Russian Tank Gun Accuracy

[rexford]

The post on 45mm accuracy against PzKpfw I's at over 1000m was brought up to point out that some crews, using what is considered to be a low accuracy weapon, were able to do a good job on long range shots (45mm tank round fired at 760 m/s, not 820 m/s, and loses velocity fast to 1000m and has a very curved trajectory, which decreases accuracy).

Hand picked crews could hit with just about anything, and do it consistently. Tiger crews too. And a Canadian 75mm Sherman could hit specific spots on the Panther curved mantlet out to 800 yards.

Some ace crews have unbelievable accuracy, that is the point.

[Spook]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by rexford:

Some ace crews have unbelievable accuracy, that is the point.<hr></blockquote>

But why is this point raised, unless you think that crew quality effect on accuracy isn't properly captured in the present CM system?

I don't think anyone here is disinclined to believe that the Soviets had their own ace tank crews in the course of WWII.

[Tero]

Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

Recently released material in both German & Russian seem to refute that Soviet optics were as poor, as we have previously been led to believe

The Finnish tankers used both Soviet and German optics. They regarded the German optics superior to the Soviet optics.

I do not recall any remarks stating the Soviet optics being especially poor, only remarks that German optics were better.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Ziess had a 93 year history of manufacturing quality optics prior to the outbreak of WWII. Soviet Ziess -LOMO -- had a history of 3 yrs? How much of that 3 yr experience involved construction of Military Optics? If I recall correctly Ziess had been manufacturing rangefinders and binoculars for the German Army since at least the 1880's.

Interestingly enough a Finnish officer is on record saying the optics on a wartime Stug were better than those on a modern T-72.

Mind you that remark is dubious as it does not specify if the "optics" include visibility to the outside provided for the TC and other crew members.

[Tero]

Oh, and on the subject of the Red Army gun accuracy:

The Finnish regarded the 45mm AT gun especially dangerous (and useful) in direct fire support role (it was phased out from the Finnish inventory in the mid-90's). All infantry direct fire cannons were called the Whip because at normal combat ranges the shell would explode before or at the same time you heard the gun go off.

There are numerous stories about Finnish AT crews sniping Red Army bunkers and emplacements over considerable distances with the 45mm AT gun. And there are numerous stories of Finnish soldiers being killed by long range shots that took off their head.

[ 10-27-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

[Skipper]

> This I've heard a lot and only buy up to a

> point. Communism is just not good at a)

> innovation, and b)quality stuff.

Communism is a nice theory. Reallife USSR launched the Earth's first artificial satellite and the first manned space flight, among many other scientific and technological breakthroughs. I'd say, soviet contrbution to the technological progress in 30 years after WWII was second to none.

Before the war, Russia made the way from illiterate peasant country torn by civil war to the top european industrial power within 15 years. Which involved a lot of innovation, too.

I am saying that soviet optics could not possibly be better thamn Germans because German optics were state of art. Soviet war industry aimed for different criteria - mass quantity at sufficient quality.

[ 10-27-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]</p>

[Richard Morgan]

Jeff -

The Zeiss lenses for my Pentacon camera are pin sharp and a glowing testament to the quality that these guys were capable of. :cool: :cool: :cool:

Regards,

Richard.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

what follows is something I posted as a result of a visit to the Bovington Tank Museum.

"Yesterday I took the day off and went down to the Bovington Tank Museum in order to take a look around their archives. This is something I have done before, but not for some years, and what I was after was all the technical reports they have on Soviet WW2 tanks. The reports cover many types of Soviet WW2 AFVs but most are based on a T34/B and KV1 that were sent to the British in 1942 as a thank you for all the supplies we were sending them. The greater number of reports are on the T34/B. Some are very short, only a few pages having survived, some are very long and detailed. Chemical analysis of armour, diesel fuel, lubricants, test firings of HE shells against different targets, everything and anything you can thing of is covered. (Strangely, the one thing I was most keen to see was not there, test firing of AP shells, must have been done, only in separate report.) Anyway, I will cut the waffle and get to the main subject of this post.

