billbindc

And now the belated pivot to “it was the Americans!”. PS: yet more evidence that the Russians are making it up as they go along.

This. We know how utterly cold blooded the Kremlin is on a daily basis. Why show how feckless Moscow's defenses might be rather than hit a grammar school and/or nursery in Belgorod or Kursk?

You make the best argument that I've seen on this. My takes: 1. This shift happened with the collapse of the front around Kharkiv and accelerated after Kherson's fall. It's not coordinated with the latest event. 2. It's been doing that since the beginning as well (remember the absurd cornucopia of evidence bust last year?). 3. See my answer above. There were far less humiliating ways to accomplish the same goal. 4. If this were the case, the simplest path would be to declare war on Ukraine and open up full conscription. Russia hasn't gone there and isn't signaling it will. Why not? Because it's political dynamite and because the state lacks the capacity to effectively process and arm another large wave absent significant aid from outside (i.e. Xi). That hasn't happened. 5. Agreed. But absence of options doesn't create new ones. Putin made a deal with Russians and he's breaking it. Any Russians who care to can simply turn on their tv and watch Solovyev catalogue the disaster. It also contradicts the essential logic of the regime. Putin's Russia has always been based on de-mobilizing political action. It's not a movement government and...as we've seen...it has been careful to trim the sales of would be mobilizers like Girkin/Dugin/etc. 6. I think the reality on US/EU aid is that the only real limiting factors have been initial fears of nuclear/regional escalation in the beginning and subsequent needs to curb what China feels like it would be justified in providing to Moscow. A couple of Mavic drones conducting a demonstration attack over the Kremlin simply won't affect any of that. In fact, China isn't particularly well known for putting good money in after bad. The far simpler explanation is that Putin isn't a guy who intentionally embarrasses himself and his regime for nebulous and perhaps unrealizable gains and that Ukraine just showed quite clearly to the Russian population that it actually holds escalation dominance in their arena of the war. As with Nordstream, we'll know soon enough.

Hearing some pretty stiff critique of ISW for this update from Nathan Rupar publicly and privately from some pretty solid analysts. ISW is making a determination based from what I'm hearing essentially on a hunch without any analysis or evidence to back it up. The May Day parade claim is a particularly strange take. Russia has already shown that it can put on big stadium events during the war. The Kremlin has a large, well funded and savvy events/propaganda team. If it lacked enough modern equipment for a normal May Day parade there's nothing stopping them from giving it a Great Patriotic War theme and rolling out whatever's floating around from 1945. Russia is a big state with plenty of internal security forces to parade for an hour or two. It wouldn't be in the top 50 of May Day parades but if they wanted a reasonably staffed/equipped parade it is doable. What can it not do? Apparently security. And the compact Putin made with Russians was that it was a "special military operation" that wouldn't seriously affect the lives of core empire people. What does it say to them that a May Day parade *in Moscow* is maybe too dangerous to hold? It would have been far easier to simply say "the boys are at the front and we are going to hold a day of quiet contemplation and church attendance instead". The idea that a big explosion at the Kremlin was the solution to that problem is preposterous.

We've seen that movie before...in fact, exactly one year ago. If Putin hesitated to break the social compact his regime depended on for power with the Russian people then, it's hard to see how conditions have changed in ways that make it seem like a wise move now. https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/03/europe/russia-ukraine-declaration-of-war-intl-hnk-ml/index.html

I would say that there's a pretty big gap between what the US says Ukraine should or should not do versus what Ukraine can and should do. The White House has to navigate escalation in such a way that we avoid both the war spreading/going nuclear and intervention in any serious way by China. In that role, it must be seen in Beijing as providing some restraint on Ukrainian actions and in Moscow as having been deterred at least to some extent in providing aid. Ukraine is in a different position. Russia has already pulled out all the stops on conventional attacks and can only escalate in ways (NBC essentially) that would very likely cause irreparable damage to desperately needed Chinese support. The pain/gain is way too far out of whack for Russia for that to make sense so Ukraine is already carrying as much of the first half of that ratio it likely will. Ukraine can also complicate Chinese relationships with the EU in any post war scenario and has a market China will be very hungry to enter when this war is over. Beijing is not going to care one bit about a drone at the Kremlin given those stakes.

