Nancy-Arracourt and the Infantry

[JasonC]

Nancy-Arracourt and the Infantry

One of the most famous operations of WW II was the seizure of Nancy and subsequent German counteract along the Moselle river in September, 1944. This period saw the pursuit operations across France come to an end, with the German front stabilized in Lorraine. The reasons for the focus on the period are various, but chief among them are the personalities involved on the US side, maneuver doctrine advocates, and the large-scale clash of armor later on. Creighton Abrams, who went on to be U.S. chief of staff and before that ran US armor tactics schools, commanded one of the armor battalions that figured prominently in affair, and was spearheading Patton's 3rd Army. Both are maneuver doctrine icons in the US military, and certainly both by any measure were outstanding commanders. And of course there is the inherent interest in the clash of armor, the decisive arms of WW II. Note that sometimes, in general treatments of the war, the whole thing is obscured by Market-Garden, which was going on at the same time essentially. But in military circles it is at least as heavily studied as M-G.

But just because flashy commanders are on the scene, and armor was the decisive arm in the whole war, does not mean what the flashy commanders were doing with their armor was the decisive issue, in any given affair of arms. Operational studies of the period do properly emphasize the importance of the fuel shortage on both sides, and given certain particular opportunities, this was especially important on the US side. Maneuverists can generally be persuaded - eventually - that as tanks burn gas, after all gas must be of some importance in armored warfare. Even this much is sometimes grudging. There was one particular passage after the breakout over the Moselle, where a US corps commander has been routinely abused for not sending the tanks streaking east. The fact that they would have run about 30 miles then sputtered to a halt is often ignored. But this aspect of the affair has usually be treated reasonably well.

There is another issue I have noticed that it seems to me was far more critical in the whole campaign, and is often overlooked, or if mentioned only in the briefest and most cursory way. It is the subject of this post. The basic question is, what events led to the US 4th armored division pulling back 5 miles on 25 September, about a week after the first German armored counterattacks by the 111th and 113th Panzer brigades? While almost every aspect of the actual armor fight around Arracourt has been analysed to death, I believe the true answer to this question has been missed. It has been missed because the reason was not the one expected by those following the flashy and dramatic clashes of the maneuvering rival armor forces.

First, though, some background is essential if this post is to be understood. It is especially important to look at things from the German side, and below the level of the army commander, and outside of the Panzer forces. The amount of analysis I've seen that meets all of those requirements is rather low. The primary point of my entire assertion, however, is that the historical military importance of something, and the amount of analysis of it offered later, are two different things. And often have little to do with one another.

The Germans initially had three formations fighting in the Nancy area, trying to prevent a passage of the Moselle river. The 3rd and 15th Panzergrenadier divisions had arrived from Italy, and held the areas north and south of the city respectively. Each was understrength, but these were veteran divisions. Many of the men had fought at Cassino; they were a tough bunch. In the city itself a newly organized 559th Volksgrenadier division held the center. In addition to its usual 2 regiments, where the manpower was not of the best quality, it had an ad-hoc third composed of recently switched Luftwaffe personel - in fine shape but green.

Later on, the German counterattack added to the above the 111th and 113th Panzer brigades, entirely new and green formations, but well equipped with new tanks, and the shell of the 11th Panzer division, a veteran but burnt-out unit with no tanks left to speak of, but some artillery weight left, supply trains and staffs, etc. Estimating formation strength, the above probably amount to one infantry and one panzer grenadier division initially, then about the strength of one panzer division later for the counterattack.

On the US side, the main units were the 4th Armored division, which made the actual breakthrough, and two infantry divisions, the 80th on the left or north, the 35th on the right or south. Each was responsible for making crossings of the river itself to give the armor room to run. Each had trouble with the Panzergrenadier divisions, and was repulsed once but tried again. When they did get across, the bridgeheads were often constricted by counterattack and harassed by artillery.

But eventually, on 13 September, CCA 4th Armored (Abrams unit) got across in the 80th division sector - opposite 3rd Panzergrenadier - defeated a battalion-strength combined arms counterattack in a rapid, head-on meeting engagement, and broke through into the German rear. CCB was at that point across the Moselle in the south in the 35th division sector, but had been stopped at the last of several canals running parallel to the Moselle on that side of the city. CCA then cut across the rear of the Germans in the city - the 559th VG division - and recon elements of CCA reached CCB's position on the canal. So far, textbook breakthrough stuff.

