DreDay
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Posts posted by DreDay
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Russia uses ATGMs as a standard on the BMP-2s you are able to dismount it and use it on the ground infantry role. Would be cool if you could dismount the AT-5B missile.
Yes of course, I totally agree that such option would be very useful and realistic; but that is an entirely different matter. I was referring to many BMP-1/2s going into combat without ATGM launchers mounted on them, as evidenced by extensive combat footage.
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I vaguely recall the last Ukrainian counteroffensive below Mariupol before the 'cease fire' took effect was highly constrained by the non-delivery of fuel to keep the advance going. Word was that the front line units were more than a bit miffed at the higher ups for not bringing up sufficient fuel to complete the offensive. I hope I haven't entirely bolluxed-up that story, working off nothing but half-forgotten recollections of other peoples conversations.
I am not sure about that one Mike. The winter Mariupol offensive by Ukrainian forces had a pretty limited scale and scope. It was mostly executed by Azov batallion with some armored support from ZSU T-64BMs. It had stalled around the village of Shyrokyne which is only 25km away from Mariupol, so I don't think that fuel shortage was a big issue there.
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If I remember rightly in the Battlefronts plan for the next year thread. It was mentioned that current families in Black Sea would be expanded before a module would come along. Does this mean that there will be units added as we go along to existing formations in patches I wonder?
There are certainly units missing. Just a few I can think of off the top of my head: BMP-1 for Ukraine, Grad for Ukraine and Russia, T-80UE for Russia, base model T-84 for Ukraine, ZSU-23-4 for both sides, ZU-23 for both sides.
Those are all great points bud. I would love to see BMP-1 and BMP-2 models with no ATGMS mounted on them; as that seems to be quite a common way to deploy them (not to mention that such addition would require minimal effort). I would also love to see BMP-1s for the pro-Russian unconventional forces as they seem to be the mainstay of DNR/LNR motor-rifle units IRL.
Also, it would be nice to see standard T-72Bs which are still used in large numbers by Russian and DNR/LNR forces; and are also supposed to enter service with Ukrainian Army/National Guard once their "de-conservation" is completed.
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Until now I have seen pictures of BTR-80, BMP-2 and BTR-4E with cage armor kits on. Maybe this is not a huge difference, but I belive that these variants could be of some use on the field in CMBS.
Yep. As I've said, Ukrainians have been very quick to embrace the SLAT armor concept. They seem to be eager to mount them on any kind of AFV and even on stationary fortifications (bunkers). These modifications are often times done on ad-hoc basis and don't always follow an ideal methodology (i.e. SLAT cages are positioned too close to organic armor, SLAT material is too fragile and welded at wrong angles); but in general such improvised addons have proven to be quite effective in mitigating the damage from RPGs.
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I've seen Ukraine's VDV and possibly national guard using BTR-80s with slat armor added, so there's already a potential new vehicle version for them.
Good point sir. Just a quick note - Ukrainian "VDV proper" consists of one brigade (25th VDV brigade based in Dnepropetrovsk). This formation uses (or at least used to deploy) BMD-1/2 IFVs. There are 3 more (79th, 80th, 95th) air-mobile brigades with similar training and traditions as "VDV proper"; but they are BTR-based. Either way though, Ukrainian forces have been quick to adopt slat armor on their APCs and IFVs; so it would be a very welcomed addition in CMBS.
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GRU spetsnaz would be a nice addition, buyable as separate platoons. Special forces could be abstracted by crazy spotting and concealment bonuses as well as higher survivability vs small arms and shrapnel (increased "health" basically) to simulate quicker reactions to sudden contact. Red side is due for some better marksman teams as well - SVD is nice and all, but it's not really operationally used as a dedicated sniper platform in RuAF anymore (SV-98 or AI L96 or could be the primary, with spotter sporting VS-VAL; or the authentic Ratnik gear pairing - 6V7M1 - for primary). Ratnik tweaks would only be welcome, since what we have now is not really Ratnik (or rather not even 30% of full Ratnik package, with fairly ineffective body armor, despite the very impressive real-life performance of aramid weave in both weight and stopping power (Ratnik vests are even dampened against contusion damage from non-penetrating hits; combat uniforms that come with the package are shrapnel resistant), and practically zero net-centric features).
SOF for all three sides would be a welcomed addition. Please take a look at the past discussions regarding this topic, as it has been brought up quite a bit...
I also agree that Russians and Ukrainias could use a few better-armed elite sniper teams. I am thinking along the lines of Steyr-Mannlicher SSG 04 and Truvelo .50BMG/OSV-96 for the Russians and Barret M82 along with some western 7.62x51/.308 rifled for the Ukrainians.
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Uncons,VDV, and Ukr National Guard at some point would be nice.
Agreed on unconventional forces for both sides with older equipment (i.e. BMP-1s, ZU-23-2s, gun-trucks, etc.); and also VDV/USMC in order to add elite light infantry force with unique equipment for both sides.
While I am certainly not opposed to Ukrainian National Guard (as in former Interior Troops) either; it would be much more difficult to find a unique niche for them; as they mostly share their OOB with other BTR-based infantry units.
