HighlandLaddie

JonS, Your points are, to the extent they are factual and not just splenetic, correct, but you have behaved like an officious ass. Perhaps LukeFF should be chagrined at his mistakes, but you should be ashamed at your maliciousness.

Does this count?

Blackcat, At least the Rifle Brigade (of "Sharpe's Rifles" fame in the Peninsula and at Waterloo) has a modern history of being mechanized, as units of the regiment were used as the first British Motor Battalions -- infantry attached directly to armoured formations -- in WWII. Interestingly, the 2/Rifles (now in light role, and recently back from Afghanistan), also a rifle regiment (the 60th Rifles, or King's Royal Rifle Corps), got its start as the Royal Americans, recruiting light infantry in my neck of the Hudson, in what we call the French and Indian War. Michael Yon writes a typically vivid dispatch about the battalion's time in Helmand here: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/an-artery-of-opium-a-vein-of-taliban.htm

bardosy, One other question: any particular reason for selecting the Devon & Dorsets? Sentimental attachment? The reason why I ask is because the regiment (now amalgamated with the Glosters and renamed 1/Rifles) is designated as a light/commando role infantry battalion, brigaded with the Royal Marines, and wouldn't be operating in Warriors. A battalion from the regiment that would act as mechanized or armored infantry would be 5/Rifles (the old King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) or 4/Rifles (formerly known as the 95th Rifles, the Rifle Brigade, and 2/Royal Green Jackets). Interestingly, 4/Rifles CO is now Lt Col Rupert Jones, the son of Lt Col "H" Jones, who won a posthumous VC leading 2/Para at Goose Green in the Falklands, and who began his career as an officer in . . . the Devon & Dorsets.

Thanks for the info, Bardosy. Actually, I didn't use high speed for the platoon mounted in Warriors, just regular Movement. The Scimitars did use Quick for the most part, as they were pretty visible going over the saddleback to the left of the road, and any enemy on that map is closer to them than is healthy. Are there further ground reinforcements after the two command vehicles? I don't know what the enemy is going to do, but I like to know what my own battalion is up to.

Bardosy, I just played the 1st Mission in your Warriors in the Sand campaign, I like the map very much, and am looking forward to the other parts of the campaign. I have a couple of questions. From my reading of the description, I took it that I was to break through the crust and exit at the far end, before Syrian reaction forces had time to arrive to interdict the route. I kept all my forces mounted, the inf platoon in Warriors going up the main road with the FO's Spartan, and the Scimitars and Bulldog going hell for leather on the left flank. Both groups used suppressive fire on likely ambush locations, and we arrived at the far end in about 7 minutes with the loss of only the Spartan -- hit by AT from the stand of trees near the road, with a loss of the driver and FO, and also the radio op, who "routed" and could not be found to be picked up by the Bulldog (the only vehicle with any room). No other casualties or damage to any other vehicles. So far so good. Now here are the two problems I hope you can help me with: first, I found that my vehicles would not exit the map at the spot marked "exit," but simply piled up at the map's edge -- where two of the traffic-jammed Scimitars were destroyed by infantry by the roadside. How does one exit? Second, as I contemplated the pile up, I got a notice saying (heretofore unmentioned) reinforcement have arrived, and found that the Maneuver Coy's 2 command vehicles are just entering the map back at the gorge, presumably to make the trip on their own. I appear to have misjudged what I was supposed to be doing in this mission, but, to be fair, I think I had a little help from the vague instructions, which describe the need to get to the destination above all else, and never mention follow on ground forces. Yes?

Sergei, I am not a game designer, and my comments and anecdotes were not directed at helping in the design of this game. I was expressing scepticism at the reported conclusion that there was scant evidence that smoke grenades were used for concealment, and my anecdotal evidence was aimed at refuting that. You say "it's quite obvious that smoke grenades of different types existed and were used," but the opposite was being said: “Right, I remember Steve saying they never found any evidence of smoke grenades being used for cover in WWII. They were too ineffective at it. They were only used for ID purposes.” It is that misconception that I was addressing. As to the details of how different units were equipped, and how and when they employed smoke grenades for concealment -- well, I'd love to be able to provide the details, but, alas, I have my own day job. At least a misconception about smoke grenades won't prevent the game designers from taking up the task. Michael Emrys, you may well be right about the smoke used by the German armoured car.

