Wartgamer
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The 3AD initial battle action clearly demonstrates the 'non-surgical' nature of artillery in the bocage. It is very similar to using artillery in jungle fighting.3AD History Website Chapter Index NEXT CHAPTERCHAPTER:
NORMANDY AND NORTHERN FRANCE
By Haynes W. DuganFirst Blood at Villiers-Fossard
This was our initial commitment to combat, with Combat Command A the principal player, the object to dent a German salient fronting our 29th Division of V Corps. It was, to us, an important action. The day: June 29th.
However, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, the official army history, disposed of it in these words:
"General Gerow (29th Commander) launched a limited objective attack with the recently arrived 3rd Armored Division at Villiers-Fossard. The purpose was simply to wipe out an enemy salient in the 29th Division lines and so secure a more favorable line of departure for the forthcoming resumption of the 29th Division's drive toward St. Lo. The crisis at St. Lo passed when the 3rd Armored Division, having achieved its main objectives on 30 June, halted."
What follows is a first hand account by William J. Camey of the Division Artillery section:
"After completing the beach landing on 24 June, Combat Command A (CC A) of the Division was committed on 29 June in an attack to take out a German salient in our lines near the town of Villiers-Fossard, three or four miles north of St. Lo. This pan of Normandy is the bocage country of apple orchards, small fields with high earthen hedgerows, and sunken roads.
"German infantry could get good defensive positions with overhead cover from artillery air bursts by digging into the hedgerows. Due to the nature of the terrain tanks have limited mobility and visibility is limited making artillery fire adjustments difficult. Also an infantry company commander on the attack could find it very difficult to know the location of his platoons.
"At 0900 Combat Command A began the attack with two task forces abreast. Each task force had a 105mm self-propelled artillery battalion in direct support. I was running the Division Artillery Fire Direction Center and had three more 3rd Armored Artillery Battalions in general support under my control as well as a call on battalions of XIX Corps Artillery.
"We had worked together as a team for two and one-half years but this was the first combat action. Things went relatively smoothly at first. However, the terrain and profuse vegetation made it almost impossible to know the exact location of some of our units. One duty of a forward observer is to keep his fire direction center informed of the location of his supported leading elements. This information, which is vital for the safety of the command is then relayed to the Division Artillery Fire Direction Center.
"Our leading element reports were not good for several reasons. First, in this compartmented terrain it was sometimes impossible to see them, and even if one did, to get a correct map reference. Normally, map coordinates for enemy forces and for adjusting fire are given by radio in the clear. Map coordinates for friendly forces are given using a simple map code. The reporting of leading elements was a low priority when you are getting shot at, when you didn't know for sure where the friendlies were, and when these dubious results had to be encoded.
"The Division Commander, Major General Leroy Watson, and Division Artillery Commander, Colonel Fredric J. Brown, had an observation post on a small hill where they could watch the action. I had a telephone line to them.
"In mid-afternoon, an observation post was hit with a major tank infantry counterattack. We learned later the counterattack was mounted by elements of one of the best divisions the Germans had in Normandy, Panzer Lehr Division. One of the direct support battalions requested a T.O.T. (Time on Target) laid down just in front of their leading elements. Time on Target is an artillery concentration fired so that the first volley of maybe 100 guns burst on the target at the same time. The technique is most effective.
"In spite of not having the most accurate frontline reports, I believed that it would be safe to shoot. I arranged for all five 3rd Armored Division Battalions to fire plus five battalions from XIX Corps, approximately 150 guns, everything from 105mm to 240mm. I assigned concentration areas to each battalion by map coordinates. A battalion concentration will cover an area of 300 to 400 yards in diameter so a ten battalion T.O.T. would cover an area about the size of a country club golf course.
"I called Colonel Brown and told him that it was close to our front lines but that I thought it would be safe to shoot. Ten battalions, 10 volleys hit the counterattack with devastating effect - 1500 artillery rounds exploding in less than five minutes. Even before we ceased firing we got reports of short rounds. One battery of the 30 firing made an error of 1000 yards and was shooting into an engineer company in reserve, causing casualties. Normally with short rounds a cease-fire is called, and every fire direction center and battery check their data. With this many battalions involved, it could take 30 to 45 minutes before firing could resume.
