Vark

Ah, Dietrich have you not heard of the phrase no theory survives contact with the enemy! I'll have a go answering your questions, though the theory is just that a theory, not fact. Case one: There are instances where soldiers meet at point blank range, assess the relative threat and decide to walk away. Or training takes over and muscle memory reacts faster than inherent compassion (300fps faster). Often though, accounts from veterans suggest sometimes these sudden encounters leave them with awful feelings of guilt. I've just read an account of a UK soldier shooting a Taliban at point-blank range and saying that the image of surprise on the mans face as he was killed and the look in his eyes, yes he was only metres way, will stay with him to the grave. I've also read an account of a Russian SMG gunner saying exactly the same thing about a German he killed, in similar circumstances in Stalingrad. So training takes over but the over ruling of the hind brain sears the conscience, perhaps. Again my response was to scenarios in which long range fire was opened on troops, not reactive situations where the threat is real and immediate, not abstract, like a long range bullet. Case two: The soldiers brain rationalises that grenading a room is demonstrative fighting, not actively seeking to aim a weapon at a living human. Again theory, then again maybe the squads grenadier is a shepherd /psycho or this is one of the reasons urban warfare is so lethal, ranges are such that this primitive survival reaction is suppressed, or can be rationalised away. Case three: You answered your own question, Eastern Front! Dehumanising of the enemy, illusionary racial superiority, struggle for survival. Also, German soldiers would have been terrified at the prospect of being captured by the slavic sub-humans!! Reverse the situation and change the scenario and make the attackers US, I wonder what the result would be? What, we can have real coffee and chocolate to eat, and no more Jabos and ToT's to endure! Where's that white flag? Yes, I agree a theory should always be subjected to questioning and the answers themselves should become questions. My response though, was to respond to theoretical kill rates and actual kill rates and the conclusion that this was mainly because of micro terrain, ammunition conservation, doctrine etc and not the mind behind the gun. If you are at all interested, Joanna Bourke's "An Intimate History of Killing" is a counter to some of these theories, as it her thesis darkly suggests that men can learn to love war. DT, I' don't want to get political but Bush/Blair did not demonise the Iraqi's and alot of the senior rankers had fought them before and had immense sympathy for the average soldiers plight. I remember an Intelligence officer relating a tale, from the first Gulf war, about a young ****e conscript, who when asked, why are you fighting, replied, because Saddam knows where my family live! There is finally the classic speech given by the Irish Fusilliers? CO, on the eve of battle, in which he explicitly says respect this culture and respect its people.

Dredging the memory banks here, so some facts will be approximations. To summarise, the majority of soldiers are governed by the hind brain activities during combat as the body, under extreme stress resorts to the brains basic functions. So colour vision is reduced, takes too much processing power and fight or flight reactions kick in, though military training can obveate some of these responses. The trouble is that a defense mechanism kicks in that makes it very hard for most humans to take the life of another. Under extreme duress the brain does not see an enemy but a fellow human being and the "lets all live together and fight the sabre tooth tiger, our real enemy" kick in. How to deal with this annoying trend? It is estimated, not just by SLA Marshall, that only 20-25% will actively aim a weapon, most will engage in demonstrative fighting (blazing away, fetching ammunition aquiring targets etc, etc). Keegan's book on war is very interesting, in that the majority of soldiers seem to replicate the ancient battles, where the aim was to intimidate your opponent not kill them. Of those quarter who do seek to take a life only 5-10% of rounds will hit anything (US studies after Normandy were shocked at how the average rifleman, proficient on the range, saw a catastrophic drop in accuracy when in combat, especially under fire). The soldiers who do actively seek to point a weapon at another human are made up of "psychos and shepherds". Psychos, is a highly inaccurate term, but it represents soldiers who are able to naturally quell their hind brains restrictive activities, or have reduced blocking mechanisms. Interestingly, soldiers who do show no reservations about killing are often treated with a shocked 'reverance' by fellow combatants. Shepherds is the far more accurate title as it covers a minority of soldiers who react lethally when soldiers, often under their care, are themselves threatened by the enemy. Societies use all types of ways to reduce this effect, traditionally dehumanising your enemy, slope, gook, kraut, commie, tommy, nip, being a few but this then can cause problems with atrocities, if the process is carried on too far. The inculcation of regimental or unit pride can help stimulate or enhance the shepherd response, again alot of soldiers say they fight for their mates, not abstract ideas like governmental philosophies. The US army has invested heavily in reducing this hindbrain activity with expensive simunitions (think extreme paintball) and conflicts like Iraq have shown the payoff. It is why a special forces unit, sniper, long range weapon system is so lethal, all the trigger pullers normally want to hit you! As an Israeli tanker said, when talking about his experiences as a gunner in 73, it was like looking at a TV screen, it was so easy to kill people. So using theoretical kill rates to prove a point is as accurate as an old SPI game with those bizzare morale rules. It rarely is the weapon, it is the human behind it that matters. Sorry for the ramble but it is an area that needs far more research by simulators of military conflicts.

