TheVulture
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Posts posted by TheVulture
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3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:
I trust this guy on 100% and more than official reports.
Tranlation: "yes." [regarding information about cruiser Moskva hit]
That's good enough for me to think it's very likely true: anyone who's been paying attention so have noticed that Haiduk isn't in the habit of posting rumours and sticks to information that can be verified. And is usually the first person to point out when something isn't true.
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3 minutes ago, BlackMoria said:
I don't think so. If I recall my limited military history of Zhukov, all problems were nails to him and his hammer was to throw endless russian bodies at the problem until it was solved. He was no Rommel or Guderian. If this new Russian commander is cut from the same cloth, I don't expect any brilliant maneuvers from him. He is old school Soviet military academy for one, and for two, the mud season will constrain any maneuvers. I expect he will throw bodies at the problem in the hope that he can deliver the much need win that Putin wants for the 9 May parade.
True. And if I can channel the absent JasonC for a moment, most of Zhukov's successes came when he was working with Vasiliev. Without Vasiliev, Zhukov gave us such gems as operation Mars which was such a disaster that it was expunged from the Soviet histories.
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Here's a few paragraphs on the subject of Dvornikov from a context-setting essay from Geopolitical Futures:
Alexander Dvornikov isn’t exactly a household name, but it could be soon. He’s the Russian general President Vladimir Putin has put in charge of the war in Ukraine after what can generously be described as a disappointing start for Moscow. Dvornikov is credited with saving the Russian campaign in Syria, and the Kremlin hopes he can replicate his successes in Europe.
In Syria, Dvornikov understood that Russia was fighting a diffused infantry force with deep ties to the populations of the areas they were fighting in, so he launched a war on those populations focusing his resources not on the fighters themselves but on their friends and families. He meant to terrify them and thus instill a deep desire to end the war. Put less clinically, Dvornikov carried out mass murder, a calculated measure intended to save Russian lives and to intimidate other populations into staying out of the fight. Putin appointed him because of his reputation and his ability to command and massacre.
NATO members have made clear they would not intervene directly, but as the atrocities mount, so would the pressure to act. The publics of most NATO countries oppose intervention, but it only takes a few Buchas to change their attitudes. And the U.S. itself is never far away.
Appointing Dvornikov to save the day is a Hail Mary. But this misses the point. Even if Dvornikov’s brutality can somehow pacify Ukraine, it will convince the rest of the world to keep sanctions in place, thereby institutionalizing their crippling economic effects. Economic warfare is being waged by a massive global coalition. Russia was hardly economically robust before the war, but there are some claims that Russia’s gross domestic product is contracting by 50 percent. That may be overstated, but there is no question that things are bad. For Russia to “win” in Ukraine would not solve this problem. If anything, it could compound it.
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6 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
BREAKING
Russian cruiser struck by Harpoon and on fire in Black Sea.
The report I've found says it was 2 (Ukraine made) Neptune missiles, rather than harpoons (which I doubt are in theatre yet)
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I'd be wary of believing this entirety at face value without further corroboration though.
https://ukranews.com/en/news/849331-russian-warship-moskva-is-on-fire-in-black-sea-media
Ukrainian defenders attacked the flagship of the Russian fleet, missile cruiser Moskva. This is reported by volunteer Serzh Marko.
“The cruiser Moskva has just been hit by 2 Neptune missiles. It is standing, burning. And there is a storm at sea. Tactical flooding is required, apparently,” he wrote.
Earlier, the Ukrainian military damaged the Russian frigate Admiral Essen.
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37 minutes ago, DesertFox said:
"If this is actually what Russia ends up doing; they are strategically bankrupt and haven’t learned a thing. Just drip feeding forces as they become available is a recipe for Russian failure."
"And personally think this is right; Give Ukraine ranged weapons. Artillery, UAVs, fixed wing aircraft, things to allow them to attack around Russian formations. keeps Ukrainian casualties down too. Should matter more than tanks."
That twitter thread also has photos of several new Russian miles-long convoys / traffic jams just to show that their logistics traffic management hasn't radically improved in the last 6 weeks.
