Maciej Zwolinski

I am in favour of a drone-delivered "synthetic MCLIC" for want of a better term. Say a dozen drones, protected by multispectral smoke and ECM, fly in a single file into the minefield, and from low level drop mine clearing explosives direcly on the ground, close to one another, and quickly withdraw. Once the drones are in safe distance, the charges are detonated as if they were a massive MCLIC. Repeat as necessary.

Do you have access to the paid stuff? If yes, is it worth the price?

I am confident we will not see that either at all or maybe sometime in the last month of the war. In the present conditions, it is about as likely as the grand cavalry charge prepared in expectation of breakthrough and exploitation before the Loos offensive, the Somme offensive, the Cambrai offensive etc. in WWI. Finally, when the Entente were in position to exploit a breakthrough, they did it with hundreds of tanks and the war ended in a few weeks. I like the brief summary from a new Wavell Room article https://wavellroom.com/2023/10/13/countering-tactical-kamikaze-drones-ideas-urgently-needed/: "Ukrainian counter-measures: keep your distance A tactical counter-measure (employed by both sides) is the withdrawal of platforms and systems from the frontline i.e. 10-15km where they are at least out of range to FPV drones. This has created an inverted frontline. Units in contact are now dug-in infantry with their supporting organic weapons such as mortars and anti-tank missiles; drone operators; and the ECM detachments seeking to disrupt or down the other’s drones. Communications are constantly degraded by the saturation of jamming systems. Self-evidently, such an abnormal frontline is the opposite of manoeuvre warfare. Neither side is daring to manoeuvre, except in very favourable circumstances, because the cost is too high. ‘Going over the top’ has become prohibitive in lives and materiel." I think it is exactly to the point. Now a large number of troops on the attack can be stopped by a very low number of troops on the defence, extremely dispersed and supported by massed fires. There is therefore no sense in massing units on the attack, unless to increase own losses, because it is so extremely easy for the defender to achieve sufficient force ratio for a successful defence anyway. The numbers on the attack are used for rotation and replacement, not for overwhelming the enemy. In these circumstances, how can an attack look like? Theoretically, speaking Infiltration and probing by dismounted infantry +counterbattery+ deep fires on the enemy rear to interrupt the flow of ammunition to support the counterbatery effort +ECM, again to support the crucial counterbattery effort. Once the counterbattery battle achieves success, then fires can be partially shifted more to the enemy's first line so that those dispersed, camouflaged and fortified infantry outposts can be whittled down. Then repeated infiltration and probing combined with indirect fires is carried out until those infantry outposts either withdraw or can be stormed. Then the process has to be repeated on each new defence line because its inherent slowness means that the defender will ALWAYS be able to create and man another defence line behind the previous one. Which to me seems exactly how the Ukrainians are fighting in Zaporozhe. The only potential way to progress from this to a more efficient system I see in 1) massive attrition of RUS artillery combined with some way to degrade RUS drones AND discovery of technical means to deal with RUS obstacles, AP mines included;. if the RUS finally run out of tubes AND become unable to substitute them with Lancets and FPV drones, AND the Ukrainians find a way to quickly go through even massive minefields, then the attacks can be started instead of lengthy counterbattery battle, with a simultaneous engagement of many defensive outposts over several defence lines with supressive, not necessarily destructive artillery and PGM fires, and Ukrainian attack hopefully will be able to continue without too much of a pause through several of those lines. Either by way of mechanised assault or on foot, Keiserschlacht style. The 2nd way out is IMHO the general morale failure caused by combination of massive losses cumulated over years on the entire frontline with the war weariness on the home front. The "1917 moment". PS. I am aware of the ubiquituous caveats, that all historical analogies are deceitful, and this is not World War I, etc. but taking them in stride I think that at this moment, it basically this is recreated World War I. And the technical and organisational developments which happened since 1918 have combined to make it even more of a stereotypised World War I than the real World War I was.

That one is actually a bit of Schroedinger's slur, which may or may not be derogatory, depending on where actually the Irish gentlemen are intended to be travelling...

On an unrelated note, the name always gets me. In Polish it is an really old style (like XVII century) derogatory term for a Muslim. Have Russians actually named an IFV after a 500-year old ethnic slur? So random....

I have seen estimates of the force gathered on the UKR side of Dnieper (for lack of better term; I know that both sides are legitimately UKR) at 12.000 men. Not enough for anything operational.

The deterioration of the Russian ORBAT reminds me of the late WW2 Wehrmacht KSTNs. Russians are not yet at the stage of Panzergrenadier regiments mounted on bicycles per ToE, but gettng there fast

He seemed optimistic to me. He makes his updates daily, and usually they include something to be happy about. Not always confirmed by the other bloggers.

That would not matter significantly in the case of helicopters used defensively like Russians used the Ka52s. In particular Longbow Apaches can fire Hellfires hovering behind terrain obstacles with only the radar extending above them. In such tactical situations despite Tunguskas and Pantsyrs the Russian would be unlikely to inflict meaningful losses. The Hokums started to get shot down because the Ukrainians had stopped trying armoured assaults and they reverted to firing unguided rockets at infantry, where they could be caught by Manpads on the approach to target.

Specialists in military aviation will invariably say that cutting rails via bombardment is wasteful. They are repaired too quickly and too cheaply to bother. And if you are so accurate that you can destroy a rail in front of a train, then you probably can hit a locomotive directly. The only static railway targets worth taking down are apparently bridges.

