ArmouredTopHat

Why cant it be a combination of all of those factors? We know the Russian BTGs had issues with lack of dismounted infantry, especially once they pushed ever deeper and took objectives requiring them to parcel out the finite amount of infantry to secure before moving on. We know that the Russians decided not to turn on half of their air defence after it had rolled into Ukraine, which is why TB-2s were able to bomb them in those first few days. How is this not a monumental cockup that should belong on an wall somewhere for sheer incompetence? We know the VKS were only really able to hit static targets, and the majority of UA air defences had been relocated days or hours beforehand. We have subsequent reports of CAS missions from the VKS being slow and prone to friendly fire. (There is a harrowing recording somewhere of a Russian officer trying to call of friendly helicopters attacking his own soldiers somewhere after he had requested air support) We know that Russian communications and coordination were a crapshow due to their own jamming and faulty equipment. Half of their men were equipped with cheap and unsecured Baofeng radios for petes sake. I mentioned it before but seeing Russian units resorting to unsecured mobile phones to simply talk to each other was that moment for me that 'something is horribly wrong' that you mentioned. If your communications systems are not working properly not even a day into your invasion, that's a product of poor planning and incompetence in my view. Russian failures in all the aforementioned points is the reason Ukraine was able to coordinate effectively. How do you even begin to isolate hostile resistance when you dont even know what / where or how your friendly units in an AO are doing?

I think there was / is a genuine attempt to field a new tank, but much like a lot of potentially promising tank projects like Black eagle or T-95, the Russians simply ran into too many hurdles. It was a -very- ambitious project packed with a lot of features that while not new, had only been really attempted on testbeds and prototypes elsewhere before. Coupled with some truly bizarre decisions like the whole engine debacle (Why on earth did they switch to a radically different engine), or the fact that the thing appears to be a black hole when it comes to space efficiency then its little wonder that the inefficient and corrupt Russian state messed it up so badly. The fact that there is still no factory in Russia able to build Armatas suggest to me the project wont be going anywhere. It is a real vehicle though, at least based on the APS test footage, gun trials and the odd propaganda video showing the internals of the capsule (alongside the hilarious tendency for the Russians to show the thing revolving its turret constantly like its larping as a helicopter) Seriously, how do you design a capsule based tank with an unmanned turret with autoloader and have the damn thing be bigger than almost every other MBT around (Despite being a lot lighter, which means protection is evidently inferior) There is some serious space inefficiency at work here and I legit cannot figure out just why the thing is so damn big.

After a bit of sleep and reflection, I will largely stand by most of my argument though I admit I made several statements poorly. I'm going to keep it buried though because I was actively losing my sanity over it, even if I might have been swayed on certain points. I again thank Steve and Capt for mostly good discussion though. Its certainly food for thought and I genuinely believe they are onto something, especially in certain areas. They provided a great read on a lot of stuff so kudos for them for providing that. On the topic of something I can more readily debate and talk about, the sorry saga of the T-14 continues. I find RedEffect is pretty biased towards Russian / Soviet systems, so for him to find this a little baffling says a lot really. Another case of a Russian wunderwaffe being a disappointment (though I think this one has been anticipated) Even with me being a tank buff, I can happily admit that Armata has been a great case of what not to do for a tank design, right at a time where tanks need to be designed in new ways to deal with the reality of combat. This was a badly designed vehicle from the onset and its already aged poorly just as much as legacy Soviet tank platforms.

