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Gen Von Television

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  1. About the Browning HQ section I admit it is just my supposition, since who else should have been carrying the whole OP in a glider? This discussion about a proven fact is somewhat getting too far for me, and it's useless: the Germans had the plans for the whole Operation; if at first they were suspicious about their luck, the following days' actions confirmed the Allied intentions. So they were able to react with speed and efficiency, without having to wait for Berlin's approval or reinforcements.

    Let me know if this thread becomes another peng challenge, so I can sod off as fast as I can...

  2. 'Model came every day to my H.Q. during the battle. On the 2nd day he told me of the plans which had been found in a glider shot down near General Student's H.Q. He received the plans themselves on the third day. General Student himself spent several days at my H.Q. He was not there in a commanding capacity but merely wanted to observe the development of the battle. He was surprised that the bridges were not blown since we had the plans for the operation.'

    I believe you know who the Obersturmbannführer Walther Harzer is... :D

  3. That is OK! I already expanded the whole data and checked the files are already well organized from the start... Maybe a file list wouldn't be really needed...

    Any idea what is an mdr file? Is it maybe the 3d model?

    S!

  4. Absolutely NOT, but then again ALL gliders were Americans. The crashed glider may have been brought down on its way up North, not necessarily a crashed landing one. I cannot buy Student may have made up this story just to despise his former enemies. I stick to his truth and Officer's words.

  5. It was actually only the Market plan in as far as it related to the 101st Abn.

    This is the theory wrote in 'It Never Snows in September' in 1990, but

    "It was incredible! In the case was the complete enemy attack order for the operation. They showed us everything - the dropping zones, the corridor, the objectives, even the names of the divisions involved. Everything! Immediately we could see the strategic implications."

    I believe those who are doubting this finding, or trying to limit the plans somewhat to the 101st only, are not in good faith, trying to cover up for a magnificent SNAFU. First of all these were found on a British officer, and this suggests the glider's transported men were liaison and staff to Browning HQ.

    In any case I believe it wasn't difficult for the Germans to detect the intentions or choices of their enemies after a few days, since there was only one road for all those big bridges leading into Germany.

  6. But if for the Normandy landings there was also a huge disinformation work going on since a long time (Patton sent to NE Anglia commanding a fake Army made with rubber weapons and real fake radio transmission: Operation Fortitude) regarding MG there was mot enough time for anything but to press on, and the Allied had already lost too much time delaying for many reasons.

    There was also another rouse for the landings in Sicily in 1943 (the dead body of an officer carrying secret plans for a landing in Greece IIRC found on the Spanish costs as if drowned after an aircraft crashing at sea): just to say the Germans' high echelons had many reasons to be suspicious about their findings, but not so for the field commanders who were close enough to verify the facts.

    Unluckily for the Allied in this operation, chance wanted two armored divisions (II SS Panzer Corps) reforming and refitting their ranks right on the spot at Arnhem, the First Parachute Army's General Student reinforced with the 59th Division from the XV Army that was on the move right when the Allied Paras started their drops. All this placement of the Germans was dictated by other reasons, as they were expecting an assault on Holland proper, with a paratroopers drop East of the Rhine. But since they happened to be right there, they quickly understood what was going on, and had enough forces to react quickly, without even having to ask Berlin for support.

    As I wrote, to me all these look like a full series of casual events that contributed to the ultimate failure of Monty's plan.

    Odd (it was already noted): for a General always so cautious and meticulous, the only time he acts as bold and we may say as careless, but with good reasons to do it, he fails.

  7. Above all I chose Historical (or semi historical) and I really appreciate detailed maps based on real places; that said in CMX1 I remember one battle was most intriguing with two Armored Regiments fighting each other to conquer or hold the City across a river (a huge map, heavy rain) only to discover it was really fictional, since I noticed there was a road leading to Bayonne (near the Pyrenees) where there never was any battle of that kind... Another one I really liked was St. Anne Chapelle (the Bulge) with just a company of Paras holding a crossroad against a Pz Grenadier Company with three HT... Scale doesn't matter, but the hint to some reality or a plausible atmosphere and Order of Battle is most essential.