In fact, the Iron Duke's other remark at Waterloo may be motto for the rest of the Ukrainian war: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

I disagree, German Empire after its establishment in 1871 was throwing its weight around and tried to be recognised as a great power at the level somewhere between France and Great Britain. It was also widely perceived then as the "bad boy" and likely the new aggressor. By referring to 1900 I tried to catch the the moment where Kaiser's Germany started trying to catch up in the race for the colonies and conflicting itself with the old colonial powers. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 was already a symptom of that and it must have taken quite a lot of external pressure to bring together the old enemies the French and the British, so I would say beginning of the XX century at the latest. BTW I think that is why Germany was blamed for starting WW I despite the fact, that actually it did not. Either Austria or Russia should get the dubious distinction, however everybody was so expecting the Germans to start the next war, that it just stuck.

In Eastern Europe the Muslim population is mostly descended from Tatar (ex-Golden Horde) Muslims. At least our Muslims have never shown any sympathy for the Arabs or Talibs during the Great War on Terror.

I would argue that this ship has sailed. Russia is now in a way in the same position as Germany was after WW2, the enemy who had been defeated once and it was not enough. It is logical, that the US and its allies now see the need for a more final solution of the problem and the return of status quo ante is not it. E.g most of the countries are weening off the Russian gas and oil, which alone counts as a major paradigm shift - could Russian economy actually warrant G7 membership in the absence of income from energy sales?. Also, the US are preparing for the war with China and second front in Europe is not a desired option. So, to me it is logical to assume that the US and its allies are helping Ukraine not because it is moral to do so, but because they want to take Russia down this time not a peg, but half a ladder. A nation, which thinks it ought to have a higher place in the world order is effectively enemy of everyone who is reasonably happy in the current set up - to state the obvious, look at Germany 1900-1945. Haiduk correctly refers to the contrary example of Georgia in 2008. I would add Ukraine in 2014. Not much difference in the moral position, but no reaction from the West. What has happened since then? Munich effect - realisation that Russia breaks its promises and there is no appraising it at reasonable cost. Why specifically Canada supports Ukraine, I cannot tell and you are obviously much better placed to know this, so if you are saying it is for moral reasons, then I won't argue too much. But I will not refrain from pointing out, that neither in the Ossetia war nor in 2014 Ukraine was Canada was engaged to the same extent.

Sometimes it is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reprisal

If this article correctly shows the sentiment in most of rural Russia, then Putin does not need to worry about the popularity of a new draft. People in that village should be happy to be conscripted. Therefore I am wondering what is keeping Putin back from announcing it - perhaps economy? Taking away people from productive economy and printing money for their pay is a double hit towards inflation.

They should have changed the music to "Smoke on the water" by Deep Purple

Although he does seem to be teleconferencing in from hospital. So not dead, but resting. Pining for the fjords.

Most reports point to a large gliding bomb. 50 km is the range usually quoted for those.

Ehm, it depends. A suicide drone which lasts three or four missions has been markedly unlucky

It is. We do not have much to give at the moment.

One such scenario immediately comes to mind, i.e. if PIS, extremely pro-Ukrainian in its policy, previously considered by the EU and Western European governements as "russophobic" contemplates making a post-election coalition with Konfederacja, a party having a significant "contrarian" isolationist, in places even pro-russian streak, it would have to explain to its voters the reasons for the change. An Ukrainian "betrayal" would be the perfect excuse. On the other hand, Zelensky has no incentives to go along with such a deal, so it is not a likely scenario after all. But that is going too deep into Polish politics and off topic.

Morawiecki's words were misreported, as he did not declare a policy shift, but stated as a matter of fact that Poland at the moment is not supplying arms to Ukraine, because it needs to rearm itself. This is generally true because most of assets that Poland could spare have been donated already and the new deliveries have yet to be realised. The press being the press reported this in a way which both creates controversy and satsifies the biases of the writers and the readers. Still what Morawiecki refers to is important to understand the present crisis in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland was determined to help from the beginning and had a significant stock of post-soviet stuff which blended relatively well with Ukrainian assets. This caused Polish aid to be hugely important in the first period of the war. By now, we have largely shot our bolt and do not have so much to give anymore. Western European aid is on the rise, and countries like e.g. Germany can help Ukraine in EU accession negotiations which Poland cannot. Therefore, our value as an ally has decreased, apparently to the extent that Zelenski decided to prioritise the profit marigins on the sale of grain over UKR-POL relations. As long as we do not close the border or the Jasionka airport - which is not going to happen - Ukrainians will continue to benefit from most of Poland's value as an ally in this war. Also, he may be counting on currying favour with the EU commission and Western European governements by creating a difficult situation for the PiS govt shortly before the elections. Conversely, most of Ukraine's value as an ally to Poland is realised via Ukraine defending itself and killing Russians. At this stage it seems they are capable of doing it without Polish aid deliveries, with Poland acting just as an airhead and land bridge to UKR, so I expect this will be the equilibrium on which the matters will settle: we will keep providing the passive support plus training, repair services and deliver under the existing contracts. Cheering for Ukraine's wins and enthusiasm for post-war close cooperation will decrease, money and asset collection among the general populace will fall away, etc. - but these have always been optional and had no impact on the general direction of the war. BTW this is exactly the course of events which was predicted by many Polish political analysts of the "realist" persuasion.

Or simply sell them massive quantities of methanol vodka. If blinding the enemy worked for Basil the Bulgar-Slayer....

Economy-wise, he seems pretty left-wing and before 2022 used to be sympathetic to Chinese state interventionism. However, he is good read as he appears to hide his biases fairly well, except for austerity politics. He really hates those and EU response to the 2008 financial crisis.