Dietrich

No DM at the platoon level either? If no, at what level are DMs to be found? (Presuming that the Marines don't have a USMC Designated Marksman Rifle for nothing.) Not to compare apples to oranges, but the three "marksman" (as designated by the sniper logo in the UI) in the SBCT MOUT platoon HQ come in rather handy. According to the UI, they're armed with scope-equipped M4s (though, since almost all such carbines -- like their full-length M16 cousins -- are fitted with optic sights, it's unclear to me what sort of scopes those are), rather than rifles more suited to actual sniping.

Lanzfield, I was referring to how the TacAI would reflect squad-level tactics of different armies, in this case the Wehrmacht versus the US Army. The German Gruppe (squad) was based on the MG (MG34 or MG42). The Gruppenführer (squad leader) directed the two-man MG team (gunner and loader), spotting with his binoculars and specifying targets. The riflemen were supposed to refrain from firing unless there appeared a more immediate and close-range threat than whatever the MG was engaging or unless given specific orders by the Gruppenführer or otherwise told to "fire at will." Thus, I reckon, in CMx2 terms a German squad would fire with just its MG under most circumstances, but if the guys in the squad spotted enemy troops nearby (within, say, 50m), the riflemen would open fire at that nearer threat, along with perhaps the Gruppenführer and his SMG. I'm not sure, though, what would be reasonable as far as how many of the squad's weapons in addition to the MG with Target versus Target Light. I suppose it would make sense for the riflemen to hold fire unless there's a enemy close by, since the MG is supposed to account for the lion's share of the firepower. By contrast, the US Army rifle squad was based on the rifle -- ten men with M1 Garands, one with a Browning Automatic Rifle, and the squad leader with (typically) a Thompson SMG. In CMx2 terms, a US Army squad's TacAI would involve (I suppose) as many of the guys with LOF to enemy units firing at will (without targeting orders) or all firing at a specific target (with targeting orders).

When you say "getting torn up", do you mean having rounds hit near him (near enough for a possible wounding ricochet) rather than being hit per se? If yes, makes sense to me. This implies that he fires off the 40mm while the MG's crew is being suppressed by his squadmates' "rock and roll", which is tactically sound. In other words, in this case it would be the MG experiencing greater suppression due to the volume of fire, even if that fire is of relatively small/light rounds (i.e., 5.56mm versus 7.62mm). From what I understand, evidently the amount of lead on target has a more or less direct correlation with the degree of suppression. Hence the at least purported effectiveness of the MG34 and MG42 in this regard -- higher rate of fire equals more lead downrange. Yet I continue to hear -- though not per se in the BFC forums -- dismissive, curiously snide comments (largely from guys who, as far as I can tell, are American) about how the MG42's high rate of fire translated actually into ammo wastage rather than significant firepower. However, I have read a certain US Army assessment from December 1944 (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/firepower/index.html). (BTW, even Gunny R. Lee Ermy figures that the tests in that film were "weighted in our favor", as he says in a Mail Call segment about the MG42.) Likewise, it was no accident that in December 1941 the Germans were dismayed to encounter ski-borne Red Army soldiers zooming out of the mist, hosing them with their handy little SMGs, then disappearing again.

It is reasonable to suppose that this is a matter of psychology as well as technology? In other words, a GI wielding his trusty M1 Garand in the face of short but frequent bursts of suppressive fire from an MG42 (which had been spotted only because of its muzzle flash) pops up from behind cover, snaps off two rounds at where he had seen the MG42's muzzle flashes, then ducks back down, in which amount of time the MG42 had fired about 15 rounds. A US Army instructional film demonstrated the somewhat poorer accuracy of the MG34 and MG42 compared with the M1919 and the M2. The film showed a GI taking cover and thinking to himself about the MG42 heard firing in the near distance, "Well, so what if it has a high rate of fire?" I've heard it both ways: Some say that the MG42's reputation is more hype than anything else and that its high rate of fire yielded a waste of ammo to accomplish that which could be achieved with fewer rounds per minute, whereas others say the sound of it made them quake in their boots and its firepower pinned entire companies at a time (see the paraphrase of Sydney Jary earlier in this thread). As regards the average GI in Normandy taking cover while some nearby-but-yet-unspotted MG42 shreds the shrubbery, I think that likely what he actually was thinking was more along the lines of "Holy @#$%, that thing puts out a lotta lead!" (I'm only going on about this because it pertains to infantry and to CMx2.) The MG42, like the MG34 and Kar 98k, fired a round (7.92x57mm) that was slightly larger and heavier than the .30-06 Springfield round fired by the M1 Garand. As such, and with the MG42's much higher rate of fire than contemporaneous MGs (like the M1919 and Bren), I think it would be reasonable to suppose that it would be more capable of shredding light cover (as is simulated in CMSF by the gradual disappearance of trees and brush when under direct fire), perhaps even demolishing medium cover like brick walls and penetrating wooden house walls.

