Bigduke6

BD old buddy, Yep, you got that right, that was a response. One of my better, I thought. However, I will be delighted to raise my game, as you so charmingly put it, if you tell me: 1. Which fronts it was Khruschev commanded. 2. The difference between a Soviet front and a Soviet field army. 3. Why it is the Soviet tool industry was incapable of manufacturing a truck. 4. If that was the case, who was it that made the Zil, KraZ, URAL, and MaZ series of wheeled cargo vehicles. 5. Whether you read "Das Reich" by Max Hastings. 6. Whether you read ANY book by David Glantz. 7. Why Soviet cavalry pants have floppy thighs. These are pretty simple questions. Well, all but the last one. My advice, answer as quick as you can. If you don't, the list is only going to get longer. [/qb]

BD, I am glad to hear you have read "Das Reich" and so are in a position to make an intelligent comment on the book...wait, you HAVE read the book, right? :eek: Now if Nikita Khruschev had been driving the German supply trucks in Northwest Europe, there would be no need for the railroad. After all, he had those really cool baggy cavalry pants just ideal for long drives behind the wheel of a Studebaker. So actually it is historically clear that German supply problems on the West Front were due to Nikita Khruschev's misemployment. As we know, he commanded several Red Army Fronts, whose numbers remain nameless. :confused:

Well, one thing is for sure, if Khruschev had been in charge of the Allied interdiction effort in Northwest Europe, instead of many Red Army Fronts, those Germans would have had no chance to move material along the French rail system. We all know what a command stud Khruschev was. :eek: BTW Khruschev was a big fan of trains and liked to ride them. And for good reason - he could fit into them better than into Tiger tanks. And what's more, your standard Soviet "big shot" train had plenty of closet space, so Khruschev had a place to hang up his snappy field marshal uniforms. :cool: Of course he may have had some trouble actually finding the Red Army fronts he was in charge of, as their numbers appear to have been a big secret, known only to Blue Division. As to the Allied transportation interdiction effort in Europe, any one interested might want to read Max Hasting's "Das Reich". It's about the 2nd SS' move to Normandy. Allied air and French resistance/terrorist tried to stop them - but failed.

BD, Your U.S. government source unfortunately says nothing about whether Khruschev would fit in a tiger tank, or if he wore those great Soviet cavalry general pants with the floppy thighs and double-red stripe down the side. You might want to do a little research on the difference between a Soviet field army and a Soviet front. It's a pretty big difference, like, 30 divisions or so. That's maybe 300,000 soldiers, which means you may well have just set a new personal record for historical accuracy, or lack thereof. Maybe while you're reading you can look up the the number at least one of the many Red Army fronts you said Khruschev commanded. Any one at all. Enjoy yer weekend.

Khruschev had several tailors throughout the war, each assigned on special detached duty from one of the Red Army fronts Khruschev was commanding. If you want to know which tailor was working for Khruschev at a particular time, all you have to do is look up the number of the Red Army Front Khruschev was commanding.

Hey Redwolf, while I'm thinking about it, what about the L52/55 85mm gun? At 750 meters, would it punch or ping a Panther mantlet?

Done, irritating text excised. I hope the rest of the text is behaving itself.

BD, Khruschev was a real short guy, perfect Red Army tanker material. And during the war years he was relatively skinny. So I am sure he could have fitted into the turret of a super-ueber PKWVI, although given his preference for garlic I am not sure I would want to have be in there with him. :eek: But of course this is all theoretical, as we know Khruschev was in command of Red Army fronts during the war. (Although the numbers of those fronts appear to be secret.) Flamingknives, IMHO "ad absurdium" is pretty close, although frankly I think that insults absurd arguements a bit.

Rexford, I have two questions/comments on the below, but in general the stuff you are giving us is great, thanks! First, maybe a nitpick and maybe an error on my part regarding the German vs. Soviet armor penetration dispute. The way I read the Soviet literature, the 80 per cent success calcluation was not, as you write, a definition of penetration success 80 per cent of the time, i.e., eight out of ten rounds punching through the armor. Rather, at least as I read it anyway, it was a definition of success if at least 80 per cent of the AP projectile made it through the armor. I realize that sounds kind of funky but that's how I keep reading it. I'm curious about the German approach to 50 per cent success. Was it "50 per cent of the round through the armor = success" or was it "50 per cent of full penetrations?" Also if you have any comments on the 50/80 success definition issue; I think you could make me smarter. Just curious. Second, could you suggest a link for the Miles Krogfus' article in the May-Aug. issue of aFV News? I sure would like to read it. Here's the text of yours I'm talking about: "The problem is that the 166mm penetration figure for IS-2 AP is related to 80% success, and converts to 175mm at 50% success. And the homogeneous penetration of 122mm AP would be much greater than the face-hardened figure, where we estimate that 122mm AP could penetrate 201mm of homogeneous armor at point blank. A similar calculation was made for SU 100 AP would have underestimate the ammo performance against Panther tanks. On the battlefield, IS-2 tanks penetrated the Panther glacis at 700m. Miles Krogfus' article in the May-Aug. issue of aFV News allows one to compute Russian penetration against face-hardened armor at 80% success, and multiplying the result by 1.06 converts to 50% success (half the hits completely pierce the armor)."

