Hetzer38
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Posts posted by Hetzer38
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Wasn't that the "Un-word" of the year 2006 in Germany?Originally posted by Andreas:Kartoffelverwandlungsargumentehass.
Cheers, Hetzer
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Wasn't that the "Un-word" of the year 2006 in Germany?Originally posted by Andreas:Kartoffelverwandlungsargumentehass.
Cheers, Hetzer
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...claims which lead to credits...like those of Rudel, Korol, Hübsch, Stüdemann, etc.
Alright, so we discuss the level of "overcrediting" too...
Cheers, Hetzer.
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...claims which lead to credits...like those of Rudel, Korol, Hübsch, Stüdemann, etc.
Alright, so we discuss the level of "overcrediting" too...
Cheers, Hetzer.
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...(quite a lot of) this thread is meant to investigate the level of overclaiming, not to deny it,...
Regards, Hetzer.
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...(quite a lot of) this thread is meant to investigate the level of overclaiming, not to deny it,...
Regards, Hetzer.
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Prochorovka - Supplement:
II. SS-PzK Stärkemeldungen for the evening of 11th Juli 1943:
SS-PGD LSSAH: 67 tanks ready for action, of those, 4 „Tiger“, 7 Panzerbefehlswagen 4 completly obsolete P II. Also included are 10 Sturmgeschütze and 20 Panzerjäger „Marder“;
SS-PGD Das Reich: 68 tanks ready for action (including Panzerbefehlswagen), of those, only 1 „Tiger“, 8 captured T-34, 27 Sturmgeschütze and 12 Panzerjäger „Marder“;
SS-PGD Totenkopf: 101 tanks, of those, 10 „Tiger“, 7 Panzerbefehlswagen, 21 Sturmgeschütze and 11 Panzerjäger „Marder“;
(The tanks of this division crossed the river 'Psel' in the morning of 12th July to the north and didn't meet the 5th Guards Tank Army first of all, but parts of the 5th Guard Army, the 6th Guard Army and the 1st Tank Army.)
[from: [R. Töppel]
* Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 6, Generalkommando II. SS-Pz.Korps, Feindlageberichte und Tagesmeldungen, 1.6.1943-2.8.1943, BA-MA RS 2-2/18, A 248-258]
...............................................
5th Guards Tank Army on the evening of 11th Juli 1943:
501 T-34, 261 light T-70 tanks and 31 british „Churchills“, some heavy KV-1 and aproximately 40 self-propelled guns of the SU-122 and SU-76 type.
[from: [R. Töppel]
* Iz otčeta o boevych dejstvijach 5-j Gvardejskoj Tankovoj armii za period s 7 ijulia po 24 ijulia 1943 goda. [Report about the battle-action of the 5th Guard Tank Army from 7 - 24 July 1943], CAMO 3, S. 7 ;
* Glantz, Orenstein, The Battle for Kursk, S. 222f.;
* Svedenija o sostojanii, poterijach i trofejach častej i soedinenij 5 gvardejkoj tankovoj armii na 16.7.43 [information on status, losses and captured equipment of the units and formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army 16. July 1943, CAMO 4, S. 1f;
* Glantz, House, The Battle of Kursk, S. 181;
* Kołomyjec, M.; Swirin, M.: Kursk 1943. 2 books, Warschau 1999, b. 1, S. 49 ;
* Zetterling, Frankson, Kursk 1943, S. 106 u. 175;]
Regards, Hetzer.
[ March 24, 2007, 03:05 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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Here's the rest, enjoy, discuss - whatever!
[378] Diagramm: Roman Töppel, 2001; Quellen: vgl. Erläuterungen.
(Diagram by Roman Töppel, 2001, sources: compare with explanations)
[379] Die in dieser Quelle ebenfalls angegebenen Verlustangaben der Voronežfront sind weniger hilfreich, da sie die zugeführten Verbände der Steppenfront nicht berücksichtigen (vgl. CAMO 7 u. Glantz, House, The Battle of Kursk, S. 336f).
(The loss data of the Voronež-Front likewise indicated in this source are less helpful, since they do not consider the added formations of the Steppe-Front (see CAMO 7 and Glantz, House, The Battle OF Kursk, S. 336f).)
[380] Vgl. dazu auch die Zahlenangaben in einer Zusammenstellung der Panzerverluste von Januar bis Oktober 1943 (Oberkommando des Heeres / Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen. Panzerlage und Panzerbestand Januar 1942-1.6.1944 sowie einsatzbereite Panzer und Sturmgeschütze April 1943 - Mai 1944, BA-MA RH 10/68, Bl. 1), die erheblich unter den mittlerweile veröffentlichten sowjetischen Verlustangaben liegen (vgl. Krivožeev, Grif sekretnosti snjat, S. 357).
(See in addition also the numbers in a compilation of the tank losses from January to October 1943, which are subtantially below recently published soviet numbers of losses (sources in brackets);)
Cheers, Hetzer
[ March 24, 2007, 01:22 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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Die sowjetischen Verlustangaben der verschiedenen vorliegenden Aufstellungen weichen zum Teil stark voneinander ab. In der Aufstellung CAMO 7 sind sie außerdem besonders unstimmig und fehlerhaft.
( The Soviet loss data of the different available lists deviate partially strongly from each other. In the CAMO 7 list, they are particularly frictioned and incorrect in addition.)
Vor allem bei den (offensichtlich falsch zusammengerechneten) Angaben der Zentralfront auf dieser Zusammenstellung entsteht der Eindruck, als sei eine absichtliche Minimierung erfolgt. Ein Vergleich mit einer anderen Aufstellung (CAMO 6, S. 2) verstärkt diesen Eindruck. (Particularly with (obviously wrongly summed up) the data of the Central-Front on this composition the impression develops, as if an intentional minimization took place. A comparison with another list (CAMO 6, S. 2) strengthens this impression.)
So entstanden bei der Zentralfront vom 5.7. bis zum 20.7.1943 laut CAMO 7 lediglich 393 Totalausfälle an Panzern, laut CAMO 6 gingen bei derselben Front jedoch bereits bis zum 15.7.1943 526 Panzer „unwiederbringlich“ verloren (vgl. ferner die Aufstellung der Panzerverluste der sowjetischen 2. Panzerarmee in Kołomyjec, Swirin,Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 24, die ebenfalls von den entsprechenden Angaben in CAMO 7 abweicht).
(According to CAMO 7, only 393 tanks are listed as total-write-offs of the Central-Front from 5 to 20 July 1943, but according to CAMO 6, 526 tanks were already "irreparably" lost until 15th July 1943 (furthermore see the list of the tank losses of the Soviet 2. Tank army in Kołomyjec, Swirin,Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 24, which deviate likewise from the appropriate data in CAMO 7).)
3. Die dritte Spalte wurde aus einer Zusammenstellung „Panzerverluste Ost“, 5.7.-31.8.1943, des Panzeroffiziers beim Generalstab des Heeres (Oberkommando des Heeres / Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen. Panzer-, Sturmgeschütz- und Pak-Verluste von August 1942-Mai 1944, BA-MA RH 10/77 K18, auch abgedruckt in Hahn, Waffen und Geheimwaffen, Bd. 2, S. 241) übernommen.
( The third column was taken from a "Tank-losses East"-compilation, 5 July to 31 August 1943, by the tank officer of the general staff of the army (sources in brackets);)
Die sowjetischen Panzerverluste beruhen dabei auf Schätzungen, die den in jüngster Zeit veröffentlichten russischen Angaben jedoch sehr nahe kommen. Nach Krivošeev verloren allein die an den Operationen bei Kursk, Orel und Belgorod im Juli und August 1943 beteiligten Verbände 6.064 Panzer und SFL (vgl. Krivošeev, Grif sekretnosti snjat, S. 370); nicht berücksichtigt sind dabei die anderen sowjetischen „Fronten“ an der übrigen Ostfront, von denen einige ebenfalls noch im Juli/August 1943 zur Offensive übergingen. (The Soviet tank losses are thereby based on estimations, which however come very close to recently published Russian data . According to Krivošeev, the formations involved in the operations with Kursk, Orel and Belgorod alone lost lost 6,064 tanks in July and August 1943. stabil. (see Krivošeev, Grif sekretnosti snjat, S. 370); thereby the other Soviet "fronts" are not considered at the remaining Eastern Front, of which some likewise changed to the offensive in July/August 1943.)
