Maciej Zwolinski

In fact, the Iron Duke's other remark at Waterloo may be motto for the rest of the Ukrainian war: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

I disagree, German Empire after its establishment in 1871 was throwing its weight around and tried to be recognised as a great power at the level somewhere between France and Great Britain. It was also widely perceived then as the "bad boy" and likely the new aggressor. By referring to 1900 I tried to catch the the moment where Kaiser's Germany started trying to catch up in the race for the colonies and conflicting itself with the old colonial powers. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 was already a symptom of that and it must have taken quite a lot of external pressure to bring together the old enemies the French and the British, so I would say beginning of the XX century at the latest. BTW I think that is why Germany was blamed for starting WW I despite the fact, that actually it did not. Either Austria or Russia should get the dubious distinction, however everybody was so expecting the Germans to start the next war, that it just stuck.

In Eastern Europe the Muslim population is mostly descended from Tatar (ex-Golden Horde) Muslims. At least our Muslims have never shown any sympathy for the Arabs or Talibs during the Great War on Terror.

I would argue that this ship has sailed. Russia is now in a way in the same position as Germany was after WW2, the enemy who had been defeated once and it was not enough. It is logical, that the US and its allies now see the need for a more final solution of the problem and the return of status quo ante is not it. E.g most of the countries are weening off the Russian gas and oil, which alone counts as a major paradigm shift - could Russian economy actually warrant G7 membership in the absence of income from energy sales?. Also, the US are preparing for the war with China and second front in Europe is not a desired option. So, to me it is logical to assume that the US and its allies are helping Ukraine not because it is moral to do so, but because they want to take Russia down this time not a peg, but half a ladder. A nation, which thinks it ought to have a higher place in the world order is effectively enemy of everyone who is reasonably happy in the current set up - to state the obvious, look at Germany 1900-1945. Haiduk correctly refers to the contrary example of Georgia in 2008. I would add Ukraine in 2014. Not much difference in the moral position, but no reaction from the West. What has happened since then? Munich effect - realisation that Russia breaks its promises and there is no appraising it at reasonable cost. Why specifically Canada supports Ukraine, I cannot tell and you are obviously much better placed to know this, so if you are saying it is for moral reasons, then I won't argue too much. But I will not refrain from pointing out, that neither in the Ossetia war nor in 2014 Ukraine was Canada was engaged to the same extent.

Sometimes it is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reprisal

If this article correctly shows the sentiment in most of rural Russia, then Putin does not need to worry about the popularity of a new draft. People in that village should be happy to be conscripted. Therefore I am wondering what is keeping Putin back from announcing it - perhaps economy? Taking away people from productive economy and printing money for their pay is a double hit towards inflation.

They should have changed the music to "Smoke on the water" by Deep Purple

Although he does seem to be teleconferencing in from hospital. So not dead, but resting. Pining for the fjords.

Most reports point to a large gliding bomb. 50 km is the range usually quoted for those.

Ehm, it depends. A suicide drone which lasts three or four missions has been markedly unlucky

It is. We do not have much to give at the moment.

One such scenario immediately comes to mind, i.e. if PIS, extremely pro-Ukrainian in its policy, previously considered by the EU and Western European governements as "russophobic" contemplates making a post-election coalition with Konfederacja, a party having a significant "contrarian" isolationist, in places even pro-russian streak, it would have to explain to its voters the reasons for the change. An Ukrainian "betrayal" would be the perfect excuse. On the other hand, Zelensky has no incentives to go along with such a deal, so it is not a likely scenario after all. But that is going too deep into Polish politics and off topic.

