Hakko Ichiu Posted February 21, 2000 Share Posted February 21, 2000 Has anybody read: When the Odds Were Even : The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-January 1945 by Keith E. Bonn I happened on this while buying "Closing with the Enemy" on Amazon. Looked interesting, but there were no reader reviews. Ethan ------------------ Das also war des Pudels Kern! -- Goethe Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Gen. Sosaboski Posted February 21, 2000 Share Posted February 21, 2000 Same thing happened to me. Didn't end up buying it (Money concerns ), but from what I've heard around, it looks pretty good. ------------------ Sosabowski, 1st Pol. Abn. Yes, I know my name is spelled wrong as a member! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest gyrene251 Posted February 21, 2000 Share Posted February 21, 2000 When the Odds Were Even is a thorough account of the Vosges campaign. It is particularly important in that it proves that the GI was just as good as the German soldier when the "Odds Were Even". Without the benefit of artillery support, air support and armor (weather and terrain precluded the use of these items) the GI beat the German at his own game. It is highly researched and well documented book. I recommend the book to anyone. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Madmatt Posted February 21, 2000 Share Posted February 21, 2000 I too saw this book the other night at one of the local Mega-Book stores. I paged through it for about 20 minutes and almost grabbed it but decided not to until I got through the over 50 WWII books I have purchased since CM got on my harddrive! Madmatt ------------------ If it's in Combat Mission, it's on Combat Mission HQ! combathq.thegamers.net [This message has been edited by Madmatt (edited 02-20-2000).] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Seimerst Posted February 21, 2000 Share Posted February 21, 2000 If you have the money buy it. It is a good addition to anyone's library if that part of WWII interests you. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Otto Mekanik Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 I agree, very well researched book, but I was hoping for more smaller level unit stories and first hand accounts. I lose interest when they describe where every unit went(ie. 14th div, 234regiment moved to the west of the 15th div, 123rd regiments) But that is my opinion. I actually stumbled across the author of that book while ordering another war book. He is at Aegis Consulting Phone(814)-623-8308 or email at aegis@bedford.net I think he went by the name of Kitt Bonn. He spent 30 minutes on the phone with me talking about war stuff and Operation Nordwind(that was VERY COOL!) He said he did that book while at the Univ. of Chicago for a thesis and they are into facts...not personal histories like he would have liked. Contact him if you want, he was very friendly. Otto Mekanik Portland, OR [This message has been edited by Otto Mekanik (edited 02-21-2000).] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Los Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 "When the Odds Were Even is a thorough account of the Vosges campaign. It is particularly important in that it proves that the GI was just as good as the German soldier when the "Odds Were Even". Without the benefit of artillery support, air support and armor (weather and terrain precluded the use of these items) the GI beat the German at his own game." I guess this instance wipes out the dozens of occasions when outnumbered, outgunned, out supplied Germans beat back US troops in small unit actions. <grin> Really skews that bell shaped curve. Los Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest GriffinCheng Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> actually stumbled across the author of that book while ordering another war book. He is at Aegis Consulting Phone(814)-623-8308 or email at aegis@bedford.net I think he went by the name of Kitt Bonn. He spent 30 minutes on the phone with me talking about war stuff and Operation Nordwind(that was VERY COOL!) He said he did that book while at the Univ. of Chicago for a thesis and they are into facts...not personal histories like he would have liked.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Gosh! I always want to be a historian. Anyone know what I should do? Griffin @ work Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest gyrene251 Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 Los.... Read the book and you will understand. Also read Michael Doubler's book "Closing with the Enemy" and Peter Mansoor's new book "The GI Offensive in Europe". You will get a better perspective. While there were many times that the Germans threw back American attacks, there were plenty of times that they didn't...we can nit pick the entire war. These books all have a fair and balanced approach on this subject. