billbindc

I agree with DefMon3 that it's prep for an attempted orderly withdrawal. It doesn't help them much except to increase the density of their lines and the risks attendant to a local breakthrough rise geometrically with every lost kilometer between the front and the river behind it.

Desperate measures being taken in Kherson (not totally confirmed yet).

Lots of discussion out there (by S. Joshi at the Economist) about the potential for the Luhansk front to be turned and collapsed from the north in the context of Russian use of nuclear weapons policy. If it would happen, that would be the likeliest trigger.

Already dated. They don't have Izium taken and it's been in UA hands for a least a day.

Blinken is doing exactly what the US should...showing the world that our side of this war will entertain reasonable talks. That does not in anyway push Ukraine into anything and Ukraine too is doing what they should...showing the world the strength of their resolve. Also, there's plenty of discussion of how to end this war behind the scenes and part of that discussion is about whether or not Ukraine really wants or needs the LDR/DNR territories back. The rebuilding program when this is all over is going to be massive and those places will require a lot of it. While the population is going to transfer in part back to Russia if this all collapses, not all will and many will be quite hostile to the Ukrainian government. What you are seeing from Ukraine and Blinken is careful positioning. That's all.

There will be some very interesting books written long after this war that will reveal the level of planning and integration between the US/NATO/Ukraine in the conduct of this war.

At this point more preventative than anything else.

Sushko is a clown. Ignore.

I would imagine Kofman is getting some pretty dank looks around town these days.

If both pockets actually kessel then the UA will have captured or put out of action something like 25,000 Russian soldiers with their equipment, training, etc. Maybe 15% of the entire establishment at war for Putin. As we've seen, Russia is already scraping the barrel for men, artillery tubes, shells, chips, you name it. He can go for real draft and hard enlistment but he can't arm them like a modern army. He can start nuking things and drive his friends away while NATO smashes his remaining forces to pieces. Or he can sue for peace. That's about it.

I think that messaging is being delivered in highly belligerent terms as we speak.

It's a good question and I don't think we can know for sure until it happens. It's certainly an issue being debated around DC. You are spot on that militarily tactical nukes are not highly useful against the Ukrainian army. It's unlikely anything short of general use destroys Ukraine's ability to resist and the partisan warfare that would ensue in that case would be extraordinarily frightful. Nuking a city would be simpler and nuking Kyiv would be not just a military strike but a statement of will. Also, of course, an incredibly significant war crime. And none of the above would trigger Article 5. The issue would come down to what the major states in NATO would do. Would Germany recoil at getting more deeply involved? Would France? I would bet (and have) that they would not. I think it would engender the kind of crusading zeal not seen since 1945. It would be clear to all that this war is no longer a regional conflict but an absolute necessity to stop a larger war to come and while India and China wouldn't help us, they would certainly back away from even the limited support they've given Russia. Another important point is that NATO has gained enormous conventional dominance as a result of this war. We don't just know how badly Russian forces have been hurt but also how badly led, trained and supplied they are while having had three months to turn them inside out analytically. NATO can destroy everything for Putin in a week or two and never has to even consider using nuclear weapons to do it. All of that to say is, yes...policy folks are certainly worried about 'backing him into a corner' but I think the event itself would transform the nature of the conflict in ways that would make that point moot.

Having strong flashbacks to Croatia's 1995 Operation Storm...which is a thing I've been thinking about quite a bit for the last couple of months but superstitiously didn't mention. Not in the details, mind but in the essentials.

As I've said in various ways, nukes make everything worse for Putin tactically, strategically, economically and however you summarize the idea that he wants to wake up alive in the morning. It's *possible* they go that far but I don't see it as likely.

My version of this is "Russia ain't magic". I keep saying it and what they are saying now is "Well, aren't you worried about tactical nukes?". There will always be something.

He's a good reporter and I don't doubt a word of it. That said, it's kind of like the bomber diagram from WWII. You'll hear about the worst situations from the wounded because that's where the most wounded will come from. It's certainly sobering to read but too much can be read into it.

The track record of post Franco-Prussian War France and post WWI Germany is awful. The former gave us the progenitors of fascism (Boulangisme, the Dreyfus Affair, etc) and the latter gave us the full blown, global domination version. Who thinks the Russia version will bring about gentle democracy?

Is there anything on where the 3rd AC is now? Reports had it at around 15k in personnel, then maybe 10k-12k and the latest I heard was more like 5k without any clear idea of where what Kofman called a "serious accession of force" was ending up. Inquiring minds, etc.

Steve, To sum up..."operational art".

Every political and military action taken by Putin has been to shore up the regime. No he's not reasonable in his goals but his methods have been rational. Going nuclear would, as you note with the repercussions above, be not at all rational way to achieve them.

This, by Orlando Figes, isn't a military article in any way but just about the best and most balanced roundup of how Russia got where it is today: https://www.ft.com/content/6153f76e-eb8c-494b-8f81-123617f5dddb Kind of off topic but also very much on.

90% of Omar was whistling "The Farmer in the Dell".

It's a dangerous habit in analyzing a fluid political and military situation to treat every data point as equally important as any other without knowing enough about the factors that led it to arise. One obvious way in which to weigh an event is to note whether or not it is something that we have seen before. Kaydrov has actually done this sort of thing multiple times as close observers of his regime-let can tell you. Is it possible it is a hugely important development? We simply don't know until something else happens but Kadryov fake resigning or similar is not an unusual event.

Kadyrov was mostly trying to get attention. It's happened before and I wouldn't read too much into it.

Russia buying shells from North Korea. As Alperovitch notes, a likely sign of severe supply issues and an overestimation of what they had originally. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/russia-north-korea-artillery.html