Calamine Waffles

Yeah, big shocker that Ukraine has those in 2022. As if Israel wouldn't have them if Yom Kippur happened today (if not better), a country that the US is willing to sell F-35s to.

I mean it's not a good comparison because the IDF and Heyl Ha'avir were much better trained and equipped forces, to levels that the ZSU could have only dreamed of in February 2022. The Egyptian offensive also faltered because their hand was forced by Assad's failure in the Golan Heights, which forced them to attack in an unprepared beyond their main objectives. The Israelis also benefited immensely from the US strategic airlift of material during Operation Nickel Grass (including tanks and other heavy weapons in numbers Ukraine wishes they had). Remember, the Ukrainians have been operating at both a technological and numerical disadvantage throughout this war. They were also not on a fully mobilised footing on February 24. The Israelis "only" really had the problem of being outnumbered and caught by surprise.

It's admittedly a bit easier to do force conservation when you can destroy your opponent's aircraft without them ever realising you are there.

You're underestimating the degree to which the IDF had been built up by the French, the UK, and the US between 1956 and 1967. On the ground both sides were roughly at technological parity, with the Arabs being inferior in the air. Then you look at the Ukrainians, who are basically using mostly Cold War era Soviet T-64BV and T-72 tanks against in general more modern Russian T-90s/T-80s/T-72B3s. The vast majority of the Ukrainian tanks don't even have thermal optics, which is standard on the T-72B3 (and alone already outnumbers the modernised T-64BV 2017s some two to three-fold). Their air force still uses vintage late 80s/early 90s MiG-29s and Su-34s against Russian Su-35s. They don't even have active radar-homing AAMs. They are also outnumbered too. No, they were operating at VPAF vs. USAF levels of technological disparity. There's no real good modern comparison.

This is correct, but the Ukrainian defensive terrain is much less favourable as well compared to the Golan Heights etc., so that was the only option available. I don't think it's a really good comparison. The IRIAF consistently outperformed the IrAF and was able to achieve air superiority over the Iraqis for most of the war until 1987/88. The PSU has mostly just been operating in an air denial mode.

Intensity was greater, but the IDF in 1967/73 was a vastly better equipped and trained force than the ZSU is in 2022. It's really not a good comparison.

No. It surpasses the Israelis. The Israelis were able to enjoy air dominance in 1967 and air superiority in the latter stages of 1973. The IDF was also much better equipped.

Armour has no role to play, they said...

@Battlefront.com re: mines

I think what happened was they put a significant portion of the mobilised men into the existing experienced brigades, which allowed them to benefit from experience from comabt seasoned troops and get them up to speed faster. You'll note that the reserve/TDF units that were also mobilised have not fared as well in Donbas and have encountered problems due to lack of experience and training.

It takes roughly about 6 months to mobilise and train men properly, so right on schedule we're seeing the ZSU committing large units of mobilised men now, 6 months after the war started. As pointed out months ago, none of the best Ukrainian units were committed to the Severodonetsk and Bakhmut axes defensive operations en masse, even though some were known to be in the relatively quiet Kharkiv/Kherson regions. We knew the VSRF were undermanned and having to control a frontline the distance between Moscow and Den Haag, all while attempting an assault in the Soledar direction towards Bakhmut. Finally, the Ukrainians were telegraphing their intentions to attack at Kherson for months, which is geographically and strategically favourable for them due to the destruction of the bridges over the Dnipro river, and hence time is on their side for such an offensive and they have no need to rush. All of this together should have suggested to people that Kherson alone could not have been the sole main effort.

Maybe tanks alone won't win the war for you. But I don't think you'll win the war without tanks.

The biggest lesson for the ZSU from 2014/15 I think is that they cannot out-mass or out-firepower the Russians, so they must find another way. And I think this is what they decided to go for.

It will be a while before we know for sure, but this: suggests to me that they are being used more like self-propelled guns, for direct fire support against hardpoints/targets/lines that cannot be bypassed, and also capable of providing indirect fire with drone support.

Or you can just take the Ukrainians at their word:

Depending on them, I would assume some went to the countryside (don't want to end up stuck in another potential Mariupol)

I agree. The ZSU have been very consistent in reporting that tanks have been essential in every phase of the war.

I wonder if it was 92 OMBr and their T-64s. Would be a great swan song for the T-64.

Still waiting to see the first captured Buk-M3 to be honest.

I believe I can fly...

They are primarily mechanised infantry supported by tanks. The fixed frontline has been broken through so now they are in the exploitation phase.

Did Jeschonnek get resurrected and now works for Putin instead?

It makes more sense to fold them into existing units, especially highly experienced ones, because training can only teach you so much.

They still have a lot of uncommitted reserves. And if Belarus decides it wants out of the war and stops messing around after Lukashenko sees Putin's army failing, then those forces in the north will be freed up too.