CM2 topic: turret speeds & the T-34

[Guest Andrew Hedges]

I think it's important to keep in mind, both in general and for CM, that most early-war soviet tactics, as "dumb" as they might appear when compared to more sophisticated early war German tactics, were in reality not dumb at all. Instead, they were rational responses to battlefield reality.

For example, the use of rigid attacking forces and things like platoon movement, often commented on by the Germans, were not done because the commanders thought that they were superior to German tactics; they were done because, given the absence of radios and the large number of poorly-trained tankers, they were the best tactics available. If the only way you can have reasonable control over the tanks in your platoon is to have them stay relatively close together and mimic the actions of the lead tank, then the best thing that you can do as a commander is have your tanks do this; it is probably much better than to try and have tanks act independently when they can't talk to each other and are crewed by inexperienced men.

The same is true of infantry command; sure, if you have well trained NCOs with a high degree of initiative, you would be foolish not to use these troops to best take advantage of that. But if you have a large number of poorly trained troops who were just mobilized last week, and who you need to stop a Nazi attack, the best thing you can do with these troops might be to place them close together (so that they will all know what they are supposed to do) and have them all attack the same objective. Ideally, of course, you would not have such an untrained army, but the job of the commander on the field is to do the best he can with the troops he has. And it's likely that the smartest commander will still suffer far more casualties than a commander with better trained troops, but you have to work with the troops you've got.

I think that these kind of differences are one of the things that SL modeled so well, if you remember the scenarios where there would be about 10 German squads, plus 5 leaders and 5 LMGs holed up in a small village, and they were attacked by something like 48 Russian squads with only one or two leaders. To win as the Germans, you had to disperse your units so that you could cover every avenue of approach. To win as the Sovs, you had to stack your squads and keep them close together, plus have a place to rally broken squads.

What made good scenarios like this so interesting -- and what I hope will make CM as interesting -- was that the troops weren't interchangeable. If you tried to have the Russians attack the way you would have the Germans attack, you'd lose C&C and the attack would come apart. IMO, this is realistic because, as stated above, I don't believe that the Sov. commanders attacked in large clusters because they didn't know any better; they did it because it was the best method, of the methods available to them, for them to carry an attack. (Obviously, as the troops quality improved, different methods of attack were employed).

So I guess as a CM player, if I were playing early war soviet, I would find it realistic if I found myself repeating historical patterns, or some of them, because it was the best manner of using my troops.

Which is not to say that there is no room for tactical improvement or innovation; there may well be some occasions where dispersing troops is a good idea, despite the C&C hit (or whatever), and of course there are better and worse ways of handling troops bunched together (i.e., you can still use cover).

[Skipper]

Thanks Andrew, you made some good points that I am trying to drive home here for the last couple of days.

Being 100% flame-proof, I would say another heresy:

even so called "zagranotryads" (basically, an MG platoon, manned by NKVD, positioned behind batallion defensive position, with orders to shoot own troops leaving the trenches) was GOOD, SENSITIVE, EFFECTIVE MEASURE, that very much helped to win the war. By the way, contrary to common knowledge, they did not exist during 1941 summer campaign, and they did not stay in existance throughout the war - only while they were needed.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Come on Greg. With some notable exceptions (ala the Siberian Army which had seen combat against the Japanese) it is not news that the lion's share of Soviet Units in 41-42 were both poorly trained and poorly lead. This is not an indictment of the average Russian Soldiers fighting potential. Throw an untrained big bruiser into the ring with a well trained, highly motivated, well lead ARMY and the bruiser is bound to get a bloody nose. Try putting a tank crew into a T34 that has barely completed basic training, let alone advanced individual training on tanks, and see how often they will be able hit targets, or how often they throw tracks, or weather they can even perform simple bore sighting on their weapons.

In my experience German general memoirs rarely are painting rosy pictures of the glorious exploits of the Whermacht. Quite the contrary. That is why these memoirs have historically been widely accepted as reliable sources of information. Try:

Von Luck's "Panzer Commander"

Von Melenthin's "Panzer Battles"

There were also numerous interviews conducted by the US Army with various German Generals and Staff Officers regarding Whermact Experiances on the East Front, and readily available in English for we non-German Reading folk.

Regarding Loza…he relays several hard to swallow tales in his "Commanding the Red Armies Shermans".

