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Michael wrote:

And he is quite correct. In the theatre, before Nov 1942, the Germans were only fighting on one front, while the British Middle East Command had multiple simultaneous and consecutive active fronts seperated by thousands of miles.

That is true, but the German forces "in theatre" were fighting in what their high command regarded as a sideshow, and relegated resources to them based upon this fact. The British were fighting in their primary theatre against Rommel, and the others for them, were the sideshow that Rommel was for his command. There were in the vicinity of a million German and Axis troops that I am certain the DAK would have loved, that were not available to them because their High Command was fighting against the USSR. While anything the 8th Army asked for, they got, essentially, as no other serious threat existed for them.

Also the comparison to modern Germany, etc as far as occupation, is inaccurate. In modern Germany, if they elect a government that the US does not like, we will not likely invade them(probably :-) ), while this was the issue in Iran and Iraq. When you force a government to agree with you, allow you to put troops there, etc, it is you running things, not them.

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Also the comparison to modern Germany, etc as far as occupation, is inaccurate. In modern Germany, if they elect a government that the US does not like, we will not likely invade them(probably :-) )

Yeah I wouldn't count on that. We've been known to do stupider things. Maybe Britain will convince us this debate on the Euro is a sinister plot for world dominance. I am sure Cameron wouldn't mind stomping on Germany (and maybe France while we are at it) right about now.

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Also the comparison to modern Germany, etc as far as occupation, is inaccurate. In modern Germany, if they elect a government that the US does not like, we will not likely invade them(probably :-) ), while this was the issue in Iran and Iraq. When you force a government to agree with you, allow you to put troops there, etc, it is you running things, not them.

Comparing Ali's coup to an election is a bit of a stretch.

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While anything the 8th Army asked for, they got, essentially, as no other serious threat existed for them.

Well, this is wrong too.

The primary theatre for the Commonwealth was the UK, the English Channel, and France. The home forces always had priority on forces and equipment. To take but two examples, compare when Spitfires became available in the UK c.f. the Med, and when 6-pr A-Tk guns became available in the UK vs the Med.

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Well, this is wrong too.

The primary theatre for the Commonwealth was the UK, the English Channel, and France. The home forces always had priority on forces and equipment. To take but two examples, compare when Spitfires became available in the UK c.f. the Med, and when 6-pr A-Tk guns became available in the UK vs the Med.

That is possible, really. It makes sense in one way (home defense should be priority) but really not sure WHY in another way (They were reading the enemy's mail via ULTRA/ENIGMA..they knew there was no longer any threat of invasion to the home isles)..as far as France, it was already occupied/conquered long before there was a DAK. Are you referring to their (British) plans for the "Second Front"? Not sure when these plans began, but yes, that is possible, I agree.

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... not sure WHY in another way (They were reading the enemy's mail via ULTRA/ENIGMA

... aaaaand this is wrong too. The development of ULTRA as an intelligence source was a long, convoluted path, which had plenty of setbacks. Furthermore, ULTRA depended at all times on the enemy using dradio to transmit the messages. If they went over telex lines, the British couldn't listen to them, and so couldn't decrypt them.

France 1940-42 fulfilled both those criteria. ULTRA - and Bletchley Park in particular - hadn't yet developed the capacity and capability to translate all messages, or to do it in anywhere approximating realtime. Furthermore, the Germans could make extensive use of landlines between France and Germany, making interception problematic.

All that aside, the British always knew the main campaign would occur in France. So even after the threat of invasion was recognised to have significantly diminished (the invasion of the USSR being a fairly key combat indicator in that respect) the better equipment was still issued to Home Forces first in preparation for OVERLORD.

The Med, for example, never got any Typhoons, while issue of SP 17-pr (in either the Firefly or M10) ran at least six months behind the UK.

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Also the comparison to modern Germany, etc as far as occupation, is inaccurate. In modern Germany, if they elect a government that the US does not like, we will not likely invade them(probably :-) )

*cough*South Vietnam*cough*Cuba*cough

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Actually Mr Emrys..the Germans were fighting on a rather large front (Russia) as well as in Greece against the British you mentioned (already won there by the way before the date you give). Perhaps ROMMELS mission only involved Libya, but you compare one German unit whose mission was Libya, then compare the entire British Empire with all of their missions, your logic is flawed in that.