Boris Sokolov schätzte auf der Grundlage eigener Berechnungen allein die Verluste der drei sowjetischen Fronten im Kursker Bogen auf 7.700 Panzer und SFL (Sokolov, Cena Pobedy, S. 159).
( Boris Sokolov estimated the losses of the three Soviet fronts in the Kursk-Salient on 7.700 tanks and SFL. (based on own calculations))
Niklas Zetterling und Anders Frankson schätzen die sowjetischen Panzerverluste im Juli und August 1943 an der gesamten Ostfront auf etwa 9.400 Fahrzeuge (Zetterling, Frankson, Kursk 1943, S. 126).
( Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson estimate the Soviet tank losses in July and August 1943 at the entire East-Front at approximately 9,400 vehicles (Zetterling, Frankson, Kursk 1943, S. 126).)
Die vom Generalstab des Heeres angefertigten Zusammenstellungen der sowjetischen Verluste waren demnach eher zu niedrig als zu hoch angesetzt.[380]
(Therefore, the compilations of the Soviet losses made by the general staff of the Heer were rather set too low as too high.)
Cheers, Hetzer.
[ March 24, 2007, 12:30 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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Totalverluste von Panzern und Sturmgeschützen an der Ostfront im Sommer 1943[378]
(Total-losses of tanks and assault-guns on the Eastern Front, summer 1943)
Erläuterungen (explanations)
1. Die Zahlenangaben der ersten Spalte beziehen sich nur auf die „Panzerschlacht von Prochorovka“ zwischen den beiden SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH und Das Reich des II. SS-Panzerkorps (Hausser) und Teilen der sowjetischen 5. Gardepanzerarmee (Rotmistrov) im Verlaufe des 12.7.1943. (The numbers in the first column are only related to the "Tank-battle of Prochorovka" between both SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH and Das Reich of the II. SS-Panzerkorps [Hausser] and parts of the 5th soviet Guards Tank Army [Rotmistrov] in the course of 12th July 1943.)
Bei den sowjetischen Verlusten handelt es sich um eine Schätzung, denn für die beiden sowjetischen Panzerkorps, die die Division Das Reich angriffen (2. PzK und 2. GdPzK), liegen für den 12.7. keine Verlustmeldungen vor.
(The soviet losses are an estimation, because their are no loss-reports for the two soviet tank-corps which attacked "Das Reich" [2nd PzK and 2nd GdPzK] on 12th July 1943.)
Die beiden Panzerkorps 18 und 29 verloren etwa 150 Panzer und SFL als Totalverluste, für die beiden anderen Panzerkorps wurden zusammen 50 Totalverluste angenommen. Von den deutschen Verbänden liegen für den 12.7. ebenfalls keine vollständigen Verlustmeldungen vor.
(The two Tank-corps 18 and 29 approximatly lost 150 Pz and SFL (total-write-offs), for both other tank-corps together 50 total-write-offs are estimated.
There are no complete loss-reports for the german formations either for 12th July.)
Die beiden Divisionen LSSAH und Das Reich verloren jedoch zwischen dem 10.7. und dem 13.7.1943 nur 3 Panzer als Totalverluste.
(But both divisions, LSSAH and Das Reich lost only 3 tanks as total-write-offs between 10th and 13th July 1943.)
Quellen ( sources): OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 22 u. 63; CAMO 2, S. 8; CAMO 1, S. 6; Kołomyjec, Swirin, Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S.49.
Unberücksichtigt bleibt auf deutscher Seite die SS-PGD Totenkopf, weil sie am 12.7. hauptsächlich gegen Verbände der 5. GdA, der 1. PzA und der 6. GdA kämpfte, und auf sowjetischer Seite das 5. mechGdK, dessen Einsatz gegen das deutsche III. PzK und die SS-PGD Totenkopf sich erst am folgenden Tag auswirkte.
(The SS-PGD Totenkopf remains unconsidered on the German side, because she fought mainly against formations of the 5th GdA, the 1st TA and the 6th GdA on 12th July, and on the Soviet side, the employment of 5th mech GdK against the German III. PzK and the SS-PGD Totenkopf didn't show consequences before the following day.)
Das gesamte II. SS-PzK verlor zwischen dem 10.7. und dem 16.7.1943 lediglich 13 Panzer als Totalverluste, die 5. GdPzA im gleichen Zeitraum 334 Panzer und SFL(The entire II. SS-PzK only lost 13 tanks as total-write-offs between 10th and 16th July 1943, 5th GdTA lost 334 tanks and SFLs in the same space of time.) (vgl. OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 22 u. 73; CAMO 4, S. 2; CAMO 7, S. 2; CAMO 5.)
2. Die Zahlenangaben der zweiten Spalte beruhen auf folgenden Quellen:
(The numbers of the second column are based on the following sources:)
Verlustmeldung „Zitadelle“ der HG Mitte 5.7.-14.7.1943: 41 Panzer und 46 StuG (vgl. OKH, Panzerlage Mitte, BA-MA RH 10/65, Bl. 12; Verlustmeldung „Zitadelle“ der HG Süd 5.7.-14.7.1943: 150 Panzer und 11 StuG (vgl. OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 67); Verlustmeldung der Zentralfront für den Zeitraum 5.7.-15.7.1943: 526 Panzer (CAMO 6, S. 2)[379]; Angaben über die unwiederbringlichen Panzerverluste der Voronežfront, Zeitraum 5.7.-13.7.1943: 1.223 Panzer (CAMO 5).
(Report of losses of HG Mitte for "Zitadelle" from 5 - 14 July 1943 : 41 tanks and 46 StuG;
Report of losses of HG Süd for "Zitadelle" from 5 - 14 July 1943: 150 tanks and 11 StuG;
Report of losses of the Central-Front from 5 - 15 July 1943: 526 tanks;
Data for the irretrievable losses of tanks of the Voronež-Front from 5 - 13 July 1943: 1,223 tanks (sources in brackets);)
Die sowjetischen Verlustangaben der verschiedenen vorliegenden Aufstellungen weichen zum Teil stark
voneinander ab. In der Aufstellung CAMO 7 sind sie außerdem besonders unstimmig und fehlerhaft.
( The Soviet loss data of the different available lists deviate partially strongly from each other. In the CAMO 7 list, they are particularly frictioned and incorrect in addition.)
Vor allem bei den (offensichtlich falsch zusammengerechneten) Angaben der Zentralfront auf dieser Zusammenstellung entsteht der Eindruck, als sei eine absichtliche Minimierung erfolgt. Ein Vergleich mit einer anderen Aufstellung (CAMO 6, S. 2) verstärkt diesen Eindruck.
(Particularly with (obviously wrongly summed up) the data of the Central-Front on this composition the impression develops, as if an intentional minimization took place. A comparison with another list (CAMO 6, S. 2) strengthens this impression.)
