undead reindeer cavalry
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Posts posted by undead reindeer cavalry
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i just lumbed total casulties together, though it does not contain separate figures for wounded insurgents. i thought that they would likely belong to the captured ones. it would be interesting if someone could come up with at least a rough estimate of separate wounded insurgents. the numbers i had in mind were 500:3000.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:What casualty figures are you using for your ratio? I just did a quick check and found 71 US KIA and 1200 insurgent KIAs (I've seen a high of 1600 mentioned by Marine sources). That comes out to 1:16 on the low end or 22:1 on the high end just for the KIAs. The US has never had much luck estimating insurgent WIA because they are taken off the battlefield and often counted as civilian casualties. When there is a guy in civilian clothes in a hosptial with a gunshot wound and no weapon, the local Iraqis (who are sympathetic or fearful of reprisals) count the man as a civilian casualty even if they know for sure he is an insurgent. So it is difficult to assess this ratio since the US side is accurate and the other one is (largely) unknown.
it's true that on KIA terms the ratio is close to 1:25, but in my opinion KIA ratio gives wrong idea about the actual performace, because the attacking side had so much better body armour and medical services and because the defending side was, i believe, preferring death over captivity to an exceptional degree.
if the 1:6 figure is even close to truth, the battle for Fallujah was much harder that would be expected. contrary to what is commonly believed, studies show that the attacking side has a huge advantage in MOUT if he has large combined arms assets and the defender has only very small ones. in Fallujah this disparity was unnaturally large so the 1:6 figure would seem to hint that either something didn't go well or there was some special condition which caused such high casulty rate for the attacking side.
true and there were even immediate negative military consequences as the insurgents were able to capture Mosul largely because of the operation in Fallujah. it's quite possible that insurgents planned it that way from the beginning as the fall of Mosul contained curious stuff like the simultaneous disbanding of the whole police force from within. it's telling that the US forces had to abandon their bases in Mosul and set up defences outside the city.Tactically, for sure. Operational and Strategic levels... the jury is still out. The success in Fallujah on the whole will likely take years more to assess. And in that time it is possible for it to swing back and forth, just like a small battle can. -
it's true in general, but i wouldn't jump to conclusions regarding Bigduke6. he seems like a rational fellow.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:You missed the point. The ones that are saying that you can only judge a tactical battle by its ultimate strategic outcome are (not coincidentally) ardent anti-Iraq war voices on this Forum. I don't see that as being a coincidence.
too true. it's also strange how certain types are not able to accept good news. what ever happens it is bad news, often in self-contradictory ways.But I don't confuse my dislike of the war with what is actually going on in Iraq. I am also not so presumptuous as to claim I know how Iraq will look in the near and far future. Some have already declared it a total failure now, in the near future, and forever more. I wish I could get that kind of info on the stock market!
perhaps it's wishful thinking from my part, but in my opinion Bigduke6 also did analyze the actual battle quite objectively, which is what i was trying to point out.No, there is only one discussion going on... how to assess the "success" or "failure" of a tactical engagement. Ardem and Bigduke are taking the position that there is no separation of tactical from strategic. If the strategic picture is crap, then whatever happens tactically is also crap because one can not be separated form the other. That is an opinon that doesn't hold much water when examined carefully.the US side wasn't necessarily outgunned or even considerably outmanned. if you look at the casulty ratio, it was 7:129 --> 1:18, which is still lower than the 1:25 ratio. on the other hand the US side was at least partly on defence and there were only small combined arms elements present. still Bigduke6 made some good commentary on the tactical side.
for an example let's consider one area which Bigduke6 did not address; the role of communications and intelligence. it was vital for the success of the US mission, but on the other hand it failed totally (abushes etc). with only slight changes to the enemy equipment (e.g. proper ammunition for the RGPs) the battle would have likely changed dramatically. this rises numerous thoughts along the lines of "how to protect mechanized infantry in hostile terrain: slat armour and air-based surveillance vs intelligence gathering on the ground". this kind of neutral study, that doesn't pay attention to either tactical or strategical goals, is what i had in mind. in my opinion Bigduke6's post was doing just that, at least partly.