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kevin Christensen Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 Another interesting bit of trivia highlighted in When the Odds Were Even. The Vosges Campaign was the first time in history that any army ever forced a winter passage through the Vosges Mountains. So the GIs were not only performing well, but they accomplished something that no army had ever done. The book interesting in that it takes on the general presumption that German WWII Military organization was better, and should be emulated by todays armies. Kevin Christensen Lawrence, KS Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 I think Los was trying to make the point that the Vosges campaign is an outlier and is OFTEN incorrectly utilised to try to support the "GIs were the equal of well-trained Germans" camp. Using outliers I can prove the Japanese were, man for man, more effective soldiers than the American Marines if I want . The point is that outliers (such as the Vosges campaign) shouldn't be used to make sweeping points (as that book tries). I've read it and don't particularly agree with the findings. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Germanboy Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fionn: The point is that outliers (such as the Vosges campaign) shouldn't be used to make sweeping points (as that book tries). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Haven't read this one, but that won't stop me from making a comment. Fionn is absolutely right here - what one should do with outliers is to analyse them and find the reasons why they happened. If the outlier has a desired outcome, while the general theory does not, you can try to create conditions in which the outlier becomes the norm. As for 'Closing with the Enemy', I would argue that Doubler does not try to prove whether the US were up to the standards of the Germans. He wants to prove that US pre-war doctrine was by and large correct and needed only tweaking in the field. This is understandable, given his background as a career officer. He also comments on the learning process units in the field underwent that made them better at what they did. His book uses a case-study approach, describing an action in the form of initial failure, improvement, success. I just don't think his thesis holds up. I shut up now. Social scientist mode off. ------------------ Andreas Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Hakko Ichiu Posted February 22, 2000 Author Share Posted February 22, 2000 I haven't even read the book yet, and here I am making a comment on my own request for comment <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fionn: I think Los was trying to make the point that the Vosges campaign is an outlier and is OFTEN incorrectly utilised to try to support the "GIs were the equal of well-trained Germans" camp. Using outliers I can prove the Japanese were, man for man, more effective soldiers than the American Marines if I want . The point is that outliers (such as the Vosges campaign) shouldn't be used to make sweeping points (as that book tries). I've read it and don't particularly agree with the findings.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> What, in comparative troop assessment, constitutes an outlier? As others have noted, there are instances where outnumbered and outgunned Germans whipped the Allies, and instances where they didn't; the converse is also true. The trick comes in isolating the factors that determine the outcome of an action starting from quality of generalship all the way down to quantity/quality of ammo. It would seem to me to be at least a robust in-going hypothesis to say that, if, in the Vosges campaign, the Germans were not out-gunned or out-generaled and had the advantage of terrain, then troop quality must have played a role. Whether it was determinative would depend on other possible factors not yet mentioned. One could argue that over the course of a campaign which is, after all, a series of smaller actions, that a statistically significant number of examples has been generated from which to draw a conclusion. Hence, the Vosges campaign would be as close to a controlled study as one can get in such things, and hence not an outlier at all, but just the opposite. After having launched this incredibly astute meta-argument, perhaps I'd better buy the book . Besides, if the US GIs were better than the Germans, I have a good excuse for why Andreas "Germanboy" Biermann is currently kicking my Axis butt in CE. Ethan ------------------ Das also war des Pudels Kern! -- Goethe Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Germanboy Posted February 22, 2000 Share Posted February 22, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Hakko Ichiu: Besides, if the US GIs were better than the Germans, I have a good excuse for why Andreas "Germanboy" Biermann is currently kicking my Axis butt in CE.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Forget about that one, it is just my superior generalship, has nothing to do with troop quality really He says gloatingly while getting his butt kicked himself on several occasions... ------------------ Andreas Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