[ March 24, 2007, 12:58 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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Kursker Frontbogen – deutsche Verbände und ihre Ausstattung mit Panzern und
Selbstfahrlafetten [363] (Stand: 30.6.1943)
Unit--tanks[364--StuG,StuH,StuPz--PzJg(SFL)--artillery(SFL)--total
9. Armee
XX.AK:
251. ID - - - - 0
137. ID - - - - 0
45. ID - - - - 0
72. ID 1(0) - 7(3) - 8 (3)
XXXXVI. PzK:
102. ID[364] - - - - 0
258. ID - - - - 0
7. ID - - - - 0
31. ID 2 (2)[365] - 13(13) - 15(15)
StuGAbt 909 - 31 (30) - - 31 (30)
XXXXVII. PzK:
20. PD 82 (74) - 28 (26) 6 (0) 116 (100)
6. ID - - - - 0
2. PD 116 (98)[366] - 34 (29) 30 (18) 180 (145)
9. PD 109 (68) - 28 (16) 18 (0) 155 (84)
StuGAbt 904 - 31 (31) - - 31 (31)
StuGAbt 245 - 31 (31) - - 31 (31)
PzBrig 21 4 (0) - - - 4 (0)
sPzAbt 505 60[367] (41) - - - 60 (41)
FklKp 312 - 7 (0) - - 7 (0)
XXXXI. PzK
292. ID - - - - 0
86. ID - - - - 0
18. PD 75 (63) - 16 (7) 6 (0) 97 (70)
StuGAbt 177 - 31 (30) - - 31 (30)
StuGAbt 244 - 31 (31) - - 31 (31)
sPzJgRgt 656 20 (20) 55 (43) 90 (83) - 165 (146)
FklKp 313 - 7 (0) - - 7 (0)
FklKp 314 - 7 (0) - - 7 (0)
XXIII. AK
78. StD 1 (1) - 26 (26) - 27 (27)
216. ID - - - - 0
36. ID[368] - - 6 (6) - 6 (6)
383. ID - - - - 0
StuGAbt 185 - 32 (29) - - 32 (29)
StuGAbt 189 - 31 (30) - - 31 (30)
Gruppe von Esebeck
12. PD[369] 86 (79) - 16 (15) 6 (0) 108 (94)
4. PD 101 (96) - 26 (26) 30 (17) 157 (139)
10. PGD - - 39 (39) - 39 (39)
4. PzA
LII. AK [370]
57. ID - - - - 0
255. ID - - - - 0
332. ID - - - - 0
XXXXVIII. PzK
167. ID - - - - 0
PGD GD 135 (118) 35 (34) 28 (19) 34 (32) 232 (203)
3. PD 100 (86) 2 (2) 14 (13) - 116 (101)
11. PD 114 (86) - 14 (10) 18 (6) 146 (102)
PzBrig 10/Stab 3 (0) - - - 3 (0)
PzRgt 39 200 (200)[371] - - - 200 (200)
StuGAbt 911 - 31 (22) - - 31 (22)
II. SS-PzK
SS-PGD 139 (109) 35 (27) 14 (11) 30 (17) 218 (164)
Totenkopf
SS-PGD LAH 122 (99) 35 (34) 29 (20) 30 (28) 216 (181)
SS-PGD DR 146 (122)[372] 34 (34) 13 (9) 30 (28) 223 (193)
ArmeeAbt Kempf
Korps Raus
106. ID - - - - 0
320. ID - - - - 0
198. ID[373] - - - - 0
StuGAbt 905 - 32 (32) - - 32 (32)
StuGBttr 393 - 12 (10) - - 12 (10)
XXXXII. AK
282. ID - - - - 0
39. ID - - - - 0
161. ID - - - - 0
sPzJgAbt 560 - - 45 (37) - 45 (37)
III. PzK
168. ID - - - - 0
19. PD 87 (80) - 14 (14) - 101 (94)
7. PD 112 (103) - 14 (6) 12 (6) 138 (115)
6. PD 117 (107) - 12 (5) 6 (6) 135 (118)
sPzAbt 503 45 (40) - - - 45 (40)
StuGAbt 228 - 31 (30) - - 31 (30)
2. Armee
XIII. AK
82. ID - - - - 0
340. ID - - - - 0
327. ID - - - - 0
PzJgAbt 559 - - 22 (22) - 22 (22)
VII. AK
88. ID - - - - 0
26. ID - - - - 0
323. ID[374 ] - - - - 0
68. ID - - - - 0
PzJgAbt 616 - - 17 (16) - 17 (16)
Armeereserve
75. ID - - - - 0
StuGAbt 202 - 31 (28) - - 31 (28)
gesamt:[375] 1.977 (1.692) 572 (508) 565 (471) 256 (158) 3.370 (2.829)[376]
„Zitadelle“[377] 1.898 (1.621) 541 (480) 458 (378) 250 (158) 3.147 (2.637)
gesamte
Ostfront:2.676 (2.172) 1.080 (952) 951 (738) 312 (194) 5.019 (4.056)
[362]Gliederung nach Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns, S. 331-334; Fahrzeugbestände nach OKH, Panzerlage,
BA-MA RH 10/60; OKH, StuG-Lage, BA-MA RH 10/62; OKH, Pak-Lage, BA-MA RH 10/63. Kursiv
gesetzte Verbände nahmen nicht am Angriff gegen Kursk teil.
(Units set in "italics" didn't take part in the attack against Kursk)
[363] In der jeweils ersten Zahl sind sowohl einsatzbereite und beschädigte als auch solche Fahrzeuge enthalten,
die sich noch in Zuführung befanden. Zahlen in Klammern: davon am 30. Juni einsatzbereit.
Panzerbeobachtungswagen wurden nicht berücksichtigt, da sie lediglich mit einem Maschinengewehr
bewaffnet waren.
(The first number includes not only ready-for-action and damaged, but also such vehicles which were still on transport/delivery to the units.
Numbers in brackets: total ready-for-action on 30th June.
Pz-command-tanks were not considered, since they were only armed with a MG.)
[364] Nur begrenzten Anteil an der Offensive.
(Only restricted part in the offensive)
[365] Beutepanzer T-34 (vgl. Zetterling, Frankson, Kursk 1943, S. 42).
(Captured T-34)
[366] Abzüglich 7 Panzer ohne Turm, d.h. ohne Kanone.
(Minus 7 tanks without turret, meaning without gun.)
[367] Davon 15 Pz III.
(15 of these Pz III)
[368] Nur mit einem Regiment am Unternehmen „Zitadelle“ beteiligt.
(Only one regiment participated in the operation "Zitadelle".)
[369] Division war mit Masse nicht am Angriff beteiligt, zwei Züge mit 10 Panzern allerdings bei
Angriffsbeginn zur Unterstützung eingesetzt (vgl. John, Kursk ’43, S. 60).
(The mass of the division didn't participate in the attack, but to be sure, two platoons with 10 tanks were used to assist at the commence of the attack.)
[370] Nur zum Teil an der Offensive beteiligt.
(Only partly participated in the offensive)
[371]Ohne Bergepanzer. Zwei der aufgeführten Panzer mußten außerdem noch vor dem Angriff als
Totalausfälle abgeschrieben werden (vgl. Jentz, Die deutsche Panzertruppe, Bd. 2, S. 101).
(Without Recovery-tanks. Besides, two of the listed tanks had to be written-off as total-write-offs.)
[372] Inklusive 26 Beutepanzer T-34 (vgl. Zetterling, Frankson, Kursk 43, S. 46), davon am 4. Juli 18 einsatzbereit (vgl. Stadler, Die Offensive gegen Kursk, S. 34).
(Including 26 captured T-34 tanks , 18 of those servicable on 4th July)
[373] Einige Tage nach dem Beginn der Offensive herangeführt.
(Lead-to several days after the begin of the offensive)
[374] Nur eine Kampfgruppe. (Only one Kampfgruppe)
[375] Kursker Frontbogen. (Kursk Salient)
[376]Insgesamt befanden sich am Stichtag noch 287 Fahrzeuge in Zuführung (On the Key-Date, the total of 287 vehicles were still on transport/delivery to the units) ,
(92 Panzer, 21 StuG, 9 StuH, 65 PzJg, 90 Artillerie-SFL).
An völlig veralteten Fahrzeugen waren folgende Stückzahlen vorhanden:
(Of completly obsolete vehicles there were the following number of pieces)
P II: 73, P 38(t): 10, P III (kurz): 83, P IV (kurz): 50, StuG III (kurz): 11, P III (7,5cm): 132.
Außerdem sind in der obigen Gesamtzahl 41 Flammenwerferpanzer III und 101 Panzerbefehlswagen III enthalten.
(Besides, the above total-number includes 41 Flame-throwing-tank III and 101 Pz-command-tanks III.)
Von letzteren waren nicht alle mit einer Kanone bewaffnet; wie Fotografien belegen, gab es auch noch alte Modelle mit Kanonenattrappen (vgl. Kołomiec, Swirin, Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 31).
(Of those, not all were armed with a cannon, like photographs prove, there still were old models with mock-up-cannon)
Oftmals wurden bestimmte veraltete Modelle nicht in zeitgenössischen Unterlagen berücksichtigt.
(Certain obsolete models were often not considered in contemporary documents.)
Dies gilt insbesondere für die Panzer II, die im Sommer 1943 nur noch bei Aufklärungs- und Pioniereinheiten Verwendung fanden, da sie aufgrund ihrer leichten Bewaffnung für den Panzerkampf unbrauchbar waren.