Although this does not prove the matter, certainly the Germans in this 1944 training film thought that MG's were pretty hard to locate. http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=_1Ve11A9Yr4&feature=related Points of interest: It is a training film where real life experiences were dramatically staged, it had to be realistic, otherwise its training value was limited/counter-productive. It portrays the Russians as highly adept at field craft, brave and resourceful, this maybe to give the sniper a worthy opponent, but again could reflect reality, you choose. The platoon commander tries to spot the DP, with binoculars, but fails, note the rest of the platoon are in cover, not trying to all spot. Modern SOP's might be different here with the widespread adoption of combat optics, but the film shows the observer very nearly killed, when he exposes himself to see clearly. Again SOP's now might encourage multiple observations but surely this not only helps your chances of spotting but also your opponents. Note also the film shows that even after firing the commander is unable to locate the exact position. The LMG is considered a platoon threat at 300 metres (the map shows the suspected location, relative to the platoon). I think a SFMG would be another magnitude of threat and certainly not something that requires some skirmishing to neutralise it. Again, does not prove anything, though the perceived threat does maybe shed somelight on this debate, though given it was made in 1944 I wonder if caution is being stressed, due to manpower shortages. The trouble with CM games is the unrealistically fast tempo, forced by having ludicrously short turn limits, a reflection of most wargaming (I've painted the little sods and their damn well going to see some action, syndrome). Troops move very slowly and cautiously and will always try to use support units when applicable, not think, "seven more turns to go and my snipers going to take 6 turns to get there, sod it lets advance!" A realistic game would, I doubt, be a commercial success, otherwise Battlefront would have allowed games lasting 300 turns!!! Because of this spotting might be artificially boosted to fit in with the other compromises made to gameplay.

Thought you might like this. http://www.military.com/news/article/marine-corps-news/marine-makes-insurgents-pay-the-price.html

Actually, when I showed my students (12-18) CMBO there were mixed reactions. Most were thoroughly disconcerted that the enemy were hidden until spotted. "But where are they?" was the most common reaction. Ah, I'd reply sagely, "you normally spot them when they fire at you!" The next revelation was the minute play back feature where you watched helplessly as the move was played out, again the, RTS instant command, threat radar in the top corner of the screen generation, grew uneasy. Just on cue one of my M4's brewed up spectacularly (I was playing the intro scenario) those who moaned and derided the graphics now either had walked away or shut up and tried to help spot the thing that had killed my tank. This consisted of lots of finger pointing, at the screen, and random guesses about the location of the tanks nemesis, they found the replay feature quite "cool" By this time my infantry were working through the woods, trying to flank the enemy positions, again great unease from my students that the enemy were not on the screen. This went on for some minutes (it was my lunch break) and most students were genuinely interested, one older pupil went on to buy all three games and made a presentation to his fellow army cadets, using the game. So yes, some of the younger generation might love eye candy and heroic game mechanics but an equal amount wanted to know more, even if the graphics were " a bit rubbish sir"

No, in my game playing Russians would reflect commanding troops who had different tactical doctrines due to wider national priorities. Russians should not be allowed to have a default option to assault, whatever their experience, then again just because they decide to run should not make them more vulnerable. You therefore get ludicrous situations where running troops are more vulnerable than slow walking ones, especially ludicrous when they are moving perpendicular to the line of fire. I think Diesels comment about tanks first, infantry as a supporting role makes a lot of sense. In soft issues, morale command control etc, I think CM represents the transition of first/second generation miniatures wargames rules to the pc screen. The behaviour of machines is easier to reproduce than flesh and blood, with all the attendant problems. Hopefully CM2 will represent a move towards the latest systems/ideas where simulation of soft issues has parity with hard systems. As an Israeli veteran said of the fighting in 67, if we swapped equipment we would still have won. As for the LOS/targetting issues surely a good unit would target the unit that posed the greatest threat to it, not the greatest points value, though I guess the later is easier programme. I would be nice in CM2 if squads could target multiple targets, especially with automatic weapons, after all that is what they were designed for. Talking of engagements, can infantry use hand grenades speculatively in SF, or do they have to have a confirmed target, which wrecks the point of having grenades.