Indeed. The value of effective camouflage is that to spot the positions, the enemy must get so close as to be well within the effective range of the defender's weaponry. In other words, if the defenders' camouflaging is poor, a stealthy scout team lurking in the brush on the opposite hill can spot the positions and call down artillery on them before the defenders even know the enemy is nearby. If the defenders' camouflaging is good, they can afford to wait for the enemy to get well within range before opening fire (or refrain from firing and just report the enemy movement and possibly even call down harassing artillery of their own). Could bunkers be stocked with ammo? For instance, if a Grenadier squad of mine is running low on belted 7.92mm ammo, can I send a couple guys (the "anti-tank team" or whatever) back to a nearby bunker to get more? Will tactical resupply be an option in the first place? (I understand that this was simulated in CMx1 by allowing units in a defensive scenario to be given more-than-normal amounts of ammo, as if each had its own ammo stockpile.) Also, I'm still wondering about whether the squad-level TacAI will reflect national differences in tactics at least somewhat. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In hopes of perhaps putting the other skein of this thread in perspective: I purchased Theatre of War and played it fairly extensively. There are things about that game that I like, and several things that I really don't like. I haven't played the game at all since getting CMSF, so I hope it makes sense that I don't troll the ToW forum and belabor my gripes about certain aspects of that game. I just don't bother. I'd rather be involved in constructive discussions about CMSF -- or just play CMSF -- than spend any time bitching about a game that I don't even play. (That said, I do think ToW2 looks rather better than ToW1, and I'm looking forward to trying out the demo. ) Likewise, there are things about CMSF that I'd like to see improved but I don't bother going on and on about them.

Statiscally, artillery was the casualty-inflicting weapon in WW2. Hence one of the key reasons for camouflaging fighting positions of any sort -- without camouflage, the enemy can spot you (perhaps even before you spot him) and just call down artillery on you. The un-camouflaged-ness of fortifications was much more a factor in Theatre of War, wherein the attacking AI would bombard whatever trenches were on the map, so that I learned to set up my troops well back from the fortifications, wait for the opening bombardment to cease, then hustle them forward to take their positions in the trenches. (The trenches afforded minimal protection from artillery and only somewhat better protection from direct fire.) Thanks in large part to the available artillery and air assets, I completed the second mission of the TF Thunder campaign with 3 WIA, 0 KIA. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- May I be so bold as to steer the conversation of this thread back towards talking about WW2 infantry (and not just what sorts of earthworks they did or didn't get killed in)? As regards CMx2, might we see infantry of different nationalities fighting at least somewhat like they did IRL? For example, a German Grenadier squad in the defense using pretty much just its MG-34/-42 at normal ranges, with the riflemen and MP40-armed Gruppenführer joining in against targets appearing suddenly at close range (or all firing as able with a specific Target order)?

