billbindc

The information is not surprising but the leak itself is...and more so with a little unpacking. Kozak is deeply inside guy and one of Putin's personal following from Saint Petersburg. He's trusted and he's one of the few who has the standing, the personal character and the demonstrated loyalty to say "Boss, this idea really sucks". And apparently, he did and more importantly, *he* didn't leak it. What's happening is that elites who want to pull Putin down are using his own closest people to suggest the boss has lost it. Pretty interesting stuff.

I can believe there will a slackening of control around the margins. Maybe that Georgian border creeps back north, maybe the Chechens develop some further autonomy, maybe there's a brushfire war in the Caucasus. But by substantial, I'm thinking something that changes the fundamental geography of the core Russia state. Siberian independence, a Yakuts republic. In short, an actual dissolution of the state that it cannot contest with any success militarily. I *do* think a late Ottoman style senescence is likely but I just don't think the near peripheral segments have the strength the center will retain.

What is our timeline? I will happily predict the current Russian state will not fall apart in any substantial way for the next 10 years.

From Julia Ioffe's interview today with Evgenia Markovna Albats, the doyenne of Russian media her newsletter "Tomorrow Will Be Worse".

Russia strongly resembles a nuclear Austro-Hungary of 1914: Discuss <insert sarcasm emoji here>

Melitopol seems like a better option in terms of space, time and what we can see of supply. It would also probably force a complete rearrangement of the supply and artillery currently defending Kharkiv from the left side of the Dnieper. But totally guessing. We have less ISR than the Kremlin does (possibly).

Someone is organizing this: https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-09-13-22/h_b439762c2fb1cc0a92457f4214601e58

Normally in the clips you see of Russian tv propagandists, you hear lots garbled buzzwords (the classic "we will take both *tactical* and *strategic* measures to solve the problem of Nazi Azov forces") that are designed to make the speaker sound like Zhukov without saying anything practical about the war. Which made sense because any practical statements would have run afoul of Kremlin dictates. This is a bigger sea change than calling it a war or saying they are losing. He's specifically and in plain words explaining why mobilization won't work. He's bluntly saying Russia may be too weak to win. If he's still on tv tomorrow or the next day, we'll know the Kremlin is losing some grip. If not, I hope he enjoys cold winters.

This is precisely what I imagine is happening right now. What that they are saying when they say no new BTG’s will go to Ukraine is that they need every new recruit to hold onto NE Luhansk and that’s not enough to keep it. And those convoys likely aren’t units running for the border but units being redeployed and to the NE and taking their loot with them.

It's pretty hard to know which of these stories to take seriously and which to discount but a couple of things are clear: 1. Most of the better Russian formations are in the south and, unfortunately for them, in Kherson. 2. The UA is not lunging of the Oskil. Yes, Lyman is holding them up but it's clear that they are being methodical. 3. The UA is definitely taking a force on force approach in Kherson to destroy rather than chase them over the Dnieper. 4. The RuAf clearly think an attack is coming through to either Melitopol or to Mariupol. 5. Zelenksy originally wanted a general offensive as per the last entry. If you add all of that up along with the estimates I've seen of some 40,000 UA reserves remaining unused...it certainly looks like there might be a dramatic attempt to end the war with by splitting the Russians in two via Melitopol and/or Mariupol. Just a wild guess but if they remain true to form, the Russians will be racing depleted forces virtually everywhere else.

The problem with 'futurists' is that it's pretty easy to look at a volatile gas station with nukes, a declining demographic situation and a complex ethnic composition and say..."hey, those guys are going to have a problem". And while I'm no big fan of the China-as-future-hegemon thesis (for similar reasons) it's clear China is a concern. Count me as profoundly meh.

Mother Russia is apparently an endless source of asiatic hordes or somefink. AKA, I haven't the foggiest idea where this dreck is from.

I was going to respond but then realized I disagree with every second or third sentence. Is "George Friedman" one of those AI writing programs?

"stuck at Customs" is going to take a significant toll on them but I'd go with the idea that L-DPR units will likely be the best there is left in Russia's army by the end of the year.

Seriously: https://fm.cnbc.com/applications/cnbc.com/resources/editorialfiles/2022/03/31/Joint_Statement_of_the_Russian_Federation_and_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China_on_the_International_Relations_Entering_a_New_Era_and_the_Global_Sustainable_Development__President_of_Russia.pdf

Here's the thing...Xi holds every single card here. Russian gas is badly situated for China's market and years/billions in investment away from being...even then...a pricey alternative to what they have. Russia doesn't have much of anything China wants and is a shrinking percentage of China's foreign trade...especially compared with the US and EU. Russia is also a would be competitor in Central Asia and has differing interests in Southwest Asia, Africa, etc. Russia's value to China was as a distraction to and a thorn in the side of the US and the EU. Xi needed the latter to have a big, dangerous security threat that could be activated to disperse their forces. In short, Russia was supposed to be Xi's pitbull. The dog might be still vicious but it's turned out to also be decrepit and the US is, through Ukraine, knocking its teeth out. So what does Xi do? I think close to nothing. A Russia that is more Austria-Hungary than useful is not worth investing in. China will do the bare minimum to maintain Russia's territorial integrity while asking the world in return in terms of trade deals, diplomatic access to the -stans and ultimately economic control in the Russian Far East. Unequal Treaties can go the other way, in time.

Just saw that. Could be true, could be part of the Ukrainian information campaign. They certainly want the Ivans grimly holding on in Kherson to think nobody's coming to help them.

I was and remain somewhat skeptical of where this goes but my antennae go up when I see repetition and what looks like a broader uptake. That's obviously happening here and the FSB will have noticed with alarm. And yes, these folks are inside the game to at least some degree or are connected to those who are. And their positioning is interesting. It's not "Why did we fight in Ukraine?" it's "Who screwed up the war?". I read that insiders seeing a viable way to challenge Putin. Again, could be a ripple or the beginning of a wave. We'll see.

I'm not sure I'd call it a significant event yet in regime stability but what's clear is that these folks think something significant has happened to regime stability. We wait and watch.

That strike is almost a perfect illustration of the Russian effort: something like $75 million dollars worth of missiles to take out part of the Ukrainian grid for...four hours?

There are huge risks for the LPR leadership if they try to make that deal...or rather if they try to make that deal too early. They will not unless and until it looks like Ukraine is on the cusp of conquering the territory anyway.

The @wartranslated guy was saying that parts of the 3rd Army Corps tried to intervene at Kupyansk and was defeated. Not sure how good the provenance is on that.

What reserves are left at this point?

Yes. And the increased density will simply make targeting for significant effect easier. Of course, that's how it goes when you are losing. You take options out of necessity that create other problems.