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On a serious note, how will T-80 differ from T-64 in gameplay terms? Slightly better target acquisition and accuracy due to a better ballistics computer? Everything in this game is one shot one kill, so armor differences are kind of irrelevant. Gun's the same.
Yep, that is an excellent point and precisely what I was thinking as well. T-80BVs (whether Russian or Ukrainian) have very few tangible advantages compared to T-64BVs. Yes, their FC system is slightly better, and their gas-turbine engines are quite a bit more powerful... but this would have minimal impact in game terms. Don't get me wrong, I would still love to see them; but their impact on gameplay would be marginal at best.
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We didn't do it because by and large after Vietnam, we recognized the fidelity on sensors only targets was pretty limited. The utility of the sensors themselves was not discarded, however it moved from being sufficient for targeting, to a system the scouting community refers to as "queuing" which is simply the progression from wider coverage but lower fidelity sensors, to narrow focus high fidelity sensors.
As a side note, a couple of my buddies from grad school had been involved in developing a new advanced seismic sensors under a DOD grand. Their goal was to develop a system for identifying not only the general type of target, but even such small details as its weaponry. I have no idea how far such experiments have progressed; but I did get an impression that such sensors wereto be used for advanced warning, rather than targeting (as you correctly point out). Interestingly enough – my buddies (who had very little military expertise, but rather PHD degrees in physics and engineering had mentioned that they saw the Russians and Israelis as their primary competitors in that realm.
As to the topic at hand, the sort of TRPs practiced in Afghanistan are likely just that, ones practiced, rehearsed and possibly even fired at to be registered. The kind of TRPs we see in CMBS are a lot closer to someone crunching the numbers 10-20 minutes before the battle kicks off, but not to the point where the battery has practiced firing at any/all/separate ones at the same time.
Agreed. The TRP techniques described in the OP’s article do certainly have a place in a counterinsurgency conflict where you are likely to have “free-fire” zones at certain areas and set times. However, I am not so sure that such procedures have a place in high-paced maneuver engagements (a-la BFBS) where large volumes of friendly, enemy, and civilian vehicles would travel around the roads and pathways in large groups at any given time.
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Main points consolidated for the heck of it:
1. China doesn't need to fear the US cutting off its maritime access because it would result in war (of that I have NO doubt), However, it is obviously sensible for it to diversify its energy supply anyway. Which is why it's working with Kazakhstan more than Russia even.
Again, we absolutely do not need a military confrontation to threaten Chinese energy shipments. Imagine a scenario where we decide (for right or wrong) to restrain China and low and behold - most of Chinese neighbors (not without our wise leadership of course) suddenly decide to close their maritime borders to cargo ships headed for China because… oh I don’t know... they execute dissidents, or torture pandas, or occupy Tibet, or through their weight around in South China sea… or eat cats… Sounds farfetched? Think again… Of course we would never do such a thing and China has nothing to fear; they can always take our word for it – that has always worked out well in global politics…
2. The China Russia deal is stalled out as far as I can tell. You can see the specific cited above. If you have something to show the contrary, please do share.
Stalled is definitely an overstatement. It has been in negotiations for 15 years and the breakthrough was achieved when China threw Russia a huge bone by agreeing to their requested rate of $350-$400 per 1000 cubic meters of gas right after the South Stream was sabotaged by European Energy Commission. There are actually several other deals that have been signed since then. And they will certainly take many years and many trials to implement. But the official strategy by both governments is very much geared to push through these pipelines. This was most vividly reiterated by Mr. Xi Jiping last month on May 8th.
Now I can find you dozens articles (almost all in English) telling us how it would never work, and of course they are all written by unscrupulous analysts that have nothing to do with our LNG companies that would take a massive hit if and when such pipelines are built.. We all know how unbiased our business (and not only business) media is.
3. I do not think the Armata program is good for Russia because it can't afford it:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/is-the-worlds-deadliest-tank-bankrupting-russia/
Again, I personally don’t care to discuss Armata till it materializes in a real combat-ready vehicle; maybe it is over-priced, or perhaps it is worth every penny… Only time will tell and for now I simply don’t know enough to care one way or another.
4. When projecting demand for Russian tanks look at past Russian tank sales, not sales of AAA or aircraft. There's been few customers for the T-90 in the past 20+ years even though it is superior to the T-72. Cost is certainly an issue as many countries opted for more T-72s in the same time period. Therefore, it is a pretty safe assumption that Armata will not sell better than T-90, but in fact worse.
Again, I simply don’t care to make any predictions about Armata right now, but if it is worth its price it would sell fine just like other Russian weapon platforms. If it is overpriced, or offers very few improvements over older models (like T-90) it would not sell well. Same logic works for all other weapon systems (politics aside); I don’t understand why you think that some unique rules apply to tanks.
5. Force multiplier is not something most of Russia's traditional clients seem overly enamored with. Price and, by extension, quantity are what they go for. T-72s are cheap, T-90s are becoming cheaper, Armata is top shelf. Based on the previous top shelf sales, Armata will not be a quantity export item for 1-2 decades.
