billbindc

The ammo was an obvious issue we could see in OSINT heatmaps of artillery strikes, etc. Virtually everything else we are dependent on PR statements that may or may not directly reflect what Austin and Zeluzhny are saying in private. Given what we know about previous big wars, I think it's quite likely the picture has been artfully skewed. We'll find out in 10 years or so.

"the press" being Jacobin Mag. Looks like we are just going to have to agree to disagree on this one.

I'm not sure I would take everything Zelensky says entirely at face value. The tank issue is an excellent and politically efficient way to beat up Sholtz with an eye towards getting aid in general. The same could be said about much of the above. The President of Ukraine would be remiss as a leader if he said anything close to "thanks chaps, we have enough". Are they short of artillery rounds? Sure. Would they like better tanks? Why not? But a PR campaign is being played and we shouldn't lose sight of that.

But with a logistical cost that Ukraine may have not been able to bear without damaging other aspects of its warfighting capability. Also...isn't this the forum that's been pretty clear on the idea that the tank is not what it was on the modern battlefield? And doesn't Ukraine have *more* tanks now of Russian vintage than it did at the start? Why the fetish for Leopards that won't materially change the war? What am I missing?

All good concerns which I think are pretty much state secrets at this point so I can't address them in detail. In general, we should be providing Ukraine with what is most effective, most immediately in a military and logistical sense while keeping a wary eye on escalatory dangers. That's what we've been doing so far and....Ukraine is winning. Can or should we expand the range of systems we are giving them? Sure and we are and we will continue to. Have we been slow? Well, this war is less than 10 months old. By government standards, we've been moving at light speed.

That's not a chill down my spine. I swear.

This, this, this, this! (Sorry, couldn't help it.)

Ri The answer to that question — “why would Democrats want them back?” — is clear: because, as this new group demonstrates, Democrats find large amounts of common cause with neocons when it comes to foreign policy. Ah, the association game. How fun. You should look up CNAS where Nuland was actually writing and working. Pretty much the opposite crowd. Also, you may assume women must be nature share the opinions of their husbands. I don't and there's plenty of evidence she didn't.

Oh, I'm sympathetic with the argument made out in the world that you are making. I was reacting to some of the vituperation on this board. I would only say that it's much harder to navigate domestic German or American political issues while taking into account the dangers of escalation that it appears from the outside. Biden especially has been playing a not-so-great hand so skillfully that it's easy to underestimate the difficulties he faces getting arms to Ukraine. Scholz not so much.

It is well worth considering where we'd be on that score had Ukraine folded and Russia was able to quickly over run the country. Every calculation on Taiwan right now would be different.

Agreed all around. The general point I'm trying to get across is that looking back and saying "USA suxxxx!!!" or "the West betrayed Ukraine!!!!" or "Ukraine had it coming!!!" is absurd. Countries act within the envelope of what they can reasonably accomplish under given political, military and economic constraints. The US isn't magically able to go "poof, here's a military for you" or the EU couldn't wave a wand and easily get 28 countries to move in lockstep any more than Ukraine could have wished away its strategic position, limited resources or corruption issues. Instead, all of the above try pretty hard to do the best they can with what they've got and what they think they know. And conditions in any given day or year change and *matter*. Sorry to lecture but the above is pretty damn important folks if you prefer solid analysis to endorphin fueled venting.

And what we *did* significantly degraded Russian power before the decision to invade. Putin had been effectively conducting a grey zone war against Western interests. What he got for that was Maydan and a strategically devastating loss of influence in Ukraine. And if you don't think the US was seriously involved in that turning point, boy do I have a Georgian civil society instructor to sell you.

Are we pretending now that PNAC was within miles of the Obama administration's foreign policy apparatus in 2014? Really? (pro tip: that's a ridiculous assertion) Also, the EU/US/Canada/etc actually began imposing sanctions in 2014 and went through several rounds of increasing sanction before the 2022 invasion in concert and consultation with each other. I can get being unhappy with the level of response, the particulars, etc but we either talk about the actual facts of what happened or it becomes a useless exercise in spleen venting.

Both a post-election and a pre-GOP House effect. They are freer to act now but will have a harder time come January.

Happy to let it go.