How many times do I have to say that poor performance from the VKS is down to a multitude of factors that happen to include them being poorly suited to the task at hand and suffering from corruption. Its. Not. The. Sole. Reason. USVs had nothing to do with the Mosvka sinking. Russian naval activity has had no clear objective outside of flinging missiles at targets of opportunity and has been beset by equipment and training problems. This is literally well documented. Again, this is getting pretty tiring. I have repeatedly said incompetence and corruption plays a PART of the reason the Russians have lacked success. Please actually read what I am saying and stop assuming I am just going 'Russians suck'. Its genuinely getting irritating at this point. I welcome rethinks and relooks, but I find you readily dismiss technologies which are both practical and in use right now. I literally keep saying that many of your points are valid, my problem is with the notion that throw everything else into the bin on a whim. I personally think its better to pursue all areas of possibility. Why not develop more loitering munitions while also seeking out APS for instance. We really should be covering all angles. I specifically said western firms created the idea of FPV drones and that recently western firms have made smaller drones. Stop putting words in my mouth please. The west has at least ensured a ready supply of components make its way to Ukraine, though much of the building effort remains reliant on fund raising, something that probably could do with looking at. Though at least some Western countries are waking up to this: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-supply-more-than-10000-drones-to-ukraine In terms of smaller drones, there are literally dozens. Black Hornet, ScanEagle, Puma, Dragoneye, Aladin, Aeryon, InstantEye Mk-2 Gen3, Wasp AE and Drone40 to name just a few that have been developed and fielded though not a lot have obviously gone to Ukraine. Again, I apologise if my argument is getting incoherent, I'm just a little worn down by this point. I meant to say the US was not exactly looking for an FPV munition capability due to being more or less satisfied by their current capability. That's not to say they were thus not seeking to innovate at all, its just an explanation to why it was not seriously pursued despite the technology being there. As for the rest, fair point. I'm kind of out of juice at this point. Honestly? Fair enough. I misread on my sources and it looks like most of the attempt reforms were post Chechen war. Though I would point out that Russian military reforms post 2008 failed to address problems that are now biting them hard in Ukraine. Honestly probably going to drop out of this line of discussion overall as its clear we have a difference of opinion that's getting increasingly hostile, at least I feel it is. I'm happy to leave it at wait and see. I thank you both for the discussion, but maybe work on being a little less...abrasive with your assertions. You two acting like you know better than literally dozens of countries and their military apparatuses is...quite something, even if you bring up some very good points. Maybe you are both right and all those people are wrong, in which case my god were doomed.

A point I kinda forgot to elaborate further on Military history is indeed full of examples of technological and tactical shifts that demand change. However, modern western militaries are literally built on a foundation of continuous evolution and adaptation, learning from past experiences and integrating new technologies and doctrines as they emerge. Successful military adaptation requires a balance between rapid innovation and maintaining operational stability. Rash, poorly planned changes can and have led to vulnerabilities and failures in military systems. We literally see that with the Russian military reforms in the 90s that aimed to rapidly sought to downsize and modernise the army which led to disastrous results in the Chechen war and in at least in part responsible for the mess in Ukraine due to the failure of the Putin regime to fix ongoing problems. The Chinese experienced similar problems during their great leap forward with regards to military reform which probably explains why they did so poorly with their brief adventure into Vietnam. Rushing such things can be a disaster if not planned properly and they take years to do so. Many modern western militaries are not adhering to “slow and steady” reform but are actively pursuing rapid modernization programs. The US DoD focus on the Third Offset Strategy, the integration of AI and autonomous systems, and the development of next-generation platforms to me demonstrate a commitment to staying ahead that is actively taking into account the current war. Things could be better but its genuinely ridiculous to insinuate the west is doing nothing. Balancing rapid innovation with operational stability ensures that the west can stay ahead of emerging threats. That is the point I am trying to convey. With that, I will go and collapse now. Im sorry if I missed anything.

It depends on the type of combat to be honest. Areas like BVR air combat (Which would be heavily featured in any war with China in the Pacific) demand the best and stealthiest airframe possible with the best and most capable missiles. 4th gens are routinely slaughtered in contests against 5th gens in exercises for that very reason. Its currently all about quality over quantity. At least until swarms of UCAVs turn up I suppose. You are right though in that more needs to be done with deterrence. There really needs to be a defensive NATO like pact in the pacific to constrain Chinese aggression. This assumes that the west is going to sit and do nothing, when its already reacting to Russian aggression. The US has certainly been keeping a close eye on China as well. The Chinese will be stronger for sure, but so will the west. China also has a slew of domestic problems that are only going to bite harder and harder as time goes on. This might precipitate a move, but it might also constrain it. Time will tell. While China’s low-tech gray-zone tactics are effective in the short term, they are not sufficient for achieving long-term strategic dominance or preparing for potential peer conflicts. Military modernization is essential for actual comprehensive power projection, deterrence, and maintaining strategic gains. As we saw with Russia, such modernisations are not a guarantee of success, though I suspect China would have better luck with it all.