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28 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:
I wonder how many Javelins Ukraine actually uses in combat. It's notable that there are very few videos of them getting fired. I think I've seen only one or two during the entire war so far.
That might be a function of who has them though. We're not seeing very much footage from regular Ukraine army: it's mostly territorial defence units units putting videos up. So maybe it's just that the javelins have been sent to army units (who might be expected to take better care of the CLUs, whike TD units have received more of the one shot AT weapons.
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Deleted - duplicate info
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I think it is worth considering how the Russia performance differs between being on the attack versus defence.
Look at the Kherson region. In the first weeks, the Russian behaviour there was much the same as elsewhere - lots of road-bound BTGs advancing more or less independently of each other, past Mikolaiv and towards Kryvyi Rih, and coming to a halt in a matter of 2 weeks or so. Then those BTGs with strung out and unsecured LOCs were pushed back up to 100km in another week or two to the villages and towns more immediately around Kherson.
What has happened in the two weeks since since then? Ukraine have made multiple attacks on at least 4 or 5 different axes. They've gained some villages here and there. Others have been gained and then lost again. Attempts to threaten the airport or the crossing point on the dam at Kozatske haven't produced any noticeable movement. To all appearances, there have been localised attacks and counterattacks with varying degrees of success, but Russia has managed to maintain a consistent perimeter around Kherson. Whatever deficiencies they may have had on the attack, the BTGs in the area, dug in to villages with their limited manpower but copious heavy weapons support, and with a relatively secure rear area and LOC (helped by the fact that the UA aren't about to start indiscriminately shelling Kherson city to hit Russian rear units) have apparently managed to create a stable situation of sorts.
Now it may be that this is a stalemate for now, or it may be that one side or the other is getting attrited to the point of being unable to function. Which would lead to either a Russia collapse on the west bank, if the Russians are getting the worst of it. Or a lessening in offensive action and Russia slowly pushing the perimeter a bit further out again if the UA is coming off worse when its trying to attack prepared Russian positions.
But this is looking like a situation where the the Ukraininan advantages that have served them well so far in, terms of information superiority and copious reliable anti-tank weapons, don't provide much useful leverage. And some of the big Russian weaknesses (lack of information and insecure rear areas) are, in this situation, not present.
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US air force command reporting a Russia airplane shot down on the border between Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts this morning
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Russian authorities are saying that a railway bridge in Schebekyno (southern suburb of Belgorod) has been 'damaged' (initial report said 'destroyed' a few hours earlier,but initial announcements like that are often wrong, so take your pick which you believe).
Looks like Ukraine's Special Ops (or 'terrorists' as Russia would have it) are active.
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If true, this could be the Russian version of "boiling the frog".
Dropping nerve agents in the middle of Kyiv on civilians would obviously get a response.
Doing it in what's left of Mariupol, on the rather dubious Azov, in a fight that Russia has essentially won already (so it's not going to materially affect the outcome), in circumstances where outside verification is impossible? This is Russia saying "are you willing to risk Armageddon over this?"
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Russia talking up the "terrorist threat level" in Voronezh oblast (neighbouring Luhansk), Krasnodar Krai (on the Black Sea coast) and Crimea. Could be either scaremongering or worrying about Ukraine special forces ops.
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1 minute ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:
How? HOW?!
I am aghast a, judging by the vehicles present, not insubstantial force can park in that courtyard and not defend it. What the fudge are they doing there?
Yeah, it really does look like they just parked a platoon or two's worth of vehicles there and just wandered off for lunch and an afternoon down the pub.
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Interesting article from Geopolitical Futures about this being the "First Economic World War". And an accurate (in my mind) little quote near the start about why Russia invaded Ukraine:
"the Kremlin perceives the eastward expansion of Western influence, including into Russia, to be a modern invasion by stealth that threatens the Russian regime.
It is not Western organizations like NATO and the European Union that challenge the Kremlin, but the socio-economic model that enabled the West to win the Cold War and that enticed Eastern Europeans to want to join the West."
As has been said before in this thread, a successful Ukraine is a problem for Russia not militarily, but because Russians can easily compare their lives with (in many cases) relatives in Ukraine, and wonder why Ukraine has it better when they all started from the same place not so very long ago.