(This is espescially true for the Pz II, which were only used in Recon- and Pioneer-units, since they were useless for Tank-battle with their light armament.)
[377] Insgesamt am Angriff gegen Kursk beteiligt.
(Total number taking part in the attack against Kursk)
[ March 24, 2007, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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The following information is taken from Roman Töppel's Kursk - Legenden, Mythen und Propaganda, Magisterarbeit 2001, we discussed some part of it in the
Ju-87/G Stuka tankbuster info-thread.
Thanks a million @ Andreas for the file!
Entwicklung der zahlenmäßigen Stärke einsatzbereiter deutscher Panzer und Selbstfahrlafetten an der Ostfront, März - Juni 1943 [360]
[360] Diagramm: Roman Töppel, 2001; Quellen: OKH, Panzerlage, BA-MA RH 10/60; OKH, StuG-Lage, BAMA RH 10/62; OKH, Pak-Lage, RH 10/63 (Auf Blatt 94 der Akte BA-MA RH 10/62 liegt ein Rechenfehler vor.). ( diagram by Roman Töppel, 2001; sources: OKH, Panzerlage, BA-MA RH 10/60; OKH, StuG-Lage, BAMA RH 10/62; OKH, Pak-Lage, RH 10/63 (there's a calculation error on page 94 of BA-MA RH document 10/62).)
Bei den Selbstfahrlafetten handelt es sich um Sturmgeschütze, Panzerjäger und Panzerartillerie.
(Selbstfahrlafetten include assault-guns, tank-hunters and tank-artillery. )
Für das obige Diagramm wurde die Klassifizierung der Fahrzeuge aus den Quellen unverändert übernommen, ebenso alle aufgeführten Fahrzeugtypen (auch PzBeobWg etc.), weshalb die Zahlenangaben von denen in Anlage 4 dieser Arbeit abweichen.
(The classification of the vehicles was taken over unchanged from the sources for the diagram above, same for all listed vehicle-types (also PzBeobWg-, etc.), therefore the number-specifications divert from those in Anlage 4 of this work. )
Den Zusammenstellungen in Anlage 4 liegt eine eigene, vom Verfasser geringfügig veränderte Klassifizierung zugrunde (vgl. die entsprechenden Anmerkungen).
(The arrangements in Anlage 4 are based on a sligthly changed classification (see the corresponding explanations)by the author. )
Relatives Kräfteverhältnis (Kursker Frontbogen) – Stichtag: 1. Juli 1943 [361]
[361] Diagramm: Roman Töppel, 2001; Quellen: Zetterling, Frankson, Kursk 1943, S. 18 u. 20; OKH, Panzerlage, BA-MA RH 10/60; OKH, StuG-Lage, BA-MA RH 10/62; OKH, Pak-Lage, BA-MA RH 10/63.
Es gilt zu berücksichtigen, daß es sich bei den Angaben zu den deutschen Kräften, von den Panzern und SFL abgesehen, zumeist um Berechnungen und Höchstwerte handelt. Dagegen wird bei den sowjetischen Kräften z.B. nur intakte Technik berücksichtigt.
(Note that the numbers for the german forces in most cases represent calculations and maximum numbers, except for Pz and SFL.
In contradiction to that, for the Soviet forces, for example only intact tech is considered.)
(vgl. Koltunov, Kurskaja bitva v cifrach, Nr. 6, S. 61,Fußnote).
[ March 24, 2007, 02:08 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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Maybe this will do ?Originally posted by John Kettler:Hetzer38,
No wonder Andreas cited Toppel! I think there's much to be said for your argument about covering up disasters. If the Russians would cover up one, then why not another as well? After all, we're talking about people who made whole offensives into nonevents, led by Stalin, a man who hid the true cost of the last battle from the very people who paid it, warehousing the pitiful mutilated survivors in a bunch of classified hospitals. Most interesting figures on German and Russian tank losses. Too bad the manpower losses aren't directly comparable, since they are counting somewhat different things. Do we have a good number for German WIA?
Regards,
John Kettler
[by Jozhik_Chernobyl'skij, posted @ FOW-forum]Kursk casualties.German records cited in Glantz, "Battle of Kursk" (p.275) suggest that the Ninth Army lost 20,720 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 11th July, while Army Group South lost 29,102 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 20th July. While these dates don't match exactly, it is likely that July 5th to 18th (more or less the time frame for the Kursk Defensive Operation, as opposed to Orel and Belgorod Offensive Operations, which were entirely different battles), the Germans lost at most 50,000 dead, wounded and missing in action.
Data from the KOSAVE II database states that between July 4th and 18th, the German Corps and divisions directly involved in the battle lost 34,217 killed, wounded and missing, of which killed and missing amounted to 5,591 and 1,142, respectively. [These figures exclude non-combat casualties.] Considering they started with 307,365 effectives, these losses translate into loss rates of 2.2% irrevocable and 11.1% total, which is far from atypical.
Tank-wise, the Germans lost approximately 1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged and 323 destroyed (total write-offs or abandoned). This is out of 2,528 tanks and assault guns on hand at July 1, and represents a total loss/damage rate of 76.5% and write-off rate of 12.8%. The figures are roughly confirmed by Heinrici (though he had estimated a total loss rate of approximately 60%), and can be verified with July month data in Panzer Truppen Volume II. KOSAVE II gives somewhat lower figures of 1,310 damaged and 226 destroyed and abandoned; here, the damaged figure is closer to Heinrici's, but the destroyed is lower. Either way, we can say that approximately 1,300-1,500 tanks and assault guns were damaged (some repeatedly - damaged, repaired, damaged again), and 225-325 destroyed completely or abandoned.
On the Soviet side, we have to look at Krivosheev as the definitive source. He cites for the Kursk Defensive Operation (July 5th to July 23rd) losses of 70,330 irrecoverable and 107,517 sick and wounded (for 177,847 total) out of 1,272,700 with the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Front. If one factors in that roughly 25% of personnel in these fronts was actually not in the combat zone (and so 954,525 were - give or take), this translates into irrevocable loss rate of 7.4% and total loss rate of 18.6%, which, in turn, are 3.0-3.5 times German irrevocable and 1.5-2.0 times German total - not surprising (especially given equipment and training disparities, plus the fact that the Russians were attacking a lot during the "defensive" operation), and also suggestive that, somehow, the German wounded had better survival rates (or, alternatively, that Soviet wounded were not evacuated from the combat zone as much and so fought on or died where they lay). [Note that these figures also include non-combat dead and wounded.]
KOSAVE II drills this down further - it claims that out of 510,252 engaged at the start of the operation, the Soviets lost 25,839 killed, 27,300 missing 117,552 wounded in action. This translates into irrevocable loss rate of 10.4% and total loss rate of 23.0%. The main discrepancy in the loss ratios with our Krivosheev-based estimates is with the denominator, and so the previous conclusions stand.
In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.
KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).
The bottom line is - no matter how one splits hairs and argues about +1% point here and -1% point there, Soviet personnel losses during Kursk Defensive Operation were 4 to 6 times greater than those of the Germans, while tank and assault gun irrevocable losses were 5 to 6 times greater. As explained earlier on in the thread, the loss discrepancy can be accounted for by difference in training and command & control at that stage of the war; at times drastic inferiority of Soviet equipment, especially armour, over much of 1943; the fact that Soviet formations frequently lost ground, thus unable to recover wounded and damaged tanks (see the discrepancy in implied wounded survival rates between the two sides); and the fact that, during the Kursk Defensive Operation, many Soviet formations spent days in vigorous attacks on the advancing German units (which, in turn, prompted greater casualty rates than should otherwise have been the case, even if only by a few percentage points).