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it's the more-or-less standard expected casulty ratio from these kind of battles. i think it was originally based on some Israeli studies.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:I don't know where you got that 1:25 ratio from, but I'm not aware that the US uses that as a gauge for success/failure.
it's a simple casulty ratio. i admit that it rises up to 1:5 if you include the captured, but i'd hesitate doing that because i'd imagine many of the captured were not necessarily active combatants.Also, I don't know where you came up with the 1:3 figure. The KIA ratio was more like 1:16. Not sure about the wounded, but I think it was around the same. Also 1000 insurgents were captured.
yes, the historical outcome of the battle was of course a clear victory.But aside from the body counting, what was acheived? -
wishful thinking. i don't know if you noticed, but i actually pointed out that in the end occupation forces seem to have been succesful in pacifying Tal-Afar and that thus these insurgents lost in the end. i was against the war but i honestly wish it all the possible success.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:I don't know why you ardent anti-Iraq war drum beaters can't see that you're allowing your bias to get the better of you. You are twisting things to fit your predrawn conclusions instead of looking at things as they really are.
I'm no fan of the war in Iraq (and don't get me started on how it is we got there!), yet I'm not turning rational military outcome assessment methodology on its head to support a preconceived political/social agenda. Sorry, but that is what a handful of you are doing. It's blatently obvious.
there are a number of separate things mixed in this discussion, which seems to have confused you.
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there's also yet other side to measuring these battles. the one of trying to find out objectively how troops are performing in battles, without concern for strategical or even tactical objectives. this is essentially what Bigduke6 did.Originally posted by Ardem:The problem is tactical battles success cannot be measure just by casualty ratio anymore.
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So tactically the American achieved there goals as did the Iraqis but to say who really won, I think BigDuke post sums it up.
it can lead to pretty surprising results. for example the Second Invasion of Fallujah was a failure if one considered how troops performed. instead of achieving the expected norm of 1:25 casulty ratio (for MOUT in which attacker has considerable combined arms assets but defender only few or none), the occupation forces managed only roughly 1:3 casulty ratio, even when they had extraordinarily excessive combined arms superiority and other advantages.
many of the battles, the one being discussed in this thread included, contain such surprising facts. it is a shame that people get such knee-jerk reactions to attempts of discussing these things, for they are very interesting.
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woah. in my honest opinion Bigduke is one of the best posters on this board. his posts are an exceptional combination of vast knowledge, creative out-of-the-box thinking and good writing skills, finished with a very friendly down-to-earth touch.Originally posted by Abbott:..Bigduke is one of the most biased posters to this website, a chip on his shoulder for all things American and an inferiority complex when it comes to being Russian. I don’t doubt he is a decent chap and he does write detailed combat science fiction, always using good grammar and excellent punctuation.
isn't he an American living in Ukraine?
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i agree it would be silly to make such an assumption. in my honest opinion it would be just as silly to assume that Germany would go on defence in 1940.Originally posted by Andreas:Why is there an assumption that with two years to strengthen their position on the demarcation line, with no losses incurred during Barbarossa/Blau/Stalingrad the Wehrmacht would just have fallen over when the Red Army attacks?
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it is good to see good critical thinking and sound analysis.Originally posted by Bigduke6:Opinions?
i think the battle is a good example of a case in which both sides most likely thought that they had won a decisive victory.
occupation forces got hold of the city around when the dicussed event took place, but insurgents took it back soon afterwards. the insurgents controlling the city were exceptionally brutal which didn't please the locals. occupation forces tried to take the city in summer 2005 but failed. a big operation followed in fall and managed to capture the city. i think there are now permanent troops in the city (following the so called ink spot strategy) and it has been largely pacified. Tal-Afar has potential for being a success story, so it is possible that you were correct only about the first year that followed.Final note - this all took place a year ago, so who's to say what the situation is in Tal Afar right now. My guess, things haven't changed much, if another Kiowa were to crash there today, I'd bet we'd have the same story all over again.