You still refuse to get it. I was not comparing Rommel to the entire British empire, only to Middle East Command, which had limited resources and very extensive responsibilities. As to the forces engaged in the Western Desert and Libya, they were pretty well evenly matched most of the time and in the summer of '41 it was the British that had to fight at a numerical disadvantage. Tactically and operationally incompetent the Brits might have been, and that was the real reason for their defeats and compromised successes, but it is senseless to go on about a flood of matériel prior to about September of '42.

Michael

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To take but two examples, compare when Spitfires became available in the UK c.f. the Med, and when 6-pr A-Tk guns became available in the UK vs the Med.

This has been on my mind for quite a while now too. The RAF from the spring of '41 onward engaged in raids and fighter sweeps over France. The main effect of these raids was to allow the Luftwaffe to do to them what they had done to the Luftwaffe during the BoB, namely to fight on their own turf, close to their own bases, under radar control. Furthermore, their pilots, if shot down and surviving, could return to the battle in most cases rather quickly, whereas the RAF pilots became POWs. The upshot is that the RAF lost pilots at about double the rate that the Luftwaffe suffered, with little to show for it.

So, as a result, I have wondered how the war might have progressed if a few wings of those Spitfires had been sent to Malta and Egypt instead of simply flung into the fray over France. There may have been compelling political reasons to fight over France in '41 and '42, but militarily one entertains doubts. Spits in Malta and the Desert Air Force in 1941 would have made life harder for the Axis and correspondingly easier for Britain and its allies in the Med.

Michael

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You still refuse to get it. I was not comparing Rommel to the entire British empire, only to Middle East Command, which had limited resources and very extensive responsibilities. As to the forces engaged in the Western Desert and Libya, they were pretty well evenly matched most of the time and in the summer of '41 it was the British that had to fight at a numerical disadvantage. Tactically and operationally incompetent the Brits might have been, and that was the real reason for their defeats and compromised successes, but it is senseless to go on about a flood of matériel prior to about September of '42.

Michael

I do actually get your point, it just seems that you are not getting mine, which was perhaps not even answered as well by myself, as by Phil directly below yours. I understand the "Middle East Command" was stretched, but my point is that was Britain's primary command. Jon above has made a good argument that this was not the case. While for certain, also, the German DAK was far from the primary German front. So Britain had to fight an air war over France, and skirmish in Iraq, Iran, Syria, that you mentioned. The German "other front" was along a many-thousand-km line through the Soviet Union. Yes, "what if spitfire" had been introduced in Africa..it would have definitely helped. Also, on the other side..what if the Tiger units had been introduced to the DAK, or Panthers even for that matter, instead of in the USSR. Or the elite SS Divisions, etc. My point is that , still, the side with ability to do this, was the British/Allied, as this was their main active front. Air Forces over Europe aside (forgive me, as a grunt, I do not think quite the same of an air war involving hundreds OR thousands even, compared to a ground war involving hundreds OF thousands. But you could also add in the navy lest they be left out, and that did also eat up a great deal of British resources and time, while their opponent in the Battle of the Atlantic was also German.

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I understand the "Middle East Command" was stretched, but my point is that was Britain's primary command.

No, defense of the British Isles was, and that was reflected in the distribution of their forces. But even that is beside the point.

The German "other front" was along a many-thousand-km line through the Soviet Union.

True, but completely irrelevant to the points I was making. I got into this discussion to rebut your statement that the Axis, specifically the Germans, were overwhelmed in North Africa by numbers and matériel. My counter-argument is that prior to autumn 1942 that was simply not true. The balance shifted several times, but mostly was pretty even. All you need to do is simply recognize that fact and this argument will be over.

Michael

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Bear in mind that those are claimed kills vs the rather eclectic German difinition of losses. Both bias the ratio heavily in favour of the Germans.

