Alexey K
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Posts posted by Alexey K
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Tried to listen to this song, but turned off after a minute.
It's simply bad regardless of theme
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So, I maintain my questions: what exact models of .50 BMG and 14.5x114 are present in game as for 1.01 patch?
So far I've seen that 0.5 BMG is Mk211 but it will be changed for the next patch.
BTW, what is standard M2 HMG round in US Army?
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Mk211 round is pretty spiffy. I don't know what the 14.5 has. (But if they're sale, it'd be nice to have one around the house.)
Hmm. I've found that Mk.211 armour penetration is 16 mm while 14.5mm B-32 round is capable of defeating 30 mm of armour.
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What exact type of round is modelled for KPVT in CMBS?
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SLAP rounds for the .50 cal are nasty.
Are there any figures of armour penetration for .50 SLAP and 14.5 mm AP?
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Accoring to wiki 14.5x114 has almost twice muzzle energy of 12.7 BMG round.
But in game M2 HMGs of Strykers and Armoured Knights seem to have significantly more impact than 14.5 KPVT of BTR-70 and BRDM-2. At least BMP-2 is quite resilent to incoming KPVT rounds but is quickly damaged by M2.
I'am requesting explanation of this fact
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T-72 I can understand but the non -M version of the BMP-2 ?
It is love, it's supposed to be irrational
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T-72 and BMP-2.
Don't ask me why
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Set "Huge" battle size and manually buy forces for each side abandoning unused points
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Thanks for answers.
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What are pros and cons of preferring mortars of howitzers?
So far from my own observations I've conluded that:
1. Mortars have quicker reaction time (from calling in to first round falling) and better accuracy (rounds are less dispersed).
2. Howizters have better firepower - single howitzer round deals more damage and suppression than signle mortar round.
Am I correct? What am I missing?
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Would you say Russia needs a Merkava-ski, so to speak? A tank custom tailored not for WWIII, but for their geographic location etc?
"Geographic" location of Russia is so huge, that "tailoring to it" would make vehicle to be adapted almost to any condition in the world.
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I think it is important to distinguish between irrecoverable losses and losses (vehicles wise). As tanks were repaired multiple times and returned to combat duties.
That is some tricky point.
49 lost tanks is irrecoverably losses for sure.
But that detailed info about 30 tanks doesn't specify if particular loss was irrecoverable. That 30 tanks might not be completely included in that set of 49 lost tanks, but merely intersect with them.
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Still dramatic lowball. Most sources point it to be somewhere in the 100-115 on the low side.
In terms of survival, don't you think it's likely that the tanks that did not suffer total crew losses are the ones we have the total report of the nature of the loss? The Israeli Merkavas on a whole did not have any total crew losses I was aware of (I do have vague memories of one or two as a result of massive IEDs or something, but not sure), but the Russian accounts from Chechnya we had to read at armor school (again, translated from Russian sources) seemed to indicate whole tanks were being ghosted left and right, and the fate of the Malikop element read terribly Custerlike (and while only losing 20 tanks, that was from a total number of 26, so not exactly a ringing endorsement).
Another source: http://topwar.ru/26962-tanki-v-chechenskoy-voyne.html
49 tanks, 132 BMPs, 98 BTRs. Time frame is not clearly stated. Next paragraph says about "three months".
Source referred is "по сведениям Главного автобронетанкового управления МО РФ", i.e. "according to Main Automotive-Armoured Tank Directorate of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Agency_of_Automobiles_and_Tanks_of_the_Ministry_of_Defense_of_the_Soviet_Union)
If it is true, then 30 tanks with known crew fate seem to be quite representative selection and give opportunity to draw conclusions.
One interesting detail is mentioned in many documents: many tanks were lacking ERA. And even on those who had it ERA blocks were not loaded with explosive charges.
IDF tactics of the era placed a heavy emphasis on "convincing" the enemy he was defeated through information operations, aviation, and the like, while Israeli ground forces high intensity conflict skills atrophied. Despite being shot at by ATGMs, many Israeli tank crews simply did not employ smoke grenades at all, and often coordination between armor and infantry simply did not exist. Tanks also on several occasions attempted unsupported operations in complex terrain, which frankly is like, 1939 level mistakes.