EDIT: here's a quite good & recent article about Tal-Afar: linky
[ January 04, 2006, 03:37 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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Soviets were only going to grow more powerful, while Nazis most likely had already experienced their peak of power. who's to say that the Iron Curtain would not have been put up at the Atlantic if Soviets would have attacked in 1943 or so? at that point Soviets wouldn't have needed Germans in potential East vs West faceoff and could have sent 90% of Germans to Siberia or Valhalla, if Stalin would have so desired. with the version that happened Germans got to see another day, both sides the Curtain, if nothing else.Originally posted by Andreas:How could any other hand that they did not play have possibly resulted in a worse outcome than the one that they got for playing the unprovoked attack hand? Why do you assume that a Soviet attack in 1942 would have been a desaster for the Germans?
if Nazis wouldn't have gone East, they would have most likely used their resources elsewhere. built a silly navy & tried to invade UK or North Africa or sumfink.
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Syrians have modernized some 200 of their T-55s. the modernized T-55 should perform better than any of the other undermodernized Syrian tanks: they could actually spot the enemy & hit it. it should do fine against Abram's sides, so penetration-wise a battle between these two should be a bit like a battle between a Panther and a T-34/76.Originally posted by M Hofbauer:the T-55 indeed has the least powerful gun of all MBTs shown here, but still a flanking T-55 somehow ending up firing its D-10 100mm main gun at an Abrams' rear end would ruin the day for the US player (I would -despite all uncertainties- still rate it with at least 400mm AP at close range)
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as a further note, it was extremely hard to destroy tanks like T-34 or KV with molotov cocktails. molotov cocktails were effective only against older models. another use for molotov cocktails was to throw them at the front of the tank so that the generated smoke would blind the tank.
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it would have been very hard if not impossible. Germans simply underestimated the size of Soviet military. their intelligence about Soviet forces located further back was weak or it did not exist at all.Originally posted by Cuirassier:Anyway, I guess I am wondering if anyone thinks that the Germans could have defeated the Soviet Union without resorting to total war. Perhaps an earlier invasion? A more firm plan to destroy the Soviet army? Many hypothetical scenarios.
i think the German plan was quite sound, in that it aimed at the destruction of the Red Army itself instead of focusing on ideological targets. Germans just didn't have what it took. e.g. in Leningrad area Germans destroyed the 2nd Shock Army twice in a six months period, only to see it rebuilt once again. if they had focused more on ideological targets it would have only made the war more difficult for them, in my opinion. taking Moscow would have hindered (at least temporarily) Soviet communications & transportation, but not much else i fear.
regarding Leningrad, it was the 2nd most important city in USSR. i believe it produced 10% of all Soviet wartime materials, even when under siege. it also had immense ideological value, being the birth place of the Revolution and the intellectual capital of Russia, if you are after such targets.
if there is a one element that could be changed to profit the Germans i would change the weather. invasion could start earlier and continue a bit longer. more effective logistics (use of railroads especially) would make a difference as well.
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i think the strongest argument for all kinds of freaky secret mumbo jumbo technology is the fact that some of the current hi-tech stuff is almost half a century old. i used to know an engineer who built lots of strange stuff just for a hobby and he had no special tools. no doubt a group of engineers with plentiful resources can come up with all kinds of freak stuff.Originally posted by Rollstoy:But here comes the problem: why don't they? Or the US Air Force? Or the NASA?
If they have flying discs, why do they bother to stick with the Space Shuttle?!!??! To leave the "Axis of Evil" in doubt? It just does not make any sense?!
As long as I do not see Alien technology influencing anything, be it military or civilian, theories about the existence of the former do not impress me too much.
not that any of it would have to do with Nazi Vixen from Venus.