They literally did though, a slew of smaller drones were developed in that time space by numerous defence companies. The whole concept of FPV was largely spearheaded by western defence companies in the first place. The innovation Ukraine did was taking off the shelf civilian drones and strapping RPG warheads to them. While an individual prediction about the war and its outcome may have been accurate, the multifaceted nature of international relations and the constraints faced by policymakers often result in a more complex reality. The assertion that the West "chose" not to be prepared oversimplifies the situation and ignores the nuanced decision-making processes and constraints involved in such matters. The complexity of international relations and the unpredictability of state actors (Especially Russia) make definitive predictions challenging, even for experts. You did predict something correctly, that doesn't mean it was perhaps the obvious outcome to expect. The US had no operational need to develop something like an FPV to address a gap in its capability because it did not have one, it has / had everything it needed. Like most militaries, it had its own innovation priorities. US companies also did largely develop the systems in drones so widely used in the first place as well. The innovation is very much there. I literally specified that counter CUAS and denial of ISR is a priority that needs to be addressed, IE constraining the ability of the enemy to see your concentration or logistics. There are a plethora of ideas tabled to address logistical vulnerability, from drone dropped supply missions to simply having redundancy in the system. This is something that is literally being actively talked about right now. Why are we concluding that modern airpower is constrained based on this war? Ukraine has / is flying essentially 80s jets and the Russian VKS is a **** show that has very little actual capability beyond bomb tossing and stand off. This is not comparable in the slightest to the terrifying ability of NATO airpower, which literally features thousands of airframes with a wide amount of capability, including that of proficient SEAD ops, not to mention highly trained pilots. If the Ukrainians can hit Russian AD with HARM missiles fired on their least effective setting, what do you imagine a dedicated SEAD campaign featuring purpose built wild weasels craft can do, all to deploy numerous strike packages onto target? If you replaced the VKS with not even 20% of NATOs airpower capability you would see profound differences and a probably collapse of UA defences. Given the hilariously poor performance of Russian AD so far, NATO airpower would simply slaughter them and they know it. As for the navy...do I really need to address this? Its been the highlight of Russian incompetency and corruption. We did see the leaked documents showing the readiness level of the Moskva before it was sunk here right? The challenges faced by Russia in projecting both air and naval power conflict are not due to a "forgetting" of military principles but rather the result of effective Ukrainian defences, geographical constraints, and the inherent complexity of modern multidomain warfare combined with the poor state of both branches. The VKS wishes it could do even a shred of what NATO based airpower can do. I literally said the same sort of thing about how its going to take some time to unpack everything. My assertions are simply theoretical as explanations based on what we know, it may not be the full picture but I would wager its pretty close. Point I am trying to make is that the Russians were having major difficulties before the plethora of FPVs as an example. I am just as curious as you are to see just what has been doing the most 'damage' for lack of a better word. To conclude, I do agree with you on a number of points, but I simply believe that wiping the slate clean is a bad idea.