Lol, would you care to give me an extensive list of M1A1/2 buyers that have a real appreciation for force multipliers? Who could challenge the military organization and might of such powerhouses as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq? Perhaps weapon purchases follow a bit more complicated model than what you outlay above?
6. I do not think the geopolitical state is going to remain the same. But Armata buys Russia no improvement in its geopolitical standing. In fact, I can make an extremely sound argument that it harms it. Definitely the money would be better spent on fixing Russia's ailing economy.
Guess what Steve - they had tried just that (with extensive support and oversight from us) throughout the 90s, and we all know how it went. Wonna tell them to do it all over again? You are going to learn a lot of interesting words in Russian very quickly.
On a side note Steve, I have studied Russian foreign and military affairs for many years in my prior life, traveled to the region over a dozen times, and still keep in touch with a couple of what you would call “power elites” there. There are plenty of things to critizes Russia for; and they are also plenty to praise them for as well. But reciting our media coverage of Russia (which is at least 90% fugazi) and then drawing conclusions that match this garbage word for word makes for a very lazy argument which, if I may say so - is below you. I would challenge you to try seeing things from a Russian perspective (amongst others), if you really want to get the full and objective picture. I am not saying that you should embrace their mentality (I personally don’t), but they do know what they want and where they are going; and that in itself is well worth trying to understand, because you will more than likely learn new things about our government and political establishment when you look at it through somebody else's prizm..
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Dang, I spent 10 minutes looking for it and came up with nothing. Problem is the original article was in Russian on a Russian news site. So there's nothing solid for me to look for in my browser history, though I did try. Unfortunately I don't see any place on this or the Beta Forum where I cited the link. It was earlier than June 18th and I think the article was fairly recent, so it would be in early June.
From what I remember of the article it was a short piece (4-5 paragraphs) with the prominent part being a one paragraph quote from, IIRC, the head of Russia's armored forces. Or possibly the head of armored forces for a Military District. Some sort of senior grade officer. The quote was in the context of saying how how advanced Armata is and the driver training was meant to illustrate that point.
I am absolutely sure he was not saying it would take 2 years to learn how to make the tank go forward, reverse, left and right. There's nothing that would take that long. Heck, I think even the Space Shuttle wouldn't take 2 years to learn how to fly. Oh, and I am also pretty sure I remember the qualifier "proficient" being used, which in this context means a sufficiently trained plus sufficient experience post training.
Note that it was phrased not as an absolute but more of an estimate. Which makes sense because they've not been around for two years yet
It is quite possible that he is overestimating.Sorry, that's the best I can do.
The point of me brining this up is not to say that Armata is crazy difficult to drive, just that compared to what it takes to effectively operate a T-72/90 it's an increase. That is definitely what this officer was saying.
Steve
Fair enough. I appreicate you spending the time to research it. Just out of curiosity - what would make T-14 so difficult to drive? I mean it uses a pretty conventional mechanized setup, and if anythig - it probably has some electornic controls to assist the driver... Now if we are talking about training a mechanic that would service and do maintanace on such an advanced machine, then I can see how it would take extensive training.. But here is a kicker - Russian word for tank driver is "mechanic", so perhaps the officer in question was talking about the mechanic the way we think of it (i.e. maintanance NCO); but the autotranslate made it sound like he was talking about a driver? Just a theory...
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Oh, I'm a man of gray areas big time
However, there are courses of action which start down a road of chain reactions which can not be controlled by the side who started the action. Why do you think the West is so very hesitant about sending lethal aid to Ukraine even though it is both legal and, from Ukraine's standpoint, moral? Because Russia has already stated that it's something they will retaliate against. Big time.I'll throw this back at you. If the US cut off China's energy supply by embargoing its maritime activities, what exactly do you think the Chinese response might be?
As for China trying for redundancy in its energy supply and/or something that is more resilient... well, no kidding they're trying to do that. Why wouldn't they? They're doing a lot of deals with Russia's southern neighbors too, which Russia's got its fingers in but doesn't have complete control over. Sensible to do, but it doesn't really change the dynamics between China and the US in any meaningful way unless one side is looking to start a war.
Currently, unless things have changed, the Russians are contractually obligated to pay for the pipeline's construction. This is not a negotiating point, this is what the Russians already agreed to. But the thing is they don't have the $70b estimated cost of making it and they've already asked the Chinese to lend them the money and the Chinese said no. In order to cut costs Russia proposed an alternative route that is more favorable to Russia but obligates the Chinese to do a major amount of work on their end to connect to the proposed new location. It is also highly mountainous and there is some doubts as to the engineering feasibility of it in the first place.
That's the way it was when I last I've looked into. Has it changed or is this a fair assessment of where things stand?
It would if the deal were structured differently. As it is, the price and obligations placed on Russia's shoulders make it a poor deal. And that's not just me who concluded that. Quite a few experts at the time came to the same conclusion and have not wavered from it.
As you say, the Chinese are extremely good at negotiating. Putin was in a very, very tight spot at the time. He needed something to distract people from the loss of business to Europe as a result of cutting off their gas backfiring. The deal with the Chinese had been on the negotiating table for 10+ years and the two things (reportedly) that they couldn't come to agreement on was the price and who would pay for the pipeline. Lo and behold the deal suddenly goes through and Russia caved on both of the sticking points. Putin got the temporary PR boost from the move, and now it's in trouble (as far as I know).