The longest and most detailed report, “A Report on the Investigation of a T34” School of Tank Technology, in turn had a long section on the sights. In the conclusion to the section on sights the final paragraph starts with this sentence,

“Telescope and periscope are of very fine construction and appear far superior to most of the equipment and components on the tank.”

Very different from that which is normally assumed about Soviet sights.

There are two reasons why this was not a surprise to me, one trivial one not so trivial.

The trivial reason is that this fits with my personal experience of T34 sights. I have looked through the site of a T34/85 model44 and found the sight to be of stunning quality. Those that have looked through a high quality telescopic sight at dusk/in poor light will understand what I mean when I say that the landscape through the sight was “sharper, brighter and lighter” than that with the naked eye. Not just enlarged. I call this a “trivial” reason because there is no certainty that the sight I was looking through was the same as those used in WW2. As the Soviets would have said, it may have been a “modernised” sight I was looking through. However, it may have been a sight of the same kind used in the war, it may even have been produced during the war. It cannot be totally disregarded.

The second reason why the conclusion of the report on the T34/B was not a surprise to me is that in another very extensive, 1947 document I have covering all Soviet ground equipment of WW2, there is no comment on the low quality of Soviet sights. I agree that a “negative proves nothing”. However, if you could see this 1947 document, both its length and nature, you too would find it “strange” that the low quality of Soviet sights was not mentioned, assuming that they were in fact of low quality. The 1947 document is full of comments on the quality, or lack of quality, of each type of equipment it reviews.

When all three of the above are taken together, the report on the T34/B, my experience of T34 sights and the lack of any adverse comment in the 1947 document a case begins to build for doubting if reports of low quality Soviet sights are correct or just myth.

In all I must have seen about half a dozen reports with sections on Soviet sights and have never seen an adverse comment on their quality. It is also worth noting that the T34/B and KV1 in question will have been produced at the time when the Soviets were under greatest “production stress”, just after the great post 1941 shift in production. Yet still the sights and specifically picked out for praise.

Before Steve and Charles launch themselves into coding for low quality Soviet sights I feel they should take another look at what evidence there is for this view.

I know Steve is always very careful about trying to avoid falling for any of the standard Eastern Front myths, but in the case of Soviet sights he also needs to be careful.

Certainly “some” Soviet AFVs, even of 1942 war production, had high quality sights. Maybe all of them, I still have seen on evidence of low quality sights, and as you can tell, I have looked in the places where one would expect to find such evidence if they were of low quality."

I do feel, that on balance, Soviet optics and gun accuracy were very similar to that of the other major players.

All the best,

Kip.

[Amedeo]

Regarding the APG report quoted in the RMZ website (and Jeff's comments on that) I want to point out that I didn't post it to suggest that the Soviets were producing some sort of wonder optics during WW2 (this would rather fit in some of the nice Ueber-something legends that haunts this forum ).

My point is that it seems that the american testers were impressed about something regarding the T-34 optics, and I'd like to know what it was. Maybe it was the rugged construction or even simply the aiming reticle! We all know that, reasonably, German optics were excellent, but to find out what the aforementioned report was referring to I think we should consider American optics. If someone has a clue about some obvious deficiency of early US tank gun sights maybe we could solve the .

Regards,

Amedeo

[Jeff Duquette]

Richard Morgan:

I recall you posting here before on camera optics, and the quality of Zeiss lenses. Have you ever owned a Russian camera? If so can you elaborate on the optical quality of a Russian camera?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Rexford Said:

Hand picked crews could hit with just about anything, and do it consistently. Tiger crews too. And a Canadian 75mm Sherman could hit specific spots on the Panther curved mantlet out to 800 yards.<hr></blockquote>

I agree that the Red Army had its marksmen like any other Army. My point with the Glantz quote was to suggest that a large number of Soviet Tank crews at the start of Barbarossa were apparently untrained. In addition even the relatively simple task of bore-sighting ones weapon was also not being performed. I think in general Soviet Tank crews in the first year or two of the war were not as capable marksmen as what would be found amongst typical German Panzer crews. Reasons for this include: training, and combat experience of most Panzer Crews. Panzertruppen had been in the thick of it since 1939. Only a handful of Soviet tank crews may have been involved in any combat previous to 1941. Those few that survived the Winter War, A handful from Spain, and handful of folks that fought the Japanese in the Kalkhin Gol Desert. But as I have said to you before IMHO excellent training goes a long way toward closing the gap between "salty" veterans, and green/untried troops (reference: see Desert Storm). The problem with the majority of Soviet Tank Crews at the start of the War is that they were seemingly untrained and untried.