In Russian: Blagadaroo vas = I thank you Yeah, I'd say that's pretty close to Bulgarian.

Got a source on that, partner?

What I want to know is, was Nikita Khruschev in charge of the two Tiger tanks knocked out by PIATs at Arnehm? I think he was. Otherwise a great tank like a Tiger couldn't have been knocked out by PIATs.

BD, "Tol'ko durak govorit o Rossii, ne znaya russkii yazyk." And if that's too complicated for you, try this one: "Meine Generaele verstehen nichts, von der wirschaftlichen Seite dieses Krieges!" Extra points if you can figure out who is the famous person that said it, and double extra points if you can see the parallels between that person's thinking, and your arguements. Me, I'm like Andreas, I just want to know which Red Army front it was Khruschev commanded. What number? You said there were several. Name one. And more importantly, do you think Khruschev got to wear those field marshal pants with the double red stripe, it would have looked pretty silly on his dumpy figure, don't you think?

BD, By "spam" I meant the U.S.-produced canned meat product called "SPAM," which was sent in zillions of tons to most all allies in the war, including to Russia. It's an invented word based on "processed ham". I'm pretty sure but not positive the company Hormel came up with it. One of the grogs reading this can correct me. Meat SPAM came about a half-century before the Internet and was one of the most visible food supplies of the Second World War. I wasn't trying to say your comments are like Internet spam. I was talking about food supplies, and had no intention of insulting you. Promise.

Leopard 2, Fair comment, I buy into that at least to some extent. Lack of operational freedom usually sucks. But not always. Consider Demyansk, the later stages of the 41-42 Winter offensive, and Mars in Nov-Dec 42. Or Vistula line in '44. All are are cases where Hitler said "stand fast" and that brought fine results, the Wehrmacht won and killed tons of Soviets. It's hard to argue Hitler saying "stand fast" ALWAYS made things worse for the Wehrmacht. Sometimes yes, sometimes no, it seems to me. And if that's the case, then lack of German operational freedom maybe is not quite the war loser that v. Manstein, Mellenthin, and Gudarian make it out to be during the Soviet offensives in late 43 and onwards. That's one of the reasons I lean towards the Glantz/Soviet school of thinking, which argues the single biggest and most decisive change between the early part of the war on the East Front, and the latter stages, was improved Soviet combat capcity - first and foremost from better operational skill, but also from things like better-trained troops and equipment (like, even, trucks and spam supplies, hehehe!)

Blue Division, 1. Since when is disagreeing with some one the same thing as denigration? 2. Which Front(s) was(were) it that Khruschev commanded? That's news to me. I always thought Khruschev started the war as boss of the CPU, and then went on to be political commissar to Chuikov's and then other general officers. Field command, I never heard of. 3. Why do you consider Chuikov's memoirs "5th grade stuff"? Cheers, this is fun!

Blue Division, If Soviet sources are as tainted as you say, why are you citing Khruschev? Khruschev after all was a politician and not a professional soldier. (Although being the Stalingrad commissar helps.) So here's a question for you: whose memoirs about Stalingrad do you think give a better picture of the military aspects of the battle, Khruschev's, or Chuikov's? I have read both memoirs. Have you? To reiterate: Supply is important, but it does not in and of itself win battles. The Allies on the West Front had factors more trucks and food than the Russians, and the Wehrmacht kicked their butts for a long time. By Feb-March '45 the Western armies however were tearing east and there was little the Germans could do about it. That was after fighting the Germans actively for about three years. Same deal on the East Front, except the Russians seemed to have learned faster. By mid '43 the Russians were executing successful mechanised offensives with big operational results. They had learned mobile warfare, and by mid '44 it was the Russians teaching the Germans lessons. The decisive, I repeat decisive, shift was newfound tactical and operational skill on the part of the Soviets. Not the presence of trucks or cans of spam.

