Maciej Zwolinski

One such scenario immediately comes to mind, i.e. if PIS, extremely pro-Ukrainian in its policy, previously considered by the EU and Western European governements as "russophobic" contemplates making a post-election coalition with Konfederacja, a party having a significant "contrarian" isolationist, in places even pro-russian streak, it would have to explain to its voters the reasons for the change. An Ukrainian "betrayal" would be the perfect excuse. On the other hand, Zelensky has no incentives to go along with such a deal, so it is not a likely scenario after all. But that is going too deep into Polish politics and off topic.

Morawiecki's words were misreported, as he did not declare a policy shift, but stated as a matter of fact that Poland at the moment is not supplying arms to Ukraine, because it needs to rearm itself. This is generally true because most of assets that Poland could spare have been donated already and the new deliveries have yet to be realised. The press being the press reported this in a way which both creates controversy and satsifies the biases of the writers and the readers. Still what Morawiecki refers to is important to understand the present crisis in Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland was determined to help from the beginning and had a significant stock of post-soviet stuff which blended relatively well with Ukrainian assets. This caused Polish aid to be hugely important in the first period of the war. By now, we have largely shot our bolt and do not have so much to give anymore. Western European aid is on the rise, and countries like e.g. Germany can help Ukraine in EU accession negotiations which Poland cannot. Therefore, our value as an ally has decreased, apparently to the extent that Zelenski decided to prioritise the profit marigins on the sale of grain over UKR-POL relations. As long as we do not close the border or the Jasionka airport - which is not going to happen - Ukrainians will continue to benefit from most of Poland's value as an ally in this war. Also, he may be counting on currying favour with the EU commission and Western European governements by creating a difficult situation for the PiS govt shortly before the elections. Conversely, most of Ukraine's value as an ally to Poland is realised via Ukraine defending itself and killing Russians. At this stage it seems they are capable of doing it without Polish aid deliveries, with Poland acting just as an airhead and land bridge to UKR, so I expect this will be the equilibrium on which the matters will settle: we will keep providing the passive support plus training, repair services and deliver under the existing contracts. Cheering for Ukraine's wins and enthusiasm for post-war close cooperation will decrease, money and asset collection among the general populace will fall away, etc. - but these have always been optional and had no impact on the general direction of the war. BTW this is exactly the course of events which was predicted by many Polish political analysts of the "realist" persuasion.

Or simply sell them massive quantities of methanol vodka. If blinding the enemy worked for Basil the Bulgar-Slayer....

Economy-wise, he seems pretty left-wing and before 2022 used to be sympathetic to Chinese state interventionism. However, he is good read as he appears to hide his biases fairly well, except for austerity politics. He really hates those and EU response to the 2008 financial crisis.

I agree, but would add 2 more factors for the discrepancy, which I think were significant: 2. different Russian behaviour than simulated. The fact that the Russians had built before the offensive multiple lines of defence suggested that they had planned to make tactical retreats and trade space for time and casualties much more often, than in reality. Actually they defended in place on the 1st line and always counterattacked. Adopting a different posture of the RUS logically should have resulted in longer advances, but lower casualties in the wargame; .3 Much more extensive minefields than in reality by orders of magnitude. In NATO those kind of densities and areas are never contemplated, so there is no idea on the basis of which this part of the defence (or denial, as the_Capt calls it) could be coded into the simulation.

Popov is a very common surname

This egg shaped picture in the bottom left is "Vasily Bykov" being damaged by Ukrainian USVs. I am wondering where will it go for repairs?

That is not exactly my point. My point exactly is separating faults of the man in one area from his presumed faults in another area, which upon further investigation, may not turn out not to be faults at all. This is a genuinely difficult question for humans. I know Musk is intensely disliked by some for his position in internal US politics, and overcoming this so as not to apply a negative bias and presumption of bad faith to other areas of his activity could be genuinely difficult. I am not involved emotionally in US politics, am a happy user of Twitter and willing to extend a presumption of good faith to Musk - from which perspective I find the depth of negative opinions of Musk in his actions over StarLink to be difficult to justify. The possible explanation is a spill over of negative emotion from his other activities, which is understandable, but still not exactly good thinking