Here's an article from April "Doubts Rise on Russia-China Gas Deal":
I enjoy a debate, which is what we're having. In fact, I asked someone to challenge my assertions. Not because I think I'm 100% correct, but because I can't seem to figure out where I'm wrong.
With that in mind, isn't that more logical to gauge future tank sales based on past tank sales (apples) rather than other systems which aren't even remotely related (oranges and bananas)? I think so and it's why I keep referring back to the T-90. By your logic the world should be lousy with them, but that's not the case even 22+ years after it was introduced. In fact, the much more expensive Abrams has been exported in larger numbers to more countries. Leo 2 has also sold more than the T-90.
I don't understand what your point is, or at least how it interacts with the one I made.
T-90 was available for production in 1993. 25 years later and there's roughly 2100 in use today and it took well into the 2000s for that number to get to the half way point. One can argue that the 1990s were extremely unkind to Russia's own production, which is true, but that's going to be the case for Russian in the next few years minimum as well. And Russia's internal economic dynamics shouldn't have much of a negative effect on exports. In fact, it should have a positive impact.
I discussed the "force multiplier" in other threads and touched on it here. Two primary points:
1. If the price is in the $7m range then it is no longer cost competitive (in a major way) with Western tanks which, probably, are going to be equal if not superior to Armata (we don't know for sure). If the price is more like $5m range and it is roughly equal with a more expensive Western tank, then that's a different story. So this one is definitely a "what do you think is more likely" situation. In the long Armata thread I made my position clear about my reading of the tealeaves.
2. Most of Russia's clients would probably rather have 10 T-90s and 5 Armatas (at the same equivalent cost) even if the Armata is twice as good. That's based on past history and general thinking of states which tend to purchase Soviet/Russian hardware.
I don't know, but the Chinese are capable (very capable) of challenging Russian technologies in the near future. Both on price and on features. Heck, they even have the US pretty concerned about what's coming up in the near future. Though personally I think they're going to stumble around a bit more before they hit their stride.
I hardly think the geopolitical state of things will remain static. That's silly
Therefore, you've misunderstood my point. Russia's non-NATO neighbors get their equipment from who? Russia. Russia can therefore always ensure that they have an equipment edge over its neighbors. More importantly, Russia's military is better run and funded than any of its non-NATO neighbors (though Ukraine is changing rapidly to challenge that). It is also larger. So what is a country like Armenia going to do if they want to break out of Russian orbit and Russia opposes it with military force? Lose. And they'd lose just as quickly and totally without Armata being in the mix.As for NATO neighbors... it can't win against NATO. Period. Armata can't change the equation.
Personally, I don't think it will matter very soon. The current regime in Moscow is in decline, perhaps steep decline. It is unlikely to regain its footing any time soon. At least not with the current bunch in power, nor with their likely replacements (i.e. as bad if not worse). Ukraine is gone permanently, Belarus is more cautious than ever, and even little countries like Moldova and Armenia are taking steps to get rid of Kremlin manipulation and exploitation. I'm not saying an Arab Spring is coming any time soon, but it's pretty obvious that the Russian Empire Part 3 is in major decline.
Not sure what your point here is, but the defense industries in the West will keep on chugging along with or without Armata. And unlike Russia, the West can afford it. Well, for longer than Russia can at least.
Steve
Steve, I honestly don't have 3 spare hours to give a detailed reply to your post. Perhaps one day we could grab a beer and chat about that stuff. May I suggest breaking up your posts into smaller segments so that they would be a little more scalable? I don't mean it as an insult, just a friendly suggestion.
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The 2 year figure came from the Russian MoD. Obviously it wouldn't take that long to get the driver to learn how to drive the tank. Drivers are responsible for a lot of responsibilities other than driving, such as maintenance and trouble shooting. Armata is a very complex vehicle by all counts, therefore more training is needed.
Steve
Source please?
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On a somewhat related note, has anyone noticed how in-gake PKP's (Pechneg) bipod is mounted in a same spot as PKM,rather than all the way my the end of the barrell (whcih gives it a very unique look in real life). Not a huge deal as far as I am concearned, but might as well add this one to a list of "not so" accurate models...
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I don’t know you very well Steve, but you strike me as a man of absolutes from what I have observed. However international politics are anything but… No one is talking about us attacking Chinese shipping, or of Russia actually using the nukes… a simple reminder that such option is possible, while extremely unlikely is all that is needed to advance strategic and diplomatic agenda…If the US cut off China's energy, that is exactly what would happen. Which again is the difference between a leverage point that is theoretical vs. practical. It is analogous to Russia's renewed direct threats of using nukes. In theory it gives them leverage, in reality if they resorted to nukes that would be the end of Russia forever. And the Russians know this very well.
Prices for what? Pipelines? Construction equipment? Russian Labor? Everything that I’ve read indicates to me that the deal is still very much in a making. It might take quite a bit before it actually materializes; but that’s how Chinese tend to do business, and I for one can’t blame them.That was before all the expensive bling started coming on line. Prices have gone up considerably since then.