von Lucke Posted February 23, 2000 Share Posted February 23, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Kevin Christensen: The book interesting in that it takes on the general presumption that German WWII Military organization was better, and should be emulated by todays armies. Kevin Christensen Lawrence, KS<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I was under the impression that the US Army already took this tack back in the late '80's --- about the same time they started introducing the "Light Division" concept and the decidedly Germanic-looking kevlar helmets... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 23, 2000 Share Posted February 23, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> What, in comparative troop assessment, constitutes an outlier? As others have noted, there are instances where outnumbered and outgunned Germans whipped the Allies, and instances where they didn't; the converse is also true. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Sure, but that's not why I think thew Vosges campaign is an outlier. Note, I did NOT say that all the fighting during the campaign was an outlier but that the nature of the campaign itself was an outlier. The end result of the whole campaign being an outlier is that if one tries to draw conclusions from it one is condemned to draw false conclusions. Also, let's not forget that Doubler wrote the book with a clear agenda in mind. Furthermore he specifically chose the Vosges campaign so as to be able to prove HIS agenda. Doubler didn't pick the Vosges campaign at random and, by chance, find that it fit into his agenda. HIS AGENDA PICKED THE CAMPAIGN FOR HIM ! . <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The trick comes in isolating the factors that determine the outcome of an action starting from quality of generalship all the way down to quantity/quality of ammo. It would seem to me to be at least a robust in-going hypothesis to say that, if, in the Vosges campaign, the Germans were not out-gunned or out-generaled and had the advantage of terrain, then troop quality must have played a role. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Good points but somewhat handicapped by the fact you haven't read the book and seen some of Doubler's conclusions. I would aver that the primary characteristic of the Vosges campaign (and this would be a determinant characteristic IMO) is that the German forces in the region were ordered to retreat from the area regardless of whether they had local superiority or not. The Vosges campaign was NOT decided by the hard fighting of GIs in the Vosges region BUT by the fighting of Soviet infantrymen on the Eastern Front and, to a lesser extent, the fighting of Allied servicemen in Normandy. Note the use of the phrase "NOT decided by the hard fighting of GIs in the Vosges region" as it is pivotal to my point. Doubler uses the Vosges campaign to assert the fighting equivalency of US forces vis a vis German forces YET the outcome of the campaign was NOT decided by the fights he examines. It would be akin to having a boxing match declared a draw and having one boxer killed driving home that night and saying that because this boxer died on the night of a drawn fight that his opponent must have killed him. To kill the first boxer his opponent must have punched him very hard and so, ipso facto, his opponent MUST have had the best right hook in the world . <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> One could argue that over the course of a campaign which is, after all, a series of smaller actions, that a statistically significant number of examples has been generated from which to draw a conclusion. Hence, the Vosges campaign would be as close to a controlled study as one can get in such things, and hence not an outlier at all, but just the opposite. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The entire NATURE of the campaign makes it an outlier . If I ordered an army to retreat to a new river line 100 metres behind my current front line so as to consolidate for the winter and the enemy followed me and engaged a few rearguard parties in a few firefights ( involving roughly 10% of my force at most) would you say that either: a) the enemy army opposing me had forced my withdrawal due to intensive offensive actions or I had conducted a strategic withdrawal in which a few small rearguard actions kept the enemy off my back and allowed me to bring my army, in relatively good shape, into strong defensive positions ? Now, look at the campaign you're talking about . The withdrawal was not forced by US units in the Vosges at all. Doubler presents this withdrawal as some triumph of US arms whereas in fact it was nothing of the sort. Tactically gaining ground against an enemy who is in strategic retreat to rejoin the main body of his army is no victory. It is as inevitable as rainfall and night. So, in conclusion, yes, one could argue what you are stating above but that would be to ignore the context of the campaign and the "conclusions" which Doubler draws. Furthermore the Vosges campaign is about as far from a controlled study as one can get since the Vosges campaign's primary determinant factor was the retreat of German forces in the region due to STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS elsewhere in France and NOT due to any fighting occuring in the Vosges. Basically my point is that Doubler chose the Vosges campaign since he could show some very impressive statistics of ground captured, enemies captured etc etc and could wrap this up with his agenda of the US fighting man and doctrine being (at least) as good as the Germans and their doctrine. He is misleading readers IMO since the reason for these impressive statistics was NOT US doctrine and individual fighting ability and efficiency but the strategical situation. Fionn Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Germanboy Posted February 23, 2000 Share Posted February 23, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fionn: Also, let's not forget that Doubler wrote the book with a clear agenda in mind. Fionn<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Fionn, agree