PsychoGeriatric

All points fully accepted Sir. However, the rarity of the tactically relevant occurrence specifically during Market Garden was not as previously stated.

Not wishing to beat a dead horse on the issue of bridge demolition not being included in the Module, but I would like add some further information. It seems to me that the occurrence of bridge demolitions during the whole of world war 2 in the tactical context of CM is completely irrelevant. The Module is specifically focused on Market Garden. Hence it's the actual incidence of demolition or potential demolition on a tactical level during the op that is relevant. Market Garden was all about capturing bridges intact. The failure to do so at Son had disastrous consequences for the whole op. The planning priorities were made on the assumption that all bridges had been potentially rigged for demolition (which I know runs in the face of Gavin's/Browning decision to give priority to securing the Groesbeek Heights instead of the main bridges in Nijmegen; as well as the choice of dropping zones at Arnhem). So based on my knowledge these are the relevant examples during Market Garden: Arnhem Sector: The second most important objective in the Arnhem Sector was the Railway bridge several miles to the west. Had this bridge been secured intact it may have changed the outcome of the operation. 2nd Bn detached C Company and a section of engineers for this task. The leading elements of this force were proceeding up the bridge ramp when the Germans blew it. C Company was subsequently surrounded and captured trying to reach Frost at Arnhem Bridge, depriving him of a significant reinforcement. Nijmegen: 5 bridges were demolished/damaged before they could be secured. They were the road and rail bridges at Honinghutie, the road bridges at Blankenberg and Hartet (all over the Maas Waal Canal) and the Mook railway bridge further south. Here is an extract from “The Sword of St. Michael: The 82nd Airborne Division in World War II” by Guy Anthony LoFaro page 469 regarding the Honinghutie bridge. “The 82nd did succeed in taking one bridge on 18 September: Bridge 10 over the Maas-Waal Canal at Honinghutie (in actuality there were two bridges at Honinghutie, a railroad bridge and highway bridge, but the latter was the primary target). Although it was considered the most important of the canal bridges because it was on the most direct route from Grave to Nijmegen, it had not been assaulted the day before. To this day there exists some confusion over whether responsibility for taking the bridge rest with the 504 or 508th, whose defensive areas were southwest and southeast of Honinghutie respectively (the Honinghutie bridges were the northernmost of the Maas-Waal Canal bridges). Given the initial array of forces it seems most likely that Honinghutie was a 508th responsibility, and it appears that Lindquist opted to delay an attack on Honinghutie in favour of sending Warren into Nijmegen. Whatever the reason it was not until the early morning hours of 18 September that Lindquist radioed Major Holmes, his 2/508th commander, and told him to take Bridge 10. Holmes assigned the mission to First Platoon of F Company under Lieutenant Lloyd L. Polette. Approaching the bridge from the southeast, Polette and his troopers were approximately 300 yards from Honinghutie when the Germans defending the bridge opened up on them. The First Platoon went to ground. Polette felt that if [he] could make one last rush he could get the bridges’ “It was just breaking day and the light was in our favour,” he wrote afterwards. So he got his troopers up and led them forward, but the enemy fire was too intense. Within minutes twelve of Polette’s troopers lay dead or wounded and the platoon was still 150 yards short of the objective. Polette positioned those who could still fire so they could get the Germans at the bridge in their sights and sent a runner back to radio for help. In particular, Polette wanted support from the battalion’s 81mm mortars. “From time to time we could observe Germans walking, or attempting to get on the bridge,” he recalled. “We kept them at a disadvantage with rifle fire. It was apparent that the enemy was attempting to destroy the bridge.” At about 0930 hours, Second Platoon of E Company under Lieutenant Thomas Tomlinson arrived in the area and added its fire to that of Polette’s platoon. For about an hour the German defenders (a hodgepodge of Luftwaffe ground soldiers and students from an army non-commissioned officer school) and the paratroopers traded small arms and machine gun fire, the latter unable to get any closer to the bridge and the former hampered as they attempted to set up the demolition charges. Ultimately, however, the Germans did emplace some charges and at 1030 hours two explosions rent the air. When the smoke cleared Polette and Tomlinson could clearly see that although the railroad bridge had been completely destroyed all was not lost because the highway bridge remained, damaged, but still standing. Under cover from a section of 81mm mortars that had finally arrived, some of which were transported to the area on the backs of several cows that had been pressed into service as beasts of burden, Polette and Tomlinson led their troopers in a wild charge. By 1200 hours the bridge was in American hands. For his actions that day, Polette was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.” (I think it would make a very nice scenario and Steve should consider auxiliary cows as a playable unit ) Summarising the remaining bridges: Blankenberg Bridge (B Company 1/504th) - The Germans blew it just as some troopers were charging onto the bridge’s roadway. Destroying it beyond repair. Hatert Bridge (2nd Platoon E Company 2/504th) - The bridge had already been blown by the time they arrived. Mook Railway bridge (B company 1 and 3rd platoons 1/504th) - Bridge blew up in their faces killing two and wounding three. In addition, the Heumen Bridge (the southern most bridge on the Mass-Waal Canal) was known to be rigged for demolition. In a desperate rush, C company 1/504th captured it before the explosives could be detonated. Finally for Nijmegen, it is well known that both the main railway and road bridges could potentially have been detonated during the river assault and GA assault from the South. Why this did not happen is still a controversy. Eindhoven Sector: This is the Sector about which I have the least knowledge. However the demolition of the Son Bridge certainly occurred in a tactical context during the attempt to capture it. Now before I get bashed, with all the tactical CM counter arguments, I must say I'm on the fence with this one. Whilst it is a shame that bridge demolition will not be modelled into the MG module, I really would prefer that BF focus their time on other new features such as fire in buildings, building damage modelling for FIBUA (otherwise the Oosterbeek perimeter may collapse within a day), fortification of houses and flame throwers FTW.

