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kevinkin

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Posts posted by kevinkin

  1. I agree (and thanks for the ideas). Given what is known technically about WWII US drops and the power of the editor, good airborne simulations are not out of reach. Map size will have to be large and scenario length set to allow for concentration, skirmishes and the final push toward the main objective. I believe the editor will allow for the creation of units that are weakened due to the jump. "Broken bones", "strained knees", units way way off course. Based on the JonS post, my test battles are pretty rudimentary. But the good news is they are fun. The feeling of hide - and - seek in the dark is there and the CM enivroment shines. For example, I have set AI units on a patrol around the map trying to find the airborne enemy and you never can tell what and when you will run into each time it's played.

    Now where is the copy of "Night Drop".

    Kevin

  2. I have a few battles (company sized at night) that use that AI set-up sprinkle method. It does provide random start locations for the AI. I will try the reinforcement method for non QB maps. Given the storied history of the airborne I think there would be interest is these types of fights. Gee, up on my list is Marshall's Night Drop. We long for replayable scenarios especially on great maps. Although, random start points may produce a wide range of results, the battles I have toyed with are fast to play and pretty interesting.

    Kevin

  3. I own RT, FI and SF and like to design. I have been playing with a way to simulate para drops where the starting position of troops is scattered. In the games I have, there is no mechanism for this other

    than the designer's creativity. But I'll ask since the 82nd and 101 played such a big role in Normandy. How has this been handled - if at all - by the designers in the Normandy community?

    Thanks Guys.

    Kevin

  4. We have read that in the late winter of '42 German high command decided to take their offensive south and a collision at Stalingrad. Case Blue was preceded by the Second Battle of Kharkov, a Soviet offensive within NE Ukraine. The objective was to capture Kharkov and surrounding road and rail network. This operation - also know as the Izium bridgehead - ended badly for the Soviets. Their attack was cut off by a classic mobile envelopment mid-May '42.

    At this point was a change in Case Blue warranted by the Germans or not?

    1) focus on the south and Stalingrad as planned

    2) change plans and strike towards Moscow

    3) change plans and go on the strategic defensive for '42 and into '43.

    Please don't kill me for hindsight, but I would op for 3 and try to wear the Soviets

    down to a point were a peace would settle on the lines established after the winter '41-42.

    Through negotiation, a new boundary would be straightened to avoid salients. I read Rommel

    envisioned a North Africa defense based on extensive mines supported tactically by assault guns and operationally by Panzer Divisions so as repeat the Kharkov experience up and down the front. So would begin an arms race.

    I believe Rommel also supported a German focus on one type of assault gun and one type of tank to simplify what we now call the "supply chain". Gee - what would those be?

    Another thought while reading about the battle was the nature of the fighting.

    Ferocious. Selecting this campaign as the first CMx2 installment would not have been too

    out of line. Perhaps it is too closely associated with Stalingrad. In any event, the battle

    makes for a great read and study. It combines static and mobile warfare with both sides

    in pretty good condition and looking for a fight to end the war.

    Kevin

  5. I had to chuckle at the mention of Black Sea too.

    It's remarkable that after the cost of taking western Europe the US was resigned to abandonment and would rely of atomic

    warfare to stop the Soviets after transferring troops out for theater. I guess a window existed for both sides just after VE in the summer of 45 when the US had the bomb and the Soviets only one in the making. Like to find a war game to sim this.

    Kevin

  6. I did not see a date for the Patton quote supplied. But anyway. Were the correlation of forces that different between May 45 and Jan 46? The initial plan was drawn up prior to Jan 46. The report glumly noted that “with the limited forces at our disposal it would not be possible to maintain a defense unaided within the US Zone for any great length of time against a strongly sustained attack.” (Not sure where the aid was coming from). So US High Command must have extrapolated out 6 months to a year as to the forces available to both side after VE day. If they could not defend, the US and allies could not conventionally attack the Soviets. My opinion is Patton was irrational in his view and it would appear the US government at the time would have agreed. I have not found a reference to a US offensive plan after the war like Patton seemed to fancy. And it just looks like the US only planned to abandon Western Europe, drop available atomic bombs and move to the Mediterranean.

    Kevin

  7. Are you trying to run them as a scenario/battle or Quick Battle?

    Here is the path on my PC:

    Any new stuff goes in

    C:\Users\kevinkin\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files (x86)\Battlefront\Combat Mission Shock Force\Game Files\Scenarios

    (kevinkin is me)

    But the original stuff is in

    C:\Program Files (x86)\Battlefront\Combat Mission Shock Force\Game Files\Scenarios

    Its been a while so I hope I remembered OK

    Kevin

  8. Happy to see this topic remains so active. I thought the below to be very relevant and include it here instead of a link so

    folks can quote it to aid in any further discussion.

