Any Caen scenarios/operations on CD or user-made in the works?

[Maximus]

I'd like to play the Germans and really show Monty why you can't sit around and drink tea in the middle of a war.

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"The greatest risk...is not taking one."

[Simon Fox]

Maximass you are rapidly approaching the trolldom you attained in your previous guise on this board. As for your moronic prattle I will render it an answer at the appropriate level for your understanding:

BOLLOCKS!!!!!

[Bastables]

You’re just not a proper chap Maximus/OBG. Oh and Bugger off!

[This message has been edited by Bastables (edited 06-07-2000).]

[Jon_S]

OBG,

If I wasn't such a nice chap, I'd call you something that rhymes with the word "wanker". Rhymes really well too ...

Grumpily

Jon

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Ubique

[This message has been edited for family content by Jon_S (edited 06-07-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Jon_S (edited 06-07-2000).]

[Vorotyntsev]

Maximanus,

Of course Monty was too gutless and wimpy to do something as brilliant as attack through the Hurtgen Forest. Positively Pattonesque, what?

[Screamin Demon]

NO THERE WILL BE NOTHING TO DO WITH CAEN EVER, EVER.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vorotyntsev:

Maximanus,

Of course Monty was too gutless and wimpy to do something as brilliant as attack through the Hurtgen Forest. Positively Pattonesque, what?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I for one have it from the horse's mouth that Monty ordered the 106th ID to take up position in the Schnee Eifel, ordered the surrender of Bataan, personnally advised the US naval command that the Japanese for religious reasons would never attack on a Sunday, contacted Rommel to tell him that Omaha was the only place where the landing would take place, himself devised the attack for the 36th ID at Monte Cassino and is fully responsible for the US performance at Kasserine Pass. He also personally switched on all the lights on the US east coast to make it easier for the U-Boats to sink US ships during operation 'Drumbeat'. And he was the scion of a leading family of tea-merchants, that's why he was so intent on having his troops brew a cuppa instead of fighting, because dead men don't drink tea. And everybody knows that the Americans don't know a good cup of tea if you pour it in their ears, therefore it was no loss to his business if they fought and died. It is true! All of it. Really! It is from the famous 'Handbook of knowledge I pulled from my butt' mentioned in the MG thread! The edition I have was co-authored by Ambrose by the way...

Please note that all smilies on this iMac have been buried alive, kicking and screaming.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Bobbaro]

The original post having been very nicely and adequately addressed, I think it a fine opportunity to remind ourselves of just how competently the general did conduct his armies. That is not to suggest that he did everything to utmost perfection, but those who positivily wallow in the concept that this guy was an absolute stick in the shingle, and an insufferable person to boot, probably hold those notions in support of something else than historical objectivity.

I offer the following observations as a strictly personal view. I just finished reading the MacArthur biography, The American Caesar, and came away from that with a more favorable impression of him than previously, without having to repeal many of my complaints. We do all so cherish our complaints, don't we? Nurished by our compliants we do grow tall in our own view. I would hope a simularly enlightening bio on Monty exists. I doubt that cheap shots and blind hero worship could be thereby ended; but, it is nice to think that a source of authoritative information gethered in one place, would be there to assist an open mind.

Getting at Monty from a remote position gets a little difficult due to reports that he virtually walked on water, or that he would have lost the war had he not been blocked by American-Anglo opposition, and all points of view in between. Partisanship based on a variety of motivations creates a fog of such thickness that the poor man just disappears underneath the cloud.

The British and Commonwealth contribution to the Normandy Campaign was rather more than substantial. That they faced the heavier porportion of the German forces with an army whose human resources had just been about used up is too often conviently overlooked. Yet, on more than one occasion all out efforts were made to take Caen and bring the advance up to schedule at a heavy cost in blood and equipment. Perhaps Montgomery detractors would rather have had those heavy German units shifted to add to those forces facing the American army. Their own already sufficiently difficult and bloody struggle would have been even worse. The criticism could have easily been reversed with Caen falling a little faster and the breakout on the American end of the battle foiled. What if there had not been room to debark and deploy the third army? The happy convienence there would have been that Montygomery was still in command and still available for blame.

It seems to me that affairs at Normandy went better than planning anticipated, though that planning failed in detail here and there as it faced an enemy whose job it was to NOT cooperate with the allied plan. The plan though thwarted in detail, was inadvertantly enabled to succeed beyond all dreams.

When we say what Monty did with his forces and what the Americans did with theirs, we forget that that the Americans WERE part of Monty's forces; he commanded them too. But he did so with such lightness and respect, that the efforts on the British side have often been seen as separate.

