Maciej Zwolinski

There are several reasons, to quote some of the top of the head: First, Russian performance against Ukraine is an outlier, caused by their attempting a coup Prigozhin style but finding their soldiers in a middle of the biggest conventional war after WW2 in columns of march. This practically killed their professional army in the first month of the war and had to create a new one on the fly. It was a result of hugely wrong assumptions, which are not going to be repeated in a war against a NATO member They would come properly mobilised and their peformance would be better. How much better, I do not know exactly. Second, out of those 31 countries, the only one which matters is the US. I am not so sure about the ablility of the rest of the European NATO members to effectively help protect the Eastern flank (prior to the weapons shopping spree on which Poland embarked; but the final outcome of this is uncertain). Even if they are fully willing. So the defence of Europe hangs on the result of US electorate not electing a radical isolationist because of their internal political issues, on which we have no influence, like after WW I. It would be much more comfortable if Russia was decisively defeated and deprived of the means to try and make a comeback as a world threatening empire. Third, and this is probably the most likely risk, is that after a hypothetical Ukrainian defeat, Russia gets wind in its sails, returns to its plans to be a World-threatening empire and new Cold War starts with the current NATO east flank being the frontier states. Even if Russia is ultimately deterred from starting a new shooting war this would not a good place to be.

This is the view from Western Europe. For most people in the Baltics and Central Europe it is absolutely clear, that the Ukraine is fighting this war on our behalf. Every Russian soldier killed by the Ukrainians is someone our soldiers will not have to shoot at. I have a son of military age and another one who will be in a couple of years, so as callous as it sounds, I would gladly have the Ukrainians fight that fight for our money. For what it is worth, I do not exactly understand why countries in Europe further to the West are not worried more. We are the next border after Ukraine, but the Netherlands are not exactly on the far side of the Moon either.

To be precise, the way I read it the issue was not a greenfield investment for the new hub, but taking over an existing facility and reserving it for Leopard work, while PZG wanted to use that location also for the work on Abrams and K2. So it did not necessarily require so much of capital expenditure upfront, but possibly in the future, when the Abrams and K2 faciilities would have to be set up somehow. Or PZG would not be able to take all the Abrams and K2 jobs it would like, taking a hit on the revenue side. Anyway, some future cost was likely.

If PGZ gets the know how for Leo 2 A6 it theoretically could use it to develop products or services competitive to KMW. On the other hand, as you correctly observed, PGZ wants to grow its own know how base, and not only provide a low value added service effectively like lease of manufacturing hall with workers, which premises and men it would otherwise use for the Polish army programmes which are much bigger and more prospective. So there indeed seems to be little commercial incentive for both parties to go through with this. A typical story illustrating why joint ventures rarely work.

Hopefully they won't like DPICM falling down on them.

A pessimistic post by Mashovets about the Zaporozhe offensive. The first one, AFAIK, which worries me.

OK, some more detailed information re this has surfaced via Wolski, who seems well connected in the industry and politically neutral. Obviously he presents the Polish perspective. What he describes looks like the negotiations not going forward for commercial reasons. The Poles preferred to do the repairs at one of the existing plants within the current structure of PGZ and its subsidiaries. The Germans wanted to set up a joint venture with operational control over some crucial business areas belonging to the Germans (possibly due to the same issues about who controls the know how which surfaced during PZH 2000 servicing negotiations), also they wanted to use a location which was inconvenient from the perspective of PGZ's plans to work on K2. At this stage it looks like neither company wants to close the deal, but to shift the blame for unsuccessful negotiations to the other. So the Poles put forward a deliberately unattractive price quote, and the Germans responded with the theory about Polish political motives.

That is one reason why the Baltics and Central Europeans opinions often are different than the old NATO countries. We have barely rented a bedsit in that house 30 years ago.

I am sure that Ukrainian's decisions what weapons to use are based on what will allow them to be safe from death/enslavement the quickest, rather than who will pay for cleanup. Especially in light of the fact, that they were running out of other ammunition. Your argument was frankly bizarre.