A Soviet sniper crew story:

From: “Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia”, Dept. of the US Army, July 1953.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>II. The Armored Roadblock (June 1941 )

When Germany launched her attack against Russia on the morning of 22 June 1941, Army Group North jumped off from positions along the border separating East Prussia from Lithuania. On D plus 1 the 6th Panzer Division, which was part of Army Group North, was ordered to occupy the Lithuanian town of Rossienie and thence to seize the two vehicular bridges across the Dubysa River north-east of the town (map 17). After Rossienie was taken the division was split into Combat Teams R and S, which were to establish two bridgeheads, Combat Team R being assigned the bridge nearest Lydavenai, a village situated almost due north of Rossienie. By early afternoon both columns had crossed the river and contact was established between the two bridgeheads...

During the rest of the day the tank {A KV-2}did not move. The next morning, 24 June 1941, the division tried to send 12 supply trucks from Rossienie to the bridgehead. All 12 were destroyed by the Russian tank. A German reconnaissance patrol sent out around noon could find no evidence that a general Russian attack was impending.

The Germans could not evacuate their wounded from the bridge-head. . Every attempt to bypass the tank failed because any vehicle that drove off the road got stuck in the mud and fell prey to Russians hiding in the surrounding forest.

On the same day, an antitank battery with 50-mm. guns was ordered to work its way forward and destroy the tank. The battery confidently accepted this mission. As the first guns approached to within 1,000 meters of the KV-2, it remained in place, apparently unaware of the German movement. Within the next 30 minutes the entire battery, well camouflaged, had worked its way to within firing range. Still the tank did not move. It was such a perfect target that the battery commander felt that it must have been damaged and abandoned, but he nevertheless decided to fire. The first round was a direct hit. A second and a third hit followed. The troops assembled on the hill near the combat team's command post cheered like spectators at a shooting match. Still the tank did not move.

By the time that the eighth hit was scored, the Russian tank crew had finally discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim, they silenced the entire battery with a few 152mm. shells, which destroyed two guns and damaged the others. Having suffered heavy casualties, the gun crews were withdrawn to avoid further losses. Not until after dark could the damaged guns be recovered.

Since the 50-mm. antitank guns had failed to pierce the 3-inch armor, it was decided that only the 88-mm. flak gun with its armor-piercing shells would be effective. That same afternoon an 88-mm. flak gun was pulled out of its position near Rossienie and cautiously moved up in the direction of the tank, which was then facing the bridgehead. Well camouflaged with branches and concealed by the burned-out German trucks lining the road, the gun safely reached the edge of the forest and stopped 900 meters from the tank.

Just as the German crew was maneuvering the gun into position, the tank swung its turret and fired, blasting the flak gun into a ditch. Every round scored a direct hit, and the gun crew suffered heavy casualties. Machinegun fire from the tank made it impossible to retrieve the gun or the bodies of the German dead. The Russians had allowed the gun to approach undisturbed, knowing that it was no threat while in motion and that the nearer it came the more certain was its destruction.<hr></blockquote>

From the opposite end of the spectrum here is a story relayed by Folkestad on extremely poor gunnery skills on the part of two Soviet T34 crews.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>PANZERJAGER, Tank Hunter by William Folkestad