I have not done any testing to determine differences in promptness of called-for support, but I will soon. My first concern has been and still is the comms between the support and whoever will act as spotter -- in other words, in every scenario where I have support assets, I check each FO or HQ (presuming that an FO/HQ will have been comms than a squad/team) to see which has the best comms to the particular asset I want to use. Would this apply also to the Harriers which -- according to the CMSF manual as well as other info I've read -- are often organic to an MEU, as opposed to F/A-18s (which can be called on by an FCT but are Navy rather than USMC)? In other words, MEU-level air assets are dedicated to support of the parent MEU and its component units, so the FCT has more-or-less direct comms with the air assets as well as undivided support from them, correct? So helo support below company level is likely to be fairly rare, at least in part because a dedicated liaison (such as a JTAC) is not likely to be attached? In light of this, the seemingly suboptimal amount of CAS (a pair of Cobras) in "Battle for Objective Pooh" seems more realistic than I had previously thought. (In light of the multple ATGMs, I would have liked a Harrier or F/A-18 or two to JDAM the hell out of those suspect positions. Of course, the scenario briefing does mention that the MEU fixed-wing assets are operating elsewhere at the time.) Thanks for the info, Bonecrusher-17. As it applies to CMSF, it may be fun to have half a dozen air assets in a given scenario, but if that's way beyond what would likely be available to a company CO.... *shrug* I'd rather have a realistic TOE (and a realistic tactical situation) than fanboish overkill... usually.

When you say "mines (IED) broken", do you mean actual mines or IEDs emplaced as if they're mines? And speaking of mines... in playing "Bloody Nose Ridge" the other day, one of my scout teams encountered a minefield and suffered some casualties, but the "Mark Mines" button was greyed out for all my engineer teams, even when they were practically on top of said mines. Why would this be the case? I read the corresponding parts of the manual but could find no explanation about what circumstances under which engineers cannot mark mines.

Forty-nine times out of fifty, my pixelsoldat is on a crest or on an upper floor of a building and is targeting an MBT/APC when he launches the Javelin. (In light of the 'one shot, one kill' deadliness of the Javelin, to me it seems gamey to use it on anything less than an MBT, unless my pixelsoldaten have no other real anti-armor assets at their disposal.) In playing "Battle for Objective Pooh" the other day, I had a Javelin team use both its missiles on a roof where an ATGM had been spotted. Both missiles arced through the air and hit the roof at approximately 60 degrees. But how often have you seen a Javelin just sail over a targeted MBT/APC as if it's a cruise missile, rather than zooming overhead and then nosediving into the target as intended?

Evidently, having your FO/FIST/JTAC in a BFIST or FSV is optimal, but having the BFIST/FSV itself parked under full cover (out of LOS of any armor and/or ATGMs) with the FO/FIST/JTAC dismounted is more optimal than getting the BFIST/FSV knocked out and all the guys inside WIA/KIA. (How's that for alphabet soup? )

In reality, binoculars would make a difference in determining a unit's type. In CMSF, each enemy unit's type is visible to the player once as soon as that unit is spotted. This is one of the few things which I don't like about CMSF and which don't make sense to me. It's one thing to be able to tell if a tank is a T-55MV or a T-72 TURMS (depending on the distance to said tank and what optics are available to the spotting unit), but would even a binocular-equipped sniper team necessarily know what sort of unit it had spotted, unless there was some sort of telltale equipment like an ATGM or recoilless rifle? Using a narrow target arc instead of a target command is something I haven't tried. I'll gladly give that a go to see how it works. Recent testing on Firing Range 55 with a SBCT (non-MOUT) rifle squad facing a Syrian Reserve Company HQ team and a Forward Observer team in open ground shows that out to 800m or so, the squad's designated marksman (DM) behaves as he theoretically should: he fires single shots, taking several seconds to aim before each one, and he is definitely more accurate than the other M4-armed riflemen, who tend to fire short bursts, and more frequently. Fairly often, too, the DM fires whereas the rest of his squadmates refrain from shooting, depending on how far away the potential target is. Speaking of which... I have read of USMC designated marksmen -- indeed, there is the USMC Designated Marksman Rifle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Marine_Corps_Designated_Marksman_Rifle) -- but in CMSF I've never seen any USMC pixeltruppen with the "marksman" symbol except in actual sniper teams. Why this omission, I wonder? Certainly in a squad of 13 men (9 of whom are armed with ACOG-equipped M16A4s) there's room for one to act as a designated marksman, right?

