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Kinophile

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Everything posted by Kinophile

  1. I suspect Ukraine have not just solved for Offensive, but also for Opponent Mental Bandwidth*. Russia is always very slow in coordinating against two disparate attacks, from operational all the way down to tactical. With enough time (read: far too much) it does eventually get there, but by then its more a question of if the attacker has temporarily worn itself out rather than any institutional ability in the local Stavka. Sheep-Bothering and Washing Machine Relocation will do that do an organization... * @The_Capt I'm sure you have the appropriate noun?
  2. https://kyivindependent.com/national/surrounded-and-desperate-how-russia-lost-lyman Despite its title it doesnt give any military insight that we don't know. Civilian limited and disjointed view of events as they washed back and forth through the town. Further reinforcement of the points made by @chrisl and @The_Capt above, about accuracy vs. awareness. RUS knew UKR were crossing the river but not where and especially when exactly, and could only respond with inaccurate weapons systems that just compounded the issue: Wot Recon doing? SFA, to be clear. The UKR operational-level corrosion strategy is effective because it permeates and directs efforts all the way down the tactical level. It is reinforced and expanded on at every unit size. Critically, every soldier "gets it", they instinctively see the value and natural superiority of the approach. They don't need lectures and explanatory slideshows, it's the obvious and natural solution to a difficult and nasty problem: Kherson appears about to Lyman also, as we're seeing from the panicy DONT PANIC speeches by local Quislings. Even so, despite the utterly godawful higher level leadership, the average RUS soldier can still make things needlessly difficult: But everyone has a breaking point Yup, from top to bottom of the RUS MoD there's a skim of modern thought floating on a dense nostalgia of long-past victories. Its as if the US Army tried to fight the 2nd Iraq War using Korean War concepts, tactics and organization. But note that Wagner doesnt have that massive bureaucratic inertia, which is fundamentally what makes them more dangerous. Finally, ref mobilization numbers:
  3. Those shahedsate increasing the burn rate of UKR SAM stocks. Not much yet, but not hard for them to increase. And we know there's more on the way. If course, this tactic is a double edged sword...
  4. https://www.kyivpost.com/world/two-top-russian-officials-defect-seek-asylum-in-france.html I've no idea how reliable the KP is.
  5. Ref steel pan, my posted pictures earlier corroborate that: The poured concrete must have rebar in it otherwise it would rapidly (ie just months) crumble apart under the pressure, expansion contraction and vibrations (the photos so far do indicate its in fine condition other that the struck areas). Im not saying its a wasted attack as such, it obviously had a great effect and the political timing was just *MWAH!*. I just want to see more than a one off strike.
  6. The second UKR is often the actual boot that does the real a$$-kicking.
  7. Ah yes, more quality NCO action, shutting down the hazing and building a strong, cohesive team spirit built on mutual respect and professional leadership. Oh wait.
  8. See, this is yet another reason I'm conflicted on a truck bomb, or possibly that if UKR did the attack with a VBIED that it was one time, opportunistic attack and not a beginning of a campaign (like we saw with Saki). I want it to be a missile because that would signal the start of a campaign but there's been no follow up and no missile debris found (that we know of). The railway is a tougher construction, but if you can take out some pillars it's a hugely complicated task to repair. The best place to hit is definitely the actual bridge span itself, as that's enormously hard to fix. UKR would absolutely have known that any damage to the main road/rail sections is repairable. Even the crazy bottle necks now will eventually clear. If you're going to hit the Kerch it's gonna take a campaign - hit the bridge span, then hit the specialised repair equipment and personnel (sorry Russian Engies not sorry) then hit the approach spans, hit the repair crews and gear for that. Basically, make the biggest initial mess you can then hit the clean up crews. And keep doing it, for weeks. Thats exactly what UKR did and continues to do at Kherson and I'm very sceptical they would waste a chance on the Kerch with a random truck bomb.
  9. @chrisl fascinating, thank you. Details always matter...
  10. Jesus Christ, it's like as if the Marines were owned by Peter Thiel.
  11. Exactly, thats why HIMARs could smash holes in it but it was like a pen punching holes through corrugated cardboard. Plus, Antonovsky Bridge built mid-80s I believe, when reinforced concrete was very much the primary construction method, esp in USSR. It was built to last, possibly even to weather a nuclear strike to some degree (we know that the south Ukraine coast was a NATO target area). Ref the Kerch, I noticed that also, the heavy rebar sections down lower. The all metal construction of the parts we've seen ripped away are possibly to reduce weight on tall piers that are already sitting on unreliable ground. The support columns get taller as the road ramps up to the bridge - so more concrete, so more weight on the top and if the foundations are not 100% ideal then using a metal construction for the road surface would reduce weight at the very top of the piers, relieving oppositional lateral force at the the very base of the entire pier/column construction. This suggests that the UKR attack deliberately hit a section of the bridge that was specifically designed to be lighter, and hence less resistant to a blast from a shockwave. A better constructed bridge would have absorbed the blast wave and immediately transferred it down the piers; but the pier construction is suspect. Re-bar doesnt just strengthen a construction, they also act as lines of force transference with a structure, like highways for energy to pass along. Its possible the pier's design and construction failed to properly transfer the blastwave's energy down to the sea bed and instead actually bounced it back up into the spans, popping them off their meagre pinnings, as @chrisl noted previously.
  12. Its not all-metal, its reinforced concrete beams with steel trussing spanning the gap and steel decking to tie the cross section together. There's plenty of all-steel littoral bridges in existence,it just requires extra maintenance, better construction and very good weather protection, e.g using the structure itself to shield vulnerable points, multiple layers of varied types of surface protection. The maintenance aspect is the real make or break; as you note, water environments (esp. saline bodies of water) are super corrosive and abrasive. Skimp on maintenance and structural damage/failure is absolutely inevitable.
  13. I've been looking for AutoCAD dwgs of the bridge for days, to no avail. Usually with a large infrastructure project like this you'll find studies and sometimes even the actual construction drawings. Engineering or Architectural journals will do an article on the thing, with some stripped down cross sections, plans, etc, maybe an interview with the Engineer/Architect. With the Kerch - nothing. Nada. Not a good sign at all when engineers attached to a project either 1) don't want to talk about it or 2) are not allowed to. Still, there are enough photos from the construction that can give a good idea of how it was slapped together, e.g.: Thats the railway span on the right. Better over-head view of the railbed construction. The above image gives a good sense of just how far apart the road & railway sections are. I assume the lower roadway in the above pic is just a construction access road, removed after completion. Above gives your basic concrete &steel beam/platform construction. Typical road section.
  14. ? Yes wind. Stiff littoral breeze. Termite chunks would rapidly descend. It's wind pushing water droplets/spray from both the blast and the road segments hitting the water surface.
  15. No (or too little) rebar in a primary load bearing structure, built on unreliable and quake prone ground conditions. That aggregate looks off too. TiR.
  16. There must be more to it. They had 8 years in front of Donetsk.
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