75mm Pak

On several occasions this routine was abruptly Interrupted as, when on one afternoon two T-34s immediately fired on us. A railroad embankment separated us from the Russian tanks parked about 600 to 700 meters distant. When we arrived, instead of our gun leader kneeling down and looking to be sure that we could clear the crown of the embankment, he had simply indicated where to place the gun. When we came under fire, our gunner looked through the cannon's sight to determine the range and swore saying, "I can't shoot. We have half the hill In the gun sight." When the driver saw our signal he came back to help us. We hooked the gun to the half-track and made a circle, dragging it around to a new position facing the T-34s. We stopped less than 100 meters from the embankment where a depression of about two feet allowed us to shoot. Just then our new 1st lieutenant, who was also the company leader, arrived In his open-topped, 4 wheel-drive Kommandowagen. He threw open one of the swing doors and demanded to know why were we not shooting? Our squad leader explained that the gun had been too low and we needed to relocate It onto higher ground. He then turned and ordered me to go to the embankment and give fire coordinates. With an antitank gun you always need to have someone observing out front because with each round fired, the barrel blast sent dust and everything flying up. In such Instances you are unable to see if you hit the target, or the ground In front, to the side or In the back of a tank. My job was to correct the fire and give new coordinates using arm and hand signals. I ran over to the berm, clambered up to the edge and from there began directing fire towards the T-34s.

Whenever we were uncertain of the distance we fired three shots. The first shot was to the estimated range, for example 600 meters, and discovering that It was 50 meters too short you would add another 50 meters. If you were lucky you got a hit, If not, and you struck behind the tank, you could correct your aim for a third time which generally placed you on target.

The Russians saw all the activity we were engaged in and kept us under constant fire. Luckily for our gun crew, the tankers shooting at us were lousy gunners. Each time they were firing It was either too long or too short. Then suddenly, as the driver was moving out of range, they struck our half-track on the back just above the fenders where we had special racks to hold our Tellerminen or T-mines. Tellerminen were so named because of their flatness resembling a dinner plate. Fortunately nothing happened although large shrapnel cut right through some of the mines. There was no explosion because they were useless without their primers in them. If by some freak accident they had ignited, the driver and vehicle would have disappeared. The accident turned out to have a practical side. We later built a sturdy storage box over the back of our half-track where it had been damaged.

The two tanks were sitting side by side, at most 30 meters apart, still shooting at us without effect. With our second shot I had the exact distance and we knocked them both out, one after the other.<hr></blockquote>

[ 10-27-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Diceman]

All very interesting. Are there any charts available that show the dispersion of shot for Soviet weapons at specific ranges, like is available for German weapons? I'm not yet convinced that Soviet armor can be treated as being inherently as acurate as German equipment. Shot dispersion tables would give us a clear benchmark of the accuracy of the entire weapon system. Good optics can not make up for other faults such as the weapon not being properly boresighted, nor does good sights mean that other components were made in a manner which fasilitates accurate fireing. It may be that Soviet optics have received a bad rap by association: the true culprets in poor performance being poor quality of gun components, gun platform components, poor maintenance, poor training, or a combination of all of the above.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Kip Said: The second reason why the conclusion of the report on the T34/B was not a surprise to me is that in another very extensive, 1947 document I have covering all Soviet ground equipment of WW2, there is no comment on the low quality of Soviet sights. I agree that a “negative proves nothing”. However, if you could see this 1947 document, both its length and nature, you too would find it “strange” that the low quality of Soviet sights was not mentioned, assuming that they were in fact of low quality. The 1947 document is full of comments on the quality, or lack of quality, of each type of equipment it reviews.<hr></blockquote>

I am assuming this is the same monster document I managed to procure from you several months back “Record of Foreign Weapons and Equipment, USSR, 1947”. I again reviewed the various write-ups on optical equipment and for the most part I agree with your assessment that there is little discussion in the Bovington Document of either high quality or low quality in reference to Russian Gunsights. With the exception of Artillery Sights..

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>RUSSIA ARTILLERY SIGHTS

General

The present standard, sights are of orthodox design and it is probably true to say that most of them are based on past and present French and German models.

