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billbindc

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Everything posted by billbindc

  1. That is supported by, inter alia, by people like Cheryl Rofer of Los Alamos fame. Nobody who really studies or has experience with Russian strategic forces (Rofer actually went on inspections) thinks they are not up to fighting a nuclear war. We shouldn't make the mistake of assuming that Russian fecklessness in conventional forces runs through their nuclear deterrence. There is no evidence that that is true.
  2. The Russian nuclear forces are not on the same maintenance and logistical regime that covers the rest of the Russian military. Everything I've seen suggests that they are well maintained and capable...if quite inaccurate by our standards.
  3. Um...Russian nukes don't evaporate east of the Ural mountains.
  4. Don't sleep on the Former Guy's intent on NATO. He's been saying we should pull out for decades and his staff (Kelly, Bolton, Pompeo) said he was absolutely going to do it in a second term. Would that have made sense? Not at all...but sense was never the operative factor.
  5. Yep. And how he’s going from topic to topic…tactical fights, then recon, then EW(!), etc. It’s possible he’s real but if so, he’s having a highly singular experience of the war that just so happens to be a good way to maintain reader interest. It is also possible that it is a consolidation of a few folks experiences but if so there’s no reason not to just say that out front. I’ve gone from moderately skeptical to completely discounting it at this point.
  6. Exactly. Note to fans...if it's too good to be true then it probably isn't what it says it is or it is outright fabrication/fanfic. Big warning signs: topicality, breadth of knowledge, etc.
  7. It's a useful point. Virtually everyone in the punditsphere ignoring Bucha now will be screaming to the heavens about the humanitarian effects of a siege of Crimea then. Best to price it in.
  8. This is what I was talking about above in regard to tells. Putin is already selling the apres moi, les deluge line to the Russian people. When he starts pushing that through Orban and Xi, start watching who does or doesn't show up on Russian media.
  9. I do agree that Russian redlines are not as close to likely possibilities as is often imagined but at the same time I think we should be wary of assuming they are set in stone. Russia losing Crimea in a maneuver battle might very possibly change the current calculus (reportedly from Putin himself) that nuclear weapons aren't worth because such a loss has existential meaning for the regime itself. That is why choking out the Crimea is such an attractive scenario. It's more efficient for Ukrainian resources, it very likely strains Russian logistics to the breaking point and it creates enormous dilemmas for Kremlin planners. Escalating to WMD in that scenario would simply exacerbate Russian problem. In short, we broadly agree.
  10. Between the difficulty of attacking across a narrow isthmus, American concerns about lunging across a potential redline and the obvious observation that Crimea could be a bigger, more decisive Kherson it's fairly odd to me that this is not being touted as a highly plausible goal of the next UA offensive. In fact, it would be hard to find a more satisfying outcome than a grudging Russian withdrawal from Crimea due to an inability to sufficiently water, feed and supply it.
  11. The tell will be when Putin starts to say that he needs to remain in power to keep more radical actors at bay.
  12. Not so enamored of the analysis in this. Should Russia launch a coup attempt and/or military intervention in Moldova is doesn't complicate anything at all for the US, EU or Ukraine. It proves every claim of Russian adventurism and imperialism yet again, it's a military commitment Moscow cannot afford or succeed in and in fairly short order, the Transnistrian forces would be ovewhelmed by Ukrainian intervention. Putin is rattling this particular cage because he wishes to demonstrate the supposed reach of Russian power. Don't buy it.
  13. I do not appear at official functions...mostly because I'm not invited.
  14. It also leaves out the endless efforts Russia put into weakening and suborning the Ukrainian state. Carden isn't just bad, he's another boring "the US is always wrong" ideologue. No thanks.
  15. Russian pilots were directly fighting American pilots over Korea. Come now.
  16. Haven't followed this in detail but if the main point is that Russia has the internal resources and external gas sales to keep this war going until the regime cracks then yes, I agree. A better question would be whether or not Russia has enough to have any prospect of winning. I think that is a fairly definitive no and help from China is more than likely to just accelerate countervailing and more than countervailing Western aid.
  17. Carden is a Nation magazine writher (edited to add: I meant "writer" but some mistakes are too fortunate to change) and Mearsheimer acolyte. I don't feel the need to add anything else.
  18. I think a lot of that tracks...especially the idea that ww diplomacy has domestic political aims. I would argue that those must be paramount as the external effects of ww diplomacy have been to drive the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, Australia, etc into much close military cooperation with the US than would have occurred otherwise. In ways reminiscent of Kaiserine Germany, the PRC behavior has helped bring about the precise geopolitical isolation it feared. I'm not much convinced that propaganda is as effective as we imagine except when it reinforces a pre-existing condition. WW diplomacy was effective in a negative sense bc it confirmed fears that China's neighbors already harbored. When the US argues for the rules based order, when it works it does so because the US is showing that it will actively commit to defending it (as in Ukraine). Russian propaganda pre war worked because it took advantage of Western political fissures. And then, suddenly it did not when Russia's invasion activated much more significant fears of a general war in Europe. I don't think much of this matters too much in regards to Ukraine. Whatever the uninvolved BRICS may say/do, in the end the EU and US can continue their support without them. In addition, they understand the economic realities of India, Turkey, etc. They don't actually *need* them to sanction Russia and they don't need their support in the UN lockstep on every issue. In other words, I don't believe it's a sign of weakness...it's a sign of excess of strength.
  19. I'm curious in light of the above what you think of Beijing's wolf warrior diplomacy. From this little town by the Potomac, it seems like the most disastrous propaganda campaign in modern diplomatic history. I think I know why it happened but I'd be interested to hear your take.
  20. I don't think you can generalize about the Global South in the same way you can about 'The West". There are two reasons for my assertion. First, the West states share common histories and institutions that make it easier for them to cooperate and coordinate interests. The "West" isn't an imaginary construct. The BRICS simply don't share those bonds. India and China are actively hostile. Russia and Brazil have little in common in political institutions or culture. In fact, what generally unites them is competition and varying levels of antipathy towards the West with the rising economic power to do something about it. Second, the BRICS don't have the United States or anything close to it. The US acts as arbiter, bully, ringleader and goad to it's alliance systems while at the same time enjoying the sort of preponderant military power that cannot be challenged safely by anyone...as Russia is learning to its chagrin. None of the BRICS can come close to fulfilling that role.
  21. This sort of thing happened routinely during the Cold War without things ever escalating into WW3. What close brushes happened were related to mistakes made outside of the warmer conflicts. And that makes sense. Violent proxy wars get a lot of attention or include a lot of 'communication' as the Capt'n would put it. And while deplorable, China supplying Russia with arms actually gives China a lot more say in what Russia does than if it had not.
  22. Without question, this will accelerate US/China tensions and reduce squabbling about aid to Ukraine: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-war-in-ukraine-china-is-reportedly-negotiating-with-russia-to-supply-kamikaze-drones-a-13909157-4740-4f84-830e-fb3c69bc1dff?sara_ecid=soci_upd_KsBF0AFjflf0DZCxpPYDCQgO1dEMph
  23. In DC it feels like the giant is very much awake. Serious people think that a war over Taiwan is practically inevitable and are taking measures accordingly. It may not be as fast as we’d like or as comprehensive but that particular tectonic plate has moved quite far in the last year. Blinken’s statement outing China’s potential help to Russia isn’t just a warning to Xi…it’s to forestall Chinese attempts to wedge further into EU politics/trade pretending to be a potential arbiter on the war and/or counter point to overwhelming American dominance.
  24. Dmytro, Frankly, I thought it eloquent. Thank you for fighting for all of us. We are with you. Slava!
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