[T-90MS, PT-16 and Griffin Video]

On 2/26/2017 at 11:28 PM, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Anything he disagrees with.

Russia is capable of making perfectly good hardware, it's just:

PzSkw (I hope that you don't mind me calling you that). I wanted to comment on this post of yours, because I find it both very well formulated and informed; yet missing some critical points.

1. The stated performance values are virtually always inflated, or purposefully vague.

That is absolutely true. Russians are infamous for claiming that their new equipment has no equivalent competitors in the world. They've been better about it lately, mostly saying that their arms match the best samples available internationally... but that's still quite a boastful claim. Then again, to be fair, what countries are actually modest or even honest about the performance of their weapon platforms?

2. The process in which equipment transitions from "idea" to "test concept" to "limited fielding" to "actually in common use" is both opaque and likely not understood by the parties navigating it themselves.  Various bits of kit have 100% been selected as the next generation Russian something or other...only to never reach fieldings, or the entirely of one Brigade has a complete set, and no one else.

That is correct as well, even though lately they have been much more consistent in deploying standard arms and equipment to multiple brigades/formations at once (i.e. T-73B3, BTR-82A, Ratnik, etc.). The reason for this ties down to their A - limited financial abilities B - limited MOD support for some models that they are supplied by the military industrial complex (i.e. BTR-90)

3. Russia's limitations are well known in broad strokes but poorly understood in detail, while the official statements broadcast nothing but strength and the impending amazing something or other.  This is intentional on the part of the Russian government, but it makes it hard to gauge actual outcome.  A complete revamp of the Russian armor fleet appears unlikely in the short term, but there's a possibility we might still see low number updates, or a wider, more modest project.

While I agree with your last point, I have to point out that you approach this issue as a US Analyst (which is only fair). The reality is that most of the confusion and discrepancy with Russian military procurement announcements has less to do with some grand scheme to intimidate their enemies; and much more to do with internal competition between various weapon manufacturers. All of them want a piece of the military budget pie, and it is essential to have their systems adopted domestically in order to sell them abroad. That is the primary reason for multiple announcements of new and diverse system being adopted.

When watching armor, and really especially armor for the Russians it needs to be taken with a giant grain of salt.  Here's my rules of thumb when dealing with Russian armor, but could still totally be applied across the defense industry:  

1. Never ever ever take press releases as factual.  Some of them may actually still be correct, but enough of them are internal politics, fluffed up to gain interest in proofs of concepts, or simple falsehoods that you cannot take them at face value.

That's a good rule that can apply to any armed force. However, the numbers of new weapon systems (Airplane, Helicopters, Tanks, etc..) that have been delivered to actual combat units are generally quite accurate and don't seem to cause a lot of questions.

2. Watch the numbers in service vs the capabilities of systems.  Part of Russia's information operations is presenting their cutting edge equipment as representative of the common Russian military formations, when in reality they're only found in limited fieldings.  

That goes back to my previous point, you need to follow the actual delivery numbers of weapon systems to combat units. They are generally freely available and reliable.

3. Always ask why you're being given information when dealing with anyone's military capability claims.  You're being exposed to information with the intention of getting you to come to conclusions and outcomes supported by the body releasing the information.  This is especially true with Russia given the absolute absence of separation between media and state.  

Again, that's a great rule to apply to any armed force. However, I have to disagree with your last point. Russian media is much more state-controlled than ours (at least on the surface of it); however it is also controlled by business interest just as much as ours, if not more. That is why you will constantly find Russian articles mocking one weapon system in favor of its opponent (KA-52 vs MI-28 is a great example of that), and for that reason they can be quite informative and provide for a much more diverse specter of opinions on domestic military hardware than you would expect.

As the case is Russian armor updates are something that certainly appear to be taking their time, and barring dramatic changes in world situation, will continue at a slow pace.  It's premature to assume anything about future T-90 models, because we've seen at least a half dozen T-90 upgrade packages, all of which were totally happening, none of which have actually occurred.  We're all prone to grab onto whatever bits of information come over the fence, but again, a skeptical curiosity is really the only way to approach this field, let alone the Russian corner of it.  