Morawiecki's words were misreported, as he did not declare a policy shift, but stated as a matter of fact that Poland at the moment is not supplying arms to Ukraine, because it needs to rearm itself. This is generally true because most of assets that Poland could spare have been donated already and the new deliveries have yet to be realised. The press being the press reported this in a way which both creates controversy and satsifies the biases of the writers and the readers. Still what Morawiecki refers to is important to understand the present crisis in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland was determined to help from the beginning and had a significant stock of post-soviet stuff which blended relatively well with Ukrainian assets. This caused Polish aid to be hugely important in the first period of the war. By now, we have largely shot our bolt and do not have so much to give anymore. Western European aid is on the rise, and countries like e.g. Germany can help Ukraine in EU accession negotiations which Poland cannot. Therefore, our value as an ally has decreased, apparently to the extent that Zelenski decided to prioritise the profit marigins on the sale of grain over UKR-POL relations. As long as we do not close the border or the Jasionka airport - which is not going to happen - Ukrainians will continue to benefit from most of Poland's value as an ally in this war. Also, he may be counting on currying favour with the EU commission and Western European governements by creating a difficult situation for the PiS govt shortly before the elections. Conversely, most of Ukraine's value as an ally to Poland is realised via Ukraine defending itself and killing Russians. At this stage it seems they are capable of doing it without Polish aid deliveries, with Poland acting just as an airhead and land bridge to UKR, so I expect this will be the equilibrium on which the matters will settle: we will keep providing the passive support plus training, repair services and deliver under the existing contracts. Cheering for Ukraine's wins and enthusiasm for post-war close cooperation will decrease, money and asset collection among the general populace will fall away, etc. - but these have always been optional and had no impact on the general direction of the war. BTW this is exactly the course of events which was predicted by many Polish political analysts of the "realist" persuasion.

Or simply sell them massive quantities of methanol vodka. If blinding the enemy worked for Basil the Bulgar-Slayer....

Economy-wise, he seems pretty left-wing and before 2022 used to be sympathetic to Chinese state interventionism. However, he is good read as he appears to hide his biases fairly well, except for austerity politics. He really hates those and EU response to the 2008 financial crisis.

I agree, but would add 2 more factors for the discrepancy, which I think were significant: 2. different Russian behaviour than simulated. The fact that the Russians had built before the offensive multiple lines of defence suggested that they had planned to make tactical retreats and trade space for time and casualties much more often, than in reality. Actually they defended in place on the 1st line and always counterattacked. Adopting a different posture of the RUS logically should have resulted in longer advances, but lower casualties in the wargame; .3 Much more extensive minefields than in reality by orders of magnitude. In NATO those kind of densities and areas are never contemplated, so there is no idea on the basis of which this part of the defence (or denial, as the_Capt calls it) could be coded into the simulation.

Popov is a very common surname

This egg shaped picture in the bottom left is "Vasily Bykov" being damaged by Ukrainian USVs. I am wondering where will it go for repairs?

That is not exactly my point. My point exactly is separating faults of the man in one area from his presumed faults in another area, which upon further investigation, may not turn out not to be faults at all. This is a genuinely difficult question for humans. I know Musk is intensely disliked by some for his position in internal US politics, and overcoming this so as not to apply a negative bias and presumption of bad faith to other areas of his activity could be genuinely difficult. I am not involved emotionally in US politics, am a happy user of Twitter and willing to extend a presumption of good faith to Musk - from which perspective I find the depth of negative opinions of Musk in his actions over StarLink to be difficult to justify. The possible explanation is a spill over of negative emotion from his other activities, which is understandable, but still not exactly good thinking

My understanding of the facts is different - as far as I know, he was asked to specifically extend the Starlink coverage to the shores of Crimea, over and beyond the usual StarLink range, specifically to allow Ukrainian USVs to make the attack. I think it is a significant difference. In particular, it would not be some kind of unfair restriction on the service which the Ukrainians would have had the legitimate expectation to cover a broader area. To the contrary, it would be specifically aiding and abetting Ukrainians in their attack. Again, my understanding of the situation differs in one significant detail. AFAIK he was approached by the Ukrainians and not the US governement. Were I in the shoes of Musk, I would not be sure of the support of US governement if he went it alone with the Ukrainians - he could be hung out to dry. Once the US Governement bought Starlinks from him, and it was clearly the US decision, not Musks freebooting initiative, the coverage was extended. Assuming these were the facts, I could not fault the man. I would not have the courage to do anything else than wait until I am sure of the political backing of the state. If that was the whole truth, the entire criticism of Musk would be wholly void. Were he in just for the profit, then clearly incurring any (even minute) risk of Russian retaliation for the small increase of revenue arising from the additional service fees caused by the use of Starlinks by Ukrainian UCVs over the sea to Crimea would be completely unjustified. Telling the Ukrainians to f.o. would be the only sensible business decision and his shareholders should keep thanking him all the way to the bank. Somehow, I think it is not only that. I am sure the motivation to let Ukrainians use StarLinks is more political, and the fee aspect is e more intended to cover some of the costs.