Of course, the flip side to all of this is that, at the end of it all, after taking these losses the Soviets still had more effectives than the Germans in the combat zone, as well as 25%-50% of their total Front strength as yet unengaged (depending on whether one takes Glantz or KOSAVE II data) - and sufficient _other_ troops to launch the Orel and Belgorod offensives (not to mention the mess that kept on in the Leningrad/Volkhov regions since about late 1941). Meanwhile, the Germans, while certainly not totally worn out, had committed more or less everything up to and including mechanized kitchen sinks (a lesser-known invention of Porsche) to this one strategic offensives, and still could not find sufficient troops to secure their tactical flanks, let alone to halt Soviet operational counter-offensives (or leave enough troops to deal with Sicily, which was a fairly obvious thing after the fall of Tunisia). In other words, yet another case of the Germans trying to strategically and operationally do too much with too little (their story since the "Miracle on the Marne", in my opinion), with predictable results. Of course, as the loss rates above testify, on the tactical level they were still formidable opponents at this point in the war, and so the Soviets in 1943 still had to compensate with meaningful superiority in the combat zone, even when on the operational defensive! [something the FoW points system more or less adequately reflects, with _perhaps_ a few exceptions.]
Cheers, Hetzer
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Maybe this will do ?Originally posted by John Kettler:Hetzer38,
No wonder Andreas cited Toppel! I think there's much to be said for your argument about covering up disasters. If the Russians would cover up one, then why not another as well? After all, we're talking about people who made whole offensives into nonevents, led by Stalin, a man who hid the true cost of the last battle from the very people who paid it, warehousing the pitiful mutilated survivors in a bunch of classified hospitals. Most interesting figures on German and Russian tank losses. Too bad the manpower losses aren't directly comparable, since they are counting somewhat different things. Do we have a good number for German WIA?
Regards,
John Kettler
[by Jozhik_Chernobyl'skij, posted @ FOW-forum]Kursk casualties.German records cited in Glantz, "Battle of Kursk" (p.275) suggest that the Ninth Army lost 20,720 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 11th July, while Army Group South lost 29,102 killed, wounded and missing between 5th and 20th July. While these dates don't match exactly, it is likely that July 5th to 18th (more or less the time frame for the Kursk Defensive Operation, as opposed to Orel and Belgorod Offensive Operations, which were entirely different battles), the Germans lost at most 50,000 dead, wounded and missing in action.
Data from the KOSAVE II database states that between July 4th and 18th, the German Corps and divisions directly involved in the battle lost 34,217 killed, wounded and missing, of which killed and missing amounted to 5,591 and 1,142, respectively. [These figures exclude non-combat casualties.] Considering they started with 307,365 effectives, these losses translate into loss rates of 2.2% irrevocable and 11.1% total, which is far from atypical.
Tank-wise, the Germans lost approximately 1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged and 323 destroyed (total write-offs or abandoned). This is out of 2,528 tanks and assault guns on hand at July 1, and represents a total loss/damage rate of 76.5% and write-off rate of 12.8%. The figures are roughly confirmed by Heinrici (though he had estimated a total loss rate of approximately 60%), and can be verified with July month data in Panzer Truppen Volume II. KOSAVE II gives somewhat lower figures of 1,310 damaged and 226 destroyed and abandoned; here, the damaged figure is closer to Heinrici's, but the destroyed is lower. Either way, we can say that approximately 1,300-1,500 tanks and assault guns were damaged (some repeatedly - damaged, repaired, damaged again), and 225-325 destroyed completely or abandoned.
On the Soviet side, we have to look at Krivosheev as the definitive source. He cites for the Kursk Defensive Operation (July 5th to July 23rd) losses of 70,330 irrecoverable and 107,517 sick and wounded (for 177,847 total) out of 1,272,700 with the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Front. If one factors in that roughly 25% of personnel in these fronts was actually not in the combat zone (and so 954,525 were - give or take), this translates into irrevocable loss rate of 7.4% and total loss rate of 18.6%, which, in turn, are 3.0-3.5 times German irrevocable and 1.5-2.0 times German total - not surprising (especially given equipment and training disparities, plus the fact that the Russians were attacking a lot during the "defensive" operation), and also suggestive that, somehow, the German wounded had better survival rates (or, alternatively, that Soviet wounded were not evacuated from the combat zone as much and so fought on or died where they lay). [Note that these figures also include non-combat dead and wounded.]
KOSAVE II drills this down further - it claims that out of 510,252 engaged at the start of the operation, the Soviets lost 25,839 killed, 27,300 missing 117,552 wounded in action. This translates into irrevocable loss rate of 10.4% and total loss rate of 23.0%. The main discrepancy in the loss ratios with our Krivosheev-based estimates is with the denominator, and so the previous conclusions stand.
In terms of tanks, 1,614 tanks and assault guns were listed as total write-offs, and we can assume that damaged-to-destroyed ratio, while not 5:1 as for the Germans, was at least 2:1 or 3:1 (this can be gauged on daily tank strength returns during the battle). Notably, this confirms the 5:1 Soviet to German tank write-off rates persistent through mid- and late-1943.
KOSAVE II's data is 1,274 tanks and assault guns destroyed (though the SU-76 data is missing - so the total should be marginally higher) and 1,046 damaged out of 2,582 employed, suggesting total loss/damage and write-off rates of 89.9% and 49.3%, respectively; the roughly 50% total write-off rate is consistent with operational returns during the battle (e.g. 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka).
The bottom line is - no matter how one splits hairs and argues about +1% point here and -1% point there, Soviet personnel losses during Kursk Defensive Operation were 4 to 6 times greater than those of the Germans, while tank and assault gun irrevocable losses were 5 to 6 times greater. As explained earlier on in the thread, the loss discrepancy can be accounted for by difference in training and command & control at that stage of the war; at times drastic inferiority of Soviet equipment, especially armour, over much of 1943; the fact that Soviet formations frequently lost ground, thus unable to recover wounded and damaged tanks (see the discrepancy in implied wounded survival rates between the two sides); and the fact that, during the Kursk Defensive Operation, many Soviet formations spent days in vigorous attacks on the advancing German units (which, in turn, prompted greater casualty rates than should otherwise have been the case, even if only by a few percentage points).
Of course, the flip side to all of this is that, at the end of it all, after taking these losses the Soviets still had more effectives than the Germans in the combat zone, as well as 25%-50% of their total Front strength as yet unengaged (depending on whether one takes Glantz or KOSAVE II data) - and sufficient _other_ troops to launch the Orel and Belgorod offensives (not to mention the mess that kept on in the Leningrad/Volkhov regions since about late 1941). Meanwhile, the Germans, while certainly not totally worn out, had committed more or less everything up to and including mechanized kitchen sinks (a lesser-known invention of Porsche) to this one strategic offensives, and still could not find sufficient troops to secure their tactical flanks, let alone to halt Soviet operational counter-offensives (or leave enough troops to deal with Sicily, which was a fairly obvious thing after the fall of Tunisia). In other words, yet another case of the Germans trying to strategically and operationally do too much with too little (their story since the "Miracle on the Marne", in my opinion), with predictable results. Of course, as the loss rates above testify, on the tactical level they were still formidable opponents at this point in the war, and so the Soviets in 1943 still had to compensate with meaningful superiority in the combat zone, even when on the operational defensive! [something the FoW points system more or less adequately reflects, with _perhaps_ a few exceptions.]
Cheers, Hetzer
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If, yes - if Chris Lawrence is using actual unit loss reports...does anyone know for sure ?Originally posted by Andreas:If, as Chris indicates, the Soviet loss figures are from unit records, it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. If they are from the "History of the Great Patriotic War", that would be another story.
So, assuming Chris is using actual unit loss reports, as opposed to collated Front data, at the moment there is no indication on the Soviet side that Meyer's story is correct, and your assumption that the Soviets doctored the loss reports is most likely incorrect.
How about the following numbers posted by Pandur, do they correlate with Roman Töppel's?
...Panzer und Selbstfahrlafetten:
(tanks and assaultguns)
Ende Mai 1943
Panzer: 1846
SFL: 1403
Ende Juni (vor Zitadelle):
Panzer: 2287
SFL: 2287
Verluste Panzer bis Ende Zitadelle Mitte Juli:
(tank-losses until the end of "Zitadelle", middle of July)
Wehrmacht/SS: 248 (Prochorowka: 3)
Rote Armee: 1749 (Prochorowka: ca. 200)
Verluste Panzer gesamte Ostfront Juli/August:
(tank losses for the whole Eastern Front, July/august)
Wehmacht/SS: 1331
Rote Armee: 8125
(alle Zahlen nach R. Töppel: Kursk - Legenden, Mythen und Propaganda, Magisterarbeit 2001)
... ?Zu den tatsächlichen Verlusten zitiere ich erneut R. Töppel:(Regarding the actual losses, I again quote T. Pöppel)
HG Mitte (9. Armee) 5.-14. Juli: ca. 90 Panzer, StG und "Ferdinands"
HG Süd (4. PzA, AG Kempf) 5.-17. Juli: ca. 190 Panzer und StG.
