References to "Armored Spearheads"

[kevinkin]

I noticed even in post cold war writings giving credit to combined arms doctrine when applied, authors seem to always

refer to the use of tanks as the "spearhead" of the subject offensive. I just read this again in "Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 41-42". Are tanks so sexy that they still skew the writings of authors who seem to know better? If a spear's effectiveness is via its momentum into a target, why would artillery be any less of a spearhead? 

 

Kevin 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Think of it like, tanks are awesome and everything else is stupid and the shaft of the spear.

 

When doing the penetration and sort of high mobility fight armor is the forefront of the fight, as unlike infantry and artillery it can basically fight on the march.  So the tippy point of the spear is the armor and mechanized type forces for that fight.  If something that can stop the armor (enemy in complex ground, heavy fortification, natural barriers) is found then the other supporting arms (and services) become much more important, but if you're speaking in terms of a combined arms offensive, right at the front of it will be the armor, (with armor supporting tools like SP artillery, tank riders/armored infantry/mechanized infantry etc) which makes the spearhead description apt.

Artillery and infantry have major momentum penalties that come with anything but "tactical" type deployments (so tank riders hopping off to clear low level objectives, short fire missions from SPGs).  They're not really the spearhead nearly as much as they're the tools that allows the spearhead to overcome obstacles (which makes them just as important as the 1939-1941 experiments in tank heavy-infantry light formations will show).   

[JasonC]

kevinkin - they are speaking operationally, not tactically.  The forces on the map that are driving into enemy controlled territory on narrow fronts to deep depths behind the initial front are mechanized units.  They penetrate deeply because of their mobility, at least as much as their armor.  They also drive through the enemy defended zone with a greater indifference to his soft firepower coverage (long range MGs, registered artillery fire etc), and thus the whole defensive position "feels" softer to them, than it does to leg infantry.  They have to hit dedicated AT weapons to hit something "hard enough" to impede their progress, and armies tend to have only limited amounts of that everywhere, and amounts of it concentrated enough to stop whole tank battalions or brigades only in chosen, important points.

 

Thus, up at that operational scale, reviewing the moves on a map, the armor formations feel like spears.  They have harder points than most of the enemy defense - all the places where the defender doesn't have concentrated AT weapons are "soft" to concentrated armor.  And they can be driven deeper into the enemy positions, more rapidly.  

 

Then their operational role is to create paths for other units to follow and expand.  Truck infantry follows them.  Leg infantry widens the holes they made, with its slower artillery support.

Understand, artillery tactically may seem like it is the longest reached combat system with its 10 miles range from any given position.  But to pick up a serious amount of it and move them forward 25 miles, you have to haul their ammo weight with them.  Horse drawn guns are not going to do that rapidly, or through a blasted moonscape, or enemy shellfire, with any rapidity.  Motorized guns can do more, sure, but still can't move large ammo dumps of a million shells on a few hour time scale.  Tank units, on the other hand, haul their fighting power with them through the enemy defended zone, to points 25 to 50 miles farther on in a day or two.  The logistic thruput to keep up full artillery parks with such rates of advance did not exist in any army.  A few guns could get forward with limited ammo supply.  But more of both only caught up, built up, and enabled large scale fire support again, after the front stopped moving and logistics and transport had time to shift ammo forward to their new positions.

 

Thus, mechanized forces were indeed the spearheads.  Just on a large time and space scale, than a tactical CM battlefield.

[kevinkin]

 

panzersaurkrautwerfer sort of started in jest where I was going. The tank weapon system is overemphasized in popular writings on WW2.

Unless you are really into military doctrine, the reader might get the impression that the tank was the be-all-and-end all of ground warfare. Just mass enough tanks and drive where you want to go. The reader may not realize that without supporting arms used in cooperation, a tank attack becomes a pin pick above the tactical level. So when supporting arms are used in cooperation with tanks do tanks form the spread head? There is no harm in calling them that. The diamond head to the power drill. The power in this this analogy provided follow on troops and logistics en mass to produce an operational defeat. I think the terms tank warfare and tank spearheads are too simplistic however . Authors admonish the early war Soviets for their lack of using tanks in cooperation with all arms. But then tend to elevate the tank weapon system higher than they may intend too. So the phrase "300 tanks to spread head an attack" sounds like a position thing. But without support they become very negative operationally if they get cut off. 

Tanks are sexy and will remain so think. 

 

Kevin

[womble]

To expand the analogy, a spearhead without a shaft is a dagger. A poorly made one with no intentional handle. Not the best weapon to bring to a line fight.

[Sgt Joch]

Authors use a lot of buzzwords to evoke sweeping images. When you actually dig down into the details, you often get a different picture.