Andreas, That's a pretty impressive bibilography you have there. So impressive in fact maybe you can give me some advice.:0 I am trying to do some research on Lvov-Sandomirz. I am interested in both the operational level but also, and which is perhaps more difficult, the tactical level. I am quite familiar with Glantz but have not read his book on the Lvov-Sandomirz op. Ziemke et al I know by reference but I have not read. I am aware of the Bundesmilitaerarchiv in Freiburg but that's a little intense for where I'm at with the research. Maybe later. Could you see your way clear towards suggesting which books would be better for research on the tactical side of the battle? I can be more specific if you want. I read English, German, and Russian. We can do this by e-mail if you want, let me know.

Blue Division, Andreas is right. I do not miss your point. In answer to your question "How do you get those sleepers and rails forward?" I answer: on the functioning portion of the railroad. Just drive the train to the end of the line and unload it. You are talking generalities and I am being specific. Take for instance the rebridging of the Dniepr in Kiev. The Germans definately applied scorched earth at least in the city itself, and just so that you know the Dniepr in Kiev is more than a mile across. The Germans knocked down every bridge and leveled the foundations. The centre of the city was dynamited. (I think it is worth pointing out that among other things the Nazis flattened a church in central dating back to the 9th century AD, which was literally the oldest Christian structure in all of Russia. It survived the Mongols, but not the Germans) Kiev's roads were full of rubble, and more to the point the rail lines leading up to the bridges were not just destroyed, the embankments were smashed as well. The banks of the Dniepr in Kiev are a marsh on the left bank, and a bluff maybe 200 meters high on the right bank. Repairing all that, and getting supply moving through the city would have, in civilian times, been the work of years. What happened? The Soviets first chased the Germans out of Kiev. So far so good. Next, using those rail-building rates Andreas thoughtfully contributed, they ran the rail line up to the bank of the river. That took about 5 days. Next the Stavka made construction and bridging materials a top rr priority. That under normal circumstances would bring the first materials on site in less than a day. And like I said, a RAIL bridge was functioning across that water obstacle in a little less than two weeks. My source for this is Katukov's memoirs and standard Kiev city histories. Katukov was the commander of 1st Guards Tank Army, and so pretty interested in a rail line connecting his troops, which by that time were closing on the Dniestr, and the rest of Russia. This all took place under conditions of "scorched earth". So obviously somehow the Soviets figured out a way to not just move the materials, but also the men and machines and the supplies to keep them working. Besides underestimating the Soviet ability to run deep mobile operations, I think you are overestimating the German ability to "scorch the earth." German military presence outside the big cities was low, and outside the regional towns practically nonexistant on the East Front. It makes sense, Russia is a huge country, and the Germans didn't have enough troops to man a continuous line, never mind place soldiers in every village. Remember, almost two-thirds of the population of the Soviet Union lived rurally in the 1940s. Sure the Germans, for instance, trashed Kiev, but the villages around it? The villages in the countryside? Are you saying that the German "scorched earth" left the land empty of people. Well I wasn't there either, but I have talked to lots of people who were, and they tell me basically people subsisted on their family plots just as they had always. They hid their food supplies because that's a tradition dating back to at least the Mongol occupation. And when the Red Army liberated the region, people more or less willingly sent food from their own stores, to support the military. Again to cite Katukov's memoirs, he notes that in winter/spring 1944 his army received tens of thousands of raw replacements recruited directly from newly-liberated regions of Ukraine. I find it hard to buy your arguement regions recaptured by the Soviets were a howling wilderness, when the Soviet army according to its own accounts returned to regions populated enough to draw supply and personnal from. I doubt you can back up your assertations with 1st person accounts, but if you can, I will gladly admit I am wrong. Finally, to anticipate your objection, I am not making these points because I think the Red Army was the greatest military organization in history, or that the Wehrmacht was a bunch of morons, or similar. I am trying to get at the historical truth. In this case, I think the truth you are missing is the same one the German high command failed to observe during the war: it is an error to underestimate the Russian ability to conduct war, and it is a bigger error to judge their capacity to do so by western standards. The Red Army was not the same as the Wehrmacht, and Soviet supply is not the same as western supply.