Totally agree here.

Peace,

DreDay

[VDV may get their new toys]

I think that's what you guys call "effective managers", right?

[VDV may get their new toys]

To be fair, I think that they are very far from "having created it". The article just mentions that the specifications for BMD-5 are being worked on. As of now VDV is concerned with procuring more BMD-4Ms (they are expecting to have 4 battalions armed with them by the end of 2017) and working out it's quirks...like actually making it truly airdrop-able. Any BMD-5 plans are premature by many years.

[Russian army under equipped?]

21 hours ago, IMHO said:

It was developed for Ministry of Internal Affairs nor for MoD requirements. Basically SWAT tasks - CQB, room clearing with no frags going through walls, non-lethal projectiles etc.

Yeah, as I've said - I can live without them in CMBS perfectly fine; the RPOs do need to be fixed though as they are next to useless right now... quite contrary to their real life reputation.

[Turkish Leo2 tanks struggle in the Syria]

9 hours ago, Armorgunner said:

It would not surprised me. If Putin where sending just the modern turrets, to equip older T-72´s in Syrian inventory. As a cheaper way to get Assads forces to be more effective. However, we have been seeing a lot of T-90´s around in Syria. So Putin seems to go all in with Assad. Would it even be possible, to put a T-72B3 turret on those old Syrian M/M1 models?

I suppose it's possible, but why? It's not like T-72B hulls are super-expensive, and Russia certainly has plenty of them in storage...

[Russian army under equipped?]

5 minutes ago, IMHO said:

This is a chemical warfare unit (however strange it may sound with MGLs ) - they are not part of Russian SOF. There are others you might have seen but they are not part of SOF as well.

Yep, that's what I am saying... same guys that are using RPO-Ms in CCMB

[Russian army under equipped?]

 

Here is a video of them being used by regular army units; no idea how many have been purchased so far, but I doubt that they came from the tender for SSO and 45th ORBr that you are referring to..

[Russian army under equipped?]

On 2/26/2017 at 5:26 PM, HUSKER2142 said:

BTR-82A put thermal imaging sight, thereby increasing its effectiveness. Plus to increase its export demand in the global arms market.

^{На БТР-82А поставят тепловизионный прицел , тем самым увеличить его эффективность .  Плюс увеличить его экспортный спрос на мировом рынке вооружения .} 

 

http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3568367

http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3332957

Any idea where they are getting the matrices for thermal sites? I have a strong suspicion that they are still communing from France despite the highly publicized embargo,,,

[Russian army under equipped?]

On 2/25/2017 at 6:05 PM, John Kettler said:

AK-400 and other small arms on the Poligon at Alabino for live fire tests by the troops. Judging by weapon optics and other things, I think some license fees are owed!

Regards,

John Kettler

 

On 2/2/2017 at 5:47 PM, John Kettler said:

Since I was already on the ARES website, I took a gander at some of the free reports there. As a result, I discovered the Russians have an infantry weapon in service, have had it for years, which isn't in CMBS. Checked the manual to confirm this is true.  It's called the GM-94 grenade launcher, and it's seen combat in Chechnya and was spotted in Crimea in the hands of Putin's green men. Report has photos to prove both. The primary munition, the VGM93.100, is remarkable, a plastic cased (near zero primary frags) thermobaric munition capable of smashing through a wall or breaching armor 8 mm thick. Those of you who paid attention to Suvovov/Rezun's specific statements about Russian reasons for strange calibers will appreciate this is a 43 mm projectile, not a 30 mm or a 40 mm. Something else to consider is that while US 40 mm HE and HEDP have MSDs of over 100 meters, it's 10 for the grenade from the GM-94, with a lethal radius of 3 meters. What I find excessively exciting is that number is also the arming distance for the grenade! Perhaps our Russian and/or Ukrainian contingent have more info on where the GM-94 fits into the Red Army. Earliest Russian Army procurement was for what was undoubtedly a Spetsnaz Regiment.