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in CMSF all squads carry Panzerschrecks. in CMSF the equivalent infantry AT team of Panzerschreck team has effective range of 1500-5000 meters. the downside for the defender is that IS-IIs are now invulnerable (just mobility kills) to squad AT weapons (not AT teams) from frontal arc. all tanks are vulnerable to all AT weapons from sides & rear - no more Tigers or KVs.Originally posted by Rollstoy:I do not know how relevant this is for CMX2, but the fact that it took, in essence, a few snipers and a platoon of engineers to stop a heavy tank force in a city gives me hope for the Syrians in CMX2.
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awful amount of explaining to do.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:The problem I have with your arguments is that you aren't interpreting things armed with the same knowledge. You've drawn conclusions that run contrary to current fact. There might be a reason to support your interpretation, but in order to do that you have to explain it.
i guess it is enough if i make a couple of points what my scenario would look like. this is just the prelude to the actual war, so that we can find a setting you find likely enough.
- Syrians have been at least partly succesful in their reform. no Soviet style massing of heavy divisions, but focus on low-signature light forces as per their new doctrine. their forces are still largely poorly trained & lead and their attempts to adopt Israeli tactics have for most parts failed. but no more Soviet doctrine.
- Syrians are determined to defend their nation. power games & rivalry are pushed aside for the duration of this conflict - or else Syria and Islam fall. for our Nation and Mohammed we fight, Christian Crusaders must be slain! no Iraq 2003 style bribery & self-disarming divisions & welcoming by the masses. no decades of sanctions and low morale.
- even if Russian talk about being on the side of Syria is largely rhetorics for domestic Russian politics, the write-off of 70-80% of Syrian debts and the numerous new weapons deals & some military cooperation are enough to give Syrians, at least on theory, something to fight against the US equipment on tactical level.
- the pre-invasion air-war is largely ineffective because Syrians are fielding mainly low-signature light forces. there are no heavy troop concentrations to bomb, mostly just infrastructure and decoys.
- like in previous cases (even against opponents who massed heavy forces in Soviet style) the US forces are unaware of this and believe they have destroyed 70-90% of Syrian forces.
- the thinness of the flow of hi-tech intelligence data further emphasis their wrong picture of the situation. light low-signature forces cause far less blips on the map.
- the US forces believe they have temporaily paralyzed and neutralized their opponent and thus believe they must act boldly and daringly to make use of this window of opportunity & launch a "Thunder Run" to capture Damascus and other key locations before the Syrian side is able to regroup. besides general doctrine, this decision is further encouraged by politics and the success of operations in 1991 & 2003.
so that's the prelude to the actual ground war. do you have many objections to the scenario so far?
but Steve, it was you who brought logistics into the discussion. i was just arguing against your position that the invading forces could just halt outside key locations like Damascus and wait for them to fall due to Syrian logistical problems.Like your logistics position. You just now tried to explain it better, but it still doesn't conform to reality. A conflict in Syria would be far easier to support than one in Afghanistan and Iraq, not less. And even if it was less... how much less would it have to be to make a real difference?Syrians don't have logistical problems in key locations like Damascus because they are the logistical roots of their military.
if Iraq is the main source of US logistics and Iraq has not been pacified by 2007, then the US logistical situation is IMHO worse than it was in the 2003 invasion (in which US forces used friendly Kuwait).
my take on logistics on the 2007 conflict is that it is mostly meaningless. if the conflict lasts long enough for logistical factors to kick in then the invading side has lost.
you misunderstood what i meant. i was talking about post-WW2 Finland, not WW2. post-WW2 Finland has had to find ways to fight 1st world superpower with 3rd world light forces. i propably have been brainwashed to think too highly of what a determined light infantry can accomplish. at least i have been brainswashed to look at things from the viewpoint of light infantry instead of heavy mech forces.As for your Finnish background...
that's where our different background is showing. i believe the small country can defend herself succesfully by making the war painful enough. there's always the political & diplomatical & economical side to wars. sure, the big country can still fight the war to its conclusion, but few leaders have what it takes, especially Western ones.My point here is that the big country will win the conventional war if it wants to.
[ December 28, 2005, 03:34 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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that small topographic map looks real tasty. would be great to have something like that in CMx2.
BTW do i read the UI correctly that the penetration numbers are given only to the range of 400 meters? and isn't that road awfully narrow?