Whilst I do agree that Pz grenadiers/tank riders should have a better chance at tank-infantry cooperation, due to doctrine, training and shared battlefield experience (especially if veteran) I do not think my scenario would vary much in an most ambush sitautions. The infantry would seek cover as would the tanks, after the initial shock and rallying phase the dedicated infantry/tank teams would put into practice various well practiced drills so both arms faught as a combined team. Basic leg infantry, riding on supporting armour, would react similarly in an ambush but far more independently, often conflicting with each other and, in the worst cases, causing each other casualties. After both armour and infantry had recovered from the initial contact their respective responses would be far less unified, in fact the armour might just retreat leaving the infantry stranded (again, after action reports sometimes show infantry units begging retreating tankers to stay). This, after all, was the problem with the British in the early Normandy battles, tanks were allocated infantry support but often neither had trained with each other, the results are well documented. Talking of that, why can experienced PzG's not keep pace with advancing armour? To get back to the original point, perhaps the individual spotting mechanism, as used in SF, could reflect the difference, by giving dedicated tank troops faster spotting times against targets located by their supporting armour and vice versa I certainly like the idea of a delay in fire commands being carried out as it could simulate a whole host of differences between well trained and poor troops. I'd never really thought about it before and it certainly would help our ambush debate. I always wondered why a green commander took longer to issue highly complex orders to his men, do they mumble? Surely a green commander does not issue highly complex orders, unless he has a veteran sergeant nearby (but that is whole new topic). I always wanted different command menus for different ability/doctrine troops, green commands would perhaps have most of the commands of an elite unit but would have to wait several turns to access particular options. This delay would be affected by morale state and any units out of command control would either automatically try to regain contact or stay put, unless highly motivated or with a history of independent action. Again, playing Russian infantry is like playing slightly crappier Germans, oh but they can human wave charge!! What role do HQ units, both platoon and company play in SF, do the units out of control magically lose their ability for stealth or fire power discipline? Are there command delays, because the game can be played in RTS mode? Do US troops have more command options than the Syrians, to represent far greater battlefield flexibilty. Another question, is there any game, both pc or board or miniatures rules that CMers think is a 'realistic' simulator of command and control. Thanks URC, I was feeling sluggish after a busy week now I'm a thinking again!

I've always got my crews out of the danger area, where possible, but often they do the crawl of death straight towards the AT team who KO'd them. Do AI routines in SF still insist troops move to the closest cover after taking a morale hit, or is it now towards friendly cover? New sub-topic, what is artillery like in SF, are the delays after calling for fire more realistic?

One only has to look at the TUSK kits for the M1's and the armoured turrets for the Humvees to see this is still the achilles heel for any armoured vehicle. Does anyone know the probability of a TC getting KO'd in CM? Sharpshooters seem to be quite reliable, but I've had HMG's target tanks at 4-500m and the commanders remain unbuttoned.

The Carius story remind me of the gunner story, guy ducks down for something, during a daylight raid, resumes position and wonders why the turret is so drafty. After a while he notices the line of holes stitched across the plexiglass!! IDF tank commanders were instructed to stand up in their turrets to aid in target aquisition and situational awareness, result larger than average percentage of IDF TC's dead or seriously injured. I believe Ellis' "The Sharp End" quotes a figure of 90% fatalities due to head injuries for TC's. Talking of TC's I watched a programme about the HJ which had an account by a German, they were stalking a Sherman and sniped the commander who had fallen back into the turret. Emboldened, the school age soldiers closed for the kill with a panzerfaust, as they closed in for the kill the hatch flew open and the tank commander fired an SMG (Thompson I believe, as the German remembered it caused ghastly wounds). End result 4 dead 2 seriously injured because they were unaware of the real situation. As for MG's, surely they are shortchanged by being unable to create a beaten zone, two MG's at opposite ends of a defensive position, facing into and covering each other create a lethal screen that is impossible to reproduce in CM, Its why linear formations suffer so badly when ambushed by flanking MG's as their formation is similar to the oval beaten zone.