Before reading john Kettler's detailed post, I also was puzzled by the idea that there was scant evidence for the use of smoke grenades for concealment. Forty minutes with Google, looking at soldiers' memoirs, medals citations, unit histories and a U.S. intelligence manual on German engineer assault tactics turns up mentions of its use by British infantry and German recce in Normandy, by Canadian infantry in Italy, by American infantry in Normandy and the Ardennes, and by U.S. Marines in the Pacific. Here are some of the sources: Report on German engineer assault tactics from prisoner of war interviews in Tunisia, from the Intelligence Bulletin, August 1943. http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/engassault/index.html Robin Neillands' "D-Day 1944; Voices From Normandy," quoting a British para witnessing the arrival of Lord Lovat's troops at Pegasus bridge: "The bridge and it's approaches were under sniper and mortar fire...... Heavy sniping and shelling sommenced as the Commandos dashed across the bridge in batches, covered by smoke from smoke grenades." From a History of the 134th Infantry Regiment (35th Division), in Normandy (http://www.coulthart.com/134/chapter_4.htm ): “When Corporal Robert W. Godfirnon and Pfc. Mitchell R. Helton, both of Nebraska, saw two of their comrades lying wounded in a field where danger of continuing machine gun fire remained, they crawled out to the wounded men, and, blinding the enemy machine gunners with smoke grenades, were able to return them to safety.” From a memoir of an infantryman with eth 84th Infantry Division, on the fight for Rochefort during the Battle of the Bulge (http://www2.xlibris.com/book_excerpt.asp?bookid=1001): “While the units were being organized for withdrawal, a sergeant from Tank Destroyers arrived with news that Jamelle had been occupied by the Germans the night before. I decided that in any event I must get the company out of Rochefort. To screen our movements the men threw smoke grenades into the street and moved out on the double.” From the memoirs of a British soldier with the 1/Middlesex Regiment, in Normandy: “In 1944 we entered Cheux by a sunken road which we eventually discovered . . . [and] we encountered a German armoured car heading straight for us, the German crew were as equally surprised as we were, although obviously not so green, as they grabbed the initiative by lobbing smoke grenades, and disappearing literally in a puff of smoke in reverse at a fair rate of knots back in the direction they had come from. “ From the citation for a Canadian infantryman: Sergeant George Campion was awarded the Military Medal for heaving smoke grenades from an exposed position to cover the movements of engineers who were clearing an enemy minefield. The action took place on the main street of Ortona, Italy, in December, 1943. Sergeant Campion gathered a pocket full of smoke grenades from his platoon, ran 30 yards beyond the minefield into the open street, and threw them. A perfect smoke screen resulted. The engineers, who had not been able to complete their task before the smoke cleared, were driven back. Returning, Sergeant Campion laid another smokescreen which enabled them to clear the mines and this allowed the advance to go on. A Marine citation: The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Harry P. Pearce (0-42016), Second Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps (Reserve), for extraordinary heroism as a Rifle Platoon Leader of Company B, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, FIRST Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, 11 May 1945. . . . After supervising the orderly withdrawal of his platoon, he again searched the area to insure that no wounded remained, killing several of the Japanese who attempted to charge the helpless men, and throwing smoke grenades to provide a screen for the stretcher-bearers who were handling litter cases...." HAROLD JAY COLLIS, First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps. . . " First Lieutenant Collis unhesitatingly exposed himself to the intense hostile fire to throw smoke grenades and provide an effective screen for the evacuation of the wounded. Completely disregarding his own personal safety, he rushed into a fire-swept ravine and, while working to remove casualties, was himself mortally wounded." Died October 4, 1944, in action on Peleliu, Palau Islands, Western Pacific.

I was able to resue the hostages in the town through the backdoor by sending a small force (a couple of MG armed recce vehicles and an engineer section, together with the FO) along the escarpment, sheltered from enemy view and fire, once the road climbed past the first "layer" of the "layer cake." There is a gap passable by vehicles in the second escarpment all the way down to the extreme right, and another, similar gap in the third escarpment as well, a bit to the left of that. I left the FO in his vehicle on a prominent knoll after passing the first gap, from which he could see and call in air attacks on the town. He was never shot at. After an initial air strike on the buildings commanding the approach to the town from this direction, I sent my engineers (with two snipers), still mounted in their vehicles racing directly to the town wall opposite the walled courtyard where the hostages are. The two recce vehicles accompanied them, providing MG cover for this move, and concentrated their fire on the few town buildings overlooking the open ground the engineers would have to cross to reach the courtyard wall (the buildings were unoccupied). One party of the engineers, covered also by the snipers, blew a hole in the town wall and took the house immediately to the left of the walled enclosure. With an MG armed recce vehicle waiting immediately opposite, the second party of engineers crossed to and blew a hole in the enclosed courtyard, permitting the recce occupants to drill the enemy MG crew guarding the hostages. All of this batch of hostages were rescued, with no casualties among the rescuers. Meanwhile, I sent the main bulk of my force toward the remote hostage location. They were not as lucky. I lost one recce vehicle, and some time, to the AT position high up on the ridge before the Apaches destroyed it. I probably used too much time breaking through the infantry astride the road, as even after a pasting from the air (perilous close to my own observers, who have no real good vantage point) I lost a vehicle here to surviving defenders. Then I stayed off the road, preferring the low ground to its left, which is shielded from enemy positions in the town or near the main entrance to town. So I avoided the roads near the town entrance and encountered no mines. (While I was crossing this low ground, air support was attacking the town entrance and the ground off to the right of the remote location). But nearer to the objective one must climb back up and regain the road. Some of my forces were held up closer to the remote hostage site by enemy infantry in positions to the right of the road, but I managed to get three vehicles to the remote building's entrance, only to have the time run out literally as I was giving the blast order. My biggest regret is not using more air power earlier. I was unsure how many passes the Apaches could make, and underused them, for fear they would be empty when I really needed them. If I had it to do it again, I would have pasted any likely enemy location without waiting for the enemy to be seen, and made sure all my aircraft were empty when time ran out.