"The attack was stopped but not broken. The German troops were reorganizing to press home their attack. I had a terrible decision to make. If I ordered a cease-fire the 3rd Armored Division, and part of XIX Corps, would be without artillery support for a critical 30 to 45 minutes. The veteran German troops could very well have overrun our leading formations in their first combat action and caused severe casualties.
"If I ordered the concentration fired again, I would cause more American casualties. I really had no choice, however. I ordered the T.O.T. retired, and the same battery fired short again causing additional American casualties. The counterattack was broken, but I still agonize over this decision.
"After the action, Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Richardson, whose 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Armored Regiment was in the thick of things with Col. Truman E. Boudinot's Task Force X, was interviewed. Richardson had belly crawled through a bocage country field to a hedgerow, on the opposite side of which was a German tank. 'What kind was it?,' he was asked. 'I don't know,' Richardson replied, 'but it had a gun as long as a telephone post.'
"At first hearing this may not have sounded particularly informative, but wait. There were only two German tanks in general use with this appearance. One was the Mark IV Panther, of which there were considerable numbers, the other the Mark V Tiger, with relatively few in action in our area. Thus, the odds were about three or four to one that it was a Panther. Either one, it could more than deal with one of our tanks as to firepower. For such a short action our losses were considerable: 333 enlisted men, 18 officers and 31 tanks. No small loss.
"One thing the Germans were quick to learn our 'secret weapon' was our artillery. Soon prisoners were asking about our 'automatic artillery' after one battery was getting off a round every 10 seconds."
Hopefully the reader appreciates the staggering losses the 3AD took on its first day. More than likely, 10% or more may have been from friendly-fire. Who knows? It would be nice to know what losses teh Germans took in this battle.
[ March 27, 2005, 12:55 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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It is a given. Its when troops are attacking or other situations where they are in the open. The Germans were very insistant on attacking any time they could. It became almost preditatble.
Its usually mortars AND artillery that are combined to get those high percentages. It is not always those high numbers either. In jungle warfare, it can be as low as 50%.
Heres an interesting stat. In Italy, 1000 KIA US troops were examined in detail. They wanted to see how they died, who died, etc.
87.5% were infantry or armored infantry. 2.7% were artillery. 2.7% were tank. 2.1% Engineers. 0.9% TD and the rest some others. Clearly, the inf/arm-inf were not 87.5% of the troops in the area. Most of the infs were due to either fragments or 'HE'. 80% were non-coms. 5.9% were officers. Rest NCOs.
228 out of 310 of single wound cases were either described as HE or Fragments. About 3/4. Rest were 'samll arms'. Multiple wound cases were very messy and often hard to determine what did the killing. Being machine gunned to death but laying in artillery barrage afterwards starts mucking up the stats.
But many HE and Frags could also have been direct fire weapons also. Its a messy business and some of the pics are unbelievable.
Even though the actual missiles were not recovered, the general breakdown of the causative agents was comparable to that determined in other ground force casualty surveys where witnesses were interrogated and autopsies were performed. Small arms accounted for 107 (10.9 percent) of the 983 missile-wounded casualties. Fragment-producing weapons were tentatively identified in the remaining 876 (89.1 percent) of these casualties. Shell fragments were identified with certainty in 382 (38.9 percent) of the casualties. However, the noncommittal term "high explosive" was used for 471 (47.9 percent) of the cases, and it was presumed that most of the missiles were derived from mortar and artillery shells. Hand grenades were positively identified in 3 (0.1 percent) of the casualties, landmines in 19 (1.9 percent), and aerial bombs in 1 (0.1 percent). If the exact identification of the missiles could have been made, the proportion of hand grenade and landmine casualties might have increased.[ March 26, 2005, 01:29 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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One of these carrier types was featured on a TV show the other day (Its a wierd show with a Marine barking and features 'Mailcall').
Anyway, this vehicle was being driven by the 'Gunny' and he did a complete 180 turn with a locked track. This vehicle turned completely around what appeared to be seconds. Nothing like you see in the CM games.
If a flamethrower was mounted on these things, It could easily approach an enemy position quickly, flame it, turn around and be gone.
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I think Jason and I are in agreement that attacking defensive positions with artillery, and Veritible proves this out, is largely a waste of material. Veritible was attacking typically dug in troops. Not the Maginot line.
Artillery, if not used against an enemy that is attacking, is best used against enemy artillery, mortars, Command Posts, lines of communications.