The notion that Monty sat doing nothing with with the British-Commonwelth army just does not wash. Their effort was measured in a lot of blood. It appears he did all he might dare do considering his resources.

All the devisive controversy that washed up on shore had its roots in national cheerleading, misperceptions, loose mouths, egotism, personalities, a little pig headness, and differing styles of leadership. If one must complain, there is enough blame to go around to cover all the participants, so that making onesided blasts leaves the argument limping and stumbling.

This situation was typical within and among all armies across the board. From the national intraservice difficulties to the international. It was simply the human condition made manifest.

Some of the most gratifying reading I have found was in the accounts of contacts made at the sharp end as the various combat elements found themselves fighting along side their allies, sometimes intermingled as necessity assigned one to the others command structure. Most of the contriversy occurred where a greater leasure allowed luxuries.

Monty's personality put off even a bunch of his own countrymen, but the complaints come from outside his British armies. During the Bulge episode a selected characterization of his entry into American Corps HQs "like Christ clensing the Temple" overlooks the very sympethetic and supportive role that he did play. I doubt that the occasional impatience or differences of concept between him and his American subordanants exceeded those in any other command. If they were inclined to think him a son of a bitch, the difference was in that he was a British son of a bitch, a sentiment which Eisenhour had so perceptively seen as paticularly inappropriate and destructive in North African allied operations.

Monty's tidy battlefield propensities sit right along with SHAEF's broad front policy. No plan could have been more audacious than Market Garden. He and Patton vied with one another in desiring the ball for a drive to the goal. They competed for the fuel to attack on their respective ends of the front. Seldom is mentioned the real culprit in the fuel shortage, General Lee, the American in charge of the logistical tail, who squandered precious transportation assets in moving his HQ to Paris against orders and with no consequences from the Supreme Commander. There was pleanty of gas, it just was sitting on the beaches.

None to few men in any nation's ranks achieved the status that the principal generals had at that stage of the war by being incompetent idiots. The sword of summery relief had and would continue to weed out the incompetants along with some who prematurely and unfairly judged. Guys like Monty had been tested and found sterling. None of them shown with totally unblimished lights.

There is nothing that makes a general shine so well as an enemy who plays to his strengths and leaves his weaknesses untested. And conversly an enemy that can find a crack the armor of the best of generals can make him look rather weak.

Monty succeeded better than even he expecetd in drawing German strength to the British wing of the invasion, so his hopes of advance expressed too optimistically for the opposition they faced made him look a little foolish.

I can think that the touch of a Mountbatten would have had a greater reception; though there there are a thousand might have beens for all the Allies, who is to say more could have been accomplished? Well, perhaps with all the bigmouths around maybe I should not ask a question like that.

There is a lot more to the unfortunant contriversy and I leave it to others to comment upon. Monty certainly did not help the situation at times and often neither did others. It had many and deep roots including relationships in WWI and before. Perhaps, I am too much like Will Rogers in never (well, seldom) meeting a guy I did'nt like. I can think of some who really had a number of bastardly traits, but who still have enriched my little journey.

[This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-07-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-07-2000).]

[Maximus]

OK, opening remark aside....Really, are there any scenarios in the Caen area in the works?

I remember the great fun I had playing the Atomic game in the V for victory series called "Sword-Gold-Junu". This area would make for some great battles, especially when the SS divisions rolled up.

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"The greatest risk...is not taking one."

[waffen]

http://www.valourandhorror.com/

this site should help anyone interested in doing a caen battle this site should be of use .it has a day by day account of the battle and pictures ,maps etc ..from D day on im sure it will help anyone interested.also has a exellent read enjoy

cheers

[DrD]

Thank you, Bobbaro, for that very interesting and well written reply.

As an American I would also like to apologize to our British friends for the statements of some of my countrymen. If I ever had to fight in a war I'd like the British army at my side! (And the Navy too.)

[Little Black Devil]

Maximus;

I'm sure as time progresses that the advent of more British, Canadian and other Commonwealth sites catering to CM will appear.

I know I for one intend to contribute a great deal of time, research and effort to a certain Canadian site which is still in the works. Okay, lets be honest, I'll probbably try and give up sleep all together.

While I can't speak for other up and coming Commonwealth sites, I'm sure its reasonable to assume that through the inevitable appearence of other Commonwealth sites we can expect to see related scenarios and operations made available to all.