QuoteRussia and the First Economic World War
The Kremlin has prepared for decades to confront the West and its socio-economic model.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
As momentous as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, the most strategically important event in recent weeks was the global economic war between Russia and the U.S. and its allies. Russia, however, has been preparing to confront the West and challenge the Western socio-economic model for a long time.
The Putin Era to the Pandemic
Russia’s strategic interests in Ukraine are well-known. The geography and history of Russia compel its leaders to create and preserve a buffer between Moscow and the major powers in Western Europe, and to ensure access to the Black Sea. Ukraine is crucial to both goals. But beyond Ukraine, the Kremlin perceives the eastward expansion of Western influence, including into Russia, to be a modern invasion by stealth that threatens the Russian regime.
It is not Western organizations like NATO and the European Union that challenge the Kremlin, but the socio-economic model that enabled the West to win the Cold War and that enticed Eastern Europeans to want to join the West. When he became president of Russia in 2000, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the economic crisis of the 1990s, Vladimir Putin inherited a broken country. Many Russians contemplated joining the European Union, hoping that alignment with the West would bring a better life.
The priority for the Russian establishment was to stabilize and rebuild the country. Putin just wanted to survive politically. Following the example of past successful Russian leaders, he centralized power. Knowing he needed stability and growth to slow the rate of emigration and address Russia’s poor demographics, he sought to make Europe economically dependent on Moscow. And looking back at history and the current power balance, he identified Germany as the lynchpin of his strategy of dependence.
Russian ties to Germany were key to establishing ties to the European Union more broadly, but this was only the beginning of Russia’s strategy in Europe. Russia opened up its economy to Western investment, established links throughout the Continent and tried to understand the inner workings of EU bureaucracy. It established close business ties with Italy, France and later Hungary, and built a political network that would help expand its influence in Europe. For Moscow, learning about European vulnerabilities was just as important as building up its economy and growing Russia into a stable economic power.
The Kremlin also campaigned to join the World Trade Organization to establish deeper relationships with the world’s biggest economic players. In the process, it benefited from foreign investments in Russia and learned how the global economy works, building partnerships with not just Western economies but also other economic powers. The only problem was that China, its major ally against the West, was not seeing the accelerated growth it hoped for and was still very much dependent on the U.S. market, giving Beijing limited ability to counter U.S. interests in the world and forcing Russia to keep its focus on Europe.
Average Russians saw improvements in their standard of living under Putin. In major Russian cities, life was similar to that in the West. However, when it became a major player in the energy market, Russia also increased its exposure to global economic cycles. The European economic crisis of the 2010s sent shivers through Moscow. Russia’s economy remained fragile overall, and the gap between urban and rural areas remained dangerously high, potentially threatening Putin’s control.
At the same time, the West offered an attractive model to rival Russia’s. It wasn’t so much the growing Western influence in Russia’s buffer zone that bothered the Kremlin, but the fact that ordinary Russians might look at Eastern Europe and see a better model for political organization and economic growth.
Then the pandemic hit. The Russian president apparently feared that the economic insecurity wrought by COVID-19 could threaten his country’s economic security and stability. As the worst socio-economic effects of the pandemic faded, action against the West became urgent. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this was a unique moment. The U.S. has been trying to reduce its presence in Europe and instead focus on the Indo-Pacific and domestic problems. In other words, from the Kremlin, the trans-Atlantic alliance and the European Union appear weak. Most important, Russia’s leaders believe they have gained sufficient knowledge of the way the West works and can fight it effectively.
Preparing for War
Russia has been preparing to confront the West since at least the early 2000s. Besides stockpiling foreign reserves, Moscow constructed trade blocs and deepened relations with projects like the Eurasian Economic Union. In Europe, it enticed Germany to become dependent on Russian natural gas, which as is clear today made it extremely difficult for Europe to cut off Russian energy imports. Shifting from gas would require Europe to build new infrastructure – a costly, time-consuming process.