Artillery can not fire full tilt forever. The US found this out in WWII. Shooting 24 guns at platoon sized targets gets expensive. The logistics of moving ammo from a US factory, across an ocean, across France shoots the logistician in the foot. Each 33 pound shell 'weighs' 100s of pounds in fuel, space, time, parts, food, lives, etc.
Troops do not have to stay in the cellers by the way. WWI proved this out. As long as a warning system allows troops to reman thier positions with fields of fire, an artillery attack followed by assaulting troops can be repulsed.
[ March 26, 2005, 11:53 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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Infantry in buildings are just too vulnearble to direct and indirect HE.
The taller a building is, the greater number of indirect fire rounds it will 'catch'. This is because rounds are coming in at an angle. No one is going to stay in a house catching 75mm+ HE for very long.
Unreinforced buildings are also very vulnerable to small arms AP rounds. Sustained HMG fire can even 'mousehole' a building.
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So the Germans had adequate artillery?
They did not even supply adequate panzerfaust.
A German estimate of casualties was around 100K for June/July btw. The fact that they lost so many troops to surrender is another 'resource' wasted (not sure if counted in the 100K). Rommel himself brought it to Hitler's attention that he was not being supplied enough men/material to allow fighting to continue. Then a plane shot him up.
The Germans should not have held anything in Normandy but fought a war of defensive attrition where they inflicted greater casualties while slowly giving ground. This would have curtailed the loss from Prisoners and stopped the wholesale loss of major equipment. The Germans lost many more men to artillery while attacking than they did while defending.
I suppose most of the initial posts in this thread have been forgotten but I will reiterate the points anyway.
One of the things that this 'logisticians' warfare supposes is that the enemy will let you just bombard the snot out of you. In other words, artillery supremacy. The US may have had 'shell' superiority but not supremacy. The obvious thing is that an enemy will be able to determine where your very valuable/expensive artillerymen and pieces are (counter-battery). Will you risk losing them to kill/wound a half dozen grunts?
If the arty is being used as a pre-lude to an attack, will the enemy artillery not prepare to get its bloody bang for buck by attacking your exposed troops? So even if you get 1 'victory' for each 100 shells, the enemy might get his 1 victory for 15 shells?
[ March 26, 2005, 11:23 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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The origional point of the thread was about vulnerability of certain positions to indirect fire. A mortar emplacement being cited I believe. The discussion, while naturally looking at many aspects, is relevant.
What is being discussed is how much more effective a 'concentration' (that is, when multiple batteries combine fire on a target area) and the expected payoff for rounds burned.
The CW expected about 250mx250m to be a concentration a regiment of guns (24 guns). Thats 62500 sq m. I think nearly everyone would agree with that.
What is debateable is the ability to 'move' that square around. Or even to observe it once it starts developing.
Now nearly anyone must realize that the shells are not distributed uniformly in the square. In the very real situation where artillery is firing perpendicular to an enemy line (that is, the guns and enemy front line are parallel), The square will basically having greater 'concentration' in the middle parrelel area.
So any optimization of using these concentrations relies on a concentration of troops and hopefully near the center area.
Its trading precision for numbers.
In the bocage, the necessity to concentrate ones own infantry (to cover small individual fields) was offset by the excellent cover/concealment available.
Calling in concentrations in the Bocage is hampered by the inability to actually observe the initial ranging rounds and the danger to one's own troops.
http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/errorsmistakes.htmTargets were located using a map reference or target number. The basic process for ranging was to use a single gun, ordering corrections to it that all batteries in the engagement applied, unless otherwise ordered. If the correction was less than about 500 yards, it was ordered in the form Left or Right and Add or Drop in yards, which was applied by each battery to its own BT line. If more than about 500 yards then a cardinal point bearing and distance was used. Since these large concentrations covered quite large areas (regiment – about 250 × 250 yards, division about 350 × 350 yards, division with AGRA about 400 × 400 yards) precise corrections were generally deemed unnecessary.In each battery all CPs calculated map data, which had to agree to within 50 yards and 30 minutes between the BCP and TCPs. On completion of ranging a regimental target it was usual to fire a single round from a pivot gun in each battery, and from each regiment for multi-regiment targets, before ordering gunfire.