The Russian GM-94 Grenade Launcher

http://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-Russian-GM-94-Grenade-Launcher.pdf

Regards,

John Kettler

I would like to know where the association with AK-400 comes from. I have heard the new "SSO" model being called AK-74M3, which is much more in line with KK's naming. Also, as it has already been pointed out - it  is very poor etiquette to quote Survivor. In this particular case his argument is not factually based. All weapon calibers are designed based on very strict design specifications that are set out for them. Russians had no issues using 12mm caliber for field guns, howitzers, tank cannons and naval tertiary  - most of those systems had used different ammo and loading methods. Same goes for 76.2mm and 155mm. In fact the new A65B and MSTA-S systems don't even except older 152mm ammo.. yet the Russians don't seem to be too bothered by it...

[Russian army under equipped?]

On 2/8/2017 at 9:06 AM, Vanir Ausf B said:

My understanding is the GM-94 is not issued to regular Russian infantry. It's used by Spetznaz and security forces, which are not in CMBS.

That's not entirely correct. GM-94 is also issued to SSO units (as was evident during their actions in Crimea) and engendering units, which are actually present in CMBB. It is said to be a very effective and handy weapon system. However given the way that the game designers have nerfed RPOs, I would not really miss expect anything from it in the current game engine.

[Modern Russian infantry battalion structure]

Gentlemen, Thank you both. I find that pretty interesting. Any idea on whether there is any reason for this or is that just due to some organizational oversight? I also wonder if that's a case of squad level gunners using RPKs in peace-time and then switching to PKMs/PKPs before deploying to a combat zone; as was a common practice with units deploying to KTO in North Caucasus in late 1990s..

[Modern Russian infantry battalion structure]

 

 

1- Some squads in CMBS tend to have both PKP’s and PKM’s. That is a dubious combination unconfirmed by actual deployment personnel or exercise reports. PKP shares 80% of the kit with PKM, so general replacement happened very quickly. However, there are some remote formations that still have only PKM’s. To note, they more than likely don’t apply to CMBS rapid deployment scenario. It is important to note though, few BMP battalions that still have not received PKP’s, use RPK-74M’s on squad level. BMP Battalions that have received PKP’s use them both on platoon and squad level. Consequently BMP platoons can either have 4xPKP, or 1xPKM+3xRPK-74M.

 

Are you sure about that friend? Can you think of any present-day Motor-Rifle units that deploy RPKs at squad level? I have not see reference to any since the "Serdyukov" reforms of late 2000's. I am only aware of Russian Naval Infantry continuing to use RPKs (God knows why); but I would appreciate any sources pointing to the contrary...

[BTR 82a in Syria]

If you think BTR-82A in Syria is exciting, what are your feelings about the combat use there of the recently brought in TOS-1A? Pretty exciting footage.

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/615448/Vladimir-Putin-Islamic-State-ISIS-Syria-Iraq-Latakia?utm_source=traffic.outbrain&utm_medium=traffic.outbrain&utm_term=traffic.outbrain&utm_content=traffic.outbrain&utm_campaign=traffic.outbrain

And here are no less than 70 pics on combat and combat training by anti ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq, including quite a few Russian airstrike photos, all of which say they're on ISIS targets. This is, of course, in keeping with official Russian statements. Meanwhile, as discussed over on CMBS, the truth is most strikes aren't directed against ISIS at all. The target breakdown of the 1600 Russia says it hit and The Express turns into destroyed isn't terribly informative. But if Russia has somehow managed to fly 1000 sorties in a month, then it dwarfs our so-called air effort there. Article is from October 31, 2015. Hot off the virtual presses! 

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/615946/Russia-destroys-1-600-ISIS-targets-US-commandos-syria

 Were I, Putin, though, I'd be worried, not about planes being shot down SAMs large and small, but of planes falling apart in flight! The Su-24M/FENCER D first entered service in 1983 and was produced until 1981-1993 . Essentially, this is building the original airframe, then stuffing it with lots of modern avionics, countermeasure systems and other goodies.The Su-24M2, also apparently and confusingly known as FENCER D, is a post-manufacture upgrade of aircraft systems.for the Su-24M. Thus, the strike aircraft doing most of  the heavy lifting in terms of ordnance tonnage, is at least 22 years old. Understand, too, that the service life on Russian aircraft, by design and the manufacturing standards (shocking in the Western view), is much shorter than the Western birds. When last seen, Putin had a single squadron (12 planes) of these in Syria. Interestingly, as reported in a long, deeply detailed article from Bellingcat from the first of the year on the status and operations of the Syrian Air Force, the Syrians are themselves flying the selfsame Su-24M2! 