And no Greg, I'm not just pissed at you cause your kickin' my ass in our latest pbem game

Beastables:

When you say PIII, what are you referring too? The German Panzer III?

Yes the Panzer III.

[Bastables]

Before I bugger off again I seem to have arrived at conflicting reports regarding the use or lack of a turret basket in the Panzer III series of vehicles. British reports dealing with the examination of captured Panzer IIIs in North Africa state that the change over from vertical stowage of the kurz/short 5cm cartridges to the horizontal stowage of the lang/long 5cm cartridges did not impact on the greatest fault of PIII turret design where the fixed turret floor forced the loader to ‘walk after the gun’. But I’ve found some new information that states that a turret basket was fitted to the PIII Ausf H (5cm L/42) along with the interior improvements finally implemented after the first fitting of the kurz/short 5cm during the late production run of the Ausf E. So I’m in a bit of a conundrum, British field studies state that even the late Ausf Js with the 5cm L/60 did not posses a turret basket yet my picture book squadron/signals Panzer III in action states that a turret basket was fitted in the Ausf H which preceded the J into production, ignoring the examples of the even later Ausf L's and H's with there 5cm L/60. Hmm its all foggy here, any one else have any more information?

[Jeff Duquette]

Thanks for the correction Beast. Actually Paul Lakowski just referred me to Chamberlain pg 64 "Encyclopedia of German Tanks". It indicates the MkIIIh was the first model to have a turret basket, and this was subsequently retrofitted to Ausf E, F, and G. Perhaps the conflicting British Western Desert reports refernce both retrofitted and non-retrofitted Ausf E - F's

Now than…did the Pz Kpfw 38t have a turret basket? I’m betting no.

[Grisha]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Come on Greg. With some notable exceptions (ala the Siberian Army which had seen combat against the Japanese) it is not news that the lion's share of Soviet Units in 41-42 were both poorly trained and poorly lead. This is not an indictment of the average Russian Soldiers fighting potential. Throw an untrained big bruiser into the ring with a well trained, highly motivated, well lead ARMY and the bruiser is bound to get a bloody nose. Try putting a tank crew into a T34 that has barely completed basic training, let alone advanced individual training on tanks, and see how often they will be able hit targets, or how often they throw tracks, or weather they can even perform simple bore sighting on their weapons.

In my experience German general memoirs rarely are painting rosy pictures of the glorious exploits of the Whermacht. Quite the contrary. That is why these memoirs have historically been widely accepted as reliable sources of information. Try:

Von Luck's "Panzer Commander"

Von Melenthin's "Panzer Battles"

There were also numerous interviews conducted by the US Army with various German Generals and Staff Officers regarding Whermact Experiances on the East Front, and readily available in English for we non-German Reading folk.

Regarding Loza…he relays several hard to swallow tales in his "Commanding the Red Armies Shermans".

And no Greg, I'm not just pissed at you cause your kickin' my ass in our latest pbem game

Jeff, I'm not disputing that the T-34 had problems, or that Soviet troops in '41 and '42 were for the most part ineffective. What I'm complaining about is the tendency to take everything the Germans said about the Russian front as the 'bible'. This is not so. David Glantz has an excellent article that addresses this so much better than I could, but in short what has happened is that postwar writings of German commanders planted the seed for many misconceptions about the Soviet Army. And, I'm seeing these misconceptions popping up here on this board.

And about our game, I wouldn't call a minor victory as kickin' your ass

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-10-2001).]

[Jeff Duquette]

What I'm complaining about is the tendency to take everything the Germans said about the Russian front as the 'bible'. This is not so.

Agree completely. Both sides of the hill should be examined in order to get a well-rounded feel for the Eastern Front. I disagree with the approach of mud slinging against reputable German Sources. Part of the problem, in my opinion, is the lack of Russian sources interpreted into English for us ugly Americans to chew on (Loza’s works are steps in the right direction). There is a great deal of German information out there which has either been interpreted into English\American or was derived as part of the US ARMYs post war debriefing of hundreds of German Officers regarding their experiences on the Eastern Front.

Interestingly enough SLA Marshall was quite instrumental in pushing these post war debriefings. Marshall’s philosophy was apparently to debrief these folks as quickly after the actual events as possible…while the experiences were still somewhat fresh in the memory. A hold over from his after-action interview philosophy. In addition Marshall had a captive audience so to speak…most of the folks he was interviewing were still interned in American and British POW camps. These interviews resulted in:

“German Defense Tactics Against Russia Break-Throughs”, by GeneralOberst Erhard Rauss.

“Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia”, by General Oldwig Von Natzmer.

Etc etc

In “The Anvil of War, German Generalship in Defense on the Eastern Front”, Marshall relays an interesting tale regarding interviews with Gen. Fritz Bayerlain (Panzer Lehr Division Commander) and Gen. Heinrich von Luttwitz. The monocle wearing Luttwitz was Bayerlain’s Corps Commander during the Battle of the Bulge, and the Battles around Bastogne. It became apparent during these interviews that Bayerlain had very little respect for Luttwitz’s command abilities and even less respect for Luttwitz’s arrogant Junker attitudes. Bayerlain indicated that the blame for the failure to capture Bastogne was a function of Luttwitz’s incompetence. Apparently during the interviews with these two Generals, the high-strung Bayerlain was quite found of lividly howling NUTS! NUTS! NUTS! At Luttwitz whenever Luttwitz began putting on one of his Junker attitudes (you know…McAuliffe’s reply to Luttwitz’s demand for surrender of the 101st Airborne around Bastogne).

Anyway I digress…I’ll take a look at the Glantz article this afternoon. Their actually making me work on a Saturday today...Basterds! Gots’ to go to Kelso, WA. Send me an email for start times on our online-game.

[Guest machineman]

Interesting point, but still another to keep in mind is that for decades both Soviet and American military interests were well served by building up the image of the Red Army as an unstoppable force that crushed the Germans and would crush the west if it could. Some of the new info coming out of the new Soviet republics paints a worse image than what was there before, including one of Glanz's own books:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/070060944X/qid=981817776/sr=1-1/ref=sc_b_1/107-6270323-7914100

Another one that may be of interest, now outdated but still with good points on the Soviet military machine:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0394524020/qid%3D981818320/107-6270323-7914100

And for a good one on the German generals:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0688060129/qid=981818456/sr=1-1/ref=sc_b_1/107-6270323-7914100

[Grisha]

Jeff,

I'm putting my bucket of mud away

If it's English-language books on the Soviet Army in WWII you want, you've come to the right man! Before anything, check Frank Cass Publishers as they have a nice set of books on the genre.

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[PzKpfw 1]

As Machine pointed out one thing to remember is German Generals had an agenda in their memoirs this included many of the Generals who were employed to write the war case study reports.

The agenda was 2 part, 1), make themselves look good, while blameing Hitler for any mistakes, & 2) paint the Soviets in a negative light but emphasisation on that they had endless suplies of men & manpower, which was what NATO wanted the party line to be.

Memoirs are just that memories of events from the war, their are not infoulable Ie, Manstiens Lost Victories is an prime example.

And lastly The Germans wrote the Wests history of the Eastren Front, even today ppl will still take an German source over an Russian one, which is an result of the cold war &Russia allowing Germany to write the EF history.

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Just to throw a little more fat on the technical deficiencies of the T-34 fire, I recall reading one account of someone who had examined a number of them right off the production line and had observed flaws in the cast armor big enough to put his fist into.

Michael

[M Hofbauer]

all batle accounts are falsified, kills are inflated, as are enemy numbers ("Viel Feind viel Ehr' " - "much enemy = much honor"), and own heroism. granted.

however, the russians have a special record in the overdoing the BS news and reports section. the latest I heard from them was that the (ridiculously low) use of DU in Kosovo was worse in terms of radiation than Chernobyl...

[Jeff Duquette]

I read through the Glantz article last night. In my mind all Glantz is getting at (other than self-promotion) is that there has been a lack of understanding of the other side of the coin with respect to inclusion of Soviet references in most studies of the Eastern Front. I think he tends to go over board in his nit-picking criticisms of post war debriefings of German officers. His chief beef with “Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia”, by General Oldwig Von Natzmer, was that Natzmer got the date for the German retreat from Kharkov wrong by a couple days. Context: Natzmer was interned at the time of preparation of “Operations of Encircled Forces: German Experiences in Russia”, and presumably did not have access to out side references. For Glantz to cast a dark cloud over the entire Natzmer study based upon a slip on one date seems very extreme. The intent of the study was not an exercise in establishing time lines and dates. It's a case of Glantz missing the forest cause there’s all these darn trees in the way.