Wow, what a thread. I wonder what topics it hasn't touched already :D

Anyways, I quote JonS remark, because it's really one of the issues that has led historiography to draw highly misleading accounts of certain episodes of the war. Such as the Prokhorovka battle. Here's a quite recent book - which has some problems, regarding readability and maps - by the curator of the Kursk memorial:

Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative

V. Zamulin

I copy the synopsis of the book Amazon offers below:

A groundbreaking book when first published in Russia in 2005, now Valeriy Zamulin's study of the crucible of combat during the titanic clash at Kursk - the fighting at Prokhorovka - is available in English. A former staff member of the Prokhorovka Battlefield State Museum, Zamulin has dedicated years of his life to the study of the battle of Kursk, and especially the fighting on its southern flank involving the famous attack of the II SS Panzer Corps into the teeth of deeply-echeloned Red Army defenses. A product of five years of intense research into the once-secret Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Zamulin lays out in enormous detail the plans and tactics of both sides, culminating in the famous and controversial clash at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943. Zamulin skillfully weaves reminiscences of Red Army and Wehrmacht soldiers and officers into the narrative of the fighting, using in part files belonging to the Prokhorovka Battlefield State Museum. Zamulin has the advantage of living in Prokhorovka, so he has walked the ground of the battlefield many times and has an intimate knowledge of the terrain.

Examining the battle from primarily the Soviet side, Zamulin reveals the real costs and real achievements of the Red Army at Kursk, and especially Prokhorovka. He examines mistaken deployments and faulty decisions that hampered the Voronezh Front's efforts to contain the Fourth Panzer Army's assault, and the valiant, self-sacrificial fighting of the Red Army's soldiers and junior officers as they sought to slow the German advance, and then crush the II SS Panzer Corps with a heavy counterattack at Prokhorovka on 12 July. The combat on this day receives particular scrutiny, as Zamulin works to clarify the relative size of the contending forces, the actual area of this battle, and the costs suffered by both sides. The costs to General P. A. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army and General A. S. Zhadov's 5th Guards Army as they slammed into 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division Totenkopf and a portion of 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Division Das Reich were particularly devastating, and Zamulin examines the nuts and bolts of the counteroffensive to see why this was so.

Zamulin does not exclude the oft-overlooked efforts of Army Group Kempf's III Panzer Corps on the right-wing of the Fourth Panzer Army, as it sought to keep pace with the II SS Panzer Corps advance, and then breach the line of the Northern Donets River in order to link up with its left-hand neighbor in the region of Prokhorovka. Zamulin describes how the Soviet High Command and the Voronezh Front had to cobble together quickly a defense of this line with already battered units, but needed to reinforce it with fresh formations at the expense of the counterstroke at Prokhorovka.

Illustrated with numerous maps and photographs (including present-day views of the battlefield), and supplemented with extensive tables of data, Zamulin's book is an outstanding contribution to the growing literature on the battle of Kursk, and further demolishes many of the myths and legends that grew up around this battle.

A really enlightening, though sometimes hard to follow, account of that very notorious engagement. Which, I must say, no wargame has ever depicted accurately (if we take Zamulin's very compelling and convincing narrative to be basically right).

EDIT: A little pun for those who don't understand why so many people would love to see CMx2 on the Eastern Front soon :) These engagements dwarf those in the Western front, with perhaps the exception of the efforts of the Commonwealth troops around Caen (Epsom, Goodwood, Charnwood, Whateverwood, etc.), which we're getting really soon!

EDIT #2: What the synopsis fails to say is that Zamulin argues very convincingly that 12th July was an astounding German tactical victory, which basically crushed the striking power of 5th Mech Corps. And this is really something that tells us a lot about why the war went the way went for the Third Reich. On the contrary as the British Empire, they used to won all the battles but the last one!

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I do actually get your point, it just seems that you are not getting mine, which was perhaps not even answered as well by myself, as by Phil directly below yours. I understand the "Middle East Command" was stretched, but my point is that was Britain's primary command. Jon above has made a good argument that this was not the case. While for certain, also, the German DAK was far from the primary German front. So Britain had to fight an air war over France, and skirmish in Iraq, Iran, Syria, that you mentioned.

No. Clearly you dont get it. The amount of fighting in Iraq, Iran and Syria is largely irrelevant. All required significant forces from a threatre already stretched, and then consititued a continuing significant drain in terms of garrison. Each required a corps, and the British just didn't have htat many corps in total, let alone in the Med.

France wasn't just about sending a few Spitfires over every couple of days. It required the retention of the major part of Britains armed forces - army, navy, and air - for years.

what if the Tiger units had been introduced to the DAK

Tiger first saw action in North Africa within two months of it's first action in Russia.

Panthers even for that matter, instead of in the USSR.

Panther saw action in Italy within months of it's first action in Russia.

