Maciej Zwolinski

They are definitely the most useful hunting Shaheeds. The only way to do this job without getting bankrupt either in money terms or in SAM stocks.

Also, it is a result of the marrying up some of the the rawest troops with some of the newest equipment a la Volksgrenadiere units. If the Ukrainians do not want to use their best in the first assault, they have to pick between saving the best soldiers and saving their best tanks

Sorry, one more from me. This is fascinating stuff. In the case of recon in force, is the minefield crossing done differently in any way?

Sorry for my complete lack of knowledge and questions out of the blue, but from what you are saying I understand that in practice a single minefield 10 km or more in depth is not a thing? Instead there may be several smaller, more discrete minefields requiring the breaching drill to be repeated several times, correct?

Those KA 52 are fighting like the Western attack helicopters were supposed to attack in the 1970s and 1980s, hovering behind terrain obstacles and popping up just to shoot an ATGM. Even the flimsy BO 105 were supposed to be able to survive fighting like that. Now Kamovs are additionally using the 10 km range of their Vikhr missiles. No Manpads has that range and the Ukrainians do not have any vehicle-based SHORAD like Tunguska able to accompany tanks and APCs . I guess the answer is Ukrainians will have to suck it up.

There have been reports of explosive breaching in the past few days, so it is being used by other Ukr units. I am wondering though - assuming it was an AT ambush by KA 52 , shooting Vikrh ATGMS over their max range of approx. 10 km. it is actually a pretty long range for a direct AT weapon. The Ukrainian guys might have been expecting to come into RUS weapons range say 5km closer to the Russian position. So my question is: would you be actually doing the explosive breach for the entire 10 km approach march? I don't think a MCLIC would cover 10 kms at a stretch. So, assuming the explosive breaching equipment would be available, would they be shooting MCLIC over MCLIC for the entire 10 km, or start this only when closer to the objective?

If ammonia leaks in the forest, and no one is poisoned, is it still a poison gas?

Actually, unless it washes away actual Russian units in some weird crossover between "Force 10 from Navarone" and "The Ten Commandments", blowing up a dam in deep Russian rear would be less useful than using those SF guys to destroy railway tracks or shoot up an airifield at this stage of the fighting.

You know that will never happen, don't you? The Western supporting countries who are so concerned about the Ukraine maintaining the moral high ground to scrutinise uniforms and AFVs for anything resembling SS Pz Div. Truppenkenzeichen would never allow for tit-for-tat reprisals in this area

Off the top of the head, Rotterdam. Serbia 1999.

The question is whether he could afford to be any more bloodthirsty, i.e. whether the army, security services, etc. would have followed such orders, after Brezhiev years of political quagmire, after Afghanistan, etc. I do not know, but in communist Poland the moment when the gig was well and truly up was during the 1989 elections. They were designed to provide the communist side with a small, but safe majority. However, the commies got some important predictions wrong, and shockingly ended up as minority. Among those shocking events the most shocking was, that the Polish United Workers Party did not get majority even in the special voting points in army bases or police barracks. Even their own enforcers did not vote for them. At that moment they understood they do not have the military option as their BATNA and quickly folded. This was 1989, butI am wondering if Gorbatschov could have taken a more bloodthtirsty path a year or a couple of years earlier. Or whether he would have faced a military option directed against him instetad

Ha, you fell into my trap! The one on the left is historical Polish eagle device which I pasted, and not the Ukrainian 82 Airborne badge. So you see it is similar. Anyway, may thinking was that it was close enough for the Russian to make up another batch of stories about Polish soldiers fighting for the UKR, this time the regular Polish army.

There goes Polish neutrality, I guess. It has been a privillege sharing this forum with you, gentlemen.

It is unlikely to have done serious harm, though. The Russians themselves were gloating about the engagement, even they are not that stupid to do this if the ship eventually gets sunk or very visibly damaged.

I cannot offer a native speakers' perspective, but to me it looks more like a philosophical than language point. For example, in legal usage if event X increases the probability of event Y, and in a particular case event Y occurred after event X had occurred, then the event X is considered to have caused the event Y. At least for some legal situations. So both the example you described using the word "lead to" and the one you described with the word "cause" could be understood as causation - in principle, and not because of the words used.

Exactly, this always begs the question "and what if the enemy did not show up?". Unfortunately, nobody can resist the temptation of squishing just a bit more of the temptingly squishable opolcheniye , whether under the hooves of the horses or Panzer tracks, and end up squarely in the devastated region trying to survive the worst winter of the century on scorched tree bark.

Those lads must have been training in Belarus near the Pripyat region and partaking heavily from the local flora and fauna. Still, quite impressive.

Sorry, I saw the word "lead to" and thought it implied a cause and effect relationship. I will read deeper into your chicken and egg posts.

This confirms that the borders were stripped of the soldiers, but does not necessarily mean the RUS had no soldiers other than conscripts. They could have decided to use conscripts in order not to take reserves away from their current locations, but tap a new source of manpower. That would have been smart. We cannot count on RUS taking the stupid decision always.

That an often quoted view, but mistaken, as it gets the causation wrong. Armament races usually occur in the course of great power rivalries, and great power rivalries often lead to great power wars. Thus, armament races and great power wars are not in causal relation to each other, but they are both co-effects of great power rivalries (albeit occuring asynchronically)

At least a part of the argument in favour of F-16 is that it can do air defence roles. If SA-10 stocks finally start running low, UKR could still festoon F-16s with Sidewinders and send them X-101/102 hunting.

Not for battlefield interdiction strikes, but CAS directly over the frontline, to the depth of artillery positions maximum (less than 10 km). By flying low, the risk could be limited to MANPADS and AA artillery. Below radar cover of the S-300/S-400 and It would be difficult for Russians to bring fighters due to SAM risk

Compared to an aircraft shooting a stand off missile from a long way away, sure. But compared to attack helicopters and SU 25 that Ukrainians are using, less of a death trap than they are. It would approach from below the long and medium range SAM envelope and would have to contest only with the MANPADS and AA guns. With plenty of flares and IR jamming pods, could work. Could help Ukrainians to use tons of iron bombs and unguided rocket pods which they have in storage.

The German battalion should be called "Soloviey". Just for a lark.

The quote about mortar ammunition provides an interesting new angle to the discussion why the Ukrainians decided against retreating from Bakhmut and whether it was worth it. Perhaps it was not about attrition of personnel and achieving a favourable casualty ratio as much as about making RUS burn through ammunition before the offensive. The ammo expenditure ratios must have been been much bigger among RUS. According to the reports from the last stage of the siege, they reverted to house by house demolition by artillery and glide bombs, using up ammunition without any constraints. BTW, the Ukrainians are reporting crazy numbers of destroyed RUS artillery. Yesterday it was 40/day or something similar. It used to be 1/10th of that number earlier in this war. Any ideas what happened and if those figures are at all reliable?