents too hard to beat, there is always the AI."

"Can't get enough Tank?"

Get the CMSOD at Combat Missing Command Post (CMCP) at http://www.angelfire.com/games3/CMCP/

[Jeff Duquette]

They were screaming at the top of their lungs to be heard, despite being within 5 yards of each other.

Combat is loud...

Yet German NCO's are distinctly heard by American Infantrymen during fire fights directing their men. A common observation by US Infantrymen of their foe. hmmm.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I am sure they were heard yelling during lulls in the firefights, or from locations with little shooting going on, or when the range was close and firing sporadic because both sides were on opposite sides of some obstacle, etc. The point is simply that voice is a fragile means of control at any distance, in combat conditions. Most NCOs have to be quite close to the men they are commanding, to alter their actions by giving them directions - a consequently, they do quite a bit of scurrying about. That, at any rate, is the clear impression I get from reading small unit histories.

[Jeff Duquette]

This is the original portion of “Changing An Army” regarding verbal commands during a firefight.

From: “Changing an Army, An Oral History of General William DePuy.”

INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics (sic German Tactics), good or bad, that impressed you?

GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression that our tactics didn't. They didn't have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement. They also did a lot of talking. You could hear the German sergeants, Feldwebels, shouting to their men all the time during an attack, giving instructions, "Go this way, go that way, more fire over here, put fire by the corner of the field." Our fellows didn't talk it up very much. If you don't talk it up, it means that nothing much is going to happen.

The point wasn’t simply issuing vocal command in a firefight...thus the original rebel yell comment. The shouting and yelling and the like was also a form of unit self-encouragement, or so the theory goes. The shouting was supposed to detract from an individuals feeling of “isolation” on the battlefield. Battlefield Isolation is something Marshall goes on about adnauseum.

From: Paddy Griffith’s “Battlefield Tactics of the Civil War”.

Another obvious course of action was for an officer to make the maximum use of his vocal chords:

A Confederate Officer: “In battle the order to charge is not given in the placid tones of a Sunday-school teacher, but with vigorous English, well seasoned with oaths, and a request, frequently repeated, to give them that particular province of his Satanic Majesty most dreaded by persons fond of a cold climate.”

Modern studies of combat psychology have shown that constant chatter in a fighting unit helps to dispel the loneliness of fear, and to strengthen cohesion. Civil War officers who habitually shouted themselves hoarse in battle were therefore almost certainly doing the right thing...

Nor was it only the officers who were supposed to shout, since whole

regiments were encouraged to do so:

A Union Officer: “At the same time you are ordered to yell with all the power of your lungs. It is possible that this idea may be of great advantage in forcing some of the heroic blood of the body into the lower extremities. Whatever may be the reason, it was certainly a very effective means of drowning the disagreeable yell of the enemy.”

[Michael Dorosh]

Voice commands seem to have been quite common from what I have read, again from the Commonwealth perspective. Don't forget that the whistle was used to varying degrees as well, but there was a set procedure for voice commands. Today, we call it GRIT -

Group

Range

Indication

Type of Fire

It was the same in World War Two. A typical fire order would be

"One Section" (Group)

"200 yards" (Range)

"Enemy MG, Line of my Arm" (Indication)

"Rapid Fire" (Type)

By keeping things simple, orders were passed quickly. No small unit action you read about in a book will tell you what it is actually like to be in an infantry section/squad in an attack. The reality is quite different from books.

They were aided by the development of Battle Drill, where sections and platoons learned to do basic maneuvers on the parade square first, then to take action instinctively later, when under fire for real. Again, commands were verbal. "Bren Team! Cover fire, Rifle Team, Left Flanking, Follow Me!"

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 04-03-2001).]

[Michael Dorosh]

Here's a direct quote from Denis Whitaker - a junior officer at Dieppe and later CO of the RHLI in NW Europe (and still a prolific author):

Each section was divided into two groups: a Bren Gun group...and a rifle group...The section commander would give an order: "Enemy machine gun, line of my arm (pointing) two hundred yards - Bren give covering fire - GO!"

The rifle group then took off at top speed in a wide flanking movement to attack the enemy position. Meanwhile the Bren gun would give covering fire by concentrating on the objective until the riflemen charged and captured it. Then the Bren group would run at top speed to catch up.

The battle drill routine - the guts of any infantry attack at any level - would be repeated over and over again through mud, hail or rain. It soon instilled basic infantry tactics...

Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumphp. 70

The point being that verbal commands were the norm, though often the soldiers could intuit what the commander was ordering. This was in a well trained section that had been together.

One may well ask what happened after the section saw combat and took casualties - but one must remember that infantry units in the combat zone don't stop training.

One can also see that in the Commonwealth example, as I've posted before, the Bren was used to suppress enemy infantry while the riflemen got close with grenades and the threat of the bayonet. The riflemen simply weren't killing anybody with their riflefire - but they had to be there to win the fight, through physical coercion as much as anything else.

What one forgets when playing CM is that a company or battalion attack is really just a series of platoon battles. The good CM players (of which elite group I do not belong) fight their battles platoon by platoon, with clear objectives for each platoon.

[Jeff Duquette]

Great reads Mike...Gracias.

Don't forget that the whistle was used to varying degrees as well, but there was a set procedure for voice commands.

Reminds of UN soldiers comments on Chi-Com use of bugles in Korea.