What Ukraine needs / wants might not necessarily be what NATO countries need or want, there is a very different level of capability and access to said capability on display. Literally different goals in mind. NATO forces fight with the realistic assumption of a strong air contingent for instance with all the support it offers. Ukraine does not have that. If my ideas are not clear, allow me to clarify: 1. I agree there is a shift, but I do not see it being a drastic one, just a continuation of trends people were aware of served with a slice of reality. 2. Western forces -are- adapting. We are already seeing changes to force makeup that will be implemented in a matter of years. This is pretty fast for a peacetime force. 2.b No one is saying this is entirely down to ineptitude, but it clearly plays a part, especially with the Russians when they had so many on paper advantages that they cannot leverage properly. As with all things the answer is far more complicated. Technology plays a part in this just as much as doctrine and incompetence. 3. As highlighted, EVERYONE is taking notes here, there is plenty of evidence shown in the last few pages here alone that different forces in NATO are actively using the conflict to draw up changes to force structure. the US is literally gaining active experience RIGHT NOW that tells them what systems are working to intercept drones and what are not in Syria. 4. I'm sorry but what? Based on what evidence? The whole reason we saw a triumph in western approach to war in the Gulf was because we have mostly kept ahead with adaptations' understand if some wrong lessons were learned (the whole need for stocks for high intensity conflict is the main point I guess) Are you referring to the Chinese ability to build lots of drones that's more a product of their cheap industrial labour pool instead of any particular military innovation? Western military companies are clearly on the cutting edge of pretty much every major military technology. I entirely agree there is an issue of scale that needs to be addressed, but why are you acting like China holds actual parity in terms of technology when they literally self admit to being behind? So, here is my broad take / vision on things for the future overall. For the record I am typing when I can, there is a lot to answer here but I will do my best. I do find it unfair for you to say that I have not posted evidence though, the last....6 or so posts I made all included plenty of links for you to enjoy. Future considerations for NATO armed forces. New generation of vehicles required that are better protected from all around attack, especially with regards to IFVs, APCs and Tanks, a true shift away from cold war era chassis and designs that seem increasingly unfit for purpose. APS should be a new standard of protection and needs to become more widely integrated. Together with this, we should be keenly exploring practical applications for UGVs to supplement and potentially even replace certain roles down the line. Doctrine should be overhauled to reflect this should they prove viable. Close range air defence needs to prioritise drones and a means for cheap disposal. Layers required to combat drones from the UAV recon level to the FPV. The development and deployment of counter-drone technologies, such as anti-drone rifles, jamming devices, and radar systems, have become crucial in defending against drone threats and should be viewed as a top priority. Adjustment on force makeup to include more organic drone capability both for recon and strike potential, at least platoon based if not squad level. Presumably tied in to more effective battlefield management systems. Heavy usage on loitering munitions as a means of leveraging infantry firepower, with traditional artillery aspects for battalion fire support backing. Mortars used to be the go to for infantry firepower on the company / Battalion level but I wonder if they are simply too exposed to do so given the threat of drone / loitering munitions. Overall emphasis on a flexible command and control alongside ISR capability, while also acknowledging that you need the means to move forward to take the fight to the enemy while also dominating them with firepower and superior recon capability. FPV munitions are not the correct solution for every problem. Recognition that EWAR needs to became a focal point for force structures, present in as many levels as possible all the way to the squads (Though in practicality were looking at platoon or company level for most systems) Understanding that drones should be viewed as a munition to be disposable and replaceable. Drone losses are high in Ukraine and thus platforms need to be cheap and effective. Recognition that denying drone / recon capability is now a priority, be it through soft or hardkill measures. Utterly key to maintaining mobile mechanised warfare by denying enemy fires the ability to target you effectively. Upholding of strengths of NATO force structure that remain relevant, perhaps even more so in this evolving environment. Squads / platoons on the ground need to be able to make important decisions quickly and have the tools to do so. Reassessment of reserve concepts, especially with regards