We put a lot of study into the matter simply because of world military forces, the Israelis look terribly American at times, and have similar operational priorities and constraints (loss adverse populations, fighting chiefly insurgent forces, and a strong emphasis on technology). It basically was a cautionary tale if we let ourselves get too tech-dependant, and lost sight of the reality that some guy with an M4 was going to have to close those last few meters to clear the enemy out of his hole.
Hmm. That's very interesting point indeed. Actually I was convinced that IDF is one of most hardened and professional armed forces in the world because they often engage insurgents.
Nevertheless, IDF in 2006 seems to be an order of magnitude better organized and equipped than Russian Army in 1994.
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I'm talking if a round hits and penetrates (or otherwise damages) to take out the hydraulic system to rotate the turret, you can still hand crank the damn thing. Maybe there's a redundant hydraulic system as well but those aren't nearly as compact as the control systems in a fly by wire plane so I couldn't imagine more than two. So if those systems go out in an unmanned turret, can you still crank it? If the primary optics go down, how will you use the good old fashion periscope along the barrel? (I forget what its called but I know the Abrams has one)
How many incoming rounds will come to your tank while you "hand cranking damn thing" into position to fire?
In CMBS we are arguing about seconds of reaction time which split life and death.
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If the Chechens had had the missiles that Hezbollah was using it would now be an independent country, or perhaps a sheet of self heating glass. Hezbollah was READY, and much better equipped than anyone thought. If Trophy works as modeled though they will have less fun on the second go.
Chechens had that-day-modern equipment wich was on par with equipment of federal forces. They even had armoured formations (one of Russian tanks was lost to chechen-owned T-72A). And, in fact, they've won First Chechen war and were de facto independent until invasion into Dagestan in August 1999.
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Good lord this thread just goes too fast to keep up with. So just some quick in passing points:
Re: Chechnya
I'm highly suspect of the "only" 30 tank losses. I'll have to dig through my library and big box of books, but most sources seem to indicate somewhere in excess of three times that number. I have not found a source outside of the posted documentation however that claims so low of an AFV loss rate which makes me suspect in to greater extent. Also, given how hard the T-80 was thrown under the bus, 30 not really so bad losses strikes me as insufficient material to support that sort of behavior.
Both Grozny and Lebanon are great examples of what happens when you suck at combined arms and armor-infantry operations though. Grozny is pretty much the textbook of how to do urban operations wrong, while Lebanon is pretty much a rock solid example of making COIN too central of a doctrine, and mistaking "effects" for effects if you get my drift.
I'vealready corrected myself above: 30 tanks are not whole losses of Battle of Grozny, but tank losses with know crew fate.
Overall tank losses from 31st Decemer 1994 up to 1st April 1995 consist of 49 vehicles.
Speaking of Lebanon I didn't quite get your point. What was wrong with IDF tactics?
And I still maintain my request for explanation. Unless you dismiss my data (which is quite acceptable but not very interesting possibility
) there should be some explanation. Russian tanks and Merkavas has shown equal crew fatality rate (~ 1 KIA per 1 lost vehicle) while Russian tanks are considered to be deadly for their crew and Israelli ones are one of the safest. -
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Er... nobody is interested in discussing my numbers anymore?
That's sad
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How many tanks was that from?
AFAIK:
Totally 29 tank lost.
Of that number 13 tanks were lost with loss of life.
Of which:
11 tanks were destroyed by ATGM and/or RPG fire.
2 tanks were hit by IEDs.
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Actually, it might be more efficient to answer some of Steve's questions about your data and find some additional data sources. After all given two AFVs that have the same crew casualty rate but are being destroyed by varying amounts of force you can still make an assessment on which vehicle has better crew protection features.