Some items are often overlooked in the accolades such an affair brings. When CCA went east of Nancy, it did not keep its rear communications in the 80th division sector open. The whole combat command was riding warm-place for leather into the German rear, and then trying to link up with CCB. The 559th VG rapidly pulled out of the city - there was no nonsense about holding at all costs. It retreated north and northeast, across the line CCA had penetrated along, at right angles to that advance. Small parties were captured by armored infantry elements of CCA stationed at road junctions, and light tanks and armored cars tried to patrol the flanks of the penetration. But there is no question that the bulk of 559 VG withdrew in good order, intact, straight across the line CCA had penetrated.

The breakthrough succeeded in levering the infantry out of the city, without requiring a frontal house-to-house slugfest. All good, all gain. But 559 VG got clean away, and its subsequent role over the next two weeks will form much of the story of this post. As the 559 VG pulled out, the 35th US infantry division took the city from the south and west, clearing it on 15 September. The 559 VG linked with the 3rd Panzergrenadier on its north or right flank, and refused its left. It occupied high ground just east of the Moselle, and anchored its refused left in villages north of Arracourt. As CCB reunited with CCA and the whole 4th Armored faced east, the 559 VG was thus along the left or northern flank of its penetration. Meanwhile on the south flank, so far there were only remaining forces of the 15th Panzergrenadier division, doing little more than screening the portion of 4th Armored's right or southern flank that was closest to the Moselle. East, for the moment there was nothing whatever.

It is at this point that maneuverist historians, with an eye on the gap in the German side of the operations map but without many questions about gasoline supplies, suggest that 4th Armored should have raced due east into open space, with only enough gas to run 30 miles or so. Such recommendations have little to do with military realities. They are more an act of maneuverist piety than serious proposals, which serve merely to smear as stick in the muds whoever points out the ridiculous folly of such an attempt.

On later occasions when some rather famous Kampgruppen did such things, the roads behind them were predictably cut and in a matter of days they predictably ran out of gas, leading to total loss of the vehicles and only remnants getting back out on foot. But such lessons are never mentioned by maneuverists. The bypassed are supposed to surrender in shock, or some infantry something is supposed to occur and make all that stuff go away. Half the point of this post is that the 559th VG did not go away.

What the corps commander actually ordered, to the brickbats of the maneuverists, was for CCB to shift to the north flank and try to press back the 559th, while CCA sent its recon elements a ways east and held all other points of the compass within range of its self-propelled guns with armor and armored infantry task forces, in roughly company strength. Then they waited for gas, and for the infantry to come up and shorten their lines.

While they were about it, the Germans counterattacked along the southern and eastern sides of the breakthrough salient, with the fresh formations, 111th and 113th Panzer brigades. The counterattack had been planned some time ago, but the forces for it were still assembling when 4th Armored got across the river. The attack was effectively triggered prematurely, and went in piecemeal over almost a week. The most concentrated attempt was the first on September 19th, against the southern face of CCA. This involved 50 tanks, a high portion of them Panthers, which struck a portion of the line initially held by a single tank company. This attack was launched in morning fog to neutralize American tac air. The Germans found, however, that thick fog also neutralized the advantages of the Panther in range and front armor, and the green crews of the brigades proved unequal to the tankers and TD crews they faced. Some penetrated to the location of CCA headquarters, but the intruders were all destroyed in the fog. The Germans then faced local armored counterattacks of their counterattack, and a see-saw melee of armor followed over the next several days. Which usually gets all of the attention.

What gets less attention is that CCB, off on the north flank, attempted to drive 559 VG back to widen the salient, and failed. It borrowed an infantry battalion from one of the infantry divisions, and failed again. At this time, the 35 and 80 on right and left were facing what remained of the 15th and 3rd Panzergrenadier divisions. They had also lent out some battalions to the armor, and had incurred losses in the earlier crossing attempts. The engineers, a source of additional infantry manpower in a pinch on other occasions, were fully engaged in building pontoon bridges over the Moselle or repairing facilities captured in Nancy, and the like. CCB itself had fought over several successive canals and minor streams after getting over the Moselle, against 15th Panzergrenadier.

If you just look at the infantry forces available, it is likely that CCB only had about 4 companies worth of infantry left standing by the 3rd week in September, counting attachments from the infantry divisions. The low infantry strength of the US armored division model is notorious, and throughout the Lorraine campaign it led to cross attachments of additional infantry battalions to make up the deficiency. The problem with little infantry in the force mix is sustaining battle causalties for any period of time, since those fall disproportionately on the infantry battalions, and on the rifle strength of those in particular.