 

For example, you look at campaign maps and you see Army/Corps sweeping over large areas whereas the reality on the ground might turn on who controls a few key villages to control supply routes and dominate the surrounding terrain with firepower.

 

"Armored spearheads" were usually combined arms units operating deep in rear areas, the bulk of which might never even come into contact with the enemy.

 

If you look at, for example, Soviet postwar doctrine, the 1st element, the "tip of the spear", would be about platoon size, mixed AFVs and motorized infantry, followed some distance behind by a 2nd group with the rest of the company, followed by a 3rd group with the rest of the battalion, etc. This way if the 1st group ran into an ambush, losses would be small. Also, this gives the commander a lot of options if they run into enemy forces, the 1st group platoon leader can decide to: 1) push through; 2) go around and let follow on forces deal with the obstacle; or 3) wait for the other groups to show up. The platoon leader also relays the info to the company HQ in the 2nd group and the battalion HQ in the 3rd group, etc., so each commander has the time to formulate a plan before they arrive on the scene. AFAIK, all combatants operated pretty much the same way in 43-45.

Edited August 20, 2015 by Sgt Joch

[JasonC]

Sgt Joch - no, I don't think "all combatants operated pretty much the same way in 43-45".  Even different components of the same army didn't operate the same way.

 

Telling me they must have because post war (not 43-45) doctrine (not practice) describing march formations and move to contact practices advised engaging with smallest elements first, is a bit like saying, since riflemen in all arms put their rifle to one of their shoulders and aligned the sights before pulling the trigger, clearly they were all fighting the same way in all respects.  There are certainly very elementary military actions that there is only one right way to do, and people do them that right way.  That doesn't suffice to remove all variation in combat doctrine or practice.

 

Russian rifle didn't fight like Russian mech. US infantry force probe routines weren't how the British attacked, armor first, in Goodwood.  German panzer divisions didn't use a stylized echelon attack scheme the way Russian mech did.  Nor did Germans put half their tube artillery and armor at army level for commitment here or there as a division's mission dictated.  Russians didn't make regimental teams of all arms by cross attachment of artillery and division assets downward, either in the even slices the US favored or the battalion sized lumps the Germans favored.  Germans didn't use armored TD battalions flocking to the wound site as a primary means of anti tank defense, like Americans did.  Russians didn't let every 2nd Lt with a radio call in a corps worth of artillery fire if he had a good target, like US and British sometimes did.

 

They all had different force types, weapon mixes, tasking procedures, favored tactics, expectations and responsibilities by size of the unit or rank of the officer, etc.

[Sgt Joch]

Maybe I was not that clear in my post, but I was only referring to armoured units operating in the enemy's rear areas after a breakthrough, i.e. the "armoured spearheads".

 

I have not seen detailed descriptions of WW2 Soviet tactics in english, if there is some I would love to read it. FM-100-2-1 contains detailed description of Soviet postwar tactics. Since from what I read, Soviet postwar tactics were heavily influenced by their WW2 experience, it gives us at least a general indication of what the late WW2 tactics were.

 

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll9/id/508

 

Regarding other combatants, U.S. armoured tactics were basically the same, as described in FM 17-33 on the tank battalion or FM 17-42 on the armoured infantry battalion, i.e. the march is led by a recon platoon, followed some ways back by a company strength "advance guard", followed some distance behind by the rest of the Battalion.

 

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll9/id/508

Edited August 21, 2015 by Sgt Joch

[JasonC]

A march formation in a manual isn't a combat doctrine.

 

US armored task forces in fact led with a medium tank company, as a rule.  With a Jumbo on point if they had one.  Not with attached cavalry in jeeps or recon anything.

 

Recon forces mostly got screening and security missions, defense of long flanks to enable other forces to concentrate, and the like.  Sometimes they even attacked, but when they did they dismounted and fought like infantry, supported by organic mortars and their assault guns and light tanks - hopefully against a relatively weak, infantry only enemy.  And that wasn't a matter of doctrine or fulfilling a planned role, it was just a field expedient when the only unit around was a cavalry battalion or company, and the operations situation required another probe.

 

The typical tactical formation in a US AD force was a task force, a battalion sized unit created by cross attaching armored infantry companies with tank companies to create an armor heavy or an infantry heavy mix in 2 to 1 ratios.  The typical tactical formation in a US ID force was an infantry battalion with attachments, working as part of a regimental combat team that attached tank and TD support, and a portion of the divisional artillery, down to regiment.