For example (I am using a deliberately exaggerated scenario to illustrate my point not to asses any named, existing or fantasy tank's capabilities), if we have data for Tank Type A and Tank Type B from two separate hypothetical conflicts that show the same crew casualty rate but Tank A suffered, on average, a destruction of much larger force we could conclude that Tank type A does in fact offer better crew protection. So lets say that Tank type A was equally likely to be destroyed by a modern RPG or a large calibre main tank round while the Tank type B (in the other conflict) was equally likely to be destroyed by an improvised gasoline based molatov cocktail or a small hand grenade the conclusion would be obvious. Then there would be no need to wax on philosophically about points #1 and #2.
I've provided some details in #434.
There is as much as I can povide right now. IDF loses are somewhat not so detailed, but to aggregate that data I need to read out large amount of text,
It is not something I can do right now.
P.S. Actually, these source are the only I've manage to find on that matter (crew survivability).
I would be happy to find some more.
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I will respond in time but am currently trying to get my retinas to reattach after catastrophic eye roll from the merkava comparison.
Please, accept my sincere apologies.
Your eye injury was unintented... er... collateral damage
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It's not really possible to compare the two battles against each other in a way that is meaningful to establish which vehicle set is "better". The only thing that can be stated, I think, is that neither the Russians nor the Israelis were adequately prepared for the fight they encountered. Bad tactics and poorly thought out strategies tend to lead to bad results
If you are simply trying to compare crew survivability, then that is theoretically possible. However, one must take into consideration the weapons being used to defeat the AFVs. Crew survivability in a vehicle knocked out by grenade fire is not necessarily comparable to crew survivability when hit by a large ATGM warhead. A comparative analysis that does not reasonably take incoming fire into account has no value.
CMBS is a great platform for putting what I just said to the test
Steve
Very good point ideed.
Both engagements have something in common and something setting them apart. Both represent asymmetric forms of warfare. On one side is regular army (IDF of Russian Ground Forces), on other - irregulars eploying guerilla-type warfare.
Differences:
1. IDF in 2006 was in MUCH better shape than RGF in 1994.
2. AFAIK, no rolling-thunder type operation was performed by IDF like storming of Grozny.
Some drill-down data from my sources (on per-casualty basis):
IDF loses :
25 men KIA due to ATGM and/or RPG hits (can't derive more accurate data from source right now).
5 men KIA due to IEDs (but there is strong evidence that some of ammunition explosions were mistaken as IEDs).
RGF loses:
<grumbling>
In editor mode table was inserted perfectly!
</grumbling>
Type of Damage|Tanks lost |KIAArtillery 1 3ATGM 2 2RPG 22 15AT GUN 1 3Unknown 4 8Interesting fact: one T-80BV is said to be lost due to shot from chechen-driven T-72A. No crew was lost in this particular case.
P.S. Give US Merkavas to test
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Before jumping into numbers, I must ask a simple question - do you really want to argue about Soviet designs being bad at protecting crew and passengers at all cost? BMP-2 with worthless side armor that can't help against HMGs, which had to be increased in Afghanistan in 1981 at the cost of it's amphibious ability, but never actually been upgraded this way in large numbers at home, because they value amphibious capability more than lives of the passengers? Cramped BMP-2, with unprotected fuel tanks in doors. BMP-3 with 100mm rounds in the middle of passenger compartment? BTRs that can protect only against small arms and also have crazy designed doors? There's a reason why these are called "Братская могила пехоты". There's a reason why people started riding on top of them, and not inside. So, do you really want to challenge that opinion?
Actually, I don't want to argue due to two reasons:
1. Forum arguments are mostly pointless. You don't see me much invovled in them
2. I'am not a specialist in question being discussed.
Instead of starting an argument I suggest a session of problem solving.
I have three pieces of data:
1. Russian armour is considered very lethal to it's crew.
2. Merkava series tanks are considered very safe for it's crew.
3. Numbers I've got my hands on imply that they are quite the same.
Problem presented is that these pieces of data being put together make no sense at all.
So, let's try and explore range of possible explanations of this contradiction while trying not to stick to particular one of them regardless of your personal preferences
Test number2: ABrams vs ATGM
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Usually I get non-APS Abrams easily killed with RPG and ATGM hits in side and rear parts of hull and turret.