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/01/16/the-syrian-arab-air-force-beware-of-its-wings/

Likewise, he has a squadron of Su-25/FROGFOOT there. Though likened to an A-10, their payload is less than half that of an A-10. We think these are the extensively upgraded Su-25SM/FROGFOOT. The Su-25 was produced from 1978-1989, making the newest Su-25SM around 25 years old. He has some unknown quantity (numbers reported suggest 4) of the Su-24M replacement aircraft, the Su-27/FLANKER derived Su-34/FULLBACK. This is the only new strike aircraft Putin has, with the earliest delivery in 2009 and the bird still in production. that's the good news. the bad is that the plane, compared to the earlier Su-24M2, is vastly more complicated, which, given US experience, can create huge maintenance issues. The rest of the force, per some reports, amounts to about two squadrons of Su-30/FLANKER C and roled for air superiority. I've seen nothing so far on these birds in strike mode in Syria. Further, as the Su-34 link shows, there is imagery from Syria showing the Su-30/FLANKER C carrying AAMs only. 

The above means that flying 1000 sorties/month means every strike aircraft Putin has in Syria must fly a sortie/day. But we all know there is no such thing as 100% force availability, right? To give you some idea of real world numbers for a complex aircraft, circa 1980, the actual readiness figure for the F-14 Tomcat was 65%. In turn, this forced the US to use two carriers in order to sustain continuous air ops.  In rotation every 24 hours, one carrier did nothing but fly escort and CAP missions, while the other flew strike. In practice, it becomes clear that the real sortie generator for the Russians there is the relatively simple and easy to maintain Su-25SM/FROGFOOT. If the NATO designator is correct, I don't at all understand why such radical improvements in capabilities don't merit a letter after the basic designator. All in all, I don't see how the Russians can keep up such a pace, especially on the SU-24M/FENCER D end. Supporting this notion is that July 5, 2015, the Russians lost an Su-24M/FENCER D on takeoff in Khabarovsk, Russia in what accident reports would call "abrupt departure from controlled flight." Nor is this the only combat aircraft loss this year. Remember, this is for a generally geriatric set of airframes not flying daily combat operations. Moreover, even ignoring enemy action, the more you fly aircraft, especially those with short service lives for all sorts of critical components, such as engines, the more they tend to break, increasing the sortie generation demands on the remaining flyable aircraft. Consequently, I think the sustained sortie generation rate will be far less than what happened in the first month. In defense parlance, the much trumpeted triumphant beginning was the surge rate. Restated, Putin made quite a splash, but he can't keep it up. 

Regards,

John Kettler

John, your points certainly have a lot of validity; but they are also a bit one-sided. The truth is that the service age of Russian strike aircraft operating in Syria is comparable to that of any other major Airforces operating there (i.e. aircraft made in the 80s and upgraded in mid 2000s.). Yes, Su-24M1/M2s are very complex and high-maintenance birds, but their operational record is comparable to that of their contemporaries (i.e. Tornado and F-111). Under the circumstances (minimal AD coverage and plenty of time to service them); they should function just fine, flying 1-3 sorties a day (with multiple crews). Same goes for SU-25SM (which is a lot simpler and cheaper to service). SU-34 is a pretty new bird, so we don't know too much about it; but it is reasonable to assume that its maintenance needs are similar to SU-27/30/33/35. Russians have been flying 70-120 sorties from Latakia daily and that is a pretty much their maximum capacity at this point. Any further flights would have to be conducted from other airfields (if that is what they intend); and we will probably hear about that shortly...