Dietrich, I considered SF but decided against it for a number of reasons ranging from; old computer (getting a new one for the house Christmas present, cough, cough) not interested in the scenario devised and after reading the comments it took a long time to get it to where it should have been on release. I do read the SF forum to check progress and am interested in the proposed expansion set in Europe. As I said before I see SF as an indicator only for CM2, but from the forums the tactical flexibility and AI is much improved and BF have finally driven a computerised stake (chip?) through the heart of the abominable Borg spotting. Though when I first came to this forum I used to read comments and think "what the hell is Borg spotting?" I don't mind speculation as long as it is reasonably informed and so far a big thanks to all contributors as we have had a good, and even tempered debate/discussion. Talking of sections (squads to you) do you have doctrinal differences represented in SF and if so how does it affect playing each side. I'd like CM2 to represent the central role the German's LMG's played in manoevre, they led the section followed by the commander whose job was to position the LMG to support any offensive action. I would also like to see limited move options for different nationalities, why can Russians advance, they used section rushes, not deliberate skirmishing tactics. Perhaps veterans used an adhoc arrangement but I have read nothing that suggests they were trained to use a combination of fire and movement as a section. If anyone has an answer please let me know, I guess if you do try to replicate the short rushes you take a moral hit, again why as modern British troops are trained, on contact, to double forward to available cover, as long as it is nearby. Playing Russians in CM is like playing slightly not so good Germans which I do not think reflected the situation on the Eastern front. In game ammo resupply sounds promising, do vehicles, in SF, have the option to increase ammo loads, at an increased risk of brewing up? Yes, I have played firefight and yes I was a little intrigued, the depiction of height was far superior to the brutal method in Steel Panthers and the emphasis on C3 allowed HQ's to do what HQ's do, act as a communications conduit, not a super combat unit. If units are out of command they should follow their last command orders and, unless exceptional, wait till new orders are received. I played one game, so far, when I got back from work (my best excuse) and so watched as my men turn into tombstones, all to quickly!! I found the infantry better represented than AFV's as a tank v's PAK duel ended up in a race to see which crew could inflict mortal damage on their opponents hill and was ended by a non scripted suicidal charge, by the tank, which KO'd the PAK. Still the real time element added real tension.

Hey DT, the more the merrier. I agree about your ideas of 'extra realism' and how pursuing the holy grail will result in the exact opposite. The three man representation v's 1 to 1 depiction of squads has been debated before but I do not play SF so do not know how it plays out. Can squads change frontage or separate into independent fire teams? I agree completely with the 'range finder' it allows gamey exploitation of the game system, a prepared defence would have range cards making their fire all that more effective than the attacker. I really do not know why the CM engine has borg spotting but it is my pet hate. Spoiler alert************Spoiler alert*************Spoiler alert***************** I remember playing "The Balka" and after executing a flanking attack set out to hunt down the armour but was amazed when the buttoned down tanks stopped, traversed their turrets to the rear, as soon as my SPG's were in visibility range and picked off my stalking Marders. Eugh, left a bad taste in the mouth, good tactics penalised by a crappy mechanism, still if this was the least worst alternative then so be it. If CM2 follows SF then terrain tiles will be far more detailed and if CM2 is based on the Normandy battles then visibility should be greatly reduced for most scenarios, Cobra breakout notwithstanding. I'd just like a game that gives the player a closer approximation to the opportunities and threats commanders faced with their TO&E's and troops. Talking of that has anyone else played the free downloadable "Firefight"?

