NamEndedAllen

Thanks, Elvis. I had the identical “corrupted scenario files” message when installing newly purchased and downloaded BFA last month. And importantly, GO EAGLES! As a proud Oregonian, I had hopes for a Marcus Mariota revival, but that looks doubtful. However, Justin Herbert sure turned out well…and now we have Bo Nix. Most of all, I look forward to the Jalon Hurts Revenge Tour this season.

Ukraine’s strategic center of gravity is the White House. And I hate to say it, but am becoming afraid of Americans.

Indeed! An excellent fact for September. Worse, it is messily tied up in multiple knotty House battles: * The “Freedom Caucus” demands on enormous budget cuts, without which - no funding for the government AND quite likely no more Continuing Resolutions. They have way more than enough votes to enforce this, including any Senate/House Conference efforts. Yeah yeah yeah, this is always a threat and then at last minute the government is funded. But at a cost. This time? See below: * https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/08/kevin-mccarthy-joe-biden-impeachment-push The Speaker is in a bind of either agreeing to impeachment of Biden now, or losing his Speakership. His latest ploy is to agreeing to start the impeachment process if the “Freedom Caucus” members agree to a stopgap spending bill to avoid a government shutdown. Which would also shut down their impeachment inquiry. Many USA sources from Fox to CBS to CNN and the newspapers of record are covering this. So Ukraine funding LEVELS are a football or a pawn within the much larger domestic political strife in the USA. Oh, and then the various trials of the previous President will be starting. No matter one’s politics, it’s a mess.

Yes, and even stronger than that. Because today Putin and Russia ALSO celebrated their 80th anniversary commemorating their victory at Kursk. Coincidence? https://gazette.com/news/wex/putin-beams-at-war-memorial-gala-as-wagner-chief-prigozhin-dies-in-plane-crash/article_6f7d740a-cc6f-59fd-9f10-ca73f329138f.html

I understand that Japan did formally surrender unconditionally, aboard the USS Missouri on September 2, 1945. ” the emperor, who ordered the unconditional surrender of Japan’s armed forces.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/13/vj-day-the-dangerous-illusion-of-japans-unconditional-surrender/ Although notice of unconditional surrender was given on August 10, the day after Nagasaki was destroyed. Japan agreed to the Potsdam Conference terms for unconditional surrender. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japan-accepts-potsdam-terms-agrees-to-unconditional-surrender

Agreed. I have to say i must be out of touch though, because I thought the strategy HAS been to cut the landbridge. could these remarks somehow be several weeks out of date? Although the allocation of units themselves could reasonably be a matter of contention: Ukraine’s grinding counteroffensive has struggled to break through entrenched Russian defenses in large part because it has too many troops, including some of its best combat units, in the wrong places, according to several American officials. Ukrainian commanders have divided their troops roughly equally between the east and the south rather than centering firepower to sever the so-called land bridge between Russia and the occupied Crimean Peninsula — the stated goal of the offensive. In a video teleconference this month, top Western military officials urged Ukraine’s most senior military commander, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, to focus on one main front. According to two officials briefed on the call, General Zaluzhnyi agreed. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/22/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war.html AHHH, Haiduck beat me to the quote. I’m just catching up chronologically.

Detailed update from Sarcastosaurus. Depending upon accuracy, quite positive on balance. (It’s Tom Cooper) https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-14-august-2023

Certainly not a breakthrough! But they do seem to be making gains towards Kupiansk. Or do you recall that the Russkies have been this close earlier this summer? I had the impression they had been slowly grinding out gains there. Despite periodic counterattacks. You and Haiduk would have a better grasp of this. As Russia presses the main thrust of its offensive in Kharkiv Oblast closer to the city of Kupiansk, officials there are planning a mandatory civilian evacuation. Ukrainian military officials say Russian troops are now less than five miles from the city. It's a situation that, if unchecked, could impact Kyiv's ongoing counteroffensive…The evacuation plans in Kupiansk are being drawn up as the Ukrainian military says the main thrust of the Russian offensive in the region is pushing toward the city. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kharkiv-oblast-city-planning-evacuation-as-russians-approach

Good news! https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-m1a1-abrams-tanks-approved-for-shipment The first batch of Abrams tanks that the U.S. is providing to Ukraine was approved for shipment over the weekend, and the tanks remain on track to arrive in Ukraine by early Fall, Army Acquisition Chief Doug Bush told reporters on Monday. "The last of the set was officially accepted by the U.S. government or the production facility over the weekend. So they are done," said Bush. The 31 Abrams tanks destined for Ukraine - older M1A1 variants - had been undergoing refurbishment and preparation for shipment for months. Though the tanks are ready, they still have to be shipped overseas and sent to Ukraine, "along with all of the things that go with them - ammunition, spare parts, fuel equipment, repair facilities," Bush said. "So it's not just the tanks."