Obviously the more regiments firing at a target the bigger the area affected by the fire. However, this was not a linear relationship. Basically, each troop’s mean point of impact (MPI) would be a distance from the MPI of the whole concentration in some direction. The more troops there were the greater the probability of there being some at a greater distance, a normal probability distribution. This is explained in more detail in Errors and Mistakes.
This is a must read.
Notice the use of a 'pivot' gun to fire a single round to confirm the calcs. This is somewhat hopeful since the dispersion of a gun can be much greater than the requirement.
Just using a single battery of guns, where one gun is used to 'vector-in' the battery, can be prone to error-assumptions. Lets say you are a FO, see a target (platoon of infantry moving), call for a ranging round (based off a nearby terrain feature), estimate its relation to the moving target, and then call for a 10 round FFE.
The fact that the ranging round could have been an outlier (see dispersion), makes the whole FFE a crap shoot. At best, given the predictable nature of width of dispersion to length, you may have got quite a few rounds somewhere laong the line between the guns and the target. But getting some of the target guys would have been luck. More than likely, the ranging round and initial rounds of the FFE would have made the target troops scramble for cover/concealment.
This is a top down look at dispersion from a gun showing percentages.
Some data for thought..
From the above tables for predicted fire some key points emerge, assuming no mistakes. For 25-pdr at a range of 9,500 yds:50% of fire unit's MPIs will be within 100 yds of the ordered target location in range and about 54 yds in line; and
100% of fire unit's MPIs will be within 400 yds and about 216 yds.
[ March 26, 2005, 10:54 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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This is Jason's origional argument. He seems to want to imply that just tossing shells will eventually defeat an enemy. Unless they have 6 months of labor/material invested.A tactician may think the only point of arty is to suppress, because he doesn't expect a modest barrage to annihilate whole companies at a go. But a logistician knows better. You don't have to win the war this afternoon. The enemy is right over there, he isn't going anyplace. As fast as you can truck up the shells, he bleeds.The only way to stop that is to dig in so deep, with such an enourmous investment in materials and labor, that every unit really has that double log bunker with 3 feet of packed earth, or (when the 150s and 155s come up) even more. Which only happens at lines prepared six months in advance by huge engineering operations, or static for ages.
Its untrue. The German trench position shown would not take anything like 6 months. Hedgerows defeat his time period even quicker.
His argument is clearly based on non-typical enemy unit densitys. There is no way that should have been missed.
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Cover/vulnerability from artillery can be broken down as follows:
1. None. Out in the open. The impacting artillery will cause casualties primarily from fragments. Being close enough to be killed/wounded from the actual blast would mean 100% death from fragments anyway. Lying down significantly reduces your vulnerability. Height being the factor. Airbursts can negate even lying down. Airbursts can be caused by timed fuses, proxity fuses or shells jumping back off the ground from impact (those shells that come in at a steep enough angle).
2. Beneath ground level. Purposely dug position or naturally occuring terrain feature (ditch, etc). Very good temporary protection. Fragments defeated by earth. Airbursts mitigated but still a problem. ground bursts need very close strikes to defeat the earth cover.
3. Beneath ground level w/overhead cover. Overhead cover defeats most fragments. Safe from falling ejecta. Still vulnerable to direct hits by HE shells that will defeat the structure through collapse.
4. Same as above with additional thickness. Thickness depends on HE content of threat artillery. HE set on delay (even mortars) require substantial earthworks.
In the case of the infantry trench I posted before, the weapons positions give cover from direct fire weapons and initial rounds of artillery. The communication trench gives type 2. cover. The individual 'U.' positions give type 3. cover. And finally, the Unterstant gives type 4 cover for a group of men.
Bocage: The actual nature of the hedgerows allowed each man to generate an individual U position that also functioned as a Unterstant position also. The Command Posts still would have to dig a substantial fortification I would suppose.
The use of Bocage fighting, with its extreme density of troops, is as poor an example of troop dispersion in defense that you could find. I am not surprised that Jason would have to resort to it.
I actually copied that map into MS Paint and did substantial measurements. Even in this dense situation, you can't typically get that many positions under a square like he thinks.
Artillery can not be as squared as he says. You can not 'place' the square with such precision as needed.
[ March 25, 2005, 02:13 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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Actually Jason came into the thread with his attrition theory and used the bad example of DBP as proof of his theory. As has been pointed out, the French were perfect targets. Its hardly material to relate to the armies fielded in ETO.