I'm not discrediting tank crews nor CM, I've had many an hour (actually hundreds of hours battling) but the analogy to chess is somewhat specious. Chess does not claim to be realistic, CM in their literature stressed the realism and non-gamey nature of their product. I'm not knocking CM, they produced a ground breaking simulation, period, but CM2 (the original subject of the thread) will take that simulation towards greater realism and CM gamers will have to adapt, and it is those adaptations I am trying to predict, with the help of other forum members. As for the combined arms versus PAK guns debate a few observations A good crew would damp the ground, if possible, to reduce the firing signature, but if the terrain is dusty then return fire by the tanks would seriously reduce visibility. Yes the mark I eyeball/ear is a potent combination but the first can be blocked by the mildest of obscurants and the second is ok if ambient noise is low, firing a large calibre gun would seriously degrade/damage any infantry nearby. I have had the fortune/misfortune to have been inside some WWII tanks and the thing you realise straight away is when buttoned down your situational awareness is poor. There is a good thread on the Miniatures Page about tanks and one ex-tanker said the most valuable person in his crew was his driver as a good driver could visualise the terrain and didn't need constant directions from the TC. I'd have thought that most infantry after being engaged by an HMG would be loathe to start drawing attention to themselves by pointing out targets to accompanying armour. Certainly the post-battle debriefs present a picture of pure confusion, as infantry try to avoid being run down by erratically moving tanks, and the tanks contiuously firing MG's in suppressive fire (again poorly handled by the CM engine) against potential firing positions. So yes, after the initial contact the infantry/tanks could use tracer or the clock system to mutually register targets but in a CM ambush the speed and coordination of the return fire is overwheming. I would like to know the survival rate of AT crews, but there are countless reports, from all major combatants, about their relative invisibility, even after firing. That is if you discount the super Wittman stories, or most German stories relating to their tank 'aces'. Do infantry gain cover from hiding behind tanks in SF?

Good point. How far do tactics in CM really comprise of negating the advantages of the opponent, manipulating the weaknesses in the CM engine, and of course vice versa. I'm thinking about Jason's posts about tank riders and how effective they are Infantry spots MG/PAK, telepathically relays information to T-34's positioned hundreds of metres behind infantry T-34's all aquire target, target destroyed Wash, rinse, repeat till victory Compare this with MG's open fire on infantry, PAK's open up on T-34's Infantry scramble for cover, some gaining spots on the MG/PAK's but cannot relay the information by voice command due to T-34's buttoned and desperately scanning for targets. Because MG's/PAK's are not overwhelmed by return fire after 1-2 shots gunners can now mutually support each other. If the infantry can see the PAK's they cannot tell the tankers, if the tankers can spot the MG's they cannot communicate with the infantry. Yes, I do know about the use of non verbal signaling methods but these would be deployed individually, not allowing massed return fire. Sure some MG/PAK's would be KO'd by a lucky shot, but most would live another day. That is until they ran into the flanking force that over ran the blocking strongpoint and the survivors were unable to get back in time to tell HQ. I always thought that once a movement order had been given it should not be allowed to change, unless that unit had information, or the battlefield situation allowed it to do so. Steel Panthers III engine was much flawed but it had an interesting command system. Units under an HQ were all given a single objective on the map, this cost command points to issue, which were recovered at a rate commensurate with the HQ quality. If units wanted to deviate, from heading towards the objective marker, they would be penalised by having the HQ's remaining command points reduced. In practice, an elite panzer company could react to a local situation by sending its platoons away from the main objective as it had enough points left after issuing the original objective and a Soviet tank company from 41 either had to either sit until it built up its command points, as it had expended its total to issue the objective, or maintain its present progress. The recovery rate of the German unit was faster than the Russian, so its OODA loop was correspondingly faster. I well remember my frustration at a PLO command unit as it waited to build up its HQ points to change the direction of its platoons that were being pinned by an Israeli SFMG platoon. By the time the objective marker could be changed the available flanking route had been blocked by a mechanised paratroop company, who had changed objective and raced across the map! Oh, and if the HQ wanted to call down artillery they had to use command points as well and if they were suppressed then the command points were affected. Not perfect at all but a clever little system that showed the importance of communication. I know that CM has command delays but I find it strange to penalise a platoon and not an HQ. Most accounts I have read of Soviet platoon actions were full of the use of initiative and quick commands, the trouble seems to have come about when the company commanders got involved, then the incompetence and inertia set in. The, what is an HQ unit in CM for is for another thread though.

