billbindc

I don't disagree that Ukraine needs to push Russia to win but it's not at all a given that either the former wins in some dramatic fashion or the latter wins by default. Russia is a politically and economically fragile entity that inadvertently set itself against the resources of the West and the national will of the Ukrainian state. It has also lost some 50% of the territory that it initially conquered. Does that mean it has greater density of troops on the ground? Sure. Does that mean it is getting "better" at this? If you ask me, that's a strange definition of success.

Do we actually know that Russia can effectively mobilize, arm and train more personnel than Ukraine? I have some significant doubts on that score. The Soviet system is dead and gone and the Russian military industrial complex is reportedly short some 400,000 workers already. How is Russia going to generate force to levels that will make a war winning difference relative to the quantity and quality of Ukrainian personnel/equipment when it can't mobilize without cutting into production and it can't raise production without stifling mobilization? .

This. In the real world, the problem with Israel is that it isn’t helping Ukraine as *much* as we might have expected, not that it is helping Russia and the reason for that is directly tied to Syria and some fairly involved security issues therein. And that’s why Russia would be idiotic to provide Iran with nuclear help.

The aid would have to win the war *and* somehow mitigate the reaction of what few semi-friends Russia still possesses. India and China would both completely freak out. So would Turkey. Israel has importantly refrained from taking Ukraine's side because at the moment, it still believes it needs Russia to keep some stability in Syria. If Russia came within miles of handing over nukes to Iran, Tel Aviv would throw everything it could at the Russians in Ukraine in terms of aid to Kyiv. Those vaunted Iranian missiles would be facing Iron Dome within weeks. It's just not going to happen.

The idea that Russia would hand over 20 nukes to Iran is frankly preposterous. There's nothing Iran could give Russia that holds even remotely equivalent value and it would have epochal effects on Russian/Israeli relations. I suppose nothing is impossible but this is as close as it gets.

Totally on point from Galeotti...as usual and he gets at a point I've tried to make here before: Prigozhin is *given* resources but he doesn't *control* resources. He's a temporarily useful and easily expendable tool. The MOD and FSB are able to protect Girkin despite his strident critiques of even Putin himself.

Is there any idea of what the Russian force density (in terms of infantry/kilometer) is on the fighting line this moment?

The stand in Bakhmut is definitely hurting Prigozhin in Moscow and it's eating away at what armed force he might be able to deploy in an domestic Russian power struggle. That itself is a good outcome for Ukraine and likely an additional bonus to fixing Russian forces, culminating the regular RA this winter, etc. This war ends when Russia can't sustain it politically or militarily. The shaming of the ultras goes in that direction.

I'm not at all in partisan alignment with McConnell but there's no argument that he's been anything but 100% there for Ukraine and that goes for 80% of Republicans in the Senate.

The last big "War Over by Christmas" was in 1914 when Western Europe/US was getting into it's first big war in 40+ years and had lost the habit of how these things work. History's got a rhyme to it.

In the larger picture, it's pretty fascinating to observe the "WTF is taking so long?" vibes. This conflict is 11 months old. Ukraine lost 36% of the country and regained 18% back in that time. Something like 4 or 5 major land campaigns have been fought out. The air/drone/missile war has gone through multiple iterations. Casualties are something north of 300,000 and vast global political and strategic forces have been transformed. I blame social media (or the internet, or video games, or something) I guess.

Yes.

Capt...you know better. This time next week it will be "Where are the F$&#ING JETS??!!!?!?!??!"

My broken record response to this is that Prigozhin is not fighting a battle to win in Ukraine, he's fighting a battle to win in Moscow. As such, the normal strategic judgements don't apply to the Russian effort. His goal isn't to "win" in Ukraine but to "win" in Bakhmut and so solidify some sort of ascendancy in Moscow's power vertical. It's not looking like he's managed either...which may be why the old guard is back at the MOD.

More than Ukraine. Also Taiwan.

That's a very strange take. The US is going 3/5ths of the way in for Ukraine...inarguably a far less strategically important interest to the US than Germany. The idea that we would do that and then leave Germany to fend for itself makes zero sense. If that's what Berlin is worried about then the Scholtz gov't is more at sea than I realized.

It's clear that the US thinks Leopards are the better tank to send to Ukraine but M1's are coming if they aren't available. Very notably, there is nary a complaint coming from the new House GOP leadership. Two strong signals that Putin should, but probably won't, be noting. https://www.wsj.com/articles/poland-formally-requests-german-permission-to-send-tanks-to-ukraine-11674558492?mod=hp_lead_pos1

It's a much bigger story than sanctions violations but well out of the bounds of this discussion.

There were numerous examples of this (i.e. committing to a pipeline measures if Russia invaded) where in retrospect the US ability to actually see what was happening versus the German desire to avoid seeing it could not have been more stark. It *possible* that part of Scholz's problem now is that the German gov't doesn't trust its own analysis.

I was reminded of this from before the war: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/07/biden-says-nord-stream-2-wont-go-forward-if-russia-invades-ukraine-.html There's a strong pattern here for other nations announcing a decision and then the German government backing away after the meeting. That can only be a few things...1. Scholtz personally rules out decisions post facto or 2. coalition partners are unable to agree on the policy.

The merits of sending tanks or not to Ukraine aside, it's very clear that this German government is quite bad at the diplomacy and politics of the issue generally. Germany is now in a situation where when/if it relents, its doesn't get much credit and it has already deeply shaken the faith of previous buyers of its military products. Very strange.

This. What gets lost in this discussion is that the next six months are going to see battles that will likely decide where this war will be in 2024. Leos and M1’s aren’t going to be on the field even if they were handed over today. Prepping for them should be well under way but today, right now, the war is going to be much more decisively shaped by extended strike capability and ammunition.

All good points but I don't feel like we really have a handle on why this is so difficult for Scholtz. As you note, Germany's already strongly into the war in a lot of ways and there's not much upside to refusing Leo's.

Do we actually know the total stock of tanks Ukraine currently possesses?

It seems like another Russian offensive of sorts is in the cards. I'm putting my money on Ukraine waiting for the RA to commit to it and then a drive towards Tokmak along the right side of the Konka with diversionary probes along the southern Dnieper.