I would love to hear your argument explaining why “Strength of Siberia” is not mutually beneficial to both countries.
It’s funny how they can sell super expensive jets and AD systems (amongst others), but all of the sudden their new tanks (if they are actually worth the price) would be discarded by potential buyers… Again, I am not trying to argue, but I simply fail to see your logic here.No, I'm saying they're going to have a hard time selling anything more expensive than a T-72, just as they have had a difficult time selling a T-90. The primary reason is price, which means the Western stuff isn't in the running either.
ORRLy? Like India, Indonesia, Algeria, Brazil, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, South and Central America (amongst others) – Yeah, Western weapon manufactures would rather be caught dead than selling to those scrubs. Now handing out used Leo2A4s at bargain prices – that’s what puts us head and shoulders above Russia (and China for that matter)… Right…Again, Russia has benefitted from selling to markets which the Western countries simply aren't competitive in either because of price or because of politics. As the Armata goes up in price, Russia loses one of its primary selling points. Which is why countries have evaluated the T-90 and instead gone with T-72s. And that is why I say that Russia has a very lucrative market for exporting upgrades and services for existing platforms (which will include the T-90 more and more into the future).
I think that a few decades are quite a stretch, but yeah… it would take a bit before Armat is a viable offering for export. My main problem with your argument though, is that you only focus on its price and completely ignore potential force multiplier benefits that it could offer (which might be well worth the price). Now for a millionth time -I really don’t know if it really offers those benefits nor do I care (for now); but it is a huge logical fallacy to only look at a product’s price outside of its features andplacement (as they would say in business school).As Armata comes online and production/refurbishment of T-72s comes to an end, the price will go down on the T-90 and that will become Russia's primary tank export until Armata becomes a LOT cheaper, which won't happen for a few decades, it will be priced outside of reach/desire of most existing Russian client states.
Yep, no doubt. So by your logic should they stick to popping out Type 88s or maybe trying something a bit more revolutionary?This also presumes that China isn't going to increase its market share, which is something I very much doubt will be the case over the next 20 years. China is in expansion mode and it is extremely good at it. It is a trend that will continue.
Simply put... because they can not afford it. The Soviet Union tried and it bankrupted them into dissolution. Russia is headed down the same path. And for what?
1. Practical military advantage against non-NATO neighbors and/or internal unrest? They already have that and will retain it without Armata.
2. Practical military advantage against NATO? Even if Armata proves to be a good all around tank, and they can afford to build/field LOTS of them, the Russian armed forces have so many deficiencies going up against NATO (including numbers) that there's no way Armata will make a difference.
3. Export potential? According to my argument, it is very low. So low that financially I don't see it yielding a good return on investment. Especially when compared to investing in Russia's economic and social infrastructure. Russian population is in decline and it's net migration is increasing. That's by far a much larger threat to Russia's national interests and having some shiny new tanks isn't going to fix that. In fact, it is going to make it worse.
Which brings me back to the point I keep asking about... where is this export market which is going to compensate Russia for such a large allocation of limited resources? I do not see it.
Steve
LOL. So you see the current state of geopolitical affairs saying in a status quo for as long as we can imagine? That’s an odd line of thinking for a historian. If we are to follow your logic, why do we bother decking out M1A2s if all we need are some Humvees and good old USAF to win any foreseeable conflict?
Or does your line of thinking only apply to undermining anything that Russians are doing, while the same standard does not apply to us and our “friends”? I’m just sayin….
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Of course, no one is talking about an all-out war between China/Russia/US/EU in a foreseeable future. That is simply not on a table for now as the consequences would be catastrophic for all the parties involved.For the foreseeable future China can not go to war with the US or the EU. If it does, it's economy will collapse and they'll have a couple hundred million people unemployed almost overnight. The economies of the US and EU will also be devastated, but they don't have the same sort of political peril that the Chinese government has. The Chinese government is many things, chief amongst them is pragmatic when it comes to their own survival.
What we are talking about here are means of exerting economic and strategic pressure on China without a direct confrontation. Their current reliance on sea routes for transporting oil and gas is a major weakness that limits their geopolitical and strategic decision making. They know it, and they sure as hell don’t like it. And now we have handed them a resolution for this limitation by pushing Russia into their arms.
The deal is definitely moving quite slowly, but that is a norm when doing business with China. At the end of the day, it is mutually beneficial to both states (both economically and geopolitically); so there is very little doubt in my mind that it would come to fruition when the Chinese are convinced that they have bargained the most out of it.For all the Russian hype about that gas deal, the Chinese are not willing to pay for it and the Russians are unable to pay for it. It's effectively stalled last time I looked into it. Which was what I, and others, predicted the day the deal was announced. If you check posts on this forum made during the days following Putin's big announcement of the deal you'll see that I predicted it would stall out. It was pretty obvious to me that it was a deal made more for PR than it was economic benefit. And with the collapse of the Ruble and the worsening domestic economic circumstances, it's even worse.