Good point. How far do tactics in CM really comprise of negating the advantages of the opponent, manipulating the weaknesses in the CM engine, and of course vice versa. I'm thinking about Jason's posts about tank riders and how effective they are Infantry spots MG/PAK, telepathically relays information to T-34's positioned hundreds of metres behind infantry T-34's all aquire target, target destroyed Wash, rinse, repeat till victory Compare this with MG's open fire on infantry, PAK's open up on T-34's Infantry scramble for cover, some gaining spots on the MG/PAK's but cannot relay the information by voice command due to T-34's buttoned and desperately scanning for targets. Because MG's/PAK's are not overwhelmed by return fire after 1-2 shots gunners can now mutually support each other. If the infantry can see the PAK's they cannot tell the tankers, if the tankers can spot the MG's they cannot communicate with the infantry. Yes, I do know about the use of non verbal signaling methods but these would be deployed individually, not allowing massed return fire. Sure some MG/PAK's would be KO'd by a lucky shot, but most would live another day. That is until they ran into the flanking force that over ran the blocking strongpoint and the survivors were unable to get back in time to tell HQ. I always thought that once a movement order had been given it should not be allowed to change, unless that unit had information, or the battlefield situation allowed it to do so. Steel Panthers III engine was much flawed but it had an interesting command system. Units under an HQ were all given a single objective on the map, this cost command points to issue, which were recovered at a rate commensurate with the HQ quality. If units wanted to deviate, from heading towards the objective marker, they would be penalised by having the HQ's remaining command points reduced. In practice, an elite panzer company could react to a local situation by sending its platoons away from the main objective as it had enough points left after issuing the original objective and a Soviet tank company from 41 either had to either sit until it built up its command points, as it had expended its total to issue the objective, or maintain its present progress. The recovery rate of the German unit was faster than the Russian, so its OODA loop was correspondingly faster. I well remember my frustration at a PLO command unit as it waited to build up its HQ points to change the direction of its platoons that were being pinned by an Israeli SFMG platoon. By the time the objective marker could be changed the available flanking route had been blocked by a mechanised paratroop company, who had changed objective and raced across the map! Oh, and if the HQ wanted to call down artillery they had to use command points as well and if they were suppressed then the command points were affected. Not perfect at all but a clever little system that showed the importance of communication. I know that CM has command delays but I find it strange to penalise a platoon and not an HQ. Most accounts I have read of Soviet platoon actions were full of the use of initiative and quick commands, the trouble seems to have come about when the company commanders got involved, then the incompetence and inertia set in. The, what is an HQ unit in CM for is for another thread though.

Ah, but you do! Just hover over the T-70 hit, during the replay, and you can hear the commander scream that he has "been hit", information an opponent would rarely have. Unless the commander was slumped halfway down the turret, or the squad was close range and saw the rounds impact, the guessing game would begin. "Did we get him? Yeah I got him! I'm not sure he could just be grazed" etc etc.

Question, will we get to a point where games are so 'realistic' that our hind brains protective function refuses to allow most gamers to place their soldiers in danger, let alone kill things. Or will any degree of abstraction suppress the function. Would you play a game where tank crews shrieked horrifically as they were trapped in their blazing steel tombs, or tumbled out and writhed on the ground burning. What happens when those little pixels look so lifelike (photo-realistic) that we risk becoming affected by our games. I like CBMM because the figures are doll like and an abstract, I felt a slight sense of unease watching Shock Force and I played Full Spectrum Warrior a few times but found it too personal. Sorry for the Friday night ramble but it is a subject that has always interested me.

Glad to be of help. I remember thinking that maybe this was not a good battle to start off my CBMM experience, so I went off to play "A day at the zoo". I got so protective of the troops I made a complete hash of that one, the grey skies, burning buildings and forbidding woods got to me. I had been used to the psychadelic greens of CM, the new terrain seriously affected my mood and therfore my perception of the game. Interestingly, I do not own Shock Force but the one to one scale, showing individual troops curl up pinned or being killed had a rather salutary effect (I watched some AAR's on YouTube). Still, Winter Wonderland is one of my favourites, and although I found a solution I spent many an hour watching the replays in disbelief. My favourite, was my bunch them all up and sneak across the road with a scout leading, this was before understanding the 8m rule. My scout died, then my platoon died in less than 20 seconds, all gone! It's a shame the damn borg spotting removes most of this 'what the f**K just happened' tension.