Of more immediate use than tanks: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/14/ukraine-smart-bomb-jdams/

That Ukrainian government would have been sanctioned, pressured and likely forced out. And the 4th most powerful nuclear arsenal isn't when you don't have the launch codes and half of your military won't want to fight the Russians. To hold onto the weapons would have been messy and complicated for everyone but it was simply not going to be allowed to happen unless Ukraine was going to try for the Albanian/North Korean option. Which, just as it exited the USSR would have been seen as an absurd proposition by virtually everyone. So no, you don't understand me correctly because your original premise is flawed.

Quite the opposite. The Russians would have done the fighting then with more relative capability than they have now and everyone would have acquiesced to some sort of protectorate status to Russia to set the example to other CSTO states who thought about keeping their nukes.

None. But North Korea is then condemned to be North Korea. I think it's a pretty safe assumption to say that domestic Ukrainian politics wouldn't have supported going in that direction.

Not impossible but very time consuming and given the Russian/American penetration of the Ukrainian services quite impossible to keep secret. You can imagine the reaction that would have ensued.

First, they didn't have the launch codes and Russia wasn't going to share them. Second, iirc missiles were made in Ukraine but warheads were made in places like Sverdlovsk-45/Lesnoy in Russia proper. Had Ukraine decided to crack the codes and start the very risky project of dismantling warheads to make them usable they would have potentially provoked a war right then with the US/NATO on the other side.

This. Ukraine was poor, insecure and unstable country in the early 90's in a world that was extremely worried about loose nukes. A Ukraine that tried to retain nukes it couldn't maintain or use would have been poor, insecure and unstable with even less investment going forward and no friends at all. The author of the article, Cheryl Rofer, is a stone cold expert on the subject. Believe her.

It's worth remembering what the Budapest Memorandum actually said...and that not just the US but Japan, Great Britain and China all also signed on: Respect the signatory's independence and sovereignty in the existing borders. Refrain from the threat or the use of force against the signatory. Refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by the signatory of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind. Seek immediate Security Counsel action to provide assistance to the signatory if they "should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used". Refrain from the use of nuclear arms against the signatory. Consult with one another if questions arise regarding those commitments. Lots of claims made about it seem to be based on the idea it contained an Article 5-like provision. It did not, and nobody in Ukraine who worked on the deal thought it did.

To pretend that the collective West faced an easy decision in 2014 is as absurd as pretending that the collective West handled it perfectly. It's also simply not true that Putin thought the West was a paper napkin, tiger or any other flimsy metaphor. Every step he took was correctly calculated until last February to approach the line that might trigger a strong US/EU response but not cross it. Then, quite obviously, he did. It's not *our* miscalculation that led to Russia invading Ukraine...it was Putin's. And it's worth noting...between Western actions and sanctions...Russia's geopolitical situation was *declining* steadily before he made the decision to invade. That's *why* he did it.

On the aid to Ukraine question, pro or con, it would be a lot more illuminating if every reaction was informed by the idea that both sides have their interests, their domestic politics and nothing close to complete information. To Haiduk, et alia...it's worth remembering that the US POTUS cannot act with complete freedom given the wider security responsibilities the US must fulfill and the domestic political landscape he must navigate here. That is assuredly frustrating for you given that you are in an existential knife fight but it's worth remembering that snarling at the hand that's feeding you ISR, weapons and supplies is unlikely to get you more...rather it's going to empower politicians here who want to give you less. Biden went way out on a limb to help Ukraine...to abuse another metaphor...don't help his enemies cut the branch. To the idea that primarily US and Western weaknesses and failures led to this war...sorry but that's just not on. Ukraine has its own domestic conditions that contributed and a geopolitical situation/history that is/was far more important. US power has limits and Ukraine had a difficult situation that had to become so regionally serious that the POTUS had to take a huge risk in extending it. Is that unfair, bitter and enraging? Of course. But to act as if Obama or Bush had a magic want to solve it is absurd. The US public wasn't remotely ready to go even part way to war over the Donbas/Crimea. Do yourselves a favor and don't imagine for a second that "USA sucks!" is going to get you a single bullet or boot. It will do the opposite as we have plenty of politicians here who will use it in next year's budget fights.