Russian artillery sights do, in most cases, lack the refinements of design which provide for first grade accuracy of fire. Robustness, and simplicity of operation appear to be the two most prominent features of design.<hr></blockquote>

The write-up on anti-tank guns sights is relatively neutral…no commentary on the stunning quality of the optics. Nor are there any comments like “Russian anti-tank sights do, in most cases, lack the refinements of design which provide for first grade accuracy of fire.” The only non-neutral comment was:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>“The PP1 internal scale has been found, to obscure the field, of view causing inaccuracy in laying. The vertical scales are marked, in metres - 100, 500, 1000, 1500 and. 2000, and the lateral scales in mils 0, 10, 20 etc.<hr></blockquote>

The PP1 was apparently employed in the 45mm and 57mm Anti-tank guns.

I cannot find any real pro or con commentary in the Bovington Document on Soviet Tank gun sights.

Kip: Personally I would be more apt to be swayed as to the superior quality of Soviet optics if I could see some hard numbers. Next time you are in the neighborhood of PRO-Kew take a look into WO194 and WO291. Also AORS4 may have done some messing around with Soviet equipment and documented it for posterity and us computer wargamers? British AORS groups did an amazing amount of research on all things dealing with tank combat during WWII…including quantifying gun sight quality. There may be some actual test data dealing with Soviet tank Optics @ Kew.

In addition…one more thing to keep in mind is that UN troops in Korea captured a fair number of T34/85’s as well as SU-76’s. I know several T34/85’s were shipped back to Aberdeen as well as Chrysler for analysis. It is possible that some of these machines also made their way to Bovington and were poked and prodded by folks there. War Office records may include additional info on Soviet Tank optics from either Red Army machines “liberated” in West Germany after the war, The T34 sent to Bovington in 42 by the Russians, or NKPA machines sent to England during the Korean War.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Kip Said “Telescope and periscope are of very fine construction and appear far superior to most of the equipment and components on the tank.” Very different from that which is normally assumed about Soviet sights.”<hr></blockquote>

Soviet tanks were know for their simplicity and coarseness of construction. They also appeared to vary in quality between -- seemingly -- different construction lots from the same factory. So perhaps comparing the quality of the tanks optics with the tank as a whole may not really be telling us anything. If you see an ugly fat women with a rumpled New York Yankees cap on and you want to be polite…”Gee the hat aint so bad lookin’”. As much as I respect your extremely well informed opinions on the Red Army Kip I am still of the opinion that – at least from what I have seen so far – Soviet tank optics weren’t anything special. I suspect with a small amount of digging I can find some German anecdotes from the East Front commenting on the inferiority of Soviet Tank optics.

[ 10-27-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[offtaskagain]

What was the zoom on a T-34's sight? I'd imagine the 2.5x-5x variable zoom on later German tanks helped quite a bit with long range gunnery, just from my own personal experience with rifles.

[PzKpfw 1]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I think he is implying several things here John. But thanks for providing us with your own interpretation of Rexfords thoughts.<hr></blockquote>

Always glad to oblidge Jeff. Now if Lorrin is implying several things, I'm sure he will explain it. But thx for provideing me with your own interprataion of his thoughts as well.

Regards, John Waters

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>panzerwerfer42 said What was the zoom on a T-34's sight? I'd imagine the 2.5x-5x variable zoom on later German tanks helped quite a bit with long range gunnery, just from my own personal experience with rifles.<hr></blockquote>

From: “Record of Foreign Weapons and Equipment, USSR, 1947”.

T-34/76 apparently employed a “TMFD” as the gunner’s primary sight. Magnification was X2.5. Single magnification.

This is pretty comparable to magnification on a German Pz.Kpfw III & Pz.Kpfw IV Tzf5(models a - f) x2.5 (Jentz, “Tank Combat in N. Africa” copyright 1998).

Interestingly Chamberlain in “Encyclopedia of German Tanks” puts the Tzf5 (a-f) @ magnification x2.4. WO195/7089 “German Tank Sights” also puts the Tzf5df/1 @ x2.4. Bird and Livingston’s “World War II Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery” also put magnification of Tzf5 @ x2.4. My vote is for x2.4. Maybe Jentz needs an errata for N. Africa?

So the T34/76 has a wee bit of an edge over the MkIII & MkIV in gun sight magnification.