Oh! I remember Winter Wonderland, it was one of the first scenarios I tried when I bought CMBB and it led to intense frustration. My troops were gunned down mercilessly or if they tried to move tactically, exhausted by the freezing wind and deep snow. As soon as a gun went off, even German guns they'd throw themselves down and try and sneak away, not a good idea in heavy snow. I went back to the drawing board and devised night combat sandbox scenarios and realised that to have any chance my troops would have to be: placed as far away as possible to each other, otherwise when one engaged a target the others would pin, or worse starting shooting at each other. This was especially true when they detected a foxhole but no enemy. I can still remember looking in horror, as I was planning a move, that units had issued fire orders against each other, argh! Spoiler Alert*********** Spoiler alert************ Spoiler alert***************** I finally managed a major victory by attacking on the left and right flanks but only after the troops had crossed the road and moved down the hill. The right flank then moved toward the centre, paralel with the road, the left straddling either side of the road, for added speed The force in the centre moved to the far right edge of its set up box and proceeded to move right. The Russians are on the roads and occupying a reverse slope ambush so hitting them from the rear flank causes huge amounts of panic, on both flanks. I'd tried earlier to move further down the hill before executing my attack but I ran the clock out. One of the keys to success are the flame throwers which cause instant panic, sneaking and rapid exhaustion, for the enemy. Used as an area fire weapon with a delayed move order, plotted to retreat the unit beyond visibility range, means that the operator normally expends only two bursts a turn. Just make sure thay are in command radius and working with one of the tank hunters who act as close protection and scouts, the grenade cluster is a very good suppressive weapon and can be fired on an area fire command, (alas normal grenades can not be used as such) I lost quite a few men taking the central flags but once I'd occupied the foxholes the AI counter attacked and my reserve platoon led by the Company commander made short work of them. I liked the scenario because it played to all of CMBB's strengths and the blizzard, at night , removes borg spotting. Hope that helped.

Change of force mix, hmm how about a pair of Tigers!! Seriously, if a platoon was facing such odds with little AT capability the sensible tactic would be either be Ascertain enemies strength, direction of advance and possible parent unit, retreat and report to HQ Ambush lead elements, capture soldiers for interogation then retreat through covered, pre-planned routes. In CM, forces who have been attacked react far too quickly, in reality when the enemy assault your positions the only thing they should find is the still hot casings from your MG's. This is especially true of the radio deficient forces in Russia, the 251 was a very useful machine because normally each had a radio, in CM they are deathtraps! In the real world artillery is far more effective at pinning soldiers, crudely it scares the sh*t out of them and in dry conditons kicks up enough dust to conceal retreating troops. German SFMG's could be transported very quickly for short periods, the British made a note of this in their evaluation of the Germans, during the war. Read your troops extracts about brave Spartans (very, triumph of the will/Untermensch) remove the capacity for fear and fight to the death. Sorry, could mention lots more including German small unit tactics but my dinner is now infront of me and my wifes look could KO a german Super cat from 1000m!

Following the discussion about defending against vastly out numbered forces I have a question aimed at people who play Shock Force as well as CM1. What gamey tactics will not work when playing CM2 (I am assuming that CM2 will develop the new engine in the modern version). I'm thinking about the death of borg spotting, but what about the revised LOS/track each bullet mechanisms/1 to 1 representations/better terrain tiles etc. In short which real world tactics will be viable in CM2 and which gamey ones die a horrid death?

Does anyone know the probability of inflicting casualties on un-buttoned AFV,s? If it was quite high for a HMG then would'nt one tactic be to KO as many T-70 commanders, rendering the vehicles useless. I take it all tactics discussed so far are versus the AI, as Jason's luring tactic could be countered by a strong screening force. The trouble as ever is the spotting in CM, out numbered units can rarely use hit and run as the more weapons/shooters you face the greater the chance of the ambusher being pinned then slaughtered. This makes the worthless T-70, lethal, as a mobile quick reaction gun platform.

