Huba

It looks like it was a German van, did Scholz say anything yet ?

Another photo. Comments mentions that this happened a few days ago. So probably a coincidence after all:

If this isn't a coincidence (which would be really weird), then sabotage seems most likely: @Der Zeitgeist I didn't know about this Maduro incident, thank!

My thoughts exactly! I wonder if Putin has the balls to show himself on the tribune, given his widely reported paranoia about personal security.

Well that's just disappointingly unsportsmanlike.

Oh, thanks for clarification. One can wonder what security measures are being taken in oblasts that border Ukraine now, given that "Russia is not at war". Probably insufficient ones

Probably not that useful against treetop level attacks. It does tell something about (lack of) VVO involvement. I'd think that there should be constant airborne radar coverage along the borders, if not from AWACS then at least from MiG-31s? Those should be perfectly capable to deal with those pesky low level flyers. Edit: Girkin thinks it was Belarusian saboteurs

Take with a grain of salt, cause it's NEXTA. But interesting nonetheless, especially combined with info of RU forming strike group against Kryvyi Rih.

Speaking of Russian offensive, that's hard to believe:

There might be multiple opportunities for counterattacks during the Russian offensive that we can't really predict, potentially leading right ito strategic counteroffensive. I think there is no point discussing that really. In more set piece scenario, cutting the landbridge seems like a thing to do. Everyone would love a drive to save Mariupol, but I think that going towards Melitopol and in direction of Crimea gives the "pincer effect" on all the forces around Kherson. Secondary pincer towards Berdyansk or even Mariupol would compliment it perfectly, but main effort should I think be placed in the westwsrd direction. In any case, if Ukraine is able to reach and hold a part of Azov shore, placing antiship missiles there means that Russians are more or less banned from using it. It is a big economic hit to Russia, cutting Rostov port and Volga trade from the world. If UA gets weapons to threaten the Crimea bridge, it means whole pennisula is effectively cut off, except for deliveries by sea ( and if Ukraine indeed has Neptunes, and not only UKs Harpoons, even that is at risk as those should be able to traget approaches to Sevastopol). From that position UA might think about continuing operations against Kherson and Crimea itself.

I'm happy to be corrected at this, but my understanding is that Ukrainian side is getting progressively stronger as time passes (due to mobilization and influx of equipment from the west) while Russians are bleeding, with no prospect of significant reinforcements in sight. The time for large scale offensive action for Ukraine will come, but waiting seems like a smart thing to do now. It probably will mean sacrificing Mariupol unfortunately. I think that reasonably, UA won't take to offensive at least untll: a) weather improves enough b) NATO artillery and other equipment is reasonably integrated c) newly mobilized reserves are available in meaningful numbers d) outcome of current Russian offensive is known Status of mobilization is hardly an open source info, I'm going to skip that. For the first two points I think minimum is about two weeks ( May 8th to piss on Putin's parade? :P), but more probably end of May or later. As for the last point, for UA high command it might be known already, but I supppose that consensus is that we'll see the main Russian effort in upcoming week. It's outcome will dictate if UA will counterattack ASAP to take advantage of the opportunity that might present itself, or if taking a pause and continuing reinforcing will be preferable. Now as to where the UA counteroffensive will happen ( assuming no significant changes in controlled territories in next days). I'd bet on the south as there is by far the most to win there - unblocking the Black Sea trade, threatening Crimea, denying Sea of Azov to Russia and goes against Putins stated goals. Attacking fixed positions in Donbas does not sound very promising, and will mean a quagmire of managing the reconquered areas. Plus it means leaving the well established defensive positions. Reducing the Izyum salient I think would be done if there's an opportunity. Terrain is more defendable there, it's generally easier to reinforce for Russians and it is largely contained at the moment. It isn't as strategically important as Kherson region. So, here's this humble layman's idea about what's going to happen. What do you think?

Long term for sure, but if the goal is to use it in a counteroffensive in early June, bringing everything available right now makes sense I think. When it starts to break down, hopefully there will be M109s ready to replace it.

I know nothing about ordnance handling procedures in airbases, but that does not look right. Aircraft on the left are Su-34s I think?

Or the Austrian Painter. It is getting grotesque. Also what's that about 150miles missiles? Is HIMARS finally announced? I missed that bit somehow...

Czechs suggest the are going to send Mi-24s, same goes for Poland

Strikes in Odessa, allegedly by Kh-101 types launched from Tu-95 with some were reportedly downed by AD.

This is confirmed by Polish state media

Missile unsurprisingly flew out of a treeline. These squares suck not only for AFVs, but for helicopters too.

Time to take some rest

Let's do a quick review of equipment and ammunition of Soviet and NATO origins: Soviet Ammo: 122mm, 152mm, 152mm for Giatsint, 203mm SPGs: 2S1, 2S3, Giatsint-S, 2S7, MSTA-S Towed Guns: D30, D20, MSTA-B, Giatsint-B NATO Ammo: 155mm SPGs: Pzh 2000, M109A4, CAESAR Towed guns: M777 It is a bit more complicated if you take into account charges for particular gun models. If in perspective the Soviet stuff is to be phased out and replaced by NATO, it will actually mean a significant simplification, especially regarding ammo. Transition phase on the other hand is going to be fun, I'll give you that.

More of gloomy Girkin predictions:

No way they can win it if West keeps it's resolve (we know Ukrainians will). But they can wage it anyway, Nazi germany 1943+ style. And that's a horrible thing to look up to

There's a Polish saying "small rain from a big cloud" and that's what this Donbas offensive turns out to be. Ukrainians don't cease to amaze!

I interpret it as mostly sabre-rattling directed at Moldova. The country took quite an unexpected turn towards EU in months leading to the war and there isn't much that Russia can do with it at the moment. Ejecting Russian peacekeepers in case of Ukrainians getting an upper hand in the war is on the cards. I can't see any prospect of Russia moving towards Odessa, but words cost nothing.

It is apparent to anyone looking that Russians are unwilling to fly strike packages deeper inside Ukraine (at least we don't get to see it). This is obviously because of Ukrainian AD deterring them. Now I'd think that at least around the frontline Russians would be able get enough air presence that any radar that starts working is attacked by ARMs. That's a bare minimum to be able to do useful CAS. The fact that they apparently can't achieve even this is baffling. In light of that, I wonder how much of an obstacle will RU AF be when Ukraine finally takes to offensive. S300 is a relatively mobile system that maybe should be able to keep up with the attacking forces, especially in combination with Buks and low level AD ( new Stormer/ Starstreak, TORs etc). This sounds really quite optimistic.