The close German-Russian partnership also benefited the Kremlin’s Europe strategy in other ways. To give a practical example, the EU had plans to make the Danube fully navigable through the establishment of additional canals, increasing Central Europe’s connection with the Black Sea. This would have given Europe more leverage against Russia at the moment, when the war in Ukraine has forced the rerouting of commercial flows from the Black Sea to much more expensive land routes. Instead, positive relations with Moscow made the project seem unnecessary, and it faded away.
It is no coincidence that after 2012, the first full year that Nord Stream 1 was operational, Europe became much more reluctant to adopt policies that could be seen as anti-Russian. There was simply no interest in Germany to carry them out. It is also no coincidence that relations between the U.S. and Germany have cooled down over that time. The U.S. needed Germany to lead Europe, or at least maintain neutrality, to prevent Russia from expanding its influence in Europe as the U.S. drew back. The fact that Russia joined the World Trade Organization in 2012 gave it even more leverage in the world economy.
It is also worth noting that the Kremlin used personal relationships to shore up its influence. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was tapped to lead Nord Stream 1. Nord Stream AG also hired former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen as a consultant to speed up the permit process in Finland. Former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi served on the board of Delimobil, a Russian car-sharing service. Former Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho was on the board of Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank. Former Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern resigned from the board of Russia’s state-owned railway company in the early days of the war in Ukraine, while another ex-chancellor, Wolfgang Schussel, remained on the board of Russia’s Lukoil. This is just a short list of top politicians, all of whom had at least some influence over their country’s foreign policy discussions. They have certainly been useful to Russian economic growth and the advance of Russia’s economic strategy in Europe.
Working closely with Europeans for the past two decades has enabled Russia to learn what is important for the stability of their countries. It has also helped the Kremlin better understand their political agendas and support causes that work to its advantage. For example, Russia enthusiastically supported many green policies, like Germany’s decision to give up nuclear power – which translated into greater reliance on Russian gas. And Russia has openly supported populist parties throughout Europe and effectively used information warfare, all in an attempt to destabilize and ultimately divide Europe.
Globally, Russia has maintained close relations with traditional enemies and competitors of the West. Joining the WTO gave it a stronger position on the global stage, which is used to advance the influence and interests of emerging global players, including the BRICS countries, which also include Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Though the results were modest, Russia promoted the group as an alternative to the West and continued to focus on building ties to China and India, establishing links that it hoped would withstand in a potential confrontation with the West, which we’re seeing play out today.
To counter the current sanctions, it has looked to China for help. The Eurasian Economic Union gives it proxies for continuing to do business with the world. At the same time, Russia’s presence in the Middle East and parts of Africa helps it keep the price of oil high – high enough that it can keep paying its bills. Influence in the Middle East and the Sahel, two highly unstable but resource-rich areas, also gives Russia more leverage over the world economy.
In building its network, Russia has tried to focus on economics and enhancing weaknesses in the global network. It expanded its influence abroad, making sure the dependencies it was encouraging were strong enough to give it leverage but lose enough to allow its withdrawal when necessary. Russian strategy certainly has its weaknesses, but Russia has options in countering the West during the current global economic war. Supporting EU fragmentation through its economic ties in Europe and using the knowledge of European politics that it’s gained over the years are likely the most important elements of its strategy. The moment European citizens feel the repercussion of Western sanctions is when the bloc will become more fragile, which will allow Russia to exploit the EU’s weaknesses.
The world is witnessing its first economic world war of the modern era. The rules are undefined, and the global economy is complex, meaning collateral damage is unavoidable and frequently unpredictable. Slowly, we are becoming aware of the repercussions the sanctions on Russia are having on the global economy. Less clear are the instruments that Russia can employ against the West. How this will change the world is a mystery. All we can do is look back at what Russia has prepared for – and guess what could come next. This is only the beginning.
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1 minute ago, Bulletpoint said:
The war in Ukraine has been the only thing on the BBC news page for more than a month now, but this morning, I noticed it's been pushed below the fold and replaced by coverage of the French elections.
I guess that means that the war is pretty much over now. Apart from a few places like Mariupol.