What I have observed is that an enemy vehicle unit (such as a BMP or a static T-54) is "visible" to a given friendly unit but is not targetable by said unit. Using the Target tool to determine actual LOS, I find that the "visible" unit is actually not in LOS of the friendly unit. Apparently an abandoned vehicle that is spotted once remains spotted even if the unit that spotted it does not actually have LOS to it. That said, what if the enemy unit in question is still active (not abandoned)? (If it is abandoned, the presumption is that it would not have moved from its last-spotted location.) In that case... I shall have to do more testing and observe the results thereof.

What if the mortar team or whoever is spotting for the mortar team does not have LOS or communication (whether direct or through multiple channels) with the friendly infantry near the target area so as to know whether friendlies might be affected by the fire?

[sarcasm]My experience has been that pretty much all cab drivers -- innocent or otherwise -- bail out from their taxis and huddle in the basement of the nearest building as soon as my forces appear on map. Not that I wouldn't prefer to spare their taxis and thus have my Cobras and Apaches preserve their cannon ammo.[/sarcasm]

Some of the sounds -- especially the rifle and LMG sounds -- in the video seem rather better to me than the default sounds as of v1.11. (One of the first mods I installed was a sound mod to improve on the game's admittedly uninspiring small-arms sound effects.)

US SOF forces in Afghanistan, according to what I've read, prefer unarmored Humvees because they are faster, more maneuverable, and can carry more than their armored counterparts. Heck, they even use Toyota Hilux pickups (with M240s on pintle mounts, among other things) which are not much different from the 'technicals' employed by the insurgents they're fighting. Another thing to consider is that there are mechanized troops as well as armored troops. Pretty much the same role-wise (especially when they're recon troops), but they go about it in different ways. So there's not one overriding reason for using wheeled/unarmored vehicles over tracked/armored ones. The point simpson22 makes about armored tracked vehicles being more intimidating and destructive than unarmored wheeled vehicles is true*, there's more to it than that. Besides, IEDs can kill even the crews of MBTs, so it's as simple as "the more armor, the better." Regarding the uproar about Humvees being suboptimally armored and thus more vulnerable to IEDs, I've wondered (and I know my musing is that of a relatively ignorant fanboi) that if troops had their boots on the ground more instead of zooming around in vehicles all the time, they might have more of a chance to spot IEDs before driving to within lethal range of them. Of course, moving dismounted means being exposed to small-arms fire, and the relatively few troops have to travel such distances on patrol that not using their vehicles most of the time is just plain impractical. * For similar reasons, some US commanders in Iraq encouraged their troops to refrain from wearing sunglasses while out on patrol, since such made them look more intimdating to the locals. After all, how often do you see a Middle Easterner wearing shades? :cool:

I have it too, vinyl as well as CD. Understood. :salute: What I meant to say was that in CM:SF, when facing the front of a bunker at small-arms range, assuming that I have about two squads against one MMG bunker, my guys can "depopulate" it without using a Javelin or even an AT4 -- just firing their M4s/M16s and M249s (with a fair amount of help from any M32s present) for long enough does the job. (Of course, most of the bunker-busting I do in CM:SF is thanks to Bushmasters, 120mm cannon, Hellfires, etc.) That said, the rear and sides of a bunker are much less pregnable (as distinct from simply impregable), such as in the second mission of the Marines campaign, when that first platoon from Fox Co (Helo) arrives on the northern edge of the map -- they don't necessarily let fly with any of their available M72s or AT4s, and a flurry of rifle grenades doesn't necessarily do the job. In such an instance (I've played the Marines campaign's second mission several times), I have a squad hustle to within handgrenade range; of course, they don't always throw right on target, but it seems more like the barrage of grenades makes the bunker's crew bug out, so that they come running out the back door and then get mown down. In the WW2 era, bunkers were of pretty stern stuff compared to what infantry generally had available. (Obviously, flamethrowers and satchel charges and the like were great for clearing bunkers, but those were carried pretty much only by actual combat engineers.) Bunkers' firing ports (I forget the more accurate term) were rather narrow, so it was hard to shoot inside. (The firings ports of CM:SF bunkers seem rather un-narrow, so I suppose it would be easier to shoot through them.) Speaking of bunkers in CM:Normandy, will there be reasonably accurate simulation of engineerly work in such situations, such as fitting shaped charges at key points? I know animations are among the hardest things to come by, but will we be able to see the engineers doing their thing, or will seeing a guy hurl a satchel charge inside have to suffice? I, for one, very much look forward to CM:Normandy in all of its aspects, and "What?! No functioning wristwatches?!" is not something you'll be hearing from me.