Glantz specializes in historical works which focus on a subject that has been tramped over for 55 years (I suppose if Glantz were reading this he would comment that its actually been a period of 56 years, six months, two weeks and 4 days, and therefore the reminder of this post must be flawed and cant be taken seriously ). How does an Author like Glantz put a twist on such a subject, and draw readers to his work? Why should I read Glantz as opposed to Erickson or Carell or even Von Mellenthin for that matter? Well if I’m egotistical I put out the word that those past accounts\studies on the Eastern Front and those other Authors just didn’t get it right. I’m the guy you need to read to get the real story of the war on the Eastern Front. It’s no different than John McManus or Dave Grossman pitching **** on SLA Marshall’s works indicating that Marshall got it all wrong in “Men Against Fire”. We’re the guys you need to read. Look closely at the references Glantz provides in the tail end of any of his works on the Russian Front. You’ll see the “Lost Victories” and the “Panzer Battles”. Seems rather contradictory.

I’m not a big reader of Glantz. I read Glantz and House’s “The Battle of Kursk”, and other than its tendency to be rather dry in areas, I liked it just fine. There is definitely historical value in this book. However, I disagree that Glantz is the go to guy for telling us the first hand Russian side of the war. Glantz is an American who siphons through Russian Archival documents, Russian Biographies, Russian war time studies, and Russian AARs (if such a thing existed). He than tells us the reader what he thinks is being said, or what is going on in these Biographies, AARs, and studies. He waters down first hand accounts and provides us with his interpretation of what Soviet General So & So-ski was thinking or doing in such and such an operation or campaign. He takes us one step further away from what might really have been the thoughts of General So & So-ski.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this approach. Historians have been doing it since the beginning of time. But if I pick up and read Von Mellenthin’s “Panzer Battles” or Loza’s “Commanding the Red Armies Shermans” I know these are Von Mellenthin's or Loza’s words, and they haven’t been interpreted or siphoned by Joe Armchair General. I personally think there is value to be derived from Glantz’s interpretations, but I also think we can’t discount Mellenthin simply because the guy didn’t have access to Russian background information while writing his book. Or perhaps we would like to think Mellenthin’s is trying to cover his ass after the fact for whatever obscure reason.

I think we need to put Glantz’s interpretations into context via examining the work of folks that actually fought there, what they thought was going on while actually fighting the war.

I think Bestables already said it best on Page 4 of this thread, and I should have left it at that.

It’s ad hominem attacks; attack the biases of the person as opposed to the ideas themselves. Or the art of ignoring the idea in favour of attacking the source. It’s elegant in that one no longer has to argue against the idea itself since its presentation is considered or declared so faulty and marred.

I also like the usual post modernist trap of declaring that one cannot understand the world through meta-theories except through the meta-theories that all Meta theories are equally invalid/valid.

[Jeff Duquette]

I think there is only so far you can carry this revisionist look at the Eastern Front. The Germans were faced by a huge Soviet Army. Soviet Red Army and Navy Losses during the Great Patriotic War were horrendous. From a Russian Source “Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses” by Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev total casualties were over 29,000,000.

bigger version for the far-sighted: http://www.geocities.com/tigervib_2000/Red_Army_Casulties_4145.jpg

Soviet tank production during the war, 1941 to 1945, was 99,150 (From: “The Red Army Handbook” by Zaloga and Ness). The lions share of this 99,150 are T34-76, T34-85, the and the various SU assault guns. This number doesn’t include lend-lease; Shermans, Grant\Lees, Churchills etc etc.

German Tank Production During the War, 1941 to 1945, (production which was servicing The East Front, West Front and Mediterranean Front) 23,759 (Also from Zaloga).

January 1944 total Soviet Tank\assault-guns on the Eastern Front was 21,100 machines. German Tank\assault-guns in France, Italy, Balkans, and Russia was 5,266. In July of 1944 over 1,500 German tanks were positioned in Normandy alone. It’s probably not much of a stretch to put an additional 400 to 500 tanks\assault-guns in Italy, Balkans, Southern France, and the Pas-de-Calais during July of 1944. This puts Soviet to German tank ratio at close to 6:1 to 6.5:1. Localized areas of Soviet thrusts (Soviet Schwerepunckts) would likely have approached 10:1 or even 15:1 ratios of Russian to German tanks. So when we read accounts by Mainstein or Mellenthin talking about Soviet Hordes overwhelming them…they probably weren’t to far off in their assessments.