to ammunition. We should be planning for the means to stock months / years worth of ammunition, not days, together with the ability to fabricate more readily. South Korean approach is sorely needed here. Defence as well as Offense are equally important. Assets for attack need appropriate protection while maintaining fire supremacy. Mine sweeping technology and measures need a major overhaul. One of the few areas we should be actually learning from the Russians with their heavy emphasis on sapper / pioneer / engineering units. Mines were the problem strangling mechanised movements well before FPVs become relevant on the battlefield. Improvements made to exercise and innovations that reflect a Ukraine conflict and can simulate it to allow NATO forces realistic preparation for a conflict with Russia. As I said before I agree on a lot of points. I will personally want to see Ukrainians come to NATO countries after the war and help with new combat exercises in perfecting what works best and what does not. There is a golden opportunity here and it should not be wasted. A lot of the above points ARE being actively discussed or acted on now as we speak, at least according to some sources. Assessment of Ukraine war Ukraine serves as an example that Nations need to maintain high levels of military readiness and adaptable defence strategies to deter potential aggressors. The ability to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield is vital. Both Ukraine and its supporters have had to innovate continuously and have broadly enjoyed an advantage most of the time. Technology is king, something the West already understood well but its more important than ever here, this could be quantified in so many ways, from how a battery of grads are relatively worthless in comparison to a couple of HIMARS platforms to how ancient T-62s are being turned into glorified sheds because they simply cannot do much else. I think people focus a little too much on FPVs when in reality I would place higher emphasis on the NATO hardware Ukraine got that gave them new and unique capability. HIMARS for example was far more dramatic in my view when it came to actively shaping Russian operations (and blowing a lot of stuff up) Both are equally critical to Ukraine winning. The use of drones, cyber warfare, and advanced surveillance technology has played a critical role. Both sides have leveraged technology to gain tactical advantages and disrupt enemy operations. Key takeaway in staying just ahead of the opponent when it comes to things like jamming frequencies to prevent loss of effectiveness for drone platforms. Ukraine needs to maintain this as best they can and so far seems to be doing so. What should Ukraine do? I think they have already at least partially found the solution that works for them best. IE maintain drone advantage while steadily reforming their military to a western approach supplemented with more and more NATO kit (perhaps with some sprinkle of soviet doctrine in areas where applicable / suitable) Continuous training (And refinement of that training) of Ukrainian forces, along with the continued acquisition of advanced weaponry and equipment from allies, is crucial. The West in the meantime needs to continue their support and build up their military industries to supply it. This is happening at least, even if its sluggish. My tank is running on empty here, but I will address a few more points before I roll over and perish. The Ukrainian army was not exactly prepared or adequate by any means in 2014, that's really the key difference. Competent large scale manoeuvre and coordination eroded fast when unprepared and overconfident Russian columns were getting ambushed in 2022 by far more determined soldiers with better equipment, organisation and preparation than in 2014. This was covered in detail here already. This does not remove the competencies of NATO, especially when they are pretty actively involved with helping / taking notes at the same time. We -do- know better than either party when it comes to high technology systems and their effective application. Its very much a two way street of lessons to be learned. Did you listen to the podcast? Because I feel like you did not. This is simply not true, there has been a wide degree of suggestions made both on this forum and elsewhere as to what is going on. The short answer is that its complicated. Russian failings are down to everything from politics, corruption, equipment, technology, doctrine and Ukrainian resistance. I thought this was obvious at this point. No one key reason exists here. I personally think the corruption and political interference are hampering them severely at this point. Given how much this has been beaten to death at this point I wont go into further detail. I will not detract from your credentials, you clearly have experience and expertise on the subject that make for very valuable input, but this does not entitle you or anyone into thinking 'my way or the high way', not does it mean everything you think is necessarily right. We need to be more pragmatic than that when arm chairing these things. I think thats about all I can handle for now. Ill try to reply to other posts when I can.