Quellen (sources):
Der Verlust von max. 3 Panzern bezieht sich auf "die „Panzerschlacht von Prochorovka“ zwischen den beiden SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH und Das Reich des II. SS-Panzerkorps (Hausser) und Teilen der sowjetischen 5. Gardepanzerarmee (Rotmistrov) im Verlaufe des 12.7.1943.
( The loss of max. 3 tanks is related to the "Tank-battke of Prochorovka" between both SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH and Das Reich of the II. SS-Panzerkorps [Hausser] and parts of the 5th soviet Guards Tank Army [Rotmistrov] in the course of 12th July 1943.)
Bei den sowjetischen Verlusten handelt es sich um eine Schätzung, denn für die beiden sowjetischen Panzerkorps, die die Division Das Reich angriffen (2. PzK und 2. GdPzK), liegen für den 12.7. keine Verlustmeldungen vor.
(The soviet losses are an estimation, because their are no loss-reports for the two soviet tank-corps which attacked "Das Reich" [2nd PzK and 2nd GdPzK] on 12th July 1943.)
Die beiden Panzerkorps 18 und 29 verloren etwa 150 Panzer und SFL als Totalverluste, für die beiden anderen Panzerkorps wurden zusammen 50 Totalverluste angenommen.
(The two Tank-corps 18 and 29 approximatly lost 150 tanks and assaultguns (total-write-offs), for both other tank-corps together 50 total-write-offs are estimated.)
Von den deutschen Verbänden liegen für den 12.7. ebenfalls keine vollständigen Verlustmeldungen vor.
(There are no complete loss-reports for the german formations either.)
Die beiden Divisionen LSSAH und Das Reich verloren jedoch zwischen dem 10.7. und dem 13.7.1943 nur 3 Panzer als Totalverluste.
(But both divisions, LSSAH and Das Reich lost only 3 tanks as total-write-offs)
Quellen (sources): OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 22 u. 63; CAMO 2, S. 8; CAMO 1, S. 6; Kolomyjec, Swirin, Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 49.
Cheers, Hetzer.
P.S.
I know I should buy Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", and quote him directly instead of quoting quotes of the book, but I don't grow money in the cellar...and my wife is being pregnant - again!
- and we'll hopefully have a second healthy kid in ~8 months...so I fear there's no more books for daddy too soon (...hmm, maybe I should borrow some...)[ March 23, 2007, 05:36 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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If, yes - if Chris Lawrence is using actual unit loss reports...does anyone know for sure ?Originally posted by Andreas:If, as Chris indicates, the Soviet loss figures are from unit records, it is reasonable to assume they are accurate. If they are from the "History of the Great Patriotic War", that would be another story.
So, assuming Chris is using actual unit loss reports, as opposed to collated Front data, at the moment there is no indication on the Soviet side that Meyer's story is correct, and your assumption that the Soviets doctored the loss reports is most likely incorrect.
How about the following numbers posted by Pandur, do they correlate with Roman Töppel's?
...Panzer und Selbstfahrlafetten:
(tanks and assaultguns)
Ende Mai 1943
Panzer: 1846
SFL: 1403
Ende Juni (vor Zitadelle):
Panzer: 2287
SFL: 2287
Verluste Panzer bis Ende Zitadelle Mitte Juli:
(tank-losses until the end of "Zitadelle", middle of July)
Wehrmacht/SS: 248 (Prochorowka: 3)
Rote Armee: 1749 (Prochorowka: ca. 200)
Verluste Panzer gesamte Ostfront Juli/August:
(tank losses for the whole Eastern Front, July/august)
Wehmacht/SS: 1331
Rote Armee: 8125
(alle Zahlen nach R. Töppel: Kursk - Legenden, Mythen und Propaganda, Magisterarbeit 2001)
... ?Zu den tatsächlichen Verlusten zitiere ich erneut R. Töppel:(Regarding the actual losses, I again quote T. Pöppel)
HG Mitte (9. Armee) 5.-14. Juli: ca. 90 Panzer, StG und "Ferdinands"
HG Süd (4. PzA, AG Kempf) 5.-17. Juli: ca. 190 Panzer und StG.
Quellen (sources):
Der Verlust von max. 3 Panzern bezieht sich auf "die „Panzerschlacht von Prochorovka“ zwischen den beiden SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH und Das Reich des II. SS-Panzerkorps (Hausser) und Teilen der sowjetischen 5. Gardepanzerarmee (Rotmistrov) im Verlaufe des 12.7.1943.
( The loss of max. 3 tanks is related to the "Tank-battke of Prochorovka" between both SS-Panzergrenadierdivisionen LSSAH and Das Reich of the II. SS-Panzerkorps [Hausser] and parts of the 5th soviet Guards Tank Army [Rotmistrov] in the course of 12th July 1943.)
Bei den sowjetischen Verlusten handelt es sich um eine Schätzung, denn für die beiden sowjetischen Panzerkorps, die die Division Das Reich angriffen (2. PzK und 2. GdPzK), liegen für den 12.7. keine Verlustmeldungen vor.
(The soviet losses are an estimation, because their are no loss-reports for the two soviet tank-corps which attacked "Das Reich" [2nd PzK and 2nd GdPzK] on 12th July 1943.)
Die beiden Panzerkorps 18 und 29 verloren etwa 150 Panzer und SFL als Totalverluste, für die beiden anderen Panzerkorps wurden zusammen 50 Totalverluste angenommen.
(The two Tank-corps 18 and 29 approximatly lost 150 tanks and assaultguns (total-write-offs), for both other tank-corps together 50 total-write-offs are estimated.)
Von den deutschen Verbänden liegen für den 12.7. ebenfalls keine vollständigen Verlustmeldungen vor.
(There are no complete loss-reports for the german formations either.)
Die beiden Divisionen LSSAH und Das Reich verloren jedoch zwischen dem 10.7. und dem 13.7.1943 nur 3 Panzer als Totalverluste.
(But both divisions, LSSAH and Das Reich lost only 3 tanks as total-write-offs)
Quellen (sources): OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, Bl. 22 u. 63; CAMO 2, S. 8; CAMO 1, S. 6; Kolomyjec, Swirin, Kursk 1943, Bd. 1, S. 49.
Cheers, Hetzer.
P.S.
I know I should buy Töppel's "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung – Die Schlacht bei Kursk", and quote him directly instead of quoting quotes of the book, but I don't grow money in the cellar...and my wife is being pregnant - again!
- and we'll hopefully have a second healthy kid in ~8 months...so I fear there's no more books for daddy too soon (...hmm, maybe I should borrow some...)[ March 23, 2007, 05:36 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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I think you are conflating things. Unit level records were not cleaned up, as far as I can tell from having looked at some of the more recent Prokhorovka stuff. They can be presumed to be accurate. The cleaning started later, and only affected higher level reports. See e.g. Töppel's thesis on the mythology of Kursk. Also, Prokhorovka is a special case, due to the mythical proportions this battle assumed. Meyer's story has nothing to do with Prokhorovka.Originally posted by Andreas:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Hetzer38:
It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.
Cheers, Hetzer.
All the best
Andreas </font>
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I think you are conflating things. Unit level records were not cleaned up, as far as I can tell from having looked at some of the more recent Prokhorovka stuff. They can be presumed to be accurate. The cleaning started later, and only affected higher level reports. See e.g. Töppel's thesis on the mythology of Kursk. Also, Prokhorovka is a special case, due to the mythical proportions this battle assumed. Meyer's story has nothing to do with Prokhorovka.Originally posted by Andreas:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Hetzer38:
It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.
Cheers, Hetzer.
All the best
Andreas </font>
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- Just in case someone asks "Who the f*ck is Bruno Meyer!?"