  8. Here you go:

    Wings of Freedom Troop Carrier C-47 losses in Market Garden and the role of the underground movement By Hans den Brok

    When the battle for the Arnhem bridges was lost, a legend was born. The brave battle fought by the British airborne troopers would over shadow all other parts of the Market Garden operation. And as where the Arnhem part became famous, the story of the two American Airborne Divisions stayed largely unknown. The Troop Carriers who brought all the paratroopers, except for a small detachment of the British, and all US gliders to the battle zone, remained in the shadow of all Airborne Forces. This book is the first to tell about the C-47 losses in the Market Garden operation. It will tell the stories of the men who flew with the C-47s, dropped paratroopers or towed gliders. Nearly 80 C-47s failed to get back to England and were lost over the Continent. Many men evaded capture with the brave help of Belgian and Dutch civilians. Some paid the highest price for their help. Over one-hundred crew members died.

    This book is the result of the questions the author had. Where did a plane crash? What happened to the crew? Who were those men? Where did they stay? Ten years of intensive research resulted in this book. The book counts over 350 pages. There are about 380 photos, many of them never published before.

    Besides, the Troop Carrier didn't have all the Aircraft or Gliders needed, so they had to be very careful about their losses.

  9. In many source books, documentaries, interviews, etc. I can find the sources if you ask politely, but not right now. After their dropping the C47s had to turn North toward the coast, and met heavy 88 Flak there, and many more 20 mm that were moved in position for the occasion, since the Germans had the plans, remember?

  10. IAlthough to be honest, this is largely through the benefit of hindsight. And don't expect me to back this up with silly amounts of primary evidence, m'okay?

    ehehe Well, it seems quite plausible, since in the end they went for that same place with Operation Varsity in March the following year...

    To go back to the Air fouling up because of the Flak, still they got heavy casualties, especially above Arnhem LZ farther down Oosterbeck...

  11. The problem with the 1AB LZ wasn't just it was some 9 km from its target, it was also the same area used to supply the whole Division: in the end they had to stretch to far to hold their objective and their resupply base and consequently lost them both. An impossible task against two Armored Divisions +.

  12. Well said LemuelG: still I have a gut feeling SBM is not entirely to blame; there were so many small facts that contributed to the SNAFU of the whole operation; planned hastily (adapt to the situation, and reach your objective: not?), started too late (a mere week, it seems), misplaced LZ (especially for the Red Devils), equipment failures (the radios for the British Paras), bringing your whole plans to the enemy (the whole plan of MG found in a crashed glider), having to move on a single high banked highway becoming a perfect target silhouetted on the sky, a too narrow corridor that was cut several time and in several different places by the flanking German Armies...

    Instead of all this difficulties they were able to almost reach their single objective (cross the Rhine). I believe the movie is somewhat dramatizing the arrival of the XXX Corps to the Nijmegen bridge (so valiantly captured by the 82nd AB): if I remember correctly they were already behind schedules by a few days...

    The movie is OK, but I believe you can get a better understanding of the situation there by watching those two episodes of the Band of Brothers series: even if the 101st AB was possibly the less pressed on Division in the whole MG Campaign, still they had an hell of a... beating.

  13. Good points here, and feel like add one more: of course we are reasoning here with the hindsight so we can only imagine the 'what if' and 'why not so' results and causes.

    What seems the most frustrating aspect of MG to me is that the Airborne Army was ready to go since August and had many failed calls; the ground (and air) logistic seems to be the most determining factor of it all. The XXX Corps were facing a Penalty battalion hastily moved forward to block the Hell's Highway to reach Eindhoven; given the fact that Operational Officers from the Netherlands warned the Supreme Allied Command about the dangers of using that path of advance (in the Netherlands Army Academy you failed your exams doin' just that), it seems that if the Allied machine was moving just a merely week before they would have possibly succeeded.

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