Last post by Tom Cooper in his Substack is interesting. In particular, he makes an interesting observation about the Zaporozhe offensive, that because of Russians' trying to defend all terrain and constantly counterattacking, they are making their defence belts constructed further back essentially useless. If the Ukrainians are likely to breach the first defence belt only after Russians exhaust all units at their disposal, then at this point the Russians will not have the soldiers to man the subsequent belts. Makes sense. https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-9-july-2023

In legal theory, there is a strong argument that what we traditionally call international law is actually not law, given the absence of anything resembling a sovereign imposing and enforcing the rules. So you can also put the word "law" in quotes. That level of objectivity is indeed low (no pun intended).

Behind their lines in the North German Plain....That line may explain a slightly different take by our German members

Without addressing specifically the DPICM issue your point is moot because theoretically it covers everything from e.g. nerve gas to helmets. In theory, I would agree with your thesis because of the theoretical example of nerve gas. But in practice we are not talking about nerve gas, just cluster munitions. So my theoretical agreement to your theoretical thesis is totally beside the point at issue. Re. DPICM, I find the position of trying to second guess Ukrainians re. moral calculus involved in using cluster munitions, killing Russians and saving UKR soldiers lives versuss having to clean up more UXO after the war and possibly causing some post-war civilian casualties as totally undefensible. Their people, their land, their war, their choice. Either the West supports UKR or tries to play out some internal policy issues having this war as the background.

You were expecting 1940/1944 or Gulf War rates of advance in an offensive against prepared fortifications while the Ukrainian usual method of attack is "artillery attacks, infantry occupies" (almost always since Kharkiv, i.e. for about a year) and they are attacking with slight advantage in men, parity in artillery and inferiority in the air? But why? Apologies in advance if this comes across as aggressive, I am not trying to be insulting, just am honestly baffled on what basis this could be expected to be anything but a bloody slog (with some possibility of breakthrough after a few months of that) and would be interested to hear your reasoning.

Ukrainians, being grateful allies, decided to celebrate 4 July in a big way.

I was answering your original question why Vikhr was developed with 10 km range, and Western systems were not developed with 10 km range - as I wrote, among other reasons, because the Western systems were developed on the basis of MANPADS which has smaller and less capable missiles . I don't know what your point is, but I know what your question was. If you cannot express your point in your question, then it is unlikely to be answered but that is not my problem.

Yes, but the tanks can hang back a few kms behind the drones. WIkipedia quotes the range of air to air Stinger as 8 km. Put it forward 2 km before the tanks and you can engage the Kamovs. In the case where you want to defend the attacking mechanised force, you know where to send them - in front of the tanks and IFVs. Like with submarines - it is very inefficient to try and hunt them in the ocean, but when you set up a convoy they come to you in droves.

I know, but in practice it is the same thing as regards the missile. The available Western mobile systems are based on MANPADS put on some chassis with a set of thermals slapped on them. But the mobile SAM missile is not going to be developed specifically for attack at treetop height. It has to be designed with a view to reaching higher up and cannot be optimised just for range.

It is a much bigger missile (about twice the dimensions of a Stinger, which has to fit a man's shoulder), it is not being shot from the ground upwards but from the air downwards, and it has a much easier time targeting a tank, than an AA missile would have targeting a helicopter. It must have been a much easier thing to design than an AA missile of similar range.

I have no idea what is the Polish explanation for the discrepancy in pricing, just that it exists. Maybe I will learn something more.

A cluster warhead would be the ideal weapon for this

On the Polish internet it is described as a price dispute. According to our sites, the German side thinks our prices are too high

That would only work if the minefields are mostly anti-tank, right? But Russians do not give a toss about modern Western sensibilities and the resulting Ottawa Treaty, and plant anti-personnel mines in huge numbers

In this war, the usual pattern from both sides was repeated attacks and counterattacks over the same ground and I think RUS just got used to denying any territorial progress to the UKR. Maneouver defence is not something they tried and they just may be afraid to start trying it for the first time in the face of the enemy's biggest offensive of the war.

Exactly. This suggests that Ukrainians think that the pendulum has swung towards ascendance of the defence, like in WW I and their armoured brigades will have a role more similar to the cavalry of WWI rather than tanks of that time - i.e. they have to have the breaktrough made for them by artillery and infantry.