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Google translation is crap here - as often. "les pièces de la procédure préalable" means "the parts (meaning all not some) of the pre-able procedure" which is the procedure by the juge d'instruction where information is ...

Thank you for settling this matter. I wanted to oppose Steiner on his revisionist views myself but could never have managed to do so as unagitated and factual as you did.

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How comes that? Following the legend Oradour and Tulle were peaceful areas. "The french are a bit touchy" is a very nice understatement for the uninformed readers.

The french people, at least who lived at that time and knew how they loved the resistance themselves, is heavily divided about the role of the Resistance. The political establishment tries to suppress any open discussion about it, because that would lead to further questions regarding the myths of the german occupation.

You're oversimplifying here. All areas where partisan war went up against the Third Reich armed forces occupation - Soviet Union, Italy "Social Republic", Yugoslavia - were actually in something any contemporary observer would have deemed as "a state of civil war" (Ukranian nationalists vs. Soviet Union partisans and the the Red Army, Communist & Non-Communist italian partisans vs. security forces of the German-backed puppet regime in Northern Italy, royalists and croats vs. Tito's partisans).

France came, in my opinion, quite close to that before, during and after World War 2. While nowadays we nurture "memory" and "truth comissions" as the cornerstones of reconciliation after such conflicts, the truth is that during most of 20th century, a policy of "forgetting" and "getting over it" was far more common.

The case for France is indeed interesting, and Fouché work is particularly balanced and makes an excellent read. Just let us remember that not so long ago it was the 50th anniversary of the mass murder of argeline immigrants Paris, who demonstrated against the war in Algeria at the Place de l'Etóile.

All of that orchestrated by Maurice Papon, prefect of Burdeaux during the Third Reich occupation, and responsible for deporting thousands of French citizens into concentration camps. He just turned his coat and joined the - victorious - Gaullists and came to wield a lot of power during the 50's and 60's in France. A very sinister character, who did his thing regardless of what was the banner flying.

Could it be, that Fouche maybe mentions that this area was full of heavy partisan activity? That even the german high command for the West, knew about it and ordered "Das Reich" to fight the partisans? Could it be, that Fouche mentions that German soldiers were attacked, tortuered and murdered by the Maquisards?

Does Fouche maybe mention the 40 awfully mutilated german soldiers in Tulle and that the german units in Tulle even were encircled?

The trial in the communist DDR was a classical show trial, where even the fightings against the Maquisards, the tortured german soldiers were ignored and the area was portrayed as a peaceful civilian area where the SS without any reason killed civilians - exactly like the media tell the people all over the world today.

Here were I lose all kind of sympathy for you Steiner14. If someone is guilty of infringing the "laws of war", that's the only person responsible. Not children, elderly people or random passers-by. Reprisals - as in enforcing a law by punishing a group rather than individuals - is a war crime, and a heinous crime in any democratic society worth that adjective.

And although he never questioned the "massacre", he was heavily criticized... I think that shows the spiritual climate and how "just" and "objective" the trial 1953 was (imagine the 9/11 "trials"^2), if even today, the undeniable simple truth, that the Resistance was acting against international military laws (and against the german-french treaty!) and that they were not at all beloved by the french people.

Not only because of the fear of repressions of the Germans, but also because of their incredible brutality, their torturing of helpless soldiers (driving with trucks over people, cutting off genitals and putting into mouth, drilling holes through the feet, putting cables though it, connecting it to trucks and driving around) and their communist agenda?

Why should anybody find binding a peace agreement they don't agree with? Should have Spaniards remain idle when Napoleon toppled the Bourbons of Spain, instated his brother and pillaged the country at leisure? They certainly didn't, and the fate those unfortunate German soldiers met isn't different from that of many unfortunate French soldiers during 1808-1814. What right had the Nazi Germany to impose their will on the French people? None at all.

Now you say the Resistance wasn't a broadly popular movement. I tend to agree with you that a good deal of the allegiance to the Resistance actually surfaced when it was clear that the Wehrmacht wasn't going to push the Allies back into the sea. The memory of what happened to the people of Dieppe and St. Nazaire in 1942 was a stern warning.

And I'm also pretty sure that a good deal of Frenchmen loathed and lamented such inhumane treatment of their enemies. But from there as to say that they were crying a river over it, there's a long long stretch.

There's only one European people who hasn't resisted with tooth and nail to invaders.