I for one intend to focus more attention on the Juno beachhead, and the all too often forgotten Canadian campaign in Normandy. Personally, I think that Juno to the Falaise Gap is a workload unto its self. I also think its safe to say that time and how easy CM's editor is to work with will determine just how much ground can be covered by all us Commonwealth types in scenario/operation development. Who knows, maybe we can all collaborate in some sort of CM dry-out centre.

While I may speak for a minority here (from a biased perspective I might add), I do think its great,...no fantastic!! that FINALLY a game engine has been developed that is able to incoporate Canadians and the Commonwealth. Well done BTS!!

I don't know about the rest of you, but playing to death battles like the Battle of the Buldge throughout a myriad of different games has just gotten real old. Time for something new and different.

Well thats my two bits....which with the American exchange rate....well it was almost two bits.

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"Hosti Acie Nominati"

[Londoner]

Thanx DrD, but to be honest i think alot of my countrymen here have overreacted a wee bit. I personally didn't find Max's statement offensive. Babaro at least offered a constuctive argument, but the rest of uz just slagged him. Max is surely entitled to his opinion, however much we disagree.

And LOL bararo, General Lee was some charater wasn't he. Didn't he requester half of Paris for his staff, not to mention selling off US equipment to the Mafia LOL.

[RobVarak]

One of the more interesting U.S. opinions of Monty can be found in General James Gavin's book On To Berlin. He spends significant time defending Monty's generalship, but emphasizes how by the end of the war his personality had eroded even his most fervent U.S. supporters.

Any support he may have enjoyed among U.S. officers was completely obliterated by his post-Aredennes press conference, in which he described the battle as "one of the most interesting and tricky that I have ever handled." To be fair, the British press added fuel to the fire by lauding Monty's "achievements" and criticizing Ike's handling of the land battle.

It's an interesting book, and I believe that Gavin is one of the tremendously underappreciated officers of the war.

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Rob Varak

Editor

Site on Sound: The Web's Premier Site For Musical Discussion

www.siteonsound.com

[Ron]

Another good book detailing the complexities and personalties of the Normandy Campaign, with added emphasis on the Commonwealth operations, is 'Decision in Normandy' by Carlo D'Este. The author's perspective is focused on the whole rather than the part and makes for a thoughtful read. The best $14(Cdn) I spent on a book to date.

Ron

My head in on loose but my shoes are tight

[Maximus]

Actually I made the comment in jist of an incident in Market Garden where an American Airborne Division was waiting for XXX Corps, and an American commander rode back in a jeep and found XXX Corps hangin' out in a village sippin' tea with the locals.

Basically, the whole argument stems around a sense of priority.

From the film, "A Bridge Too Far" when that US Airborne commander (forgot the actor's name) went to Michael Caine's tank and said, "Must you do everything by-the-book?" That is where I get most of my setiment towards the lack of priorities of British Command. YES, it's Hollywood, but isn't it true to some degree?

In war, isn't the best motivator, instinct or spur of the moment? Since battles are very fluid and dynamic situations, you can't always go "as planned" or "by-the-book".

Same thing happened in Sicily if I do remember correctly. Monty was cautiously advancing while Patton had already moved across the whole island and liberated Palermo which was what Monty was after.

Again, no offense, just explaining myself a bit better. Patton may have been a radical General, but he knew how to get the job done as quickly as possible. Patton, if you all haven't guessed is my role model.

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"The greatest risk...is not taking one."

[Londoner]

Quick, doesn't me best Max. Russell Wiegley affirms, "The American way of war in WW2 chewed up American Infantrymen". His achievments costed more American blood that need of been shed.

[This message has been edited by Londoner (edited 06-07-2000).]

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Maximus:

Again, no offense, just explaining myself a bit better. Patton may have been a radical General, but he knew how to get the job done as quickly as possible. Patton, if you all haven't guessed is my role model. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That assessment wholly depends on the success of the operation and how much risk you want your generals to take. Patton took much larger risks with his men and material than the British at that point in time were willing or able to take. They had lost most of a generation in the trenches during the great war, largely due to ill-advised gambles, and they could not afford to lavish manpower onto their problems. The approach by the book mostly served to save man's lifes, and that should not be forgotten. In Market Garden it worked the other way round, but I believe that a lot of English soldiers were spared because of this approach in the later stage of the war.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[gaffertape]

Maximus:

There is some truth in that, but there is also truth in the rest of the British soldier's statement in A Bridge Too Far:

They could have gone up that road, yes, but their infantry was still fighting and hadn't caught up to the armoured column.

As you yourself have posted, tanks without infantry are easy prey; particularly when XXX Corps were restricted to a single road.