This is sort of my point, countries are already in the process of adapting current structures from the lessons learned in Ukraine.

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

We DID have deep stocks (Or at least deeper stocks) of kit, but a little something called the end of the cold war came. Germany scrapped such a crazy amount of its hardware for literal pennies that upon reflecting it was an actual crime. Pretty much everyone thought that war was now far less likely, so why spend to maintain keep reserves and large armies? It was a perfectly reasonable attitude at the time when social concerns were a more pressing issue. I dont see how Iraq or Afghanistan gave a warning to this either, the conflicts were completely different and revolved around insurgencies after relatively quick and easy conventional campaigns. The problem with both was it made the west largely focus on on COIN developments. I dont know how else to say it, but the war in Ukraine was not expected for a lot of reasons, even when in hindsight we might find it was obviously coming. The reasons for this war are so illogical to our minds that such a thing was identified as folly. From the strategic point of view, it does not give Russia anything but a black hole for their forces to be eroded away on. People assumed it would not happen because it was a -stupid idea-. Should there have been better plans in case of it happening anyway? Very much so, but you can at least understand why such a thought was considered unlikely.

Part of that is because outside of some select systems, we are very much not sending our latest and best in several areas. Much of the kit is as you say several decades old. The reasoning is pretty understandable (we need the stuff too!) Here I fully agree entirely with, the war has demonstrated that you dont just need good kit but you need stocks / reserves to make up shortfalls. Ammunition for artillery systems being a key example. That's not quite true, we do at the very least ensure Ukraine has access to the components it needs to build its FPVs: https://www.twz.com/news-features/competition-to-supply-ukraine-with-fpv-drones-gets-underway#:~:text=A multi-national effort to,quantities FPV drones to Ukraine. Western militaries are ultimately subject to the whims and wills of a civilian government who decide its budget and to a degree what the military in question is geared towards achieving. I'm not blaming anyone here, just pointing out how these things tend to operate and that we cant just blame one particular set of people. Just look at the UK Mod for instance with its recent funding woes. There were some reasonable reasons to believe the Russians could have done better than they actually did prior to 2022. Everything from the Ukrainian response to actual Russian capability was misjudged to be sure though. I would argue its better to overestimate a foes capabilities than underestimate them however. The latter is far more dangerous. I largely think it was the Ukrainian response to fight well and hard that probably caught most analysts out. Some Analysts did raise doubts about Russian capability but figured the sheer difference in firepower, vehicles, manpower, air power ect against a weaker foe would overcome any deficiencies. The most prevailing attitude I saw pre 2022 was that Russia would occupy a big chunk of Ukraine and lose the subsequent insurgency if it stuck around: Ie still eventually lose. Civilians and politicians seemed convinced the whole notion of invading was suicidally stupid and therefore 4d chess master Putin would not attempt it. The fact of the matter is that most civilian and military analysts and experts misjudged the situation, though I think that is due to said analysts being more concerned with the consequences of such an invasion to their own security concerns. I also think its reasonable to assume most analysts figured the Russians would at least plan such an invasion a little more effectively, rather than the utterly half arsed and rushed botch job it turned out to be. We got a glimpse of a more properly prepared invasion regarding infiltration of UA assets in the south which is probably what most figured would happen on a wider scale. https://www.voanews.com/a/three-reasons-most-analysts-were-wrong-on-war-in-ukraine/6974782.html

Plenty of important stuff Ukraine is desperate to get from the West as well though that they cannot produce, its not quite that one sided.

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see.

I also view the Gulf war as a clear case of Western doctrine working vs a country that at least tried to work with soviet doctrine, not to mention the intricacies of western approaches like a strong NCO system and Mission command tactical approaches that give NATO armies such flexibility and 'soft power' in the field. These I feel remain especially relevant if not more so in conflict given the fast acting status of warfare, and we see that as Ukraine steadily tries to shift from its soviet doctrine to one more western aligned with regards to such concepts. I view top down military systems increasingly obsolete for this very reason. Certainly we hear a lot how the younger Ukrainian leaders frequently clash with the older figures who are more soviet approach focussed. The Soviet system is simply too rigid for even this relatively static warfare due to command decisions requiring speedy responses. We saw this quickly with how sluggish the Russian ability to direct artillery or airstrikes onto valuable targets, something that's taken them literal years to fix and even then its still only caught a handful of valuable Ukrainian assets. The fact it two two years for Russia to actually visually destroy a single HIMARs system for instance spoke a lot about the inflexibility of such doctrine and how damaging it was in the field.