Damaging without a doubt. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/08/07/china-japan-hack-pentagon/?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=wp_news_alert_revere&location=alert In the fall of 2020, the National Security Agency made an alarming discovery: Chinese military hackers had compromised classified defense networks of the United States’ most important strategic ally in East Asia. Cyberspies from the People’s Liberation Army had wormed their way into Japan’s most sensitive computer systems The hackers had deep, persistent access and appeared to be after anything they could get their hands on — plans, capabilities, assessments of military shortcomings, according to three former senior U.S. officials, who were among a dozen current and former U.S. and Japanese officials interviewed, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.

In the event of the breakdown of central authority control across Russia, this proliferation of armed organizations would magnify opportunities for one or more of them to seize control of nuclear weapon facilities. An emerging warlord/governor could devise blackmail strategies to suppress rivals around Russia and secure their allegiance. Until another warlord succeeds in seizing nukes in their territory. Or simply looting the material for sale to highest bidders around the world. I imagine this is a low probability scenario right now. But the idea behind it cannot be entirely absent from at least some Russian entities…mafiosi…plenty of players and wannabes. Especially after the near coup or whatever it was.

Another angle on staff training for command at the battalion and brigade levels, let alone divisional and corps or army. Apart from classrooms…it’s expensive! Or impossible. That’s in part why I think The_Capt was talking about NATO training being at the small unit level. Time, space, opportunity…not to mention money and technical means. I doubt the public has ever given a moment’s thought to how the heck do you train a person, a group of persons to actually command an army in combat? Literally. WHERE can you train a corps size exercise, one opposed by another corps or at lest division or multiple brigades? How do you coordinate or can even permit the assembly of such huge forces? How often is enough? How often would even be possible? How can you pay for the sheer scale of these exercises? I think we realize all that, here. But they don’t at most newsrooms and many “think tanks”. Rotating through the NTC is a rare privilege, requiring not only all the above, but the standing up of the OPFOR refy to “teach” the incoming units some lessons. Gaming exercises have always been a feature of command training etc, because…it’s a lot easier and accessible. But does it stand for field exercises? Of course not. And do field exercises with all the rules, the referees and mostly (but not always) lack of live ammunition capture combat? Actual casualties and all the rest? Of course not. So how could we expect the Ukranians to have mastered the art at the first time or two? The Allies can provide all the matériel they have, offer training outside the country, provide ISR, and moral support. And the Ukranians can provide the courage, the grit, the intelligence, the fortitude…all of it. But these sorts of large scale operations take all that, plus experience. If learning comes in large part from making mistakes, well then… in a way, I can’t blame the bulk of the public for misunderstanding what militaries face in these regards. Let alone what Ukraine is facing, enduring right now. Very few alive really have a clue, especially given how thin on the ground veterans are. Here, we really need to resist the wailing and gnashing of teeth when reality doesn’t resemble Hollywood movies.

Yes, agreed entirely. My own post and point was about Ukraine’s training and experience for large scale ops - not the West having pre-digested magic or whatever. Rather what you are saying. No magic answers, only the cycle of learning by experience, filtering back to commands, then back into the field…again and again. Historically, that’s how I understand the higher commands in past large scale wars had to achieve reliable skills in coordinating divisions, corps, armies, and army groups. And these skills are easily lost when those who learned them as teams are gone, generations without experience pass. My understanding will fall short of yours, but I think we are on the same page.

Which is why I said *both* experience and training! I think we are agreeing here about the inestimable value of experience for learning. “Furthermore, training and experience in these doctrines at the higher command levels cannot conceivably be thick and varied. Even for WWII nations at war, it took hard experience and much time for each of the higher level command staffs to excel in the reality of combat.” We ought not to expect miracles in relatively short time frames. And I don’t believe you are suggesting simply ignoring initial training for how to coordinate large or small operations. Both are all of a piece, along a spectrum of scale. At the scale of what is being attempted now in Ukraine, very hard, bloody experience is the teacher. Presumably, that hard-earned experience is being digested and fed back into the relevant command structures in Ukraine’s military and elsewhere: “learning.” With any luck, this is a virtuous circle.

Ahhh…you said it better than I did! Just too early to be drawing too many conclusions about this level of command?

We could also consider the simple fact of training in both militaries. For the Ukrainian side, we know that unit training has been compressed and truncated both within Ukraine and often at the various NATO host countries. Furthermore, training and experience in these doctrines at the higher command levels cannot conceivably be thick and varied. Even for WWII nations at war, it took hard experience and much time for each of the higher level command staffs to excel in the reality of combat. Whatever flavor - operational art, doctrines of combined arms, Air/Land/Sea - it would seem premature to draw ultimate conclusions, while Ukraine is at such an early and rushed stage. Russia? The forum has been filled with harsh judgments about every level of organization and command, for almost every military facet. Logistics, intelligence, planning, leadership, corruption, morale…Difficult to use Russia’s performance to date as a standard by which to judge the current best contemporary doctrines and thought at the Western War Colleges.