As a journalist of my acquaintance put it "What are the going to do? Invade Ukraine?".

On your second to last point, it's pretty good information strategy...especially if deniable. People will...as we are doing...speculate endlessly on who/what/why in the absence of confirmation. Taken as a given that dictatorships under stress simply cannot afford to look weak, few will believe Putin did it to himself. So, the discussion will be of internal or external enemies, what it says about Moscow's vulnerabilities, Russia's military weakness, oligarch or military maneuvering, etc. In other words, a perfect way to accelerate Russian society's predilection for conspiracy and fear mongering. So...no benefits for Putin but some very solid benefits for Ukraine and Zelensky...if he coolly denies it. PS: if we wanted confirmation that it *wasn't* a false flag, the fact that the Kremlin tried to keep it under wraps and had no orchestrated announcements or measures is pretty definitive. The Russian's don't take a dump, et cetera and so forth.

A reminder that no claim of a false flag that I know of has stood up to extensive scrutiny as yet in this war: https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/moerklagt/militaer-radiokommunikation-afsloerer-russiske-flaadeskibe-var-paa

Don't believe the hype. And there is no universe in which China, India, etc take what is essentially an embarrassing nuisance attack as a legitimate excuse to drop a nuke.

Exactly. Zelensky doesn't control every possible Ukrainian act and wouldn't want to. Things that are deniable are often useful. It's also hard to fault the operation on the level of informational conflict...demonstrating Russian vulnerability just as the Bradley's are warming up is a shrewd move.

Any argument that this was a false flag has to address the following: 1. What political/propaganda goal is be served by demonstrating the weaknesses of the Russian capitol's defense? 2. What response to this supposed escalation would it justify that Russia isn't already doing? Until someone provides very compelling answers to those questions, assume it is what it looks like...some patriotic Ukrainians poking Putin in the eye for propaganda value.

What is your best assessment of what happens when/if Ukrainian *air* defenses get degraded as reported in the next few months? Is the Russia AF able to do FA? Will it gain some advantages at high altitude lobbing, etc but not much else?

I think your second paragraph gets closer to what I mean. I don't think Russia has quality targeting data and what data they have is usually aged by the time they can close their ooda loop. So they simply can't routinely satisfy what the more logical nat bloggers are demanding and that audience is just a part of who they are messaging. A more important audience are the much larger mass of citizens who gargle with ressentiment every morning. They have a racist and essentially fascist view of Ukrainians and are willing to put up with quite a bit as long as they see them being punished for daring to reject domination. Not to coin a phrase but spend enough looking into the grey zone, and the grey zone looks into you.

Some of these attacks are certainly mistakes or simply not giving much of a **** about accuracy but there have been far too many attacks on civilian targets to call it a marginal effect. See below for just one example: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/dozens-of-russian-missiles-strike-civilian-targets-in-ukrainian-cities

You said specifically that "Russian military thinking is behind the times" and described above and earlier how terror and/or strategic bombing didn't work. Which, of course, it didn't and the Russians know that. At best, these campaigns wear on Ukrainian air defenses but Russia knows better than anyone that its air force is ill prepared to take advantage of that fact. So no, it's not really a military strategy at all unless you broaden out the meaning of the term so far that everything is. Russia's semi-indescriminate bombing is almost entirely political in nature...aimed at looking stern and violently busy to its own hardline factions who are the only improbably likely danger to the regime. Bakhmut was a similar situation...action without real hope of success or compelling strategic logic in order to send a message. Think of it as grey zone thinking run amok (or turned to for lack of anything else to try).

Russia isn't employing a military strategy when it hits Ukrainian civilian targets. It is employing a political strategy. Domestically, it provides evidence to the mass of Russian hardliners that there is no length that Putin won't go to win. In Ukraine, it sends the message that Russia will relentlessly attack in all ways without remorse until Zelensky submits. This isn't mass bombing in the style of WWII or even Vietnam. It is communication.