Everyone gets bothered about comparing one steel beastie to another in purely technical terms, then focuses on the clash of armor, which in this case was transpiring in on the south face of the salient. But this organizational issue gets decidely less coverage. And its consequences, I maintain, were in the process of playing themselves out on the -north- face of the salient. Where the 559 VG, having lost perhaps a battalion's worth of effectives in its retreat and with a somewhat longer frontage, could probably dispose 4 at-strength infantry battalions opposite about 4 infantry companies of CCB.

Now, fog neutralizes airplanes and it makes range and front armor plates less important, but those are not its only tactical effects. Schrecks and fausts become rather more deadly weapons against light armor and even Shermans, when the visibility is 100 yards than when it is unlimited. VG pattern automatic-weapon infantry also becomes more effective as the visibility falls. A dozen tanks and a score of halftracks may help one infantry company hold against 3 times its numbers if the MGs can light up anything that moves at 500 yards. When the visibility is 100 yards, they are instead relying on that outnumbered infantry to protect -them-. Fog also tends to neutralize an advantage in artillery, simply because targets cannot be seen until they are so close a barrage will hit both sides. So much is theory.

Historical records states that on the 24th of September the character of the Arracourt battle was changed materially, when the 559th VG stopped defending, and instead attacked CCB from the north, from three directions (probably a battalion each). By this time the attacks of the Panzer brigades from east and south had failed repeatedly for 5 days (CCA lost 32 tanks or TDs in that period), with heavy losses in tanks. It says further that CCB was almost overwhelmed by 559 VG's attack, and was only 'saved' by late afternoon massive tac air support (after fog had burned off). The following day it was raining. The division commander ordered 4th Armored to fall back 5 miles to a shorter and more defensible line. And the day after that, the 35th infantry division relieved CCB opposite the 559 VG.

So, on its face, what really happened that nobody talks about, is the green 559th VG clobbered a battle-worn CCB that was understrength in infantry, and sent the whole 4th Armored, which withstood everything 111th and 113th Panzer brigades could throw at them successfully, back 5 miles, asking for help. Everyone focuses on the armor clash. And certainly that pressure prevented CCA from aiding CCB. But it was the VG that landed the punch, and did so because it was directed at the real weakness of US armored division circa 1944. Which had nothing to do with zippos and glacis plates, and everything to do with not enough infantry to sustain high intensity combat.

Nor is that the end of the story. On the 25th as the 4th Armored pulled back, the Panzer brigades ceased their attacks. But the 559 VG did not. Over the next 5 days, it mauled the 35 infantry division in and around the Gremecey forest. SMGs in the woods, and over ground still studded with leftover WW I fortifications. After 3 days of this, the 35th was getting beat badly enough that the corps commander ordered them to withdraw too - but Patton countermanded the order. The 6th Armored division came up, and launched flanking attacks around the forest, which again forced the 559 VG to withdraw.

The 559th VG was not a crack formation. 1/3rd of its infantry were Luftwaffe ground personnel recently inducted into the infantry. The others were not the highest quality manpower, meaning they had portions of youngsters, middle aged men, some with minor health problems. It had no tanks, certainly not scores of Panthers like the 111th and 113th Panzer brigades had. It was cut off inside Nancy, its tactical HQ overrun by CCA's first penetration. About a battalion's worth of men were captured retreating from the city, while making their way toward the new German lines in small groups. In maneuverist cartoon versions of military theory, they were supposed to be beaten because somebody drove around them.

They walked back, set up new defenses, held off repeated armored attacks, bled the attackers dry of infantry because they didn't have enough to start with. Then at le moment juste, they counterattacked, infantry against armor, in poor visibility conditions. They beat 3rd Army's finest tankers and set them back on their heels. Then they took on the relief infantry sent to deal with them, and beat them too. The third division they faced, fresh and fully armored, forced them to retreat again. The 111th and 113th Panzer brigades were stopped cold by one combat command, about 3 battalions. The 559 VG wasn't stopped until three -divisions- were thrown at it in sequence.

Glamour and the realities of military performance, are two different things. And the unglamorous truth, in my opinion, is that the retirement of the 4th Armored in late September was brought about by the main operational weakness of the US armored division at that time. Which was not thin front armor on the medium tanks, nor seperate open-topped vehicles carrying the best anti-tank guns, nor a commitment to exploitation rather than tank dueling, nor an insufficient commitment to maneuverist gospel. The armored divisions just didn't have enough infantry.