 

Then when a US ID force actually had to attack, it is a battalion assigned the mission, but they don't attack with the whole battalion.  They designated one company as assault, another as support, and the remainder as reserve (3rd line plus HQ, weapons, etc).  The support has a front line position with observation and in range to support by fire, and gets to hold the frontage if the assault battalion gets shot to pieces, so there isn't a hole in the line as the result of a defeat.  It quickly has the same frontage assigned to it as the assault company, just staying at the start line.  It also is supposed to move up and relieve the assault company when and if the attack succeeds, to allow that company to reorganize and the like.  Either it, or the reserve, then takes the assault role, with the other getting the new support role, while the original assault company rotates into reserve as soon as the local combat conditions permit it.

 

Thus, a US infantry battalion is expected to attack with just a single company, and at most some mortar and MG fire support at medium range from the rest of the formation. 

 

How the heck is that supposed to work?  Answer, they aren't relying on infantry numbers to begin with.  It doesn't take a regiment to follow up a barrage.  Sending more men wouldn't increase the shells sent, or the number of supporting tanks, or make the ground any better, or surprise the enemy more.  All the determinants of the success of these little probes, not pushed too hard individually, were outside of the question of how many men were sent and frankly most of them were beyond the control of the attacking infantry battalion.

 

Didn't matter, because these nibbles were going on all over the line, and some would succeed, and the accompanying artillery fire would bleed the enemy, and between him bleeding and little wedges being driven into his position and the whole thing being continued day after day, the line would gradually crawl over the enemy and hurt him the while.  That's how US infantry divisions fought.  The whole system was designed to have another probe ready to go the next day, no matter what.  They didn't try to win the war *today*.  Meanwhile, every nibbling company could get tank support and an artillery barrage and have the whole "kit bag" in a combined arms sense, and the local commander was expected to use the right tool for each enemy encountered, and carefully pick through them.

 

The US AD way of fighting, on the other hand, was above all the find a local flank and turn it with a vehicle move.  Find fix flank was the standing method of any task force.  Terrain and enemy dictated who had which role in that.  An armor heavy task force (2 medium tank companies, 1 armored infantry company, smaller attachments of TDs, engineers, cavalry, whatever) would generally do the finding with a tank company, and the fixing with one of the others.  The armored infantry could be the flankers if it involved going through woods or a town or over a river, or the fixers if it was just a matter of containing an enemy infantry force and pinning them down.  The flanking move could be designed to assault the enemy from a new direction, or to just get behind and "bag" them, expecting to take them prisoner after subjecting them to a prolonged shelling, or it could be a true bypass movement, finding a route that the rest of the task force would follow, leaving only a small screen around the enemy and hauling tail for the next objective.

 

Both forces tended to think of their problem as one of movement and reaching tactical objectives.  The AD way in particular wanted to find a way around and keep going, and fought to get that only if it had to.  The ID way assigned near and reachable objectives, expected to clear them and hold them, and then ratchet the whole thing forward, more systematically.  They also fought to enable movement more than the other way around, but expected to have to fight more because more things could readily block them.

 

The emphasis on ground control and rating any mission as successful if a terrain objective was reached, was arguably a pretty dumb way of thinking about combat, but it was the American way in such things.  Big bags of prisoners and avoiding complete destruction of one's own formation were about the only other items that ranked.  And even the former of those was not much more than gravy, the big thing was to reach the spot on the map the muckety mucks had assigned one to reach, by the hour they called for it to be reached.  Stringing those together into a victory was the responsibility of someone with stars on their shoulder, not bars, oak leaves, or birds.

 

Failure was always an option.  Meaning, if the mission looked too hard or losses promised to be too high, they could and did just say "screw this, somebody blew it" and chuck the mission, go to ground, defend what they could.  Somebody else can do the job today.  Pressing hard and getting a lot of guys killed was considered a disaster and stupidity, not bravery or devotion to duty.  With the net result that advantage situations were pushed and disadvantage situations were backed off, though also with a side effect of some lethargy or half heartedness - at least by some other armies' standards in such things.

 

Just an example of the variety of actual combat practice, in different armies and branches, in the second half of WW II...

Edited August 21, 2015 by JasonC

[Sgt Joch]

A march formation in a manual isn't a combat doctrine.

 

US armored task forces in fact led with a medium tank company, as a rule.  With a Jumbo on point if they had one.  Not with attached cavalry in jeeps or recon anything.

.

with all due respect, the U.S. Army did not go to all the trouble of establishing a combat doctrine, just so ground commanders could ignore it.

The doctrine was followed, a march to contact was carried out by a recon element, the M4 tanks were held back and used as needed.