[Skipper]

Some facts and thoughts from the russian side of the fence:

1. From the table, it's not 29 million, it's 11 million. Within this figure there is over 2 million of 1941 POWs (yes, most of the 3.1 million people lost in 1941 were taken prisoners!). There is also some double counting, especially for the same 1941 period (I personally knew somebody who was deemed officially MIA twice). All in all, the modern russian point of view on this is that the number of RKKA dead was 8.6 million. Within this figure there is 2 mililon above mentioned POWs who died in captivity.

2. On the issue of POWs, germans actually took 3.6 million in 1941. How so? They had that nice procedure of rounding up a lot of non-combatants in every place they took, and labeling them POWs. Out of these 1941 POWs, almost nobody survived.

3. Total losses of USSR that cannot be accounted for natural causes were 19.9 million. Ie, 11.3 million civilians (!!!) died thanks to the war, in addition to 8.6 million combatants.

4. Overwhelming numerical superiority was achieved in 1944, when the general outcome of war was largely obvious. In the decisive battles of 1941-43, such as Moscow or Kursk, RKKA did not enjoy any considerable superiority.

5. Germany and her allies lost in war with USSR about 4.3 million combatants, including 0.6 mln who died in captivity (most of these were captured in Stalingrad Cauldron).

6. So, the total ratio of irredeemable losses is less than 3:1. If you exclude the POWs, or exclude the 1941 disaster (which is practically the same thing), it is 2:1. Keep in mind that RKKA was on offensive throughout most of the war, and also that the regular army cadre of NCOs and junior officers was almost completely destroyed in 1941. Make your own conclusions.

I can also run some Eastern Front / Western Front comparisons, if anyone is interested. Basically, in 1944-45 RKKA paid several times less in terms of, say, KIA/sq.km of captured territory, or even own KIA / german KIA, despite the fact that german opposition was much more determined.

Sources:

* V.V.Kozhinov, Russia XX century, 1939-64

* Human losses of USSR in Great Patrioic War - articles, 1995

* Maksudov S.O. "On frontline losses of Soviet Army in WWII", 1993

[This message has been edited by Skipper (edited 02-11-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Skipper (edited 02-11-2001).]

[Grisha]

Jeff,

When German generals report Soviet numbers as 10:1 in superiority they aren't far off in many cases. But why is that? Well, let me ask you, in 1941, or 1942 were there occasions where German attacks were at 10:1 odds? I think you'll have to say that, yes, such German numerical superiority did happen at specific, focused points and times. How did they do that? Just because the Germans encountered such Soviet odds does not prove that the Soviets had 10:1 odds overall. In fact, Glantz & House's book, When Titans Clashed, contains overall combatant strengths between the Soviets, their allies, and the Germans with their allies. This information shows that the Soviets didn't possess 2:1 odds overall until late '43, and 3:1 odds overall until late '44(And, incidently, the Germans possessed 1.9:1 odds overall against the Soviets in Nov 1941, from an intial German numerical superiority of 1.4:1 in June 1941).

I'll post passage from another of Glantz' books, Soviet Military Intelligence in War, but before I do let me explain its context. This passage has to do with the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945, which commenced from three bridgeheads which had been gained in the summer offensives of 1944. In October, the Soviets began planning razvedka and maskirovka(intelligence/reconnaissance, and deception, respectively) operations for their big push from this area in January. The effects these extensive plans had on the actual offensive were amazing, to say the least, as German intelligence was totally unaware of any buildup in the area,

The net effect of this intelligence failure was staggering. In all three bridgeheads the Germans assessed they faced odds of about 3:1 or 3.5:1. Actually the Soviets created an operational superiority of between 5:1 and 7:1 in the bridgeheads. When Soviet concentration occurred, that translated into Soviet tactical superiority of between 8:1 and 16:1. The effect of such superiority was predictable. German defenses crumbled almost instantly on day one of the Soviet offensive. German reserve panzer divisions, although at more than full strength(17th Panzer Division, for example, had 210 tanks, half of them heavy tanks), were inundated and swept away in the Soviet advance that drove hundreds of kilometers into Poland.

So, yes, German generals are correct in saying that they encountered 10:1 odds against the Soviets, but it was usually the result of them being operationally 'faked out', because the Soviets had no where near enough men to have that kind of overall force ratio. So from 1944 to 1945, the Germans were getting 'faked out' a lot by the Soviets

And, no, I'm not pissed you kicked my ass in that night scenario

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Best regards,

Greg Leon Guerrero

[This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-12-2001).]