* Insert Bruno's story here * (4th post from above)
...The Henschel 129s, supported by Fw 190s, for three hours uniterruptedly attacked the soviet concentration. When one Staffel was above the battlefield, another returned to the base, the third was at the airfield to re-fuel and take ammunition, whereas the fourth took off for another action. Not even one soviet tank succeeded in breaking through to the rear of the German army...
[from: Miniatury Lotnicze 8 - Hs 129 in combat - by Marek Murawski]Bruno Meyer was born on November 13, 1915 on Haiti. He began service with the Luftwaffe at the end of 1937 at the cadet school in Hildesheim. His military career began in Poland during the September Campaign of 1939, when he piloted a Henschel Hs 123 biplane in the ranks of II.(Schlacht)/LG 2. As that unit's pilot he later fought in France and on the Eastern Front. In the spring of 1941 he became commander of 5.(Schlacht)/LG 2. On exceeding the number of 200 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight's cross on August 21, 1941. In the first half of 1942 he fought with his Staffel at the middle part of the Eastern Front. On July 8, 1942 he was comissioned commander of 3./Erg.Zerst.Gr. based at 'Deblin-Irena' airfield. On November 1, 1942, he accepted the duty of commander of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 2, equipped with Hs 129s, which was soon moved to Africa. In the summer of 1943 he led his Staffel in the fights at Kursk. On October 18, 1943 he became commander of IV.(Pz)/SG 9, which then won significant successes in fights in the area of Bielgorod, Orel, Krivoy Rog and Uman. After he recieved the rank of Major in October 1944, he took the headquarters post of "Führer der Panzerschlachtflieger" (commander of tank-destroying pilots at the commander-in-chief of the strafing air force)..Cheers, Hetzer.
[Edit-misspelling, wrote "was born 1925" instead of 1915 - Thank you Mies!]
[ March 20, 2007, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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- Just in case someone asks "Who the f*ck is Bruno Meyer!?"
* Insert Bruno's story here * (4th post from above)
...The Henschel 129s, supported by Fw 190s, for three hours uniterruptedly attacked the soviet concentration. When one Staffel was above the battlefield, another returned to the base, the third was at the airfield to re-fuel and take ammunition, whereas the fourth took off for another action. Not even one soviet tank succeeded in breaking through to the rear of the German army...
[from: Miniatury Lotnicze 8 - Hs 129 in combat - by Marek Murawski]Bruno Meyer was born on November 13, 1915 on Haiti. He began service with the Luftwaffe at the end of 1937 at the cadet school in Hildesheim. His military career began in Poland during the September Campaign of 1939, when he piloted a Henschel Hs 123 biplane in the ranks of II.(Schlacht)/LG 2. As that unit's pilot he later fought in France and on the Eastern Front. In the spring of 1941 he became commander of 5.(Schlacht)/LG 2. On exceeding the number of 200 combat sorties, he was awarded the Knight's cross on August 21, 1941. In the first half of 1942 he fought with his Staffel at the middle part of the Eastern Front. On July 8, 1942 he was comissioned commander of 3./Erg.Zerst.Gr. based at 'Deblin-Irena' airfield. On November 1, 1942, he accepted the duty of commander of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 2, equipped with Hs 129s, which was soon moved to Africa. In the summer of 1943 he led his Staffel in the fights at Kursk. On October 18, 1943 he became commander of IV.(Pz)/SG 9, which then won significant successes in fights in the area of Bielgorod, Orel, Krivoy Rog and Uman. After he recieved the rank of Major in October 1944, he took the headquarters post of "Führer der Panzerschlachtflieger" (commander of tank-destroying pilots at the commander-in-chief of the strafing air force)..Cheers, Hetzer.
[Edit-misspelling, wrote "was born 1925" instead of 1915 - Thank you Mies!]
[ March 20, 2007, 11:48 AM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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While talking about numbers...
From the Dupuy-forum, posted by Chris Lawrence (08-14-2002)
How old are these records C. Lawrence is referring to ?...Conveniently enough the Soviet attack is clearly identified in their records and there is only one brigade it could be.
This is the 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. It is the only candidate and was reported at attacking from Visloye at 1200 Moscow time (1100 Berlin time).
There are no other candidates. The division operated with two tank brigades forward and one in the second echolon. The other forward brigade (4th Guards Tank Brigade) was to its right at Nepkhayevo while the other tank brigade remained in the rear. The Corps 47th Heavy Tank Regiment (Churchills) was already 7 - 10 kilometers away in the III Panzer Corps area engaged, and the independent 96th Tank Brigade was moving southeast of Gostishchevo and joined that fight.
Therefore, one is left with the 26th Tank Brigade. It reports that it attacked from Visloye at 1200 (Moscow) time. Visloye is at the northwest tip of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This attack drove onto height 209.5, two kilometers southwest of Visloye. The brigade then reports being attacked by 40-50 planes during the German counterattack (which occurred at 1210 Berlin time according to German reports).
The Soviet losses
The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.
The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.
As the 4th Guards Tank Brigade clearly took casualties, this all points to the actual losses of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade being around nine tanks. Assuming that some were lost to German armor, antitank guns and infantry (both during the attack and during the German counterattack) then it would appear that the claim by the VIII Air Corps of "more than 6 hits" may in fact be high. The claim of 40 tanks killed appears to be off by an order of magnitude.
In June 1996, Colonel a.D. Koltunow admitted that soviet historical literature about the Tank-Battle around Prochorowka isn't corresponding with the whole truth. He was "asked" at that time to "clean-up" the numbers....Vor diesem sehr eindrucksvollen Denkmal gab Oberst a.D. Koltunow eine Erklärung zu den damaligen Geschehnissen ab, in der er zugab, dass die sowjetische Geschichtsschreibung über den Ablauf der Panzerschlacht bei Prochorowka nicht der ganzen Wahrheit entspricht. Er sei damals "aufgefordert" worden, die Zahlen zu "bereinigen".[from: Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil I)]
It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.
Cheers, Hetzer.
[ March 19, 2007, 03:12 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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While talking about numbers...
From the Dupuy-forum, posted by Chris Lawrence (08-14-2002)
How old are these records C. Lawrence is referring to ?...Conveniently enough the Soviet attack is clearly identified in their records and there is only one brigade it could be.
This is the 26th Tank Brigade of the II Guards Tank Corps. It is the only candidate and was reported at attacking from Visloye at 1200 Moscow time (1100 Berlin time).
There are no other candidates. The division operated with two tank brigades forward and one in the second echolon. The other forward brigade (4th Guards Tank Brigade) was to its right at Nepkhayevo while the other tank brigade remained in the rear. The Corps 47th Heavy Tank Regiment (Churchills) was already 7 - 10 kilometers away in the III Panzer Corps area engaged, and the independent 96th Tank Brigade was moving southeast of Gostishchevo and joined that fight.
Therefore, one is left with the 26th Tank Brigade. It reports that it attacked from Visloye at 1200 (Moscow) time. Visloye is at the northwest tip of the large woods south of Gostishchevo. This attack drove onto height 209.5, two kilometers southwest of Visloye. The brigade then reports being attacked by 40-50 planes during the German counterattack (which occurred at 1210 Berlin time according to German reports).
The Soviet losses
The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.
The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.
As the 4th Guards Tank Brigade clearly took casualties, this all points to the actual losses of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade being around nine tanks. Assuming that some were lost to German armor, antitank guns and infantry (both during the attack and during the German counterattack) then it would appear that the claim by the VIII Air Corps of "more than 6 hits" may in fact be high. The claim of 40 tanks killed appears to be off by an order of magnitude.
In June 1996, Colonel a.D. Koltunow admitted that soviet historical literature about the Tank-Battle around Prochorowka isn't corresponding with the whole truth. He was "asked" at that time to "clean-up" the numbers....Vor diesem sehr eindrucksvollen Denkmal gab Oberst a.D. Koltunow eine Erklärung zu den damaligen Geschehnissen ab, in der er zugab, dass die sowjetische Geschichtsschreibung über den Ablauf der Panzerschlacht bei Prochorowka nicht der ganzen Wahrheit entspricht. Er sei damals "aufgefordert" worden, die Zahlen zu "bereinigen".[from: Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil I)]
It seems to me that the loss-numbers found by C. Lawrence mustn't be the ultimate proof that Hptm Bruno Meyer's "Tank formation 'destroyed' by air" - story is complete rubbish.