For example, when U.S. 4th AD started its drive north to Bastogne on dec. 22, both Combat Commands were led by a recon element composed of M5 stuarts and cavalry vehicles. The medium tanks were behind in other groups and were only brought up to the front lines as needed.

[JasonC]

I deny it. The tank battalion commander led the road march north in his own vehicle, though that was out of contact. Then Task Force Ezell, one tank company leading, one armored infantry company, and one battery of Priest was the first to push in to the Bastogne perimeter. They were ordered back.

As for the famous attack on the 22nd - which wasn't until 2 days later - by Abrams force, that made the link up with 101 for the final time, the leading element was a Sherman platoon, led by the tank Cobra C-6 specifically. Halftracked armored infantry was the next element. First hand AARs specifically mention the Germans setting off Teller mines for the first halftracks, after four Shermans had already passed. (A barrage went ahead of even the Shermans, incidentally).

An account - http://www.army.mil/article/17393/

Lots of armor battalion first hand accounts attest to the practice of leading with the medium tanks, in platoon or full company strength, not just on that occasion but back to Cobra, Brittany, the race across France, the Lorraine fighting, and in the Bulge. It was SOP.

[JasonC]

Cavalry did screen ahead of parts of the advance, avoiding heavy engagement and just reporting, enemy outpost here, took fire from there, etc. Not as leaders of an attack column, but well in front of those, and not engaging more than that.

When it came time to engage, if the terrain called for infantry, armored infantry dismounted and went first, with tanks just fire support. If it called for a drive straight down a road, Shermans went first.

[kevinkin]

I took another look at  "Closing with the Enemy", Doubler and FM 17-36, Employment of Tank with Infantry. The US used Cavalry primarily as screening forces and not as breakthrough and exploitation forces as we find in the East. Sure there were exceptions like the pursuit from the Riviera to the Rhine. Or screening the Third's pivot into the Southern Bulge. Given that the US knew pretty much knew where the Germans were at the end of each day (i.e. fixed), and the broad front operational mandate, Cavalry assets were mainly used to gain intel and report. Not to punch or pass through tough resistance. Combat for them was mostly on the defense not at the point of attack.  US forward attachments contained considerable strength. They knew they would draw fire soon after jump off. So they led with either armored protection or disperse infantry depending of terrain. The Cavalry helped tie in the flanks of the ever moving formations at sunset. They spent a lot of time securing rear areas with their ability to cover a wide area. 

 

Kevin

 

PS  I am a great fan of light mobile forces and they play a large part in my wargame enjoyment. In the ETO there are two lesser known battles to note. The Peel marshes (defence) and in the South, Montrevel (overextended pursuit). 

Edited August 22, 2015 by kevinkin

[Sgt Joch]

Err, ok, I deny your denial.

I have been doing a lot of in depth research on the 4th ADs drive north. The advance by each of the Combat Commands, CCA, CCB and CCR were led by a cavalry recon element composed of light tanks and vehicles. I can even give you the exact pages to check in the U.S. Army official history if you wish.

[kevinkin]

http://www.louisdimarco.com/mecz_cavalry_doctrine.htm

 

A page from the past ... and great reading.

 

Kevin

[Sgt Joch]

I was re-reading the U.S. Army official history on the august cross-France dash:

 

http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-5-1/index.html

 

I see lots of references to cavalry/recon units ranging far out in front capturing villages or key terrain. I also came across this interesting quote about Gen. Grow's 6th AD during the dash to Brest:

 

 

"...Grow postponed the advance until noon of 3 august. The delay not only would permit several additional hours of rest but also would enable the cavalry reconnaissance squadron to take its proper place at the front and on the flanks of the column, a procedure impossible to this point because of the speed of the commitment into Brittany and the traffic congestion near Avranches.

 

The division shoved off at noon, 3 august, with the cavalry troops where they belonged."

(p.374)

 

[kevinkin]

Here are two passage from the link above which is well supported with end notes. One concept that is repeated often is "economy of force". Grow's quote above is understandable given the written doctrine at the time. But cavalry largely allowed other heavier formations to concentrate and provide their own spear heads.

 

Kevin

 

"Europe proved that when employed skillfully, and in circumstances that accounted for their characteristics, mechanized cavalry was more than capable of fulfilling all of the tactical missions of horse cavalry, and was not limited to just reconnaissance. In particular, mechanized cavalry proved very effective in the defense. It also demonstrated that it could provide flank and forward security, and execute attacks. Cavalry proved to be particularly well suited to fast paced, unstructured offensive operations required by pursuit. A variety of special missions, including control of civil populations and convoy escort, were also effectively executed. In its tactical capability, flexibility, and success, cavalry far exceeded the limited doctrinal view envisioned for it by the doctrine writers at Fort Riley, Kansas."