[BTR 82a in Syria]

Supposedly T-90A in Syria:

 

There have been quire a few shots of T-90As in (supposedly) Aleppo area coming out for the past couple of weeks. There was also a direct quote by Putin published in Russian media stating that Russian allies that were fighting a tough war; were in great need of T-90s and other advanced armor (and it's pretty much accepted that he was not talking about DLNR...).

The real question at this point is who is actually operating them. I have read several theories, but the general consensus among Russian observers (for what it's worth) is that they are crewed by Iranian volunteers..

[In another blow to transparency, Putin classifies peacetime Spetsnaz losses]

Just a quick update for Russian-speakers and Google-Translate studs - here is an official reference to a presidential decree in question. As I've said - it's not entirely new (issued on 5/28/2015) and did not go unnoticed in Russian media (including the "opposition" outlets).

 

http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201505280001?index=0&rangeSize=1

[In another blow to transparency, Putin classifies peacetime Spetsnaz losses]

The real range should be 25-100, Usually special forces advisers are sent to lead command. Although might be a few vehicle crews sent to train and operate the vehicles. Volunteers who stay longest should be guys who are trained by special advisory teams, So then they can train their volunteers. And then there are the teams that stay to protect critical areas. Maybe up 150. Although the estimation of 500 doesn't sound crazy I really doubt that is what it is. 

 

Right. I was told by my Russian sources (who are by no means an ultimate authority on this, but do happen to have more inside information than any of us) that there are around 100 Russian active duty KIAs from that conflict. However, that number does not account for Russian volunteers (i.e. not active duty) that had traveled to Donbas either independently or as part of Russian voluntary training/deployment system. There is also an ambiguous category of Russian volunteers and advisors that were recruited from active duty personnel, but deployed to Donbas as either PMCs or volunteers independently of their organic units. Those numbers are likely to be much higher, and I am not even sure that they are fully accounted for.

[300 Ukrainian T-72's to be upgraded into PT-91 Twardy's]

This were just talks about nothing several months ago. No such contract. All T-72, which now received UKR forces are just repaired after long time storing T-72AV, T-72B and taken from Africa's contract Ukrainian-upgraded T-72AU1. In whole since winter to this time no more 50 T-72 transfered to armed forces and National Guard. I think some of these tanks of course will be in module as on UKR as on UNCONs side (if UNCONs will be issued together with airborne/narines). 

 

That's exactly right, it would make zero sense for Ukrainians to send off T-72s to be upgraded in Poland; while their own Kharkov tank plant (arguable the most respected Soviet design bureau) has a suite of their own T-72 upgrades that are at least competative with PT-91s. Besides, does PT-91 upgrade (which seems to be a fine package in its own right) apply to T-72Bs (which is what Ukrainians have)? As far as I know, it was designed for T-72A/M1 platforms that are quite different from T-72B in many ways.

 

I can only see it happening as some political gesture to support Polish tank makers that have not had a ton of success on foreign markets; but the Ukrainian government simply does not have the funds to pay for it. If such a contract was to occur, it would be a form of Polish welfare for their weapon makers by proxy of Ukraine…

[In another blow to transparency, Putin classifies peacetime Spetsnaz losses]

I think that there is some confusion that is caused by OP's article. The new government decree in question (which is not that new btw – it was announced over a month ago) allows for non-disclosure of casualties incurred in special operations. It does not specify what particular units it applies to and does not draw any distraction between special vs. conventional forces. Obviously this action has been enacted due to Russian actions in Ukraine. However, this policy is not Ukraine-specific and allows Russian government more flexibility when conducting clandestine operations abroad.

 

While this policy obviously limits the freedom of speech and information while further prevents public oversight government actions; it is also worth noting that it was an openly issued decree that was coverd and discussed in all forms of Russian media.

[What do you think the first module of Black Sea would be?]

Actually a USMC squad is quite large if I'm not mistaken. According to Wikipedia current structure is 3x4men fireteams. Iirc in CMSF it was even larger and brought a whole lot of firepower.

 

Yep, that's why I wrote "besides small squad size"

[What do you think the first module of Black Sea would be?]

Oh aye, don't get me wrong VDV would be very fun to have. Verba MANPAD, BMD-1/2/3/4 series, BTR-MDM Rakushka, Sprut-SD and Sprut-SDM just to name a few.