Kofman and Evans is a pretty decent rundown of where we are on the offensive. Kofman is fairly optimistic and both are critical of the pre-game jitters from the USG and the overall theory of success. https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/the-calm-before-the-storm-waiting-for-ukraines-offensive/?__s=4983vxa1cr7umn9uarm1 Caveat: it would shed more light on the complexities involved if there was less emphasis on supposed American political considerations (supporting Ukraine is popular...this is a bad point) and the more rigorous interpretation that arbitraging Chinese intervention is a far likelier influence.

It's also a ridiculous assumption to assume that the Russia Airforce is a shiny deus ex machina ready to be pulled out of the box to win the war. Yes it has a lot of planes. What it lacks is doctrine, pilots, attitude and upkeep. We've been to this rodeo before with the Russians and we know how it's highly likely to turn out. https://www.businessinsider.com/fighting-in-ukraine-reveals-russian-air-force-fragility-think-tank-2022-12?r=US&IR=T

Sure. But that’s for later. The war is quite enough to be working on and ending hostilities in a way that’s positive for Ukraine and NATO is the requirement for all the rest.

I disagree. All we should be discussing with Russia right now is how and when they are going to end the war, leave Ukrainian territory and in the meantime what steps we are going to take to avoid any sort of accidental direct conflict that could escalate it. America setting conditions on a future Russian government muddies the water and affirms the Russian claim to the rest of the world that the US is meddling in their internal affairs. Call it a 'color revolution by other means' if you will. In addition, it is not at all clear that articulating those conditions now will actually help any would be revolutionaries as it would make it simple for the regime to then label any and all American stooges. Eyes on the prize...arms to the UA and support until they win the war. That's all and it's more than enough.

Agreed. And to be clear, my point above isn't to say that the regime is strong. The cracks in regards to the war are quite obvious and the economy is living on borrowed time. But there isn't an alternative to Putin that anyone takes seriously and until one arises or he falls out of window, he's what we are going to get.

I'm less convinced of this now than I was a year ago. Putin has demonstrated an ability to take people like Kadyrov and Prigozhin out of the box and put them back in again. The FSB has quite clearly terrorized elites thoroughly. Russian propaganda outlets are talking about the possibility of losing the war and the sky isn't falling...either in general or on the mouthpieces saying it. So far, the regime isn't showing cracks and there is no overt evidence of any clique successfully jockeying to build an alternative power base. Prigozhin and Kadyrov tried it and failed. Putin may *believe* that certainly. But I think this Autumn of the Patriarch ends like the book...with nobody quite believing he's gone until the vultures start gathering at the palace.

I agree that there were degrees of control in various republics in the USSR but there's an important difference between now and then...then the bureaucracy doing the controlling was collegial in nature and operated by a consensus that filtered up to the Presidium, etc. Today, such control is entirely personalized with local governors in effect appointed by Putin personally and with only one who has any degree of local autonomy due to unique circumstance (that would be Kadyrov, of course). In the old milieu, it was a fairly straightforward process for the bureaucracies in control at the end of the USSR to translate into local elites without immediate disruption to local power centers. Today? Local governors are creatures of the central node. Elections are fenced in with law and regulation that gives whoever has seized power the ability to keep it in safe hands and the status quo is enforced with lawfare and targeted elite violence. Put simply, the current system isn't just an upside down pyramid nationally...it's also one locally. All of that is a recipe for one of two outcomes should the state falter significantly...either a local potentate has retained enough freedom of action and power to seize the reins (the Federated State of Gazprom is one such possibility) or there will be forcible competition between the center and competing local factions. In other words, hybrid...where in the best case the violence is sub rosa and in the worst where there is blood running down the streets. PS: If you want an excellent illustration of how it worked in USSR, it would be hard to better HBO's Chernobyl. The interplay between local committees, regional secretaries and the Center is hard to improve on.