GAFF

[Spook]

And yet to this day, it always seems to boil down to "Monty vs. Patton" when comparisons are made. Interesting.

The only basis for comparison is the Sicily campaign, where Montgomery & Patton were in equivalent command roles. Beyond that, Monty's role was one step higher, as an army group commander. So for discussing operational conduct of the NW Europe campaigns, the real basis of comparison should be Montgomery vs. Bradley or Devers. All the more so, in that Bradley's opposition and contempt for Monty ran even deeper than Patton's in some regards.

Insofar on this topic thread, though, I haven't really read much objective commentary as to discern how "good" or "bad" Monty really was, for those among you who think it's important to comment specifically on him. I'm sorry if this offends some of you posters, but I seem to be only reading the generalized comments that Monty was "good" or "bad" or "competent" or that he was admired/despised by colleagues. That just doesn't tell me nearly enough.

To pose some examples: How would one assess Montgomery's operational capabilities in the Normandy, Holland, Ardennes, and Rhine campaigns? Could he have done better or worse in such grand-battles? Was he right or wrong in his "Single-thrust" concept for invading Germany? How might a commander of similar traits had fared on a different theater of war, like the Eastern Front?

(I drop that last nugget to hint that I think it's valid to say that Western Allied operational leaders MIGHT still be a bit overrated compared to the best Soviet higher commanders of WW2, let alone the Germans.)

Babboro is right to point out one thing, though. For the Normandy campaign up to late-August, Monty commanded ALL of the ground forces, including the US forces. That was a role that can easily be forgotten about, and shouldn't.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by gaffertape:

Maximus:

There is some truth in that, but there is also truth in the rest of the British soldier's statement in A Bridge Too Far:

They could have gone up that road, yes, but their infantry was still fighting and hadn't caught up to the armoured column.

As you yourself have posted, tanks without infantry are easy prey; particularly when XXX Corps were restricted to a single road.

GAFF<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hehe, facts getting in the way of a great story again - also, there seems to be this misconception that drinking tea means a break from fighting. Tea is made here wherever and whenever possible. SS_Panzerleader posted somewhere the story of two British officers caught in an arty barrage in Tunisia brewing a cuppa under their truck. If they could have gone somewhere, they most likely would have. Since they couldn't, they went ahead and had some tea while waiting.

Also, have a look at the history of the 43rd Wessex Division. They actually lost a whole batallion put across the Rhine to cover the withdrawal of 1st Airborne sorry remnants.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Jon_S]

OBG

did you read the Hollywood thread? And if you did, did all the big words make sense to you? Reading your post above ...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From the film, "A Bridge Too Far" ... That is where I get most of my setiment towards the lack of priorities of British Command<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

... it would appear not.

The whole thrust of the Hollywood thread was that films distory history for dramatic effect or in the interests of the 'story'. Cripes, you didn't even have the decency to watch two films - let alone read any books - before forming a bigotted opinion!

Still grumpy (despite Bobbaros excellent post)

Jon

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Ubique

[This message has been edited by Jon_S (edited 06-07-2000).]

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:

How would one assess Montgomery's operational capabilities in the Normandy, Holland, Ardennes, and Rhine campaigns? Could he have done better or worse in such grand-battles? Was he right or wrong in his "Single-thrust" concept for invading Germany? How might a commander of similar traits had fared on a different theater of war, like the Eastern Front?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not being a trained historian, but in my discipline you would have a big methodological problem here. How do you compare it? Against what? Where is someone who operated in similar circumstances, numbers involved, terrain, technology? Fiendishly difficult to do, therefore boiling down to personal opinion very often.

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Andreas

The powers of accurate perception are often called cynicism by those who do not possess them. (forgot who said it)

[Jon_S]

RE: Andreas' tea drinking story...

In one of the gliders on teh way to Arnhem some Brit paras started brewing up in the back. The co-pilot was a little nervous about the operation, the flak, and then completley lost it when he looked in the back and saw the chaps using a petrol cooker on top of a stack of ammo.

The pilot took a more relaxed veiw, and told him to make sure they got a cup too.

Sort of sums up the British phlegmatic approach to warfare for me.

From the book A Bridge Too Far.

Regards

Jon

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Ubique

[This message has been edited by Jon_S (edited 06-07-2000).]

[robertpat1]

While I'm a belever in Montey's troop sparing tactics. I would like to bring up posably one of the most under rated brillint milatary minds of the centery... Romal. Just wondering what your reaction's are.

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A 2x4 and a kind word work better than just a 2x4