 

"Post war analysis indicates some startling realities regarding the missions given to cavalry groups in the European theater during World War II. Reconnaissance, the mission originally envisioned for mechanized cavalry made up only 3% of cavalry group operations (as measured in number of days committed to combat). In contrast, defense, probably the mission for which mechanized cavalry was least well equipped and organized, was executed 33% of the time. The analysis also revealed that special operations (29%), offensive (10%), and security missions (25%) were also conducted more often than reconnaissance. In armored divisions the cavalry squadron performed reconnaissance missions only slightly more often (13%)."

Edited August 24, 2015 by kevinkin

[Sgt Joch]

interesting Kevinkin,

 

could you post what pages those quotes are on, especially the second one. I would be interested in reading more on that.

[kevinkin]

Well the site is only organized in Chapters and WW2 ETO is in Chapter 4. There are a lot of juicy references in the notes section. The site looks old fashion but the write-up in great. 

 

- Kevin

[Sgt Joch]

OK, I misunderstood. I thought you were referring to the document I posted. I will check out your link.

[Sgt Joch]

very interesting indeed:

 

Offensive Missions

 

(...)

 

 As with defensive missions, the circumstances of the European campaign forced commanders to employ mechanized cavalry in the traditional role of horse cavalry. Thus, mechanized cavalry was used offensively to lead pursuits, and to capture key objectives such as bridges. They were also used when required to conduct deliberate offensive operations when infantry or armor were not available.

 

During the European campaign the US armies were able to disrupt the German defenses to the point of executing pursuit operations on two occasions. The first occasion was following the breakout of the Normandy beachhead and the virtual destruction of the German Seventh Army in Falaise. The second occasion was following the breaching of the Rhine River and the destruction of the German Army Group in the Ruhr. On both of these occasions cavalry groups and squadrons were in the vanguard of vigorous pursuits.

 

There are many examples of cavalry leading in the pursuit of the summer of 1944. Already alluded to was the 3d Cavalry's rapid advance at the head of XX Corps from Avaranches to the banks of the Moselle in August 1944. Another noteworthy dash was that made by troops of the 102d Cavalry Group into the heart of Paris on 1 September 1944.(64) The 4th Cavalry led VII Corps to the Seigfried line in the Ardennes by the middle of September.(65)

 

In pursuit, cavalry attacked mounted, using speed and surprise to compensate for the lack of armor protection and anti-tank capability. The objective during the pursuit was to maintain the tempo of operations to prevent the enemy from organizing an effective defense. This required units to quickly breach natural obstacles such as rivers, and often to attack despite being outnumbered.

 

(...)

 

Cavalry was the ideal corps or armored division element to lead a pursuit. The light armor of the cavalry was a major advantage when pursuing the enemy because speed, not firepower or protection, were essential to preventing the enemy from reorganizing his defenses. Cavalry units were faster than armor or armored infantry in terms of road speed, with the all wheel reconnaissance platoon capable of maintaining speeds over 50 miles per hour. The mechanized cavalry was also more maneuverable than other arms due to the lower ground weight of its vehicles which allowed it to cross small bridges as well as soft ground. The cavalry's enhanced command and control capability allowed it to move dispersed searching out clear areas, intact bridges, fords, and by-passing areas of resistance. Finally, when the enemy was encountered, cavalry troops were capable of hitting fast and hard with a coherent combined arms team of light tanks, armored cars, assault guns and mortars. This small synchronized combined arms team provided sufficient combat power to break up any hastily organized resistance.

 

 

 

 

http://www.louisdimarco.com/doctrine_chapter_4.htm

 

Although what they describe as "Offensive Missions" would be closer to what I was referring to as "recon", i.e. ranging ahead of the armored units to scout out where enemy units might be located and either deal with them or leave them to the heavier armor/infantry/artillery forces following behind.

[kevinkin]

After reading the thread again, lets go back to the notion of why writers call tank elements the "spear head". I think it's just because they are sexy. Once they define combined arms earlier in their book they expect the reader to remember the concepts. And TANK Warfare jumps off the shelf better than COMBINED ARMS warfare for sure. US Cavalry filled many roles. Mostly buzzing around outside the sectors where the Germans became fixed and subject to set-piece battle. I guess defining what a spear head is - is semantics - as long as the reader understands that all arms have a role in defeating a well equipped and determined enemy.

Doubler's point is that the US went to war with sound doctrine. But realities forced battlefield improvisation and throwing the book away

to reach the next hill by nightfall.  

 

Kevin 

Edited August 24, 2015 by kevinkin