Indepth article from a group of military analysts who spent time recently on the front lines. Quite specific takeaways from the larger article are below, in case you don’t want to read the full piece. Perhaps not as optimistic in tone as many posts, but good grist for the mill: Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow with the Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Center for New American Security, says after his visit to Ukraine it's clear the country is struggling with how to employ its forces.…Gady visited Ukraine with a group including Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense analyst focusing on Russia and Belarus and director of Rochan Consulting; Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment and Principal Research Scientist, CNA. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-sobering-analysis-of-ukraines-counteroffensive-from-the-front 1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon and company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications. 1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility. 2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc. 2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress. 3.) Ukrainian forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. 4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space and slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is Ukraine's inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. 5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks and months. 6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2 [command and control]/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR [information, surveillance, reconnaissance] coverage. Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks. There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind regarding any potential tactical impact of delivery of ATACMs [U.S.-produced Army Tactical Missile System]). Russian forces, even if severely degraded and lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated and synchronized along the broader frontline. 7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine. 8.) Russian artillery rationing is real and happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses. 9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration. Ukraine will have to better synchronize and adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tactically decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the Ukrainians IMO). 10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed and will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire and maneuver at scale. Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime. Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st Russian minefield. 11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines. 12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks. 13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying and tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian command and control. 14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent and morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied and older men called up for service now. 15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal and is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting and exercising command on the frontline. 16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition and hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains. But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination between units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. ... and Russians putting up stiff resistance. We asked Gady to drill a little deeper into a couple of the points he made. On Tuesday, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley told reporters that the U.S. and allies have trained 17 brigade combat teams - 63,000 Ukrainian troops - in combined arms maneuver. More are in the pipeline. But Ukraine is having trouble on the battlefield executing those coordinated maneuvers on a large scale because of the compressed training timelines while facing off against “one of the world’s most powerful militaries,” Gady told us. Ukraine “is probably doing a lot of combined arms operations at smaller-unit levels, but I think it needs to scale this up,” he said. The U.S. is "probably expecting some sort of results with all the aid and the military hardware that it has provided," said Gady. "The basic idea here was to train Western-equipped mechanized arms brigades in combined arms maneuver. I think this approach has had some setbacks. I'm not sure that it has been a failure across the board. I think it just requires a more concerted effort." Gady however was quick to emphasize that “no Western type of military can really do this sort of combined arms operations at scale, with the exception of the United States. But even the United States Armed Forces would have a very difficult time breaking through these defensive layers because no Western military in the world currently has any experience in breaching the types of defenses in depth that the Russians put up, in the south and east of Ukraine.”

#1 on Putin’s Playlist: https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-putin-open-talks-us-stance-ukraine-makes-it-difficult-2022-12-02/

Just posted this above, 2 hours ago. Carolus replied that the “unused” weapon systems may not amount to a significant amount, although individually still potentially lethal. His point about crews though might not be on point considering that any Wagners may well have accepted the order to fold into the MOD forces.

Unexpected resupply of weapons for the Russkies? https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/wagner-turns-over-2000-heavy-weapons-including-tanks-sam-systems

In the latest example of 'unconventional' improvised Ukrainian weapons, we now have video of the contraption made of half a dozen AK-74 assault rifles in action. This follows footage released two days ago which showed the same weapon, but did not depict it firing. It is now one of a variety of improvised small arms solutions — some more relevant than others — that have been pressed into service as counter-drone weapons by Ukrainian forces. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/watch-six-ak-74s-strapped-together-as-a-ukrainian-anti-drone-gun-in-action

Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile that was donated by the United Kingdom to Ukraine has reportedly fallen into Russian hands in a partially intact state. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/crashed-storm-shadow-missile-falls-into-russian-hands

https://www.pcmag.com/news/wagner-hackers-say-they-shut-down-russian-satellite-internet-provider?zdee=gAAAAABjNL8PmPe1NVwXmsDz8u4vSBveiNgx9PrBRN7r8ioXhCPYQf9r8MTGbPb8VidcggehfuHNBYyHzuH4Bs9gxdWcd7aHBGYzEud9Yp2tH6xrHV4VqVs%3D

Never happened. Only the House passed it, or tried to. Never came up in the Senate. So, no money, and no further action on it.

As part of an unholy deal promised elsewhere in the forum, I bought the bundle on Day One. Now I only lack CMA and CMFI. Likely not for long!