Cheers, Hetzer.
[ March 19, 2007, 03:12 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]
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Here's some more info from Martin Pegg's "Hs 129 Panzerjäger!":
[...I'll summarize the rest...]...In January 1943, Dornemann was appointed Staffelkapitän of 4.(Pz)/Sch.G 1 based at Stalino, but between February and May, 1943, he was unable to obtain a single confirmed tank kill, despite his repeated and determined cannon attacks. He knew he was hitting the target and the tanks often clattered to a standstill, but without any visible sign of damage a confirmed kill could not be awarded...(1)(1) As well as Tank "kills", pilots could claim tanks "Hit with measurable effect"; in other words, damaged to an extent which would temporarily put them out of action.
...Georg Dornemann's technique for destroying tanks was to attack them from the side so that if his shells failed to penetrate the interior, he at least stood a good chance of immobilizing the vehicle by damaging its tracks and wheels. Occassionaly, he would approach his intended victims from behind and endeavour to destroy the fuel tanks. If successful, such attacks frequently started "... brilliant firework display"...
...During the run-up to a tank target, Dornemann frequently used his 20mm guns loaded with tracer and high-explosive shells to aim, but on some occassions he was so certain of a hit he fired only his tungsten-cored ammunition. If struck in the right place, a tank could be destroyed or disabled with two or three of the armour-piercing rounds...
...It was not until 1944 that a training manual for attacking tanks was completed and until this time no standard method existed. Instead, it would seem that each individual Staffelkapitän operated more or less as he saw fit, and two different methods of attack were evolved, each of which had its favourable points. Franz Oswald and Bruno Meyer preferred to approach from behind, where the tank's armor was thinnest...
* Added advantage of attacking from behind:
- if own aircraft is hit during approach, you're already flying in the general direction of your own troops...
* Disadvantages
- target is very small when viewed from behind, pilot has to be an excellent marksman;
- in order to ensure hits @ 90° @ rear sloped armor, you have to fire while being in a dive and in order to avoid crashing into target, you have to pull out at greater range than if you were attacking horizontally. (...or you press it home to point-blank range and...KABOOM!)
Walter Krause, who flew with 10.(Pz)/SG9, confirmed that because of the dangers of this method of attack his Staffel performed horizontal attacks as a standard. Using the fuselage-mounted weapons to correct aim, pilots would open fire @ close range with MK 101 / MK 103 cannon, usually from ~250-50 m (~820-164 ft), banking immediatly to avoid any explosion if the target detonated immediatly after being hit.
Here's a nice photo showing the white diagonal lines painted on the port glass side panel. These lines (calibrated for 10°,20° and 30° dives) aided the pilot in aligning with the horizon during diving attacks.
[from: Squadron Signal No 1176 "HS 129 In Action"]
And here's a self-explaining scan from Martin Pegg's "Hs 129-bible":
Cheers, Hetzer.
Panzerabwehrflugzeug and other assorted misuse of language
in Combat Mission: Barbarossa to Berlin
Posted
Damn!
And I thought this was the "Panzerschlachtflieger-continuation-thread" !
Now it turns out to be the "Kartoffelverwandlungsargumentehass-continuation-thread", ...ARGH! :mad:
Anyway, maybe this is still useful...in the oncoming discussion...
"Tank-Buster"-films
* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m63oJu39EPk(01:47) posted by Tero;
- Stettin, March 1945 - a lone Ju87G (Rudel?)makes two strafing runs on russian tanks,...
* "Stukas in 1945"(01:40);
- Hs129s and Ju87Gs attacking soviet tanks on the snow-covered fields of Pomerania (January/February 1945);
- "Stettin sequence" of the lone Ju87G....slightly better quality then the first vid...
...looks (and sounds) to me that the Ju87G fires 5 shots (bursts?) in the first and 3 shots (bursts?) in the second attack-run...?
* "Documentary on Stukas"(04:18);
- Celebration of 100,000th sortie flown by Stukageschwader 2;
- Ju87Ds dive-bombing and making low-level "Steckrübenwurf" bomb-attacks against soviet armour;
- Rudel making two attack-runs on soviet tanks in his Ju-87G, firing one burst of two rounds during each attack.
* "Rudel vs. Russian tanks"(00:28);
- ...short version of the vid above, just showing Rudel in action...
* http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cU6OK1zSxKg(01:40) posted by ParaBellum;
- February 1943 - battle of the Kuban Bridgehead. Modified Ju87D-3 of "Panzerjagdkommando Weiss" in action against soviet shipping and landing craft (Rudel was credited with destroying 70 of these craft after a month).
- The film shows eight attack runs (one against two targets) of the "Kanonenvögel" against soviet shipping...
Rudel & other "Tank-Buster" links:
Big Guns
The Eastern Front - Luftwaffe Aces - Hans-Ulrich Rudel
Pilotenbunker - Hans-Ulrich Rudel
Stuka-Pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel: His Life Story in Words and Photographs
Interview - Tank-Busting Stuka Pilot
The Dupuy Institute Forum - Tank Busting Aircraft at Kursk
Poster Child for the Blitzkrieg: The Ju 87 Stuka
(Incomplete) List of German "Tank-Busting" Aces (5th post from above)
Tankbusters: Airborne Anti-Tank Guns in WW 2
Bruno Meyer's 'story' about Panzerschlachtflieger vs Tanks on 8th July 1943 (4th post from above)
Air Operations during Battle of Kursk July-August 1943
Other Links:
Luftarchiv - Bordwaffen I - Maschinengewehre- und Kanonen
Kursk - Raw Data to download
Katukov’s missed opportunity at Kursk?
Red Army Studies - Soviet Military History Journals
Report about Operations of the 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, Jul.14 - Aug.31, 1944
eMilitary Manuals - The Machinegun Collection
Maritime Terms and Definitions (circa 1944)
1.JMA - Heavy artillery at Leningrad
Admiral Kuznetsov - Memoirs of Wartime Minister of the Navy - Meetings with the Allies
Mine Warfare - "The bottling up of the Red Banner Fleet at the base of the Gulf of Finland"
The Red Army tank losses in the Karelian Isthmus during the Winter War
Axis History Forum - Russian Tank losses in the 'Battle of Berlin 1945' to "Fausts"
WaffenHQ - Codenamen militärischer Operationen im Zweiten Weltkrieg
WWII by the book - German Aircraft Bombs
WRG - Bombs, Dispensers & Drop Containers
A Lesson of History: The Luftwaffe and Barbarossa
Why Wikipedia is ****
Photos
Ju 87G
Ju87G-1 right wingpod 12-round box-magazine
Ju87G-1 half loaded right wingpod box-magazine
6 round 37mm ammo clip being loaded into (12 round) box-magazine
Junkers Ju 87 G "Panzerjäger" - photos
3,7cm H-Pzgr. Patr. L'spur o. Zerl.
3,7cm H-Pzgr.L'spur o. Zerl.
37x263B ammo for BK 3,7 (1)
37x263B ammo for BK 3,7 (2)
37x263B ammo for BK 3,7 (3)
vorläufige Schusstafel for 3,7cm M-Granatpatrone 18 L'Spur
Schusstafel for 3,7cm H-Pzgr.Patr. L'Spur o.Zerl.
Hs 129
Hs 129 - sideview, cockpit
Hs 129: *Effect of AP-ammo - *Attack-Angles - *Knocked-out T-34...
Hs 129 - photos
"Marat"
Marat 1939
Marat's magazine has blown
Wrecked conning tower after explosion
Marat after explosion - 1
Marat after explosion - 2
Marat after explosion - 3
Marat after explosion - 4
Marat wreck, hull painted as concrete quay
Marat now Petropavlovsk, 1944 or 45
Marat now Volkov, 1951
Other
"An old map of Kronstadt"
"New map of Leningrad"
"Oktyabrskaya Revolutsia" under Stuka-attack
"Illustrious" under Stuka-attack
"Hurrie" (armed with 2× 40 mm Vickers Type S cannon)
"Hurribomber"
(modified) Russian Kursk Map 1943
Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil I)
Cheers, Hetzer38.
[ March 25, 2007, 02:32 PM: Message edited by: Hetzer38 ]