Request for Comment: Book

[Aacooper]

I'd like to go back to the assumption that the Germans conducted a strategic withdrawal in the Vosges and opposite the 3rd Army. If that assumption is about the Alsace-Lorraine between September and December of 1944, I believe that assumption is incorrect.

I am back at home from my "uno vez mas" business trip and I can quote from "Panzer Battles" by Von Mellenthin. Von Mellenthin was the Chief of Staff of Army Group G from September 21st till his sacking in December 5th. I don't have secondary sources, as most of my library is at the Public Library. Still, Von Mellenthin is well-placed to give an accurate description of the orders that Army Group G was handed and tried to carry out.

Before Balck and Von Mellenthin took over, Balck met with Hitler (p. 372 in the paperback edition): "Finally Hitler announced his formal orders: Balck was to hold Alsace-Lorraine in all circumstances - the political situation demanded that the old Reichs provinces should be retained - he was to fight for time, and on no account must he allow a situation to develop in which forces earmarked for the Ardennes offensive would have to be sidetracked to Army Group G."

Around Luneville, Manteuffel counter-attacked on 9/18, and on 9/21 Balck's first move was to counter-attack. The goal was to stop XIIth Corps.

October was quiet, and Von Mellethin writes about the reinforcements (p. 382) "Even well-equipped units from Germany had received virtually no training and came straight from the parade-ground to the battlefield. Some panzer brigades had never even done any squadron training, which explains our enormous losses in tanks."

Now, I will interject that Balck learned on the Eastern Front that an effective defense is mobile, with tactical withdrawals and counterattacks. He rejected the notion of a static defense. Those movements are significantly different than yielding territory.

The US attacked again in November, and in the 3rd Army sector the 11th Panzer Div. had a successful counterattack. The result (p. 391) -- "Thus we gained time to reform our front and move up reserves." He didn't say anything about a strategic withdrawal. Around Metz, von Rundstedt wanted the salient abandoned, Balck wanted to defend it, and Hitler (who of course got his way) wanted Metz to be a fortress with a garrison to (p. 394) "fight to the last. But we minimized the effect of these orders by only alloting second-rate troops..."

The 7th Army attacked on 11/11 towards the Saverne Gap where (p.395) "the situation remained very tense." A withdrawal into the Vosges was ordered on 11/14 and the tacticality of it is shown by this quote (p. 396): "In spite of a very gallant defense the 553rd VGD was driven back remorselessly towards Sarrebourg..." Hitler ordered that (p. 397) ""not an inch of ground" was to be yielded at Saverne... ... We had no alternative but to issue orders accordingly." The Panzer Lehr was used for a counterattack and suffered losses. The use of the PL meant Army group G failed to meet the third part of Hitler's order. I don't have much Bulge info here, so I don't know if any other divisions used in Bulge were diverted to Army Group G in this timeframe.

Army Group G's mission is made clear by Balck and Von Mellenthin's proposal to counterattack to (p. 402) "regain Strasbourg, and crush the enemy's salient in this area." They didn't get the forces to do that.

The 95th Division captured a piece of the West Wall on 12/3, which led to the removal of the First Army commander. Von Mellenthin was removed, and Balck followed him in mid-December. Von Mellenthin puts a good face on the fighting, saying the Americans (p. 404) "had not achieved any great success." I believe the successes were significant when the rainy, snowy weather and hilly, mountainous terrain is considered. Hitler fired the top commanders, though.

Based on Hitler's orders, and the efforts of his commanders to follow it out, there was no strategic withdrawal in Alsace-Lorraine (Hitler seemed to acknowledge the possibility of losing ground, but that's not a call to withdraw). Rather, the German forces were forced to withdraw because of actions of the American army.

Because there was no strategic withdrawal, the Vosges campaign is not an outlier, but rather a +1 (who knows) Sigma campaign for the Americans. For example, the Hurtgen forest, when the difficulty of the terrain is factored out, might be a -1 Sigma campaign (again, who knows). All of the battles and campaigns can have the air, supply, and manpower advantage effects removed to calculate which side had better tactics, arms, and fighting spirit. However, I will not touch that question with a 10 foot pole. My point is that the Vosges are a valid data point for making that judgement.

Fionn, if I am wrong, please respond with a reading list so I may correct my uneducation (while waiting for CM to come out!).

However, I believe you are confusing the August mad dash with the September attempt to re-establish a strong front. The Bonn book does not deal with the Champagne Campaign, but rather the attacks against an organized defense.

[Allan]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fionn:

Actually I believe the Germans had the better belt buckles although I don't much like some of the cheapo late-war belt buckles they had (yuck).

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ok Fionn, I am starting to worry about you. Now you have turned into the fashion police

Maybe we should close this thread before we get into standard issue underwear

Allan

[Gromit]

If anyone is looking for a good source for comparing and contrasting the armies of europe in WW2, I highly recommend the original ASL Annual 1989. Unfortunately, it is out of print (at least until MMP gets around to a reprint).

There are two articles in particular I am referring to:

Pg.5,"A Nation of Workers: Utilization of American Manpower and Material in ASL" by Craig F. Posey. This deals with actual AGCT (Army General Classification Test) data and how levels I-V were distributed among the various arms of the US Army. Unlike the British and Germans, who sorted men based on several grades of physical service and assigned upon expected physical demands, the Americans had only General Service and Limited Service; the later was dropped in July, 1943.

Pg. 22,"The Evolution of Small Unit Tactics: A Historical Commentary on Squad Leader" by John Hill. This excellent "commentary" nicely weighs the tactical strengths and weaknesses of all the major european powers.

Hill's discussion of the Americans reveals the true nature that underlies the "symptoms" if you will, of the actions everyone above has talked about.

Hill says: "As a soldier, the American is an amateur and always will be. He is often an exceptionally talented amateur, but he is not, and has no desire to be, a professional. To the American, the concept of fighting is not that a soldier's profession, but rather a dirty job that has to be gotten on with."

The article goes on to talk about how "in philosophy and tactics the American soldier is a day laborer. He is a confirmed skeptic, a diehard opportunist, and a dedicated scavenger."

There are some more good thoughts if anyone is interested and cannot find the '89 Annual.

I guess my whole point is that if you agree with the opinions and viewpoints of Posey and Hill (which I do for the most part- they ARE generalizations after all) then the arguments over "who was the best" between the Germans and Americans can be reduced IMHO to the basic fact that Germans fielded a professional army for the majority of the war and the US consisted of mostly amateur soldiers "getting on with a dirty job".

Essentially, I feel that you all are trying to compare "apples to oranges" as the old saying goes.

Great discussion guys, this is just my opinion on the matter.

Paul

[This message has been edited by Gromit (edited 02-26-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Gromit (edited 02-26-2000).]