Fair enough. But also fair enough for Musk, were it the case - he is a private person after all. Not under a duty to conduct foreign policy in Eastern Europe. He is fully within his rights to have preference for his private business up to the boundaries of treason. And this is far away from treason. I do not get this. What action of Musk you describe by the phrase "jumped the line of his competence"? Was that his lack of agreement to extend StarLink to the shores of Crimea at the request of the Ukrainians? I mean, what other person would have that competence?

From my experience the inference from general behaviour is always a bit suspect because people just like to judge others wholesale and avoid the unpleasant cognitive dissonance, so they rely on it too much and end up in non sequiturs. So as in other cases, I try not to jump on the bandwagon of "Musk's fault" - funnily enough, in Polish politics, we have an ironic saying "Tusk's fault" as the former PM Tusk is blamed by the current governement for all wrongs, including those he could not have any connection with. Another ironic Polish saying underlining the dangers of such reasoning can be translated as "He is a drunk. And a thief. Because every drunk is a thief". Actually on the basis of our domestic politics one can illustrate perfectly the fallacies arising from overreliance on this. The current POL governement is populist-nationalist. A lot of people of more liberal persuasion automatically chalk them up to the pro-Putin camp, whereas looking at the facts they demonstrably are in the most anti-Russian group, up there with the Baltics and Finns. While some foreign journalists or analysts just make such connection because they are weak on facts, some Polish opposition radicals also try to argue so flying in the face of the facts. Imagine the mental hoops they have to jump through. It is literally painful to read. But we have strayed far off-topic, like an USV in Severnaya Bay with its StarLink suddenly cut off.

Absolutely. I merely would like to point out that it is exactly the same rule that is (allegedly) imposed by the US government on the Ukrainians in connection with deliveries of US weapons - they are not to be used e.g. in Briansk oblast over the other side of the uncontested Russian border. I remember the traditionally anonymous US government officials getting their collective panties in an anonymous twist when the Russian Legion drove some Lend Lease Humvees or MRRAPs over the border. Same stupid principle, just different geographical direction. If the US governement is getting away with such idiocy, why Musk is getting a harsher treatment?

Looking from outside of the US, I must say that I do not get the Musk hate/presumption that Musk must be doing bad stuff. Apparently in November 2022 Musk believed Russian propaganda that they will nuke the Ukraine if Crimea is attacked, got scared and refused to extend StarLink coverage to Sevastopol. With hindsight, that was a bad call and unnecessary. However, the US governement with its intelligence apparatus, satellites, gazillions of security advisers also belived all sort of tall tales about Putin's "red lines" and dragged its feet disgustingly over each additional couple of km of range in the next batch of weapons. Artillery, HIMARS, tanks, cluster ammunitions, ATCMS, planes - each time there was a huge discussion over whether this will finally prod the Russian bear into its mighty rage, which always ended with a whimper, but the discussion never goes away. Sure, Musk bottled it that time, but so did the United States of America and the rest of NATO on a number of times. He may be the richest man on the Earth, but still he is a private individual and surely should not be held to a higher standard than the most powerful military alliance in history and its constituent governments.

Actually the same example can be used to defend the_Capt's original description of soldier vs warrior dichotomy as valid. From XVIII cent. we see European armies made up of soldiers fighting in the line of battle, who are forcibly conscripted or tricked to "voluntarily" join, i.e. are carrried away by the recruiting sergeants dead drunk during some country fair. Those people are forced to learn how to load the musket by the threat of running the gauntlet, and prevented from escaping by cavalry pickets and the threat of hangman's noose. Such man is the quintessential soldier-but-not-warrior, and at the same time a wholly contemptible figure, devoid of any agency. Up to late WWI, the European armies always had a strong element of this, because it worked as long as one could put infantry in close order line of fire with the officers at the edges and NCOs behind the line to motivate stragglers. Even Prussian regulations in force at the beginning of WW I proscribed keeping soldiers in close order as long as possible and judiciously releasing them to create and feed the skirmish line, so that they remain under the direct supervision of officers for as long as possible. The result of course was Kindermord bei Ypern. Because of that - although no two persons' associations are the same -the word "soldier" does have the connotation of someone who fights because he is obliged to, whereas "warrior" does bring up the idea of someone who fights because he wants to. On the XXI century dispersed battlefield the second kind is actually needed, hence the reneissance of the term.