[PzKpfw 1]

I dunno Jeff, i believe in fact Von Melenthin etc was ediited, its a fact of the business .

I think whats missing is that Glantz is the real only source we have on the Eastren Front, German memoirs are fine if you want the German POV, of what occured which often is incorrect as its based on their perceptions. Yes Glantz is dry but most ppl reading his work are doing so out of a serious intrest in the subject matter Ie, academics, so I guess it doesn't mattewr us regular joes end up scratchin our heads .

The Russians respect Glantz enough to let him crawl around the archives & to translate his books to Russian, I think what your missing about Glantz is his contribution to getting this area opened up for study Ie, efforts in picking up where Erickson left off have opened the doors, especialy to Russian historians, whom he has helped.

As I said before the Germans because of Russian politics were allowed to write the Wests history of the Eastren Front, now over 50yrs later the German version is being challenged, and some ppl donrt like changeing their veiws when their bookshelf is lined with German volumes on the EF.

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. February 1945.

[M Hofbauer]

I can also run some Eastern Front / Western Front comparisons, if anyone is interested. Basically, in 1944-45 RKKA paid several times less in terms of, say, KIA/sq.km of captured territory

That is a ridiculously invalid comparison. You cannot equate the wide, half-deserted stretches of the russian land / eastern front to the dense environment of Normandy/FRance to Germany. To make a comparison based on "KIA per sq.km territory gain" between the "performance" of the western allies (US/UK/FF) and the Russians is hilarious.

[Skipper]

For 1944-45 period we are talking about operations in Western Ukraine, Poland, Chekoslovakia, , Austria, Hungary, East Germany etc. Check your globe on terrain, road network etc.

Any efficiency criteria can be ridiculed, but whichever you take, the fact remains the same - RKKA achieved more during the period when western allies fought seriously.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

I dunno Jeff, i believe in fact Von Melenthin etc was ediited, its a fact of the business .

I think whats missing is that Glantz is the real only source we have on the Eastren Front, German memoirs are fine if you want the German POV, of what occured which often is incorrect as its based on their perceptions. Yes Glantz is dry but most ppl reading his work are doing so out of a serious intrest in the subject matter Ie, academics, so I guess it doesn't mattewr us regular joes end up scratchin our heads .

The Russians respect Glantz enough to let him crawl around the archives & to translate his books to Russian, I think what your missing about Glantz is his contribution to getting this area opened up for study Ie, efforts in picking up where Erickson left off have opened the doors, especialy to Russian historians, whom he has helped.

As I said before the Germans because of Russian politics were allowed to write the Wests history of the Eastren Front, now over 50yrs later the German version is being challenged, and some ppl donrt like changeing their veiws when their bookshelf is lined with German volumes on the EF.

Regards, John Waters

I think this is a good observation of why Glantz and Ericsson are important. I was the one who stated that I would not trust any German officer memoir unless I had independent confirmation. I am not saying they made their stuff up, and I have in fact not read any of them. What should not be forgotten when picking up their books is that at the time they wrote them, the last German POWs from Russia were only returning - these generals had something serious to answer for at the time. Their memoirs can be interpreted as an attempt to deflect blame that would be put on them onto somebody else (preferably dead) as easily as unbiased history. The same goes (to a lesser degree probably) for their exit interviews with the Americans.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Skipper]

> As I said before the Germans because of

> Russian politics were allowed to write the

> Wests history of the Eastren Front

Not that it had anything to do with Russian politics. Just one of the effects of the Cold War. In USSR there were huge number of books published, mostly under auspices of Ministry of Defence Political Directorate

Upon leaving the secondarty school back in mid 80s, my general impression was that the whole Western Front was just a feint, and haven't even heard about such things as Bulge or Market Garden. So, it was just as one-sided on our side of the fence then.

[Skipper]

> As I said before the Germans because of

> Russian politics were allowed to write the

> Wests history of the Eastren Front

Not that it had anything to do with Russian politics. Just one of the effects of the Cold War. In USSR there were huge number of books published, mostly under auspices of Ministry of Defence Political Directorate

Upon leaving the secondarty school back in mid 80s, my general impression was that the whole Western Front was just a feint, and haven't even heard about such things as Bulge or Market Garden. So, it was just as one-sided on our side of the fence then.