    Kevin

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    From Liberation to Confrontation: The U.S. Army and Czechoslovakia 1945 to 1948 by Bryan J. Dickerson

    Quote,

    Though the likelihood of an attack against U.S. forces in Germany by any of the other occupying forces including the Soviet Union was deemed very remote, plans were prepared to defend against that possibility. In January 1946, the G-3 section of U.S. Forces in the European Theater headquarters released “Plan ‘Totality’,” a defensive plan for the American zone. The plan was very vague but called for a rapid concentration of occupation forces, delaying actions until the arrival of reinforcements, and the defense of key areas such as the Frankfurt and Nuremberg areas. The latter in particular was very important because losing it could isolate U.S. forces in Austria. Air power was vitally important to offset deficiencies in the ground forces. It was presumed that intelligence would give adequate warnings of the build-up of hostile forces. The report glumly noted that “with the limited forces at our disposal it would not be possible to maintain a defense unaided within the US Zone for any great length of time against a strongly sustained attack.” [22]

    The area along the German - Czechoslovak Border was deemed to be one of the most defensible in the American zone. With its rugged and thickly wooded mountains the Border region would have been ideal for a defensive line to counter aggression from the north-east, ie. Czechoslovakia or the Saxony region of the Soviet zone. Of course as U.S. troop levels in Germany evaporated, such a defense could not have been maintained for very long and a fighting retreat would have been the best that American commanders could have hoped for. [23]

    In Washington, however, senior American military leaders had no intention of conducting a fighting retreat, let alone an outright defense, in western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. They recognized that western Europe was indefensible because of the weakness of American forces and the refusal of the Truman Administration and Congress to provide sufficient funds for adequate military, naval and air forces. Therefore, the Pincher series of war plans drafted in 1946 for war against the Soviet Union called for the abandonment of western Europe in the face of unstoppable Soviet land forces. More significantly, the Pincher plans called for neither a “Overlord II” return to Europe nor the use of atomic weapons. Instead, Pincher placed the highest priority on retaining the petroleum fields of the Middle East, and the use of conventional air power to reduce Soviet war making capabilities. Eventually American and Allied forces would invade the southern Soviet Union across the Black Sea to seize Soviet petroleum fields in the Caucusus. [24]

    The Pincher Plans were superseded by the Broiler, Charioteer, Frolic, Bushwhacker, and Crankshaft Plans which were drafted in 1947 and 1948. Like Pincher, these plans called for the immediate abandonment of western Europe and counter-offensives elsewhere. Unlike Pincher, these plans relied heavily upon atomic weapons and strategic air power for cripple Soviet warmaking capabilities and force a favorable conclusion to the war. Despite the fact that American atomic capabilities were extremely limited, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no choice but to rely upon them. They simply did not have any other forces available to inflict significant destruction upon the Soviet war machine. They also had too many places to defend and not enough forces to do so. [25]

    End Quote

    22]. U.S. Forces in the European Theater. Headquarters. G-3 (Operations) Section. “Plan ‘Totality’: Alert Plan for Defense in the Event of Aggression.” Germany: 22 January 1946. USAMHI Library.

    [23]. Ibid.

    [24]. Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950, (London: Frank Cass, 1996). In his book, Ross examines the development of American war plans against Soviet invasions. For the Pincher Plans, see Chapter Two.

    [25]. See Chapter Three of American War Plans.

  9. I never addressed the fate of the 79th VG. I was speaking in much more general terms on why operationally destroyed formations can be re-formed under the same name and with remaining veteran survivors.

    "It's not semantic. A rebuilt is nothing that is secret. You do not admit your logical failure that you brought up a newly set up unit like the 6th army as an absurd argument why 79. VGD was destroyed during Wacht am Rhein."

    Therefore, please clarify. Thanks.

    The new formation could be named anything once re-formed since it existed as the original unit only on paper after destruction and the fortunate few fleeing into the hinterland in a disorganized manner. A division reduced to scattered platoons is not a functioning division any longer.

    Kevin

    PS: For what it's worth ..