Putin wants to portray the withdrawal as a redeployment to focus on the east, but I think this basically just means he wants to hold on to the occupied areas. I don't see any massive new offensive happening - seems we're back to the situation before the war.
BBC news, like most UK news, suffers from an obsession with human interest stories. Journalists are pretty much trained to care about nothing else it seems. They don't know how to cover a war except ion the big situation changes (Russia invades, Ukraine wins battle for Kiev and Russia withdraws), and stories about normal people being affected by the war. Once they've run out of angles to cover on that, they don't know what to do any more. because they don't know how to report on the actual military situation where there are developments worth reporting.
Any dramatic or noteworthy developments will get covered still, but anything else is going to be fighting for air time with coverage of the upcoming local government elections in May.
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Russian military warehouse hit in Luhansk region. Looks like ammo cooking off.
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11 minutes ago, Strykr45 said:
Has anyone researched the US BioWeapon/Lab connection to this situation ???
There isn't a connection.
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Fun implications on Russia's manpower problems from today's ISW update
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10
QuoteThe Russian Defense Ministry is reportedly offering cash bonuses to incentivize forces withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine to reenter combat operations. Radio Svoboda published images of a document on April 10 that it reported was issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense on April 2 offering specific bonuses for Russian troops in Ukraine.[1] The document specifies large payments including 300,000 rubles for destroying a fixed-wing aircraft, 200,000 for destroying a helicopter, and 50,000 for armored vehicles and artillery. Radio Svoboda stated the payments are intended to coerce units withdrawn from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions to reenter combat. We have previously reported several instances of Russian soldiers refusing orders to return to Ukraine after being pulled back.[2]
Russian forces are implementing increasingly draconian measures to conscript previously ineligible personnel. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 10 that Russian forces are now conscripting previously ineligible categories of people, including those with childhood disabilities and workers in protected industries.[3] The GUR reported that DNR/LNR authorities are enabling traffic inspectors to issue on-the-spot conscription notices and are establishing checkpoints on key highways. DNR and Russian military police are additionally reportedly destroying documents granting exemptions—such as medical records or work certificates—to forcibly conscript people.[4]
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Ukrainian protest in Kherson today
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Claims that Russia has lost up to a company trying to attack Oleksandrivka SW of Kherson
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24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
This is a laughable gesture by a creaking global order that has its head so far up its own...well you get the idea. I have said it before, this war is terrible and costly, they all are and I don't want to downplay that, but it is the beginning of an era of "power being power" we are entering into, a Season of Mars (not Venus) that has been a long time coming. That is bigger than this war, it has implications for the next ones. This elevates this whole thing beyond "a local border disagreement" -as some have posited- and towards a strategic "black swan" or shock. The implications span from the tactical through to the geopolitical, that kind of thing is rare.
This is an argument I keep having with friends and acquaintances in the UK - it probably applies in much of the west to be honest. People keep talking about 'international law' and the legality or illegality of various things. This has been used a lot as justification for various stuff in the last 40+ years, but it seems like the majority of people seem to actually believe that international law means something. That the decisions of the UN security council are in some way binding. That international relations are governed by some rules-based authority.
I keep trying to point out that the only way to force a country to comply with 'international law' is military or economic pressure. The 'law' is nothing more than a voluntary code of conduct of countries agreeing to abide by some rules in exchange for other countries agreeing the same, on the basis that we all benefit in the end by resolving differences by non-military means - even if it may work against one countries interests in individual cases.
But it is purely voluntary. If a country like Russia decides it is willing to live with the consequences, it can ignore whatever 'rules' are imagined by international law. Which has worked pretty well for it up until 2022, as the west seemed to think that Russia was willing to be part of the rules based international order. It isn't. It's just willing to make enough of a pretense at it (whilst doing what it wants) to paralyze the political actions who of countries who do believe that stuff.
So yeah, I think there is going to be a rapid shift to people understanding that this rules based system is unenforceable on countries that don't want to play that game, and that a power based reality is going to become more prevalent.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
After those satellite pictures of stockpiling Russian vehicles at Khersonn airport, here is you daily report of explosions heard from the airport / Chornobayivka (nearest settlement)