My understanding of the facts is different - as far as I know, he was asked to specifically extend the Starlink coverage to the shores of Crimea, over and beyond the usual StarLink range, specifically to allow Ukrainian USVs to make the attack. I think it is a significant difference. In particular, it would not be some kind of unfair restriction on the service which the Ukrainians would have had the legitimate expectation to cover a broader area. To the contrary, it would be specifically aiding and abetting Ukrainians in their attack. Again, my understanding of the situation differs in one significant detail. AFAIK he was approached by the Ukrainians and not the US governement. Were I in the shoes of Musk, I would not be sure of the support of US governement if he went it alone with the Ukrainians - he could be hung out to dry. Once the US Governement bought Starlinks from him, and it was clearly the US decision, not Musks freebooting initiative, the coverage was extended. Assuming these were the facts, I could not fault the man. I would not have the courage to do anything else than wait until I am sure of the political backing of the state. If that was the whole truth, the entire criticism of Musk would be wholly void. Were he in just for the profit, then clearly incurring any (even minute) risk of Russian retaliation for the small increase of revenue arising from the additional service fees caused by the use of Starlinks by Ukrainian UCVs over the sea to Crimea would be completely unjustified. Telling the Ukrainians to f.o. would be the only sensible business decision and his shareholders should keep thanking him all the way to the bank. Somehow, I think it is not only that. I am sure the motivation to let Ukrainians use StarLinks is more political, and the fee aspect is e more intended to cover some of the costs.

Fair enough. But also fair enough for Musk, were it the case - he is a private person after all. Not under a duty to conduct foreign policy in Eastern Europe. He is fully within his rights to have preference for his private business up to the boundaries of treason. And this is far away from treason. I do not get this. What action of Musk you describe by the phrase "jumped the line of his competence"? Was that his lack of agreement to extend StarLink to the shores of Crimea at the request of the Ukrainians? I mean, what other person would have that competence?

From my experience the inference from general behaviour is always a bit suspect because people just like to judge others wholesale and avoid the unpleasant cognitive dissonance, so they rely on it too much and end up in non sequiturs. So as in other cases, I try not to jump on the bandwagon of "Musk's fault" - funnily enough, in Polish politics, we have an ironic saying "Tusk's fault" as the former PM Tusk is blamed by the current governement for all wrongs, including those he could not have any connection with. Another ironic Polish saying underlining the dangers of such reasoning can be translated as "He is a drunk. And a thief. Because every drunk is a thief". Actually on the basis of our domestic politics one can illustrate perfectly the fallacies arising from overreliance on this. The current POL governement is populist-nationalist. A lot of people of more liberal persuasion automatically chalk them up to the pro-Putin camp, whereas looking at the facts they demonstrably are in the most anti-Russian group, up there with the Baltics and Finns. While some foreign journalists or analysts just make such connection because they are weak on facts, some Polish opposition radicals also try to argue so flying in the face of the facts. Imagine the mental hoops they have to jump through. It is literally painful to read. But we have strayed far off-topic, like an USV in Severnaya Bay with its StarLink suddenly cut off.

Absolutely. I merely would like to point out that it is exactly the same rule that is (allegedly) imposed by the US government on the Ukrainians in connection with deliveries of US weapons - they are not to be used e.g. in Briansk oblast over the other side of the uncontested Russian border. I remember the traditionally anonymous US government officials getting their collective panties in an anonymous twist when the Russian Legion drove some Lend Lease Humvees or MRRAPs over the border. Same stupid principle, just different geographical direction. If the US governement is getting away with such idiocy, why Musk is getting a harsher treatment?

Looking from outside of the US, I must say that I do not get the Musk hate/presumption that Musk must be doing bad stuff. Apparently in November 2022 Musk believed Russian propaganda that they will nuke the Ukraine if Crimea is attacked, got scared and refused to extend StarLink coverage to Sevastopol. With hindsight, that was a bad call and unnecessary. However, the US governement with its intelligence apparatus, satellites, gazillions of security advisers also belived all sort of tall tales about Putin's "red lines" and dragged its feet disgustingly over each additional couple of km of range in the next batch of weapons. Artillery, HIMARS, tanks, cluster ammunitions, ATCMS, planes - each time there was a huge discussion over whether this will finally prod the Russian bear into its mighty rage, which always ended with a whimper, but the discussion never goes away. Sure, Musk bottled it that time, but so did the United States of America and the rest of NATO on a number of times. He may be the richest man on the Earth, but still he is a private individual and surely should not be held to a higher standard than the most powerful military alliance in history and its constituent governments.