Do you have Krafft's report on the battle? If not, Pm me and I'll send you a copy. A rather self serving document, but with lots of useful information on orders of battle and day by day dispositions and actions.

to her pleasant surprise, she could afford two tubes. One for granny's bum grapes and one for the bags under her eyes. A symptom of years of...

Thanks very much for the link JonS. It's a glorious day in Melbourne today. Ideal for a spot of gardening. Looks like that'll have to wait for 2 hrs

I was doing some research into the usage of the 2 inch mortar by commonwealth forces, since I've always been under the impression that they were principally used for laying down smoke screens. Any way I came across this little gem in the Victoria Cross citation for Major Robert Cain during the battle of Arnhem (see the part on the use of the 2 inch mortar in an anti tank capacity): War Office, 2nd November, 1944. The KING has been graciously pleased to approve awards of the VICTORIA CROSS to: — Captain (temporary Major) Robert Henry Cain (129484), The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, (attd. The South Staffordshire Regiment) (I Airborne Division) (Salcombe, Devon). In Holland on 19th September, 1944, Major Cain was commanding a rifle company of the South Staffordshire Regiment during the Battle of Arnhem when his company was cut off from the rest of the battalion and during the next six days was closely engaged with enemy tanks, self-propelled guns and infantry. The Germans made repeated attempts to break into the company position by infiltration and had they succeeded in doing so the whole situation of the Airborne Troops would have been jeopardised. Major Cain, by his outstanding devotion to duty and remarkable powers of leadership, was to a large extent personally responsible for saving a vital sector from falling into the hands of the enemy. On 20th September a Tiger tank approached the area held by his company and Major Cain went out alone to deal with it armed with a Piat. Taking up a position he held his fire until the tank was only 20 yards away when he opened up. The tank immediately halted and turned its guns on him, shooting away a corner of the house near where this officer was lying. Although wounded by machine gun bullets and falling masonry, Major Cain continued firing until he had scored several direct hits, immobilised the tank and supervised the bringing up of a 75 mm. howitzer which completely destroyed it. Only then would he consent to have his wounds dressed. In the next morning this officer drove off three more tanks by the fearless use of his Piat, on each occasion leaving cover and taking up position in open ground with complete disregard for his personal safety. During the following days, Major Cain was everywhere where danger threatened, moving amongst his men and encouraging them by his fearless example to hold out. He refused rest and medical attention in spite of the fact that his hearing had been seriously impaired because of a perforated eardrum and he was suffering from multiple wounds. On 25 September the enemy made a concerted attack on Major Cain's position, using self-propelled guns, flame throwers and infantry. By this time the last Piat had been put out of action and Major Cain was armed with only a light 2" mortar. However, by a skilful use of this weapon and his daring leadership of the few men still under his command, he completely demoralized the enemy who, after an engagement lasting more than three hours, withdrew in disorder. Throughout the whole course of the Battle of Arnhem, Major Cain showed superb gallantry. His powers of endurance and leadership were the admiration of all his fellow officers and stories of his valour were being constantly exchanged amongst the troops. His coolness and courage under incessant fire could not be surpassed. Whilst there is no evidence that he successfully knocked out any armour with the 2 inch, it seems that it was sufficient to suppress and cause the withdrawal of a self propelled gun assault. I've read variations on the account, which state that Major Cain fired the 2 inch from the hip (unlikely given the recoil) and horizontally by leaning against a wall (which seems feasible, since the 2" mortar was triggered). On a side note, there were no Tigers in Oosterbeek until 24 September (A company of 14 Tiger IIs from Schwere Panzer Abt 506). So the action on the 20th (which actually took place on 21st) was actually against Stug IIIs of Sturmgeschutz-Brigade 280. It by no means detracts from his various acts of bravery though. The 75mm howitzer was an airborne artillery piece firing with open sights. Lastly, Major Cain was the father in law of Jeremy Clarkson (BBC Top Gear). Apparently he had no idea that he had fought at Arnhem let alone the VC until after he passed (i think). He never spoke of it.

Thanks Michael, your intuition is absolutely right. Although I was more of a lurker than a contributor. Registered as IPA in 2001, but all was lost in the great purge. It's amazing to see so many of the old ones still here a dozen years on. All the best.

Another great Arnhem site, but from the German perspective, is Defending Arnhem here http://www.defendingarnhem.com/ It contains probably the best compilation of German Orders of Battle for the various battle groups during the battle, as well as the 1:25000 scale map used by the 1st Airborne Division. The resolution is excellent. The map available to the British was pre war before the Arnhem Bridge was built. So they actually had to draw the bridge on it for the op. I have more detailed street maps and aerial photographs for Arnhem scenario building, but the topographical information on this one was very useful for an Oosterbeek map that I made for CMBO many years ago.