Also, it has been pointed out to him that his 'tons-o-ammo' vs. 'tons-o-building-materials' is wrong in many situations. The hedgerows being a prime example. The tons of material (hedgerows/sturdy buildings) are already there and easily defeats artillery. See the Normandy map he posted. Individual dugouts into a hedgerow do not take weeks to build. It is perhaps a few hours work. Multiple dugouts are positioned throughout that map. He wants you to believe each one is manned.
Jason's attrition theory is spiraling closely to using artillery as a tactical weapon. He wants you to believe that you must go out and attack with it AND with other weapons. In other words, combined arms. Nothing new.
For whatever reason, winning must be by attrition to Jason. The Germans lost nearly as many men from surrendering units. They will be explained as attrition by Jason. The Germans did not send more than 1 replacement for each 10 men lost in Normandy (June/July). There will be another attrition aspect to this.
The Germans were not always defending and suffered horribly at St. Lo trying to counter attack (and in many other actions in Normandy). They were murdered by artillery while trying to counter attack St. Lo (which saved the day since the US units in St Lo were weak). Artillery is best used against troops that are attacking in the open to get the best bang for buck. The US and CW artillery was just too well tied in and the German tactics from the previous years of fighting were old school.
Mortars, believe it or not, are more effective in support of units attacking hedgerows than most artillery. They do not have the very long dispersion that artillery exhibits, and the very steep angle, combined with fuse delay, can inflict casualties. The US used HE/smoke mortar concentrations to root out Germans in hedgerows on more than a few occasions.
Artillery in the jungle only accounts for about 50% cas usually. The Bocage may have had similar results and inf weapons/direct fire AFV, etc may have made up for the numbers. Being in one hedgerow, facing an enemy in another; I would not want artillery that was behind me to fire at that hedgerow. I would be well within friendly-fire danger.
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A Military EncyclopediaArtillery was excellent for counter-mortar, but had certain limitations, especially when fire onenemy mortars close to our own troops was desired.
The 4.2-inch and 81-mm mortars were perhaps the best weapons to use against enemy
mortars.
[p. 237]
The 4.2-inch chemical mortar units were most effective in counter-mortar when trained in
artillery methods, attached to the artillery for fire control, and employed in at least company strength for
massed fire.
Based on Operations in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-1945.
They were in demand as infantry support but also functioned as artillery
[ March 24, 2005, 06:03 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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The Germans would counter with depth if they could.
They basically had a thinly held front line backed up by strength in depth. Putting all your pies in the window was not too smart.
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I guess the game should also track barrels then. Once a two barrel LMG gets one hot and swaps (and keeps firing), its starting to reach its maximum temp. Not sure if teh game can get all this detail in.
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Chapter 10
93rd Chemical Mortar Battalion battles
The 93rd Cml Mort Bn joined VIII Corps in action at Emmelshausen on 29 March 1945. The first company was committed on 3 April 1945. The companies of the battalion were attached to various divisions of the Corps and fought with them until relieved on 20 April 1945. The entire action was characterized by light resistance and lack of great need for the heavy support of which mortars are capable. 1148 rounds (579 HE and 570 WP) were fired by the battalion.
Battalion Headquarters. During the entire action, battalion headquarters stayed in the vicinity of VIII Corps headquarters. Telephone communication with Corps was nearly continuous and liaison was maintained with the Corps chemical officer. Battalion headquarters retained close administrative control with the companies. Regular scheduled visits to the companies by the commanding officer, executive officer and staff officers kept battalion headquarters appraised of the administrative and tactical situation of the mortar companies.
Headquarters Company. The company remained with battalion headquarters at all times. The ammunition sections maintained a battalion ammunition dump of approximately 6000 rounds and moved it forward each time the company moved. They also kept the mortar companies supplied with ample ammunition during the entire period. The supply sections hauled all classes of supplies from the Army dumps to the mortar companies.
Company A. The company was attached to the 65th Infantry Division by operation order of VIII Corps dated 3 April 1945. On that date the company departed the battalion assembly area, vicinity Neukirchen, and reported to an assembly area in the 65th Infantry Division zone at Sontra. On the following day the company was attached to the 259th Infantry Regiment and the platoons further attached to the three battalions of the regiment. On the initial movement into positions, the company was strafed by approximately 50 ME 109 planes. No casualties resulted and the platoons were emplaced in defensive positions in support of the regiment in the vicinity of Mulverstedt.