I hope this is interesting.

[Michael Emrys]

Interesting story, Jason. Thanks.

I always get the feeling that there burns in the heart of maneuverists a not-so-secret desire to replicate the successes of the Germans 1939-41, but without acknowledging that those successes were by and large won against armies that were badly overmatched in a way that did not recur until the 1991 Gulf War. By 1944 the infantry of the major belligerent armies were well supplied with fairly effective AT weapons, and as important, had confidence in those weapons. Tanks on the battlefield were still scary presences, but not the irresistable juggernauts they were seen to be in the first two years of the war.

Michael

[JasonC]

That is undoubtedly part of it. And I agree the issue of confidence is real. Late war, well equipped infantry in combined arms armies just did not melt. The 101st didn't at Bastogne, and the units of the 30th that closed the door behind Peiper didn't either. In fact, Peiper didn't have enough infantry either, even with the better panzer division layout and with following infantry and FJ units assigned to help, because his KG dispensed with most of them, and he soon got seperated from the panzer grenadier regiments. As one US commander put it at the time, eventually the "human equation" had to tell. By which he meant, Peiper had powerful tanks, but only a battalion or two of personnel, while he was surrounded by the better part of 2 divisions. Equipment only could not and did not confer invunerability. And gas trucks are not as armored as Panthers or King Tigers.

But to me there is a different moral in that story. The 4th AD did break through, did smash the 3rd Pz Gdr's local counterattack, did get clean into the rear. It is precisely at that point that the doctrinal dispute begins. How to use such success when attained? In other operational circumstances, with much more gas, depth and breadth of the attack, supporting arms fresh and alongside - sure, taking off east would have been the right answer. But only because the essential tasks to reap the reward of the breakthrough would -not-, in that better case, have been sacrificed to that more distant goal. Whereas around Nancy in September 1944, they were.

They wanted to shake themselves free and continue the dream pursuit, which had already carried them clear across France is a single month. They were blinded to unwelcome realities by a vision of success just out of the grasp. How did this play out? When CCA pushed into the rear, the mission was to raid and pursue, to free the rest of the division, and then push on. CCA gave practically no thought to destroying the garrison of Nancy. They posted a few light tanks and put a platoon of armored infantry at this crossroads or that. The bulk of the force was drawn up in a body east of the city, ready to punch again - into -air-, and without enough logistic reach to "touch" anything but air at the end of another swing of the armored fist.

But had they thought of the matter a little differently, at that moment the primary tactical reality was not that they now had an unexploitable hole in the German line and thus a road east - for 30 miles then a sputtering halt. The primary tactical reality was that they had a chance of destroying the entire 559 VG division for trivial loss, had they paid attention to that goal. They were thinking about terrain, and how far they could drive, and about avoiding strength to strike at weakness. Which are sensible enough things when you have enough gas, and enough follow-on forces can get across the limited river crossings to do everything else for you. But they didn't. And in the circumstances, they should have been thinking not about ground but men, not about punching into air but about annihilating the 559th VG.

If they had done so, and had successfully prevented the withdrawl of the 559 VG intact, the subsequent history of the campaign over the next two weeks would have been rather different. Without that division, the Germans would probably have had to defend with the available mobile troops, not counterattack. If they had gone ahead with the counterattacks, the defeat of those would have left the Germans nothing adequate to stop 3rd army in the sector. CCB would not have been burnt out. The 35th division would not have been mauled. The logistics situation would still have been grim, and therefore decisive advances would still have been out of reach. But broad front advance would have been possible, because the Germans would not have had enough to stop 4 divisions, in only the shells of the 3rd and 15th Pz Gdr, less than a division's worth between them.

Destroying enemy forces makes subsequent tasks easier. It also avoid subsequent high losses to one's own forces, if enemy forces are destroyed on the most advantageous terms. Withdrawing in small groups of infantry through an unrestricted armored force, should have been such an opportunity. In the actual logistic situation, it was unrealistic to expect more than the passage of the river, capture of the city, and destruction of its garrison from the breakthrough achieved. They sacrificed the last of those by focusing on a mirage of greater success that was not real. And CCB and the 35th Infantry division paid for it.

[Keith]

While I agree with your assesment that the American armored division was light on infantry, which limited a division's "staying power", the primary cause for the reverse was more to due to the corps commander's (Eddy) failure to support 4th Armored Division's advantage with adequate follow on forces. Eddy's decision to consolidate XII Corp's foothold acrross the Moselle rather than pressing on to Germany was a gift to the Germans that allowed them to concentrate reserves. Also Eddy chose to send armored elements back to support the infantry rather than to support the continuation of 4th Armored's advance.