with what you said, far too many researchers choose their cases so that they fit their hypotheses - it makes it immensely more gratifying to see that you are right A big problem in qualitative research these days. Minor quibble, Doubler wrote 'Closing With The Enemy", and I assume you are talking about the Vosges campaign thingy which seems to have been written by Keith E. Bonn. ------------------ Andreas Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Aacooper Posted February 23, 2000 Share Posted February 23, 2000 Fionn, Where´d you get your information that the Germans were withdrawing on purpose opposite the 7th Army? You present no information to that effect. In "Panzer General", Mellethin (sp?, I´m writing this away from home), the chief of staff of the Army Group G in the Vosges states only that the US 7th Army was making good progess. He doesn´t mention a planned withdrawal. If they were withdrawing on purpose, why were they defending opposite Patton? The 7th Army out-gained the 3rd in that timeframe. If they were withdrawing on purpose, why´d they leave troops behind in Colmar? If they were withdrawing on purpose, why did the Germans construct fortifications in the Vosges? The Germans withdrew from river line to river line when the American attacks made the position untenable. Once Strausberg was taken, the Germans DID withdraw on purpose, and that was a textbook withdrawal. However, the US made progress against the Germans when they tried to make a stand in December, until the Bulge happened. The fact is, sometimes American tactics, fighting men, and strategy were better than the Germans, and sometimes the Germans were better than the Americans. There were very few battles with little airpower, good supply on both sides, and evenly matched foes. If you can cite a better example, please do. The lesson that I get from the Vosges is that the late-1944 U.S. fighting man was better than the German late-1944 fighting man because the U.S. didn´t skimp on training as the war went on. Since I don´t believe there was a planned German withdrawal, there is no way the Vosges is an outlier. Any Army-sized battle has to be factored into the overall equation of who is better. An outlier is Audie Murphy single-handedly turning back a German attack (oops he was in the Vosges). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
von Lucke Posted February 23, 2000 Share Posted February 23, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aacooper: The fact is, sometimes American tactics, fighting men, and strategy were better than the Germans, and sometimes the Germans were better than the Americans. There were very few battles with little airpower, good supply on both sides, and evenly matched foes. If you can cite a better example, please do. The lesson that I get from the Vosges is that the late-1944 U.S. fighting man was better than the German late-1944 fighting man because the U.S. didn´t skimp on training as the war went on.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Well, I'd have to cite the fighting in the Huertgen Wood between Sept - Dec '44, and Kesselring's defense of the Gothic Line in Italy during the same period. [This message has been edited by von Lucke (edited 02-23-2000).] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 23, 2000 Share Posted February 23, 2000 Andreas, Yes, sorry that was a quick post and I got the name wrong. Someone had mentioned Doubler and it stuck in my head somehow. AAcooper, Hmm, well I don't want to come across too strongly so just bear in mind that if I point out errors in your argument it is nothing personal ok? I mean no offence but I'm going to correct some misunderstandings and misappreciations. I didn't present any "evidence" since the fact that the units in Southern France were ordered to withdraw by their higher command is generally known and has never once been challenged in any book I've read. Thus, I thought everyone who reads this forum would be aware of it. It's a historical fact so well known as to rank equally obvious to me saying that Rommel felt any invasion should be defeated on the beaches before it had time to consolidate. As for your 7th Army comment. I presume that you understand that over the course of a 1000 km front line it is somehow possible that while one might order units in one section of that front line to resist to the end one might order units at the other extremity to conduct a strategic withdrawal. FWIW the Germans did not strongly resist Patton. They merely put up a few rearguards every so often and tried to get the hell behind the Seine. Patton's campaign was ANOTHER example of a succesful campaign being succesful primarily because the enemy was conducting a strategic withdrawal at the time. Hell, check the dates of the Falaise pocket and then look at the dates in the Vosges campaign. It's all quite self-explanatory. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> If they were withdrawing on purpose, why´d they leave troops behind in Colmar? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> For the same reason they left troops in major ports all along the coast of France (at least 160,000 were left in these fortresses). It was a fuehrerbefehl. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>If they were withdrawing on purpose, why did the Germans construct fortifications in the Vosges?