The company remained attached to the 259th Infantry Regiment until 13 April when it reverted to control of the 65th Infantry Division. At that time the division was placed in corps reserve and the company moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Friedrichroda. The company was relieved from attachment to the 65th Infantry Division on 16 April and reverted to battalion control.
On 18th April, Company A was attached to the 76th Infantry Division at Limbach and further attached to the 385th Infantry Regiment. Late on 18 April the entire company supported the 385th in an attack on Chemnitz. The company fired into the town scoring hits on factories in the town and starting fires. 111 rounds of HE and 6 rounds of WP were expended during this operation. On 20 April the company again reverted to battalion control and saw no further action during the period. The company lost two men missing in action.
Company B. The company was attached to the 89th Infantry Division by VIII Corps operation order on 3 April. The entire company was attached to the 353rd Infantry Regiment and moved forward in the attack on Eisenach. After Eisenach had been captured, the company moved to support the attack on Rohla on 7 April. Very effective fire was placed on the town that day and the town was taken. 98 rounds of HE and 96 rounds of WP were expended in this action, and the gun positions were attacked both by small arms fire and by five Nazi planes, type not identified.
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Then am I correct in making a second layman's translation: Wartgamer is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely not hit something else?Originally posted by Dave H:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Wartgamer:
(snip)For a laymen translation: Jason is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely hit something else.
Isn't Jason saying that for every 25-30 shells fired one will normally land close enough to somebody to cause a casualty? Differences in the density of the enemy soldiers within the impact area would not appear to have an effect on the rate of casualties. If the enemy soldiers are spread uniformly through the area, a single shell may miss completely, or only land close enough to affect a single soldier. If the enemy soldiers are concentrated in part of the impact area, more of the shells will miss completely, but any shells that hit the area of concentration may cause multiple casualties. Six of one, half a dozen of the other. Wholesale killing with artillery is neither very romantic nor very heroic, is it? </font>
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]web page Here is data for a German 150mm divisional artillery piece.
Note the 50% zones in length and width.
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Not trying to interest you. Trying to logically find where the 120mm fit into the German Order of Battle.
http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html
If you go through much of this information, its evident that not many 120mm are even at the Regt level (and so Andreas is wrong). 81mm are all the rage.
So, if in the middle of 1944 (the 120mm has been in production for awhile), these divisions are not using it; Then who is?
81mm would tend to be lost easier than 120mm due to proximity to the enemy. Thats one of the reasons that the production was greater.
Speculation: Were they in other divisions in France not in Normany? In Italy? Russia?
Certainly those divisions burnt out in Russia and transferred to France/Germany/wherever, did not bring heavy equipment with them.
And US heavy mortars were attached to infantry outside of thier typical unit grouping.
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Well its either I am one thing or another. No pleasing everyone thats for sure.
I forget. Have you ever had anything memorable to say? You seem sarcastic and annoyed.
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http://img62.exs.cx/img62/7726/mgpost4jk.th.jpg' alt='mgpost4jk.th.jpg'>
A MG position showing a 'U.' position adjacent
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This shows a SQUAD trench system. The shelter at the rear is the bomb proof. The Unterstand was the hide out during intense bombardment. The 'U' in the trench system were small dugouts for less intense bombardment.
[ March 24, 2005, 10:46 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]
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Your math was based on this.Back o the enveloper - 7857 m2 middle area, 26302 m2 farther area. Assume a platoon in the former and 2 more plus weapons in the latter. A mix of foxholes and trenches, 1.5 m2 average per man, with 40 men in the middle area in 20 positions and 120 more in the farther area in 60 positions. JasonCThe bottom line is your whole argument is based on density of troops in an area. The reality is that troops are spread out in a thin line and area is largely dead space.
For a laymen translation: Jason is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely hit something else.
Assaulting/Advancing with the Bren LMG
in Combat Mission: Afrika Korps
Posted
http://www.hypospace.net/equipment/mortars.htm
This page shows the ballistic shape of the 2 in mortar rounds.
Given the ammo expenditure this table shows, there must be some resupply if it is used during a firefight.The US grouped the 60mm weapon at company and one of the main functions of the jeep/trailers was resupplying ammo for the MMG and 60mm mortars.
[ March 28, 2005, 08:36 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]