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No. Clearly you dont get it. The amount of fighting in Iraq, Iran and Syria is largely irrelevant. All required significant forces from a threatre already stretched, and then consititued a continuing significant drain in terms of garrison. Each required a corps, and the British just didn't have htat many corps in total, let alone in the Med.

France wasn't just about sending a few Spitfires over every couple of days. It required the retention of the major part of Britains armed forces - army, navy, and air - for years.

Tiger first saw action in North Africa within two months of it's first action in Russia.

Panther saw action in Italy within months of it's first action in Russia.

True..even wiki says this, however, as also wiki says, they were only deployed in negligible numbers in Africa. And I will grant your point, as I also said above, about the French front, albeit that to me just says that the British High Command was not very capable, if devoting ""the major part of Britain's armed forces-army,navy and air- for years" when they did nothing at all on the ground save the disastrous "invasion" of Dieppe, from 1940-1943 in France. But I do get that there was a continued effort to make the Germans guess that an invasion was imminent, etc, which tied down many forces in the deception..just am amazed if they would actually tie down the bulk of them, to sit, while they had units in Africa in so much need as seems to be implied.

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Thank you for settling this matter. I wanted to oppose Steiner on his revisionist views myself but could never have managed to do so as unagitated and factual as you did.

Thank's for the flowers :) War is a dirty affair - and sometimes events are not easily understandable. And since human lives and believes are involved there are a lot of feelings and emotions involved. We should look at the facts and weigh them to understand the behaviour and learn from it. Just a make a few points clear:

  • Even in counter-insurgency troops are bound by the laws of war. Even when the other side doesn't play by these rules.
  • If the laws and rules are broken by the other side, the responsibles have to be identified and be brought to court (See former Yugoslavia). Murdering enemy fighters after they have laid down their arms or unarmed civilians as is out of bounds.

In my personal experience disciplined and well led troops who have grown up with an education based on our shared values in Western democracies rarely have a problem with this - even when it is tough sometimes. Although some negative examples exist - exceptions which confirm the rule and which usually end in court.

In the case of the French upheaval in 1944 there were other units involved in tough fighting with the FFI (which could be considered as regular troops applying mostly small wars tactics when they carried arm-bands - just like the German Volkssturm later) e.g. the 11. Panzerdivision in August fighting it's way from Toulouse to the Rhône river at Avignon and then up the Rhône valley through Montélimar to Valence and then to Lyon.

Although French source complain about the handling of insurgents (mostly marked FFI, armed by the Allies) there were no such large atrocities committed by this unit to my knowledge. Both the 2nd SS Das Reich and the 11th Panzerdivision had previously fought on the Eastern front, both consisted to some extent of Volksdeutsche pressed into service. So the question remains, why one unit reacted this way and the other the other way?

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Why should anybody find binding a peace agreement they don't agree with?

Your point is correct - but there is another aspect in this argument: Steiner14 is wrong referring to this peace agreement. The Germans violated and nullified this agreement themselves when they occupied the "Free Zone" in Southern France on 11. November 1942. All French troops and local governments (e.g. Algeria) abroad passed to the Free French side after this event - until the occupation of Southern France by the Germans the French troops had fought the Allies in Morocco in accordance to the agreement.

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No, defense of the British Isles was, and that was reflected in the distribution of their forces. But even that is beside the point.

True, but completely irrelevant to the points I was making. I got into this discussion to rebut your statement that the Axis, specifically the Germans, were overwhelmed in North Africa by numbers and matériel. My counter-argument is that prior to autumn 1942 that was simply not true. The balance shifted several times, but mostly was pretty even. All you need to do is simply recognize that fact and this argument will be over.

Michael

I hadn't really thought of this as an argument. My original line which you referred to, was only one small part of my reply to another post, as to my opinion on why there were no mention of "tank aces" in the desert war, with my opinion PRIMARILY being that in the desert war, the Germans were not really in the overall strategic position that later created the tank aces. Phil, also replied directly below your original reply. While my interest in WW2 has primarily been that I had family fighting in it on the German side(father's family) and the Allied side (mother's family). Phil, as a designer on this game, I assume to be much more of an expert. He mostly also seems to have supported my statement in a more clear way than I did. That said, however, I know that NO warfighting force, probably in all of history, has ever had "what they needed"..it has almost always been "use what you have". Nevertheless, I quite humbly agree to disagree here, and I apologize if I was argumentative.