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> BEFORE the campaign they constructed fortifications because that was army policy. During the campaign they constructed defences simply because ANY good army constructs defensive strongpoints all along any defensive line it occupies. Don't mix up a professional army's response to a retreat order (ie. a staged retreat) with a hard-fought "stand and die" type situation. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> The lesson that I get from the Vosges is that the late-1944 U.S. fighting man was better than the German late-1944 fighting man because the U.S. didn´t skimp on training as the war went on. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> As von Lucke said I could point out many other campaigns occuring during this time period in which US troops were beaten back time and again in trying to take their objectives. These other campaigns (some of which were pointed out by von Lucke) feature German defenders who were ordered to fight to the last to defend their positions. The Vosges campaign was simply a delaying action and all involved knew it. The tenacity of resistance (on the whole) wasn't comparable to campaigns in which the Germans were determined to hold. Finally I'd like to point out that your view of the Vosges campaign and the US fighting man is EXACTLY what Bonn set out to imprint on his readers. Final point... If Los (who is in the US Special Forces) has some issues with the book and its depiction of US capabilities then maybe he should be listened to? I am NOT saying that all small unit actions in the Vosges resulted in US defeats etc.. Far from it actually. I am merely saying that I feel the overall nature of that campaign led to it being chosen by Bonn to showcase his agenda and that, therefore, I'd be VERY wary of accepting anything written in an obviously biased book. As Los alluded combat capability is a bell-shaped curve. That means most units are average but on the extremities of the curve you get 1% who are truly atrocious and 1% who are simply as good as the best in any other army in the world. American combat men, at their best, were excellent but, generally speaking, weren't as good as fully trained or mostly trained German equivalents. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Quenaelin Posted February 24, 2000 Share Posted February 24, 2000 When the odds were even, ha, I doubt that very much, in year 1944 - 1945 german forces were so weak and outnumbered that there was only pure will or gutz what pushed them on. As you can see from the numbers losses in Allied side was much greater at first, but then Axis was out of resources and their losses started to grow fast. This is simply common sence, no book is needed for this kind of conclusion. I am not telling you witch side has best soldiers, better dicipline and better training is only one asset in the war, remember only one asset of many others which are affecting to outcome of the war. BR: Quenaelin Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 24, 2000 Share Posted February 24, 2000 Quenaelin, It's not as simple as you make out. The book was limiting itself to describing the actions during the Vosges campaign (where the situation was more equal in terms of fighting power than elsewhere). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Allan Posted February 25, 2000 Share Posted February 25, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fionn: Quenaelin, The book was limiting itself to describing the actions during the Vosges campaign (where the situation was more equal in terms of fighting power than elsewhere). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Ok since everyone is giving their opinion, and opinions are like butts (everybody has one), here is mine...errr opinion that is. For the last two years I have been on a WWII reading campaign. From what I have read it seems like from the beginning of the war till late 1944, the German solier had no equal. However, dilution of the average German combat unit with poorly trained /inexperienced soldiers due to attrition, degradated his combat effectivness in battle. I think one must also look into other factors such as the "mindset" of the German soldier at that point in time and the infantry weapons used by each side. For example, the average GI had an M1 garand semi-automatic rifle. The average German had the bolt-action Mauser. From a shear lead throwing ability, the GI had an advantage (discounting other squad weapons like MG's,BAR's etc). Thus, I think the question is much more complex than a simple mano y mano scenario. We probably will never know the true answer but it is fun to discuss. Damn, we need CM to come out before we start discussing which side had the best belts. Allan [This message has been edited by Allan (edited 02-24-2000).] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Herr Oberst Posted February 25, 2000 Share Posted February 25, 2000 Hmmm, now what was that quote... "I have never seen troops who performed so poorly in their first battle, nor who had learned so much by their second." IIRC, Rommel commenting on the US troops. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 25, 2000 Share Posted February 25, 2000 Actually I believe the Germans had the better belt buckles although I don't much like some of the cheapo late-war belt buckles they had (yuck). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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