Blue Division, "The Germans are EXPERTS at the tactical withdrawal." Practice makes perfect, eh? Seriously, I dunno about that partner. I always thought deep spaces, long retreats, the other guy's lengthening supply line, and General Winter fought on the Russian side, Napoleon and Gustavus Adolphus, and Charles of Sweden and all that. But mebbe you know better than me. "Also special rail road flat bed trucks that had a claw that stuck into the wooden sleepers of the track and tore them up and snapped them in two as the car passed over them." Seems to me like an awfully complicated and expensive machine to do a silly and pretty pointless job. This is Russia, you know, land of the taiga forest and labour camps. If there's one thing the Russians had an endless supply of, it's more wood for railroad sleepers and laborers to cut it and then lay the rails. What do you think German prisoners of war were for? "Also, thousands of tons of bridging equipment would have to be brought forward and laid down, again by thousands of engineers." In Katukov's memoirs about 1st Guard Tank Army's assault crossing of the Wisla, it took about about 48 hours. Against very serious German opposition, air, tigers, you name it. Patton would have been impressed, by comparison Oppenheim was a cake walk. Seriously. The 1st Guard Tank's operation lost almost no pace at all. If you are talking unopposed, see above. Construction labor and wood construction materials are effectively limitless, in Russia. Metal and concrete even during the war were available as well. For instance, when the Germans evacuated Kiev they knocked down all five bridges crossing the Dniepr, which is a very serious river like the Rhine. The military bridges were up in days, and a rail bridge was functioning in less than two weeks. "Many hundreds of miles of roads and tracks would be unsafe to travel on due to mines being laid. As I have said before, every house has also been demolished and there is nothing to eat either." Blue Division, Russia is not the Ardenne. Russian roads pretty much sucked everywhere, and if the Germans wanted to waste mines on a road, it was no big deal for the Soviets to drive along side the road. It wasn't like the dirt was a whole lot worse, or you can only travel where the original roads are. Large-scale military land movement in general, and in Russia especially, depends on the railroad. And the Russians did pretty well at not getting ahead of their railheads, and at the same time keeping on the offensive pressure.

Napoleon didn't have T-34's and IL2's on his ass, though... </font>

Mashenka is just a case of the victor writing the history, a little before he actually won. A fine piece of work and only a little askance from wartime reality, which of course was necessary to make the celluloid leap. The only thing that bothers me is that Masha has let down her ear flaps.

Driving a battalion or two of heavy tanks through a Russian encirclement is not the same as re-establishing contact. For ground resupply to work trucks have and carts have to be able to go in, and tired foot soldiers have to be able to walk out. That in turn means you need a corridor out of enemy observation, as if he does have observation he trashes whatever is moving in the corridor with artillery, never mind direct fire. So your corridor needs to be maybe three miles wide at absolute minimum, hopefully five miles wide, and really ten miles wide. Could a couple of battalions of Tigers controlled a swath of the Russians steppe say some 30 square miles in size, and probably a lot more? Me, I doubt it, that would work out to less than a platoon of Tigers per square mile, and that's before the Tigers started breaking, getting stuck, and not even considering that they really could only have an effect during the day in reasonable visibility condidions. At night or during a snowstorm, unsupported, big tanks like that woudl have been close to dead meat for Russian infantry. The way I figure it, the 80 - 100 Tigers would have driven around for about two weeks as fire brigades, killed some Russians, at the end of which time there would be about 20 Tigers still running, and there would be plenty of Russians. As to Paulus, he got a lot of flak later on not just from Hitler for his behaviour. He was the general on the spot, and it was up to him to say "I need to break out now, this city fight is useless." He didn't until the very end, and then it only was in terms of "Save 6th Army or it will be destroyed." Never did he take the responsibility to stand up to the high command and say "We are losing this city fight, either end it or I quit." Instead, Paulus decided to soldier on, grit his teeth, fight to nearly the last German infantryman, and generally have faith his men would prevail. v. Manstein is very harsh in his memoirs on Paulus. According to v. Manstein, Paulus avoided taking responsibility on himself, and was a major contributor towards the Stalingrad disaster.

Leopard2, I believe I am being objective, or at least trying to. I believe the "western/german" point of view is heavily overrepresented in western study of the Eastern Front, and I believe Soviet history is badly underrepresented. I really do believe Soviet combat ability has been underrated by most western historians. I am not saying the Soviets were the most efficient soldiers during the war, but what I am saying is that putting down the unquestioned Soviet successes during the war to "overwhelming numerical superiority" or "lots of Studebaker trucks" is sloppy, lazy, history. That's why I make such a big deal about the Studebaker trucks. It's a traditional western explaination for Soviet success in mobile, mechanised warefare, implying they never could have managed it without the West's assistance. I am not trying to be a jerk, I hate people pointing fingers and so forth over the Internet, and I respect your right to your point of view BUT (obviously there was a "but" coming) have you read any Soviet primary sources? Which? If not, then my friendly advice which you can blow off at your choice is: Read Glantz's Clash of the Titans. It's in English, and available in softback through Amazon. Objectivity is about two points of view. Not just the western.

Blue Division, I can't respond to what you say without repeating what I have said. I strongly urge you to read Glantz's "Clash of Titans" if you want to get a better picture of the Red Army, and how it stacked up against the Wehrmacht.