Like you said it was customary to attach infantry battalions to the armored division for support. However in this battle Eddy actually DETACHED infantry and tanks from 4th armor to help his infantry fighting in the Moselle bridgeheads. Eddy is to blame, not 4th armored.

[ScoutPL]

Interesting look at a much lauded battle.

I would argue that 4th Armor couldnt have maintained it penetration AND cleared the city of the 559 VG (or even contained it).

US doctrine stressed(since the Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers) that the armor formations were designed for an exploitation role. Now we all know this severely limits their use. There are a number of examples of a TO&E based on this single role failing the Armor Divisions when they were thrown into other roles, which was often necessary due to the chronic shortage of Infantry Divisions (the real issue here).

What was needed, as JasonC stated, was at a minimum another brigade's worth of infantry to shore up the penetration's flanks. Destroying the 559th in Nancy would have taken at least another Infantry Division, if not more. So we come to the real crux of the problem: The US didnt bring sufficient assets to the fight.

Another poster tries to blame Eddy for pulling away assets from the 4th and not bringing up more. I think a more accurate look at the situation would reveal that those Infantry Divisions on the flanks NEEDED those 4th AD elements to sustain their own fights. As far as bringing up more reserves to fill out the assault force? My bet is they just didnt exist. The Airborne Divisions, which usually acted as the theater fire brigades, were all involved in Market Garden.

I think the failings of the Arracourt battles are more a question of Corps and Army resource management then anything else. I think this coincides with JasonC's argument I just raise the responibility a little higher.

The AD TO&E was dificient in all roles except those it was designed for (penetration -to an extent- and exploitation). But I think most operational commanders were fully aware of this by 1944. They just failed to ensure there were enough reserve formations available to fully take advantage of the penetration once it was established. The reason for this was that the assets just didnt exist. And when faced with two options (sit and wait or do what you can with what you got) my bet is Patton would always choose the latter, especially with Monty in the process of destroying three Airborne Divisions for naught in the north.

JasonC made this statement early on, which is really the reason I read the entire thing:

"armor was the decisive arm in the whole war"

But I think the rest of his article pretty much disproves that statement (on every front except perhaps the Russian, in most areas, and North Africa), whether that was his intention or not.

One last Devil's Advocate point of view:

I would be interested in learning what the threat analysis of the 559th was during the planning stages. I can see them being written off as unimportant due to their makeup and diverse personnel resources, so perhaps the plan all along was to not focus on their destruction. The fact that they were allowed to escape and then enjoyed some success attacking an Armored CC that they outnumbered 3 to 1 (considerably more in infantry) could be blamed on simple shortsightedness on the part of the planning staff. Which is relatively easy to poke at with 50 years of hindsight.

[jgdpzr]

So just who is this Nancy Arracourt person anyway?

[ 06-05-2001: Message edited by: jgdpzr ]

[JasonC]

Keith recites his maneuverist catechism.

Eddy was right that the problem his corps actually faced was consolidating the bridgehead and that the enemy to worry about was the German infantry. The tankers who wanted to streak east were living in the fantasy world of those who ignore logistics. There wasn't enough gas to go 30 miles, and the farther east they went the less they would get. Therefore, nothing decisive could be accomplished by heading east.

Eddy could not "support with follow on forces" for numerous reasons - because there was very limited bridge capacity over the Moselle at that point (only the southern route, with 6 canals and streams to bridge, etc); because he didn't have the gas to run tanks around and reposition much of the infantry rapidly, as the latter task took trucks away from "transport sharing" supply runs; because he did not have any large advantage in numbers anywhere to draw upon to start with.

The CCA tanks concentrated east of Nancy accomplished nothing, when they could have destroyed much of 559 KG if they -had- been employed in supporting the infantry. Eddy sent CCB to retake the ground lost behind CCA's advance, because they had not bothered to secure the corridor. Why? The gospel of mass and breakthrough dictated a concentrate column to punch east - which indeed worked well when it met and defeated 3 Pz Gdr's local counterattack on the day of the breakthrough.