I am not sure what you mean by a balance of power… Military power – certainly not! Soft power – even less so! But it sure as hell would significantly limit our strategic means of restraining China due to missing the ability to cut off the flow of strategic resources into the mainland.Sooooo... if the pipeline is ever finished it will be an asset for China, but it doesn't change the balance of power any in real sense.
I have not followed weapon procurements closely for quite a few years, but when I did (in mid to late nineties) M1A1 (export version) was valued around 4 mil, while T-90S was closer to 2.5 mil. T-72S was around 1.5 mil.It's not. Latest guess on price (2012) I've seen for a M1A2 is over $8 million. So a T-90MS is about 1/2 as expensive. The high end Armata price estimate puts it close to a M1A2, the low end puts it at about 50% more than a T-90MS. Either way, it's still significantly more expensive than the T-90MS which Russia has already found a tough sell.
I don’t understand why you assume that Russians would have a hard time selling advanced and highly competitive tanks in face of western competition. If you look at their other weapon platforms that are a much better match for western counterparts (i.e. fighter jets, SAMs, etc..) they have been quite competitive and successful with those. What would make a competitive tank any different? Now whether T-14 is that tank or not… I have no idea nor do I care to even guess that until they are service ready…True, but not in correct context. Comparison between Western tank sales and Russian tank sales is meaningless because the Western countries have been very picky about who buys their stuff. Further, Russia has lost T-90 sales to its own, much older and much less capable, T-72s. And this reinforces my point. The more a Russian design competes with a Western design on price and complexity, the less customers out there willing to purchase it. Armata is a deliberate step towards Western designs and therefore, by definition, will limit export possibilities. The reason this is important is one counter argument to draining the Russian coffers to produce Armata is that they'll get paid back in future export sales. This is the premise that I've been challenging.
Exactly this. I've made that argument before as well. The biggest beneficiary of Russia's Armata program has been Western defense industries. It's the same thing that happened when the T-72 came out. And the West has a track record of being able to best whatever Russia fields in both design and manufacturing. So we once again return to the basic question I've asked since the start... what benefit does Russia get out of emptying its coffers to fund Armata's development and production?
Steve
I don’t necessarily except your premise that Russian weapon systems would always be inferior to the Western ones. As I’ve said above, there are quite a few examples of their weapons platforms holding their own just fine (albeit not when it comes to tanks as of late). Will Armata development spur new spending and research for western platforms that can counter it? –Of course! That’s how world works. But I really don’t understand why you expect the Russians to give up trying to build advanced MBTs… They are an advanced weapon researcher/manufacturer/exporter; so I simply fail to see why they should not research and try to field advanced armored platforms… I am really missing your point here
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Interesting article, Although I think Ukraine had the capability to do this type of training on its own. I guess Poroshenko really wants US cooperation in Ukraine. I hope the war just finishes and all this bloodshed ends.
You make a very good point Vladmir. It's not like Ukraine desperately needs US help to train a light infantry battalion... but from US perspective, it gives us an ability to evaluate the state of Ukrainian forces and to find the right starting point to improving their combat capacity.
Realistically speaking, ZSU/National Guard face a ton of challenges ranging from logistics, to C3, to command structure, to training deficiencies and so on. We are not ready nor willing to tackle all of them right away, so we start at a most manageable (tactical) level and then move from there...
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While it is true that recently Russia has made much of its warming relations with China, the truth is neither country trusts each other. It is also true that Putin just stated in the St. Petersburg economic conference that this new relationship should not be played up too much. Which is rather a different tone than he took last year. Perhaps the reality of the new relations with China are not as good as they appear on paper. For example, China is reluctant to do business with Russia's top banks because of sanctions.
http://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml
China can live just fine without expanding its relationship with Russia, but its very existence is threatened if North America (let's not forget Canada!) and Europe reduces its relationship with China. China knows where the money is.
But I'm straying from the topic
I actually find this topic to be quite important (much more so than Armata’s export potential) so I hope that you don’t mind me straying along with you.
The danger of Russia turning to China instead of EU for partnership is not so much in a formation of some Warsaw Pact 2.0 that will oppose us, but rather in their strategic and economic ties that benefit both countries, but pose geopolitical challenges for us. One primary example of this is that China would now be getting oil and gas through (land) pipelines from Russia rather than sea routes that it has relied on up until now.
This is not something that you hear mentioned a lot, but our ability to block those sea routes was a major restraining factor that has given us a tremendous amount of leverage so far. Now, we would no longer have this advantage… it’s not like we can bomb Russia to block their supply lines to PRC…
I think it depends very much on what bling comes with it. I've seen estimates of $4.5 million in 2011 for T-90MS based on the $1b India spent on 354 of them.
Oh, I totally agree. The estimates are all over the place. And again, it is based on what might be on the vehicles and what might not be, which is still an unknown.
Agreed such numbers are meaningless without looking at the whole package that is offered in a contract. However, I find it very hard to believe that T-90MS would cost as much as M1A2 (all else being equal)…
Looking in the review mirror is always a better way to view what is behind you, but if you look long enough you'll probably crash into something because you weren't looking forward
My point here is to make some prognostications based on the information we have now merged with the known track record from earlier times. And not just with Russia and the Soviet Union, but with other nations and their defense activities.