In the editor, select "Mission" from the drop-down menu at upper left. At the bottom, switch from "Blue vs. Red" to "Red vs. Red". Select "Units" from drop-down menu. Click on "Purchase Blue", and you'll see that "Red" units are available for purchase for Blue. Hope that helps.

With all this talk about foxholes, I recall Bill Cosby's words about foxholes. (listen from about two minutes in) And speaking of bunkers, my experience (in CMSF, that is, playing as Blue 80% of the time) has been that bunkers are not very hard to take out (or at least "depopulate"), even with weapons that don't necessarily penetrate the bunkers' walls (50-cal MGs and/or copious amounts of 5.56mm). I will do some testing, though, to more clearly see how readily pixeltruppen in bunkers suffer casualties from attackers' fire.

So far only a handful of Blue-vs-Blue scenarios (that I know of) have been made, but once the British module is out, I reckon there'll be a lot more Blue-vs-Blue battles. I, though, am more interested in Royal-Marines-or-3-Para-versus-Taliban-in-Helmand kind of scenarios. Any Blue forces versus Taliban, for that matter. When the NATO module comes out, my MG3 teams will be burning through a lot of ammo.

Yes. But as I said in the post I started this thread with, my questioning is about the Army JTAC's not-quite-optimal connection to air assets vis-a-vis the Marines FCT's consistent big-"+" connection, rather than the promptness and accuracy of the support mission itself. Having the spotter -- whether JTAC or FST or whatever -- in an unbuttoned BFIST or FSV will yield the best results overall, but what I'm wondering about is why a JTAC never has connection to air assets as good as the FCT's connection. By the way, thanks for the detailed info in that regard, akd. Even a unit with small-"x" comms to an air asset can get good results. For example, in the first mission of the Marines campaign, my SEALs can consistently get the on-station CAS to drop a bomb right on the static T-54 (the SEALs' Elite experience level may have something to do with that, though), even though their connection to the CAS is just small-"x" level and thus it takes a while for the JDAM to arrive.

So I assume it won't be simulated that a hurrying runner might get his legs blown out from under him by a random near-miss mortar strike and thus not reach his destination? To hypothesize, how will this abstract simulation of runners work? Let's say you have half a dozen men (one half of a split US rifle squad) a couple hundred meters forward of the MLR in an observation post, and they spot a company's worth of enemy troops moving into position at the near edge of the forest 500m ahead. Assuming that the unit in the observation post in this instance (IRL an observation post might be provided with a field telephone or even a radio, or at least they would have a flare pistol with which the signal the troops in the MLR) has no direct communication with its parent HQ (or with parallel units), an abstracted runner leaves the unit, and after a time period equivalent to a man running/jogging the distance between the unit and the HQ, the HQ receives the information. What about TacAI-controlled flare-pistol signalling, for units which would have neither a radio nor a field telephone? Don't get me wrong, though: I'm looking forward to the subtleties and challenges in combat afforded by (reasonably) accurately simulated WW2-era C2. I recall a few huge maps in CM:BB and CM:AK with spotters for medium (81mm/82mm) mortars where the maps were rather larger than the mortars' maximum range, and the mortars were off map. *** POSSIBLE SPOILERS *** In playing "Afghani Stan" the other day, I had my SOF operators storm the Taliban-guarded buildings. They cleared two buildings without loss, but as they were hustling out of the second building on their way to the third, click BOOM -- a third of my force taken out with a tripwire-triggered IED. Ouch. *** END SPOILERS *** Four-hour-long battles in CM:Normandy?! Wouldn't that necessitate tactical resupply? In CM:SF, if a squad runs low on ammo, you have 'em hustle back to the nearest Stryker/Bradley/etc., but how would this work in CM:Normandy? Some might say that tactical resupply is beyond the scope of a WW2 CM game, but why would that be? Even if CM:Normandy has games no longer than those of CM:SF, your troops could still run out of ammo long before they have a chance to reach the objective (or before the enemy has stopped trying to steamroller them). And what if (for example) an AT gun runs out of ammo halfway into the scenario? Would it have to be abandoned (with a view to saving the crew from being overrun or taken out from a distance)? (I understand that the way's it worked in CMx1 was that crewed weapons could be provided much more ammunition than the weapon's crew could carry, to simulate stacks of ammo boxes at the weapon's dug-in position.) Which is why I look forward to seeing CM:Campaigns (or whatever it's called) finished.