 

Right on, ma man. I am not entirely sure if there are any BMD-1s or BMD-3s left in active duty anymore; but let's also not forget BRD-ZD, BTR-RD, 2S9, and a whole host of other support vehicles. It would also be really interesting to figure out the proper tactics for BMD’s 5-man squads and to see how much their superior training and morale can account for relatively small squad size. Much of the same would apply to USMC (besides small squad size) as well. There are certainly plenty of other add-ons that would be a welcomed addition. However, I can't think of any that would add more realism, challenge, and pure enjoyment as VDV and USMC…

[where to find Russian current OOBs]

Oh, if you mean TO&E for these units, then yes, that is much more difficult for the reasons DreDay enumerates.  The game generally assumes the "new look" brigade structure mentioned above (tank brigade is the reverse, with 3x tank battalions, 1x motor rifle battalion) that was supposed to be standardized.

 

Agreed. It is generally safe to assume that a Motor-Rifle Brigade would have 3 BTR/BMP battalions and one tank battalion; while a tank brigade would have exactly opposite ratio... In that sense, new Russian brigades seem to follow the structure of old soviet Regiments (albeit with more support assets). Still though, there are some anomalies that simply don't make sense - for instance 27th Sevastopol Motor-Rifle Brigade (a relatively elite unit) of Western Military District deploys BTRs and BMPs at the same time... Why? Your guess is as good as mine..

[where to find Russian current OOBs]

Boche, you bring up a great question; but unfortunately it's almost impossible to give an accurate answer to it. Russian army has inherited the Soviet tradition where every formation had somewhat unique structure and TOE. They had made a conscious effort to standardize their brigade-level TOE in the late 2000s; but that effort seems to have failed due to a multitude of social, economic, and operational reasons.

 

 

However, there are still some basic commonalities that are shared by most ground forces. For instance, a Motor-Rifle brigade would generally consist of 3 Motor-Rifle Battalions, 1 Tank battalion, a recon battalion (broken down into LRRP and Electronic recon companies), at least 2 mixed artillery/rocket battalions, and an AD/AAA battalion along with some other support assets. However, each brigade has some unique equipment and org structure that varies from others.

 

 

It is also important to note that Russians have been fighting with BTG formations (that are even more unique and dynamic than proper brigades). BTGs tend to be even more unique in their structure due to the resoures that are available to them, and special tasks that are placed upon them.

[What do you think the first module of Black Sea would be?]

Not exactly like, RPK is still used at squad level as the mmg. Pictures from crimea show this. Also support assets would be different. Ka-29 would need to be added as helicopter support. Any similarity should mean they would be easy to code in then, large output (a new "faction") for very little input.

 

You are correct, old friend. There are a few small differences between Russian motor-rifle and naval-infantry armaments and org structure; and Naval Infantry's use of RPK-74s at squad level (only God knows why) is one of such distinctions. Don’t' get me wrong, I would love to see Russian Naval Infantry and a whole host of other Russian/Ukrainian/US specialized units. However, VDV and USMC are very much on top of my wish list due to their very unique armament and OOB.

[What do you think the first module of Black Sea would be?]

Russian VDV and Naval Infantry clashing with USMC over Odessa along with the addition of unconventional/militia forces for both sides.

I have mentioned it before a couple of times - Russian Naval Infantry has pretty much the same structure as BTR motor-rifle battalions; albeit they are privy to higher training standards and fighting spirit - still though, they can be modeled in CMBS already. VDV and USMC on another hand, use entirely unique equipment and OOB - their addition would bring some much needed new blood into the game.

[What do you think the first module of Black Sea would be?]

They do have some unique kit like a different version of the t-64B1M and variety of armored mrap type vehicles.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equipment_of_the_National_Guard_of_Ukraine

 

That's actually a good point. If we are to have rebel/militia type forces; then the MRAP and other lightly armored vehicles of National Guard would be a welcomed addition. They could also be given some "westernized" small arms like TAR-21 made by RTC FORT and some advanced sniper rifles.