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A really enlightening, though sometimes hard to follow, account of that very notorious engagement. Which, I must say, no wargame has ever depicted accurately (if we take Zamulin's very compelling and convincing narrative to be basically right).

I take it from your above comments you've read the book? Is it any good (saw it lurking on the shelf of my local bookshop)? What is the myth it is demolishing, the Soviet account or the revisionist (or maybe not revisionist) historians? What has everyone got wrong about the battle? Sorry for all the questions, I started a thread about books and this was one of them I mentioned.

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I will grant your point, as I also said above, about the French front, albeit that to me just says that the British High Command was not very capable, if devoting ""the major part of Britain's armed forces-army,navy and air- for years" when they did nothing at all on the ground save the disastrous "invasion" of Dieppe, from 1940-1943 in France.

You may not think they were very capable, but yet again you'd be wrong. They certainly made some mistakes, but strategically the British weren't just streets ahead of the Germans, they were in a whole different timezone.

But I do get that there was a continued effort to make the Germans guess that an invasion was imminent, etc, which tied down many forces in the deception.

After 1942 that was sort of part of it. But only a small part. Since you seem to be blithely unaware of this bit of history, let me point out that they were also preparing for an actual invasion, not just a deception. There've been a few books, movies, and games about it. You might want to look it up, it's called Operation Overlord.

But before that (although it wasn't a bright line, of course, more of a gradual change of stance) - which is the time period we're looking at here - the concern was more about not losing the war. It took roughly 4 months to move a unit from the UK to the Middle East, and about the same to bring them back again assuming the shipping was even available (although as far as I'm aware no formed units moved back to the UK until late 1943). Once a unit left the UK it was, for all practical purposes, permanently gone.

I suppose they could have asked the Germans nicely if they'd postpone an invasion for 4+ months so the British would bring something back to defend the UK with, but I'm not sure if OKW would have been very receptive to the idea.

Saying the British Armed Forces in the UK did "nothing at all on the ground" between 1940 and 1944 is like saying the USAF SAC did nothing at all in the air between 1945 and the end of the Cold War. It's trivially true, but only if you're prepared to ignore their whole raison d'être.

Jon

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I am quite aware of Overlord. I am also quite aware of many books on the subject, which all state that the British knew there would be no invasion, at the same time as the German Command decided it, because the British read the dispatch to that regard, before the German corps commanders in France even did. You do not give your British Empire as much respect as I am even giving them.. Enigma/Ultra were incredible, war winning, efforts. As far as tactics on the field of battle however, to state that the British were in a different time zone, is quite inaccurate. The Germans kicked them off the continent in France at Dunkirk, in Greece, landed on them and knocked them out of Crete, and came within probably a hairbreadth of kicking them out of Egypt, so much so that observers said the sky above Alexandria was black from the British burning papers before their planned evacuation, the one tactic they positively excelled at early in the war. That they then turned this around, is an amazing act, and was truly a great piece of warfighting by troops from all around the Commonwealth, but it was hardly a situation of being tactically worlds ahead of an army that had pretty well thrashed them in the war's first few encounters.

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Yee gods. You can't make this stuff up folks.

A3S, there are these things called Levels of War. It's a conceptual framework that helps us to make sense of large and complex events. The strategic layer is the top level, and deals with national policy, theatre strategy, and deciding on which campaigns to fight. The operational level is below, and nested within, the strategic layer. The tactical layer is lower again, and again nested within the operational layer.

When I said that the British were timezones ahead of the Germans strategically I meant, perhaps surprisingly, that the British were timezones ahead of the Germans strategically. I made no comment on the tactical layer.

In other news, you seem to have an rather naive view of ULTRA. It didn't spreing into being fully formed. It took a long time to develop the techniques required for decryption, and another long time to develop the doctrines associated with analysing the information it provided and then how to distribute that intelligence.

Regarding the threat to the British Isles, the British knew that SEALION was probably off for 1940 when the barges started dispersing in late September. But they - or the Germans for that matter - didn't know that SEALION was off for ever until late 1944.

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I should mention that I'm not a North Africa expert. I've read quite a bit about the fighting there, but that's as far as it goes. Just an enthusiast participating in the discussion. Learning and sharing and all that. :)

I'm not the game's designer, either. That would be Steve and Charles. I am but a shoulder at the programming wheel.

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