For example, we can safely say that customers have been reluctant to purchase T-90s in any major way. A few here and there besides India and Algeria. This despite the T-90 being available for export for at least 14 years and probably more like 20. This despite the fact that the vehicle's price is significantly less than the Armata (both percentage and absolute numbers). This despite the fact that the T-90 is basically the same as the T-62s and T-72s that such nations already (probably) employ, thus having fairly low adoption costs/headaches.
Modern MBT sales have been pretty low all across the board as of late. I mean, what new MBTs have sold at a better rate than T-90? M1A1/A2 and Leo 2s (which are mostly upgrades) for sure, but can you think of any others?
Let's presume for a second that the Armata is no more expensive than a T-90, that it is as easy to integrate into existing infrastructure, and comes with no extra baggage in terms of training and maintenance. Looking at the T-90 track record this would presume that in about 20-25 years from now there will be about 1300+/- Armatas exported. But we know the cost will be higher, the impact on infrastructure significant, and more costs/problems associated with training and maintenance. Logically, therefore, one should expect that to have a negative impact on export sales. On top of this it presumes no significant Chinese competition within the next 25+ years. Anybody want to say that's a safe assumption?
I feel we have all the information we need to make a pretty fair guess that the export market for Armata is going to be less than T-90 and stretched out over at least as long a timeframe. When looking at the costs it's taking to develop, and the questionable utility even for Russia itself, I just don't see this as something Kremlin planners should be counting on to balance the books.
On the other hand, I think there's a very good market for the T-90 in the near future. I think there's a VERY good market for upgrades to existing Soviet/Russian equipment. And that should be a highly profitable business for Russia. Though the irony is that the better their upgrade sales the likely lower their Armata sales will be.
Steve
I get your point, but I simply don’t care enough to debate it. Perhaps you are right. Or perhaps Armata would turn out to be a major force multiplier that would be highly valued by any military force that can procure it. It is a new generation of MBT design, a phase that any major MBT manufacturer needs to embrace in order to be competitive. Is it the right kind of MBT design? I don’t have a slightest clue… but it is inevitable that other major powers would try to field their own revolutionary MBTs sooner rather than later…
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I've seen multiple sources that have pegged it at $8m per vehicle. Which seems reasonable considering a 1999 estimate for a full up T-90 is excess of $4m. Which is another point to make... we still don't know what a T-90 really costs, so if we can't discuss Armata until we have a definite price... well... then we're never going to discuss it. That hardly seems fun
However, we don't need to know what the exact price is going to be to answer the question I posed. We do know that Armata, no matter what, is going to be more expensive to produce than an upgraded T-90, it is going to be more costly to maintain, it is going to involve major infrastructure expenses to support them, and pose some big costs/challenges to crewing them. Russia's MoD said 2 years to learn how to drive one of these things properly. I asked before, and I'll ask again, what countries out there are willing to put the sort of resources necessary to ensure a steady supply of contract soldiers to maintain operational readiness?
So with that in mind, I'm still looking for someone to answer the questions I've raised.
Steve
Steve, I've actually seen different numbers. T-90A/S was said to cost around $2.5 mil in late 90s, and Armata is estimated to cost $4-5 mil as of now. Now I personally view Armata numbers (whatever they are) as fugazi, because the vehicle is nowhere close to being combat ready.
As for its export potential - I honestly don't know, nor care to forecast such things until we have solid information about the vehicles’ readiness and features. That's a discussion that I would love to have 3-5 years from now (if not later) when the work on T-14/15 is actually completed; but for now there are simply too many unknowns for me to make any educated predictions
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Hmmm... let me think.... If the recent pattern of Russian ultra-nationalist belligerence extends east they could find themselves crossing swords (rhetorical or otherwise) with China. If China and Russia get into a spitting contest then a likely candidate for Armata would be Taiwan. Taiwan has the industrial base to maintain the beast, and none of the other major powers dare help Taiwan modernize its military for fear of invoking China's wrath.
Eh, that's all I got.
So far we have only seen a strengthening of strategic and economic ties between Russian and China. I see no reason why this pattern would break as long as we continue isolating Russia in Europe. A conflict between Russia and China has been a wet dream of our neocons (I hate that term, but we all know what it means in this context) for several decades; but so far we have only seen the contrary… and our policy towards Russia has only strengthened this alliance with China. I personally fear that this is a great strategic blunder that would come back to haunt us in the coming years; but only time would tell..
Either way though, It is much more likely that Armatas (or at least some of their components) would end up in PRC rather than Taiwan in any foreseeable future.
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That's a very good point. If you are asking about real-life - Russian FOs are now trained to operate UAVs (if those are available to them) and/or to coordinate with UAV controllers.
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All that says is that they are currently operating T-80. They are planned to be binned to make room to recieve T-14. Trust me
I know exactly what you are saying my friend, but the fact is that the 4th Guards Division has been receiving upgraded T-80s as of late. This was confirmed in a recent interview by its commander.