Actually the same example can be used to defend the_Capt's original description of soldier vs warrior dichotomy as valid. From XVIII cent. we see European armies made up of soldiers fighting in the line of battle, who are forcibly conscripted or tricked to "voluntarily" join, i.e. are carrried away by the recruiting sergeants dead drunk during some country fair. Those people are forced to learn how to load the musket by the threat of running the gauntlet, and prevented from escaping by cavalry pickets and the threat of hangman's noose. Such man is the quintessential soldier-but-not-warrior, and at the same time a wholly contemptible figure, devoid of any agency. Up to late WWI, the European armies always had a strong element of this, because it worked as long as one could put infantry in close order line of fire with the officers at the edges and NCOs behind the line to motivate stragglers. Even Prussian regulations in force at the beginning of WW I proscribed keeping soldiers in close order as long as possible and judiciously releasing them to create and feed the skirmish line, so that they remain under the direct supervision of officers for as long as possible. The result of course was Kindermord bei Ypern. Because of that - although no two persons' associations are the same -the word "soldier" does have the connotation of someone who fights because he is obliged to, whereas "warrior" does bring up the idea of someone who fights because he wants to. On the XXI century dispersed battlefield the second kind is actually needed, hence the reneissance of the term.

Exactly! Designated for defending Europe, but from the perspective of defending the US that is expeditionary warfare par excellence. You were so expecting to fight on another continent, that you were practicing getting there on annual basis. And leaving heaps of prepositioned equipment and materiel already in place. Strategically, it was not aggresive , but defensive warfare, yet certainly at the same time of the expeditionary kind. An army geared for home defence would look like Finnish army: based on conscription, equipped to operate in its native terrain, not spending money on power projection to faraway countries, coastal defence batteries vs aircraft carriers, etc. The US looks like the polar opposite of it.

It could make sense. Especially in countries which are not in a war for a long time, those with conscript and/or underfunded armies the popular view and self-image of soldiers can get low. I.e., poor underfed low IQ country boys easily intimidiated by anyone, mostly trying to survive until the end of their term. I remember stories in 1990s Poland of soldiers being slapped around by local gangsters or even hooligans at country discos. Since a soldier needs courage and initiative on the battlefield, it makes sense to try to psych him up and make him more aggressive, if you can get that by referring to him by a more aggresive name than just "soldier"- sure, go ahead. By the way, surely it is evident for everyone the US army is not designed for self-protection but expeditionary warfare. POMCUS? REFORGER? The Marine Corps? Come on.

Do you mean shadows like on aerial photos? They can really stand out. Good idea.

J**us wept, the Russian could not strafe 3 pontoons without being damaged....

That has historically been how Russians got their armies to improve. In WW2 it took them two years become decent, and one more year to be good. Plotting that learning curve on this war's calendar Russians should now be somewhere at the level of Operation Uranus. Luckily, their current counteroffensive in the North-East looks more like Operation Anus, so it looks like they are learning slower.

This is because they are currently in an assymetric match-up vs NATO-supplied battlefield AA weapons, which has come about due to the AA being an afterthought in NATO armies which assume air superiority, and Ukrainians not having air superiority. This is a fairly random capability gap, which can is likely to be eliminated before the next war. I think it will be eliminated soon as part of the effort to reclaim superiority in the up to 2000 m. sphere (per the_Capt's excellent post from yesterday)

I hate to repeat myself but I again encourage everyone interested in this to look up "the Invincible" by Stanislaw Lem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Invincible

He got scared that the Ukrainian drones will be too succesful and turn Sevastopol into the second Pearl Harbour. Following which Elon would be invited by the vengeful Russians for a polonium tea and strychnine cakes party.

Amen. And there are hundreds of ways in which they can be taken out of the fight. For example - with the manned systems approaching USD 100 mil. per unit, I can easily see them becoming something like battleships, so costly that they cannot be risked on many missions, including those which would be feasible for cheaper platforms. For missiles there is a similar problem, already experienced by the Ukraine - once the Russians divided up the large ammo&POL depots into a multitude of smaller ones, they ceased to be economic targets e.g. for Storm Shadows because that would be exchanging "2000 pounds of education" for a "ten-rupee jezzail", to quote Kipling's "Arithmetic on the frontier". Ultimately, the ground forces should be designed to be able to stand on their own, which includes developing a functional battlefield ADA.

I do not think Prigozhin considered it sufficiently safe without the political clout that the engagement in African affairs would have given him. Gierasimov and Shoigu would be after his head and with easy access to Putin's ear. A private person, even exceedingly wealthy one, plays in a completely different league, than a warlord. In 1200 yrs of the Roman Empire in the West, three men famously made a successful transition from warlordism to private life: Cincinnatus to plow, Sulla to drink and fornicate himself to death, and Diocletian to grow cabbage. The chances are not particularly high. So he probably had no safe choice and was bound to chose between risky options.

They were looking for Kuban Cossacks, but there was a mix-up and have recruited Cuban Cossacks instead.