    On October 27, 1944, the division was raised again outside the Welle system, this time in West Prussia and now as the 79th Volksgrenadier Division (79. Volks-Grenadier-Division). It had only ten percent combat veterans and was largely made up by absorbing the 586th Volksgrenadier Division (Katzbach). On December 11, 1944, the 79th Volksgrenadier Division was assigned to 7. Armee a reserve force near Bitburg, Germany. Although at half strength, the 79th was to take part in Operation Herbstnebel.

    On December 21, 1944, the 79th VG moved towards its assembly area near Diekirch, Luxembourg. On December 24, 1944, the Volksgrenadiers in conjunction with the Führer Grenadier Brigade, launched a series of attacks against the Blue Ridge Division, the 80th Infantry Division (United States). The objective was to seize the town of Heiderscheid, which included a strategic bridge across the Sure River. Both units suffered very heavy losses, particularly when on December 26 most of the 79th VG artillery and FGB armor was destroyed by American fighter bombers. The 79th VG began falling back towards the town of Baunscheid, to hold another strategic bridgehead there; it was unable to hold against the US 80th Infantry Division.

  10. The term destroyed for large formations is often semantic. Of course the 6th was militarily destroyed in relation to what it was in June 41 and 42. But for political and ceremonial/moral reasons nations re-build formations around remnants. This is

    especially true for regiments and battalions. But was also the case for the 6th Army - probably for political reasons and home front propaganda.

    Kevin

  11. The term destroyed for large formations is often semantic. Of course the 6th was militarily destroyed in relation to what it was in June 41 and 42. But for political and ceremonial/moral reasons nations re-build formations around remnants. This is especially true for regiments and battalions. But was also the case for the 6th Army - probably for political

    reasons and home front propaganda.

    Kevin

  12. Womble

    I don't recall any significant allied forces in the south of Europe - not even Italy - to confront an albeit slow Red advance. I was thinking more on the lines of 5th column activity in the channel ports. Not strategic bombing. Or naval interdiction. I would not discount the Soviet industrial capacity. The point on getting it to the front is important. You must have noticed the square mileage conquered by the Reds June 44 to May 45 compared to the allies in the same period. But lets get back to John's Patton quote. George was insane to think the west was in position to attack the Soviets. In contrast the Soviets were in a better position to attack the west if so ordered. And if Patton was given charge of an Allied attack it would have failed leaving the west exposed to a massive counter offensive. The real mystery is why Patton thought the way he did, not Stalin's behavior after VE. Even if Stalin did continue the war against the west the decision would not have been as irrational as what Patton put forward in the quote above (beat with ease).

    Kevin

  13. Given the west relied more on material than manpower and the Reds had a lot more manpower, I do think the west's supply would have been more tenuous vs the 45 Soviets than the 44 Germans. They would still need to be able to off load at the coast and even minor disruptions at the ports could have had a disproportionate effect. The Russians did not have to build a major strategic bomber force since they wanted ground for occupation and they put their resources into the army. I remember reading that allied strategic bombing turned out to be less cost effective than medium bomber and TAC air battlefield interdiction from a military POV.

    Supply lines eventually run through cities so you are right about potential placement of 1 or 2 nukes - just not Berlin - farther to the east.

    One thing we sometime miss is the Soviet position in southern Europe vs the West's. Covering that flank in a hypothetical WW3 would have stretched the allies even more.

    Perhaps Stalin just wanted to consolidate his gains and thought communism would spread on its own with out major military actions. Hence the cold war.

    Kevin

  14. Ardem

    Not so sure the Rhine would have been the stopping point. In principle, the Allied supply was easier to interdict given

    it needed to cross the Atlantic. The Red Air force probably could not knock out the ports but keep them at less than full

    capacity. I wonder how much Stalin knew about the Bomb prior to August? Not to say it would have been used in Western Europe but maybe east of the Vistula striking supply lines.

    Kevin

  15. John

    Thanks for posting an "age old" question to be discussed here in the RT forum among well read and interested players.

    I guess we need to know what Georgie meant by "beat" without atomic strikes. Also, what did he mean by "lacking" and

    no knowledge of combined arms?

    - Conquer Moscow/overthrow communist Russia : Impossible

    - Push Russian back to pre-1939 border: Highly unlikely militarily and too costly with casualties

    - Push Russians back away from Berlin into Poland: Maybe militarily but the boys are not coming home soon or transferred to

    the pacific

    - Tanks infantry and artillery: Well with enough supply the Red army would more than be a match for the west.

    - TAC and Strategic Air: OK give the west the nod

    As far as supply, I think the red army could at least have fielded a force capable of defending their gains.

    With that, the was west lucky Stalin took a break in May 45.

    Kevin

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