To "support with follow on forces" would have meant, in practice, that the two supporting infantry divisions were supposed to send an additional RCT each to each side of the salient (north and south) to free up CCA and CCB. They had already lent about an RCTs worth of infantry to 4th AD. And they had each sustained about a battalion's worth of losses in the bridging fights. To "support with follow on forces", therefore, would have meant about one division worth left along the corps front to face 3rd and 15th Panzergrenadier and 559 VG. (18 initial, 2 lent, 2 lost, 4-6 for "follow on forces" of 2 RCT, 2-3 battalion strength each).

The plain fact is that the logistics and bridgehead situation made it an infantry-dominated, positional battle. And in that respect Eddy's corps did not have any great strength advantage over the Germans opposite him. When the Germans threw 111th and 113th Panzer brigades at the bridgehead, they were leading to Eddy's strongest suit, and handily repulsed. When they eventually lead to his weak one, infantry, with the 559 VG's counterattacl, both CCB and then the 35th Infantry division lost. Unaided his corps would have been repulsed, with the intervention of Army in the form of the support of the 6th AD preventing that result.

Logistics prevented him from converting his armor strength into a decisive force multiplier. He reasonably attempted to use the means he had to meet the task he had, which both before and after the Panzer brigades attack was primarily an infantry one.

[JasonC]

I generally agree with ScoutPLs comments. One clarification first - I am not suggesting 4th AD should have attacked Nancy proper, nor that another infantry division should have done so. The missed opportunity (certainly a matter of hindsight, but that is what AARs are largely for) was not cutting up 559 VG when it withdrew from the city. I am thinking of a pursuit-like attack of the fleeing elements, directed northeast of Nancy.

This was actually considered on the day of the breakthrough, but rejected in favor of the breakthrough maxim, hit weakness not strength. Since there were Germans (rallying) to the northeast, but none to the east, CCA directed itself east.

The idea I am thinking about would have CCA, instead, ensure link-up with CCB in the south, screen the -east- with its recon elements, and immediate pursue northeast, hitting "strength", or bodies rather than air. The roles of the recon elements and the main body were substantially the reverse of that, in the actual history. The period I am talking about is from the day after the breakthrough charge to the "central position" east of Nancy (which I consider correct, even excellent), for the following 2-3 days.

It is an example of the doctrinal maneuver on the rear for the purpose of bringing about battle under favorable conditions, to destroy the enemy force. With that destruction as the direct and immediate objective of operations, rather than seizure of ground. As regularly practiced by Napoleon, similar to closing the Kiev pocket rather than running for Moscow, etc.

As for the issue of the US assessment of 559 VG, I think that is an excellent point. It was considered a recently formed, low quality manpower, relatively immobile "garrison" or "fortress" division. It was expected to defend passively inside Nancy, while leaving the more difficult maneuver fighting to the vets of the 3rd and 15th Panzergrenadier, on the flanks.

The threat assessment of it as a formation was generally very low. Among the brass, only the corps commander, Eddy, who was tasked with juggling the depleted infantry forces of the corps, seems to have taken it at all seriously, for which he has been roundly criticised by historians - and at the time by his subordinates in the 4th AD.

The opinion of Eddy by the others was low enough that Patton considered relieving him at the end of September, after the 559 VG mauled the 35th Infantry division in Gremecey forest. Eddy's differences with Wood, the commander of 4th AD, eventually ended in Wood's relief from command of that division in November 1944.

Patton did not relieve Eddy in September, and instead supported the corps with 6th AD. Perhaps on examination he found the corps was being asked to do rather a lot - and it had just practically destroyed the 111th and 113th Panzer brigades, gotten over the Moselle, and cleared Nancy, after all. While facing a force about as large as itself. It is hard to call that losing, even in 3rd Army.

[ 06-05-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by ScoutPL:

"armor was the decisive arm in the whole war"

But I think the rest of his article pretty much disproves that statement (on every front except perhaps the Russian, in most areas, and North Africa), whether that was his intention or not.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Is it even possible to choose just one decisive arm?

I would vote for artillery well ahead of armour in any event - especially as utilized by the Allies in 1944-45.

Ask yourself how many battles could have been fought and won without artillery, and how many could have been won without armour.

Many victorious battles were fought without effective or overwhelming tank support (Ortona, Omaha Beach, South Beveland, Hitler Line, etc.) but few were fought without artillery.

[Dittohead]

Just wondering what role if any did ULTRA play in the decision making. Many of the US decisions and battle plans(Mortain)were made with an excellent grasp of the available intelligence. Were US cmdrs overconfident based on the ULTRA info concerning the green VG division? Did they depend too much on the ULTRA info?