You are absolutely correct to reference the earlier plans to have them switch over to T-72/T-90; but that no longer seems to be the case. Why?.. I have no clue. Perhaps it's just a move to keep the workers at Omsk pant happy.. Perhaps there are some deeper logistical and tactical reasons for that... but there is no denying the fact that they are re-arming with modernized T-80s.
Also, contrary to the earlier statements by Russian MOD, 5th Tank Brigade is now slated to be rearmed with T-14/15s before anyone else. Again - Why? Perhaps because they use the oldest equipment right now (T-72B/BAs); or perhaps it is due to their (relatively) successful performance in East Ukraine during the Debaltsevo offensive.. Either way, I would not be surprised one bit if those plans change again before T-14/15s are actually ready for service...
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They're already sunk if that happens because it means the targeted country has some sort of special status with NATO or at least one of the major countries within it. And that means that if Russian tankers should decide to go on vacation or get lost in the country they're going to have a lot more problems than a Leo or Abrams.
I would definitely agree that such a scenario would present more problems for the Russians, but to say that they are “sunk” is way too premature. Ultimately weapon platforms (even the most advanced ones) don’t decide the outcome of the battles (as we can clearly see in Iraq right now)– logistics, training, initiative, C3 and such have a much bigger effect on it; and Russians are much more likely to hold notable advantage over their neighbors in all of those areas.
Think about it. What countries are even likely to accept Western military aid besides Georgia and Ukraine? I can't think of any. And if they did, where do you think they'd get the money for such purchases?
Those are the only two that I can think of as well, and if they were to get such weapon systems – it sure as hell would not come out of their budget…
I've made this point before, but I'll restate it here. Russia's legacy clients purchase Soviet type weaponry for three reasons:
1. It's cheap
2. They have the infrastructure to handle them
3. It's good enough for their needs (usually domestic use, sometimes matching similar weaponry of a neighbor)
I am not sure that you can sum old Soviet weapon clients and the current Russian ones into one bucket. Countries like Algeria and Venezuela (just to name of few) were never known as Soviet clients.
While I agree with the points that you outline above – one major one that you seem to be missing is that quite a few countries are hesitant to purchase Western weapons due to increased oversight and pressure that comes along with such purchases. Politics play a major role in international weapon trade whether buying from Russia and China or US and EU…
Armata is as expensive as a Western tank and almost as difficult/expensive to maintain. They have very little, if any, infrastructure to handle something like the Armata. Even the Russian MoD is saying it will take TWO YEARS for a driver to be fully trained. What tinpot dictatorship wants to spend that sort of money just to get their fancy expensive propaganda pieces do move without crashing into something? And because of that their neighbors won't likely be getting these any time soon either.
Soooo... who exactly is the market for these vehicles? I don't see it. I do see a continued market for upgraded Soviet era hardware and T-90s for many decades.
I have purposely stayed away from any discussion of T-14/T-15 simply because so little is known about them right now. Your assumptions are certainly valid, but would they still hold true 10 years from now? Only time will tell..
I fully agree with the theoretical need from the Russian government's perspective. However, the Soviet Union felt the same pressure in 1980 and look how that turned out. Domestic spending can only take a backseat to military spending for short periods of time unless there is a demonstrated justification for it. Last I checked less than a half dozen countries spend the % of GDP that Russia is slated to spend, one of which is Israel and the others are 3rd world nations. It's not a good sign that Russia can sustain this level of spending. Certainly the Soviet Union couldn't and it had vastly more resources than Russia does.
From a pragmatic standpoint Russia should just say "the heck with it" and scale down to small, efficient force that is capable of doing nothing major on its own. Plow the savings back into the economy, including the defense sector. Russia can not have a competent, well armed military without an economy strong enough to support it. They need to get their economy reorganized first. And having $50b worth of assets taken over for failure to pay legal judgements from binding arbitration isn't going to help one iota.
Again, I see your point; but the defense sector has actually been fairly profitable and competitive for the Russians so far. Would that be the case if they embark on Soviet-level expenditures of cranking out 3000+ tanks a year? Almost certainly not, but so far they have been quite conservative with their actual purchases..
Is there a timeline? Numbers? Also, what is the degree of confidence that this will actually happen? Militaries, Russian and other, make announcements all the time that don't happen. I think this has happened a few times already with T-90 modernization programs, hasn't it?
Steve
Exactly! Which is why I am very skeptical of any Russian weapon procurement plans until we see them in action; and when it comes to Armata we are still quite a few years away from those plans being anywhere close to materializing…
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Thank you very much Bydax!
It is quite possible that he is overestimating.
However, there are courses of action which start down a road of chain reactions which can not be controlled by the side who started the action. Why do you think the West is so very hesitant about sending lethal aid to Ukraine even though it is both legal and, from Ukraine's standpoint, moral? Because Russia has already stated that it's something they will retaliate against. Big time.
What do you think the first module of Black Sea would be?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
As far as I know, 25th Airborne Brigade had practiced (relatively) regular para drops prior to this crisis. Also, all the airmobile personnel (i.e. 79th, 80th, and 95th brigades) were para-qualified. Now, their priorities might have shifted due to the current crisis; but CMBS storyline is based on an alternate chain of events.
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