My initial in-editor testing showed no improvement in connection to the air assets when in an FS3-equipped vehicle, whether an M7A3 Bradley BFIST or an M1131 Stryker FSV. According to my limited understanding of the technology involved (and according to what the CMSF manual says about it), a spotter -- whether a Forward Observer team for artillery or a JTAC/FAC for air support -- in an FS3-equipped vehicle gains improved capability to spot targets and coordinate the support, whether air or artillery. According to the v1.11 game manual: However, being in an FS3-equipped vehicle yields no concrete improvement in connection to air assets. In other words, a JTAC in a BFIST still has just small "+" comms to aircraft. Still, having your JTAC or FO in a BFIST (or FSV) is best, since the spotter will have the best view and targeting capability available. According to the "Version 1.11 Feature List" thread, a BFIST or FSV must be unbuttoned for the on-board spotter to use the FS3.

The officer in charge of a JTAC could similarly be an Air Force pilot doing a stint on the ground. That's one thing I didn't think to try when testing this in the editor. (I just purchased the units, team and assets, then clicked on "Deploy Blue" and took note of what the comms rating was.) My passive observation has been the unit experience isn't a modifying factor when it comes to support asset comms ratings, though. I'll fiddle some more in the editor and see what I can find out. My in-editor tests showed that no matter what type of air asset, whether helo or fixed-wing, the JTAC always had no better than small "+", while the FCT had big "+" for both helos and jets, Harriers as well as F/A-18s (which, in the context of CMSF, would most likely operate from a carrier in the eastern Mediterranean rather than a land base). Pardon my ignorance, but jets are Air Force (obviously) whereas helos are Army? If yes, that makes sense, since helos are there to support the Army more or less directly, whereas Air Force assets range far and wide on a variety of missions.

I seek the best available communication between my on-map pixeltruppen and their support assets, whether artillery or air. Platoon-/company-level 60mm mortars are good for this, since (if you use an HQ to spot) you generally have green "+" comms to them. In my recent playing through of "Battle for Objective Pooh", I was glad for the presence of the MEU Fire Control Team, which afforded me green "+" comms to the attack helos. I couldn't recall ever having green "+" comms to air support with any other unit before, so I fiddled with the editor and discovered that evidently no Army unit, even an actual JTAC, has better than small "+" comms with air assets, whereas if your pixeltruppen are Marines and you have an actual Fire Control Team on map, you can have green "+" access even to F/A-18s and Harriers. The reason for this thread is to hopefully find some sort of answer to the question: Why do the Marines have better comms with their air support? (The Fire Control Team is captain rank, while the JTAC is first lieutenant rank, but I don't think rank would really have anything to do with the quality or alacrity of communication with air assets.) Is is because (in the context of CMSF, at least) the Marines air assets available are, not simply attached to, but actually components of the MEU? Is there one or more links in the C2 chain between a JTAC and an air asset? Would this be because the air assets are USAF and not actually Army? In planning possible future SOF scenarios featuring significant air assets in support of few (no more than two dozen) Blue infantry, I'm tempted to have a Marines Fire Control Team stand in for what IRL is a USAF CCT (Combat Control Team), but I suspect this would yield unrealistically good comms between the maneuver units and the air assets.