My motive for following a thread or contributing to one is pretty bloody selfish I want to test my analysis or improve on it and also to see a logical progression of thought, that might come to a conclusion (the effectiveness of flame throwing tanks on the CMBB board is an example). I have spent/wasted many an hour chasing up posted links much to my betterment, this discussion/ideological battle does neither, that is not an implicit criticism of any contributor, far from it, but I have learned nothing new (I even knew about the plural for agenda, sorry). I did say I was selfish! Not only that, this topic always seems to generate more criticism of events and few alternative solutions, that are not major beneficiaries of hindsight. One side always claims the other is not listening/incorrect or that they are the reasonable guys and the other are... well fill in your own epithet. The end result is a defensive cycle that ends up achieving little. Hey! I guess it reflects the conflict we a focusing on! Steve, I don't seek to aportion blame, that would be the height of presumptiousness, but you response to Meade is hardly likely to encourage debate. For what it is worth I'm an anti-intellectual, as a teacher I have seen the havoc their self-serving, dogmatic interventions have created. Intelligent, informed, conversation yes please, intellectual pontification I'll pass on that one! As to the reference to the the counter insurgency manual it was one of my favourite reads, though my edition did not take well to repeated reading (shoddy binding). Another side of the coin is the Utility of Force, full of english pessimism but it encapsualtes the Gordian knot faced by Western forces engaged in unconventional warfare.

As a reader and occasional contributer to this website I have one question. Is this discussion getting to do anything more than allow the same entrenched positions to be restated ad-infinitum? Already one side is calling another biased and the other is saying they speak the truth, shoot me down please but, lots of heat but any light? These WOT/Israel good/bad debates end up too ofen as exercises in mental masturbation and I spent nearly a year living in Israel hearing these same arguments (not the WOT it was the eighties). Sorry for being Eyoreish but this whole subject seems to bring out the least pleasant attributes in people, how ever much one side berates the other for being idealogues and not accepting the 'truth'. I Know of somebody, very, very high up (don't we all) and their take on all of this can be summarised as this. No one knows everything, very few know more than some, some know more than most and YOU will only find out after 40 years and even then you will only know 50%! I look forward to reading the Task force 88 official history and having a chuckle, thinking how wrong or right my theories were, that is if I get to that elderly state!

Having read DAF,s post I thought I'd fire up Totenkopf and revisit it, as I'd never found it that hard. Winter wonderland was the source of many a bitter memory and frustrated impotence, but Totenkopf? Was my memory being selective to protect me from its horrors, no, not really as with other Andreas scenarios you have to look very carefully at the units and the terrain. Spoiler below***************Spoiler below***************Spoiler below****** Taking the Time, terrain and troops part of a M-ETT analysis leads one to a few conclusions Time Very limited given the command delay of your forces especially the AFV's, so no skulking, then again no dashing otherwise it's a slaughter Terrain Favours an advance from both flanks, the left has plenty of cover, allowing you to close with any defenders, especially the MG team in the corn field, then you can execute a right flank assault, taking out the PAK and pinning German reinforcements. The right has less cover but troops can move to the woods/scattered trees on the right hand edge as they are mostly shielded by the rise (on which the road runs). I say mostly as I lost 18 men to the MFC as they moved from the woods edge to the shallow depression infront. From there they can move to the clump of trees (where two PAKS are) and then stage an assault on the woods before turning left. Middle used to rush up light MG AFV's through the cornfield and the woods and buildings allow the BT's to remain hidden and the HQ units to get eyes on to the main German defensive line, respectively. Troops Suprisingly good, with decent command ratings and stealth. Most powerful single unit is the three 60mm mortars, especially if the battalion HQ is spotting. AFV's used to draw out PAKS after infantry have eyes on potential firing points. Right flank Two BT-7's lost to a 222/PAK combo, but combined arms took out 2xPAK, 2x222 and an MMG, with AT assets gone the surviving BT's could effectively support the infantry in capturing the clump of woods, key to the German defensive position. Left flank 2 BA-10's lost to super PAK who eventually succumbed to 2 platoons plus mortars plus 45mm fire. PAK forced to fire after supporting MMG removed by infantry assault and BA's charged forward. Platoons infiltrated via the pine trees to be able to engage the central defenders Centre Wait for both flanks to be engaged and then sent both MG AFV's to fix the central defenders as they responded to the threats from the flank, lost one tank to AR fire. With time running out I gave all surviving units platoon orders to advance, from both flanks towards the victory flag, and although bloody it allowed a partial victory. I could have coreographed the final assault better but I experimented with a new bold strategy. Conclusion As with my comments on Gefechsaufklaerung the key is exploiting terrain and maximising your units abilities.