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Sergei,
that's true, though i think Syrians should mostly stay clear of flat open areas. what i had in mind was the build up areas and the areas with considerable terrain elevations. though i guess Syrians are too rigid for the kind of flexible gathering of smaller units to create local ad hoc "task forces".
parts of the coast are quite forested BTW.
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Drusus,
i fear Syrians are more like the Soviets were in 1941, and the invading forces more like the Germans.
what might be more productive would be to look what kind of tactics modern Finnish forces use. how are we able to disperce our forces and yet be able to concentrate them at key points. how can we have light forces, yet concentrate firepower for great effect.
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you are arguing against something that i am not arguing for. like i said, Syrian side is doomed if it is to fight in a classic Soviet style. what i am arguing for is that a Syrian force fighting on a low-signature light force doctrine is able to halt a Shock & Awe Thunder Run invasion for long enough to make the invasion costly enough that the invading side runs into political difficulties.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:Much of what you've come up with is not plausible, and therefore can not be taken seriously. At least not the way you've presented your case, which amounts to presenting a position without anything to back it up. And in many cases, such as in the other thread, the positions you come up with are contradicted by current events. From what I can tell you've got a chip on your shoulder and are building a case based on your bias and not the facts.
if there is something to argue against my opinion, it is to argue that Syrians can't fight that kind of war or that the invading side would not run into political difficulties.
Shock & Awe doesn't work against light forces because they are hard to detect & bomb. Thunder Run doesn't work because light forces are hard to detect and are very effective against rapidly advancing mechanized forces. once the Thunder Run is stopped the enemy is confused and has to deal with more than isolated pockets of resistance. these can be dealt with, but it takes time and casulties. if the invaders have time and can take the casulties then it is not a problem - Syrians lose.
[ December 21, 2005, 06:19 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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all naturally true, but the transformation is largely a question of how to use the already available resources. it all boils down to wether the Syrians are able to transform mentally or not (not that simple of course, but it boils down to it). i am well aware of the rigid nature of Syrian military force, and the internal powergames related to military affairs, but i wouldn't underestimate the evolutionary pressure they must be feeling on their shoulders.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:There is always a gap between doctrine and the ability to cary out doctrine. All indications are that in Syria the gap is really a chasm. They don't have the money, the political will, nor historically proven institutions to back it up.
i am not expecting them to turn into super warriors of planet Zydzy, i am just expecting them to at least try to use those desired low-signature light force tactics & strategies.
but of course you are the one writing the scenario, so if you say that the reforms have failed then they have failed.
i don't think we have different or contradictory sources, i just think that we are reading them in different ways. the great majority of Syrian units are poorly trained and poorly lead, but they have a considerable number of units that are considered to be at least moderately, if not well, trained. in a defensive war that just might be enough to halt the enemy invasion for long enough.Cite your sources that they have well trained infantry units and I'll cite mine that state they are extremely poorly trained and poorly lead.
i am certain that you have read a lot more than i have, especially regarding Afghanistan, but i don't think it's the cause for our differing opinions. i think we just interpret things differently, or perhaps our background & basic viewpoint is just so different (mine, as a Finn, being one constructed on the question of how to defend succesfully against 1st world superpower with a light 3rd world force).I really, REALLY wish you would actually read something about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan before you post utter crap like this again. Tactically speaking the US forces can match, and generally beat to a pulp, any armed action against them.it might also be that where as i have the priviledge of just speculating and dreaming up perhaps a bit unlikely events, you have the responsibility to create a scenario that is the most likely & generally expected one. it might also be good to remember where my take originates from; the discussion in which others said that Syrians should use their artillery in direct fire against tanks etc because they have no chances to use conventional tactics succesfully.
i totally agree with what you say about US forces above, though there's a questionmark on how the US forces would do against a well-equipped light infantry force. the odd thing about wars is that every now and then the better side loses.
exactly. the question is would the kill ratios be high enough for the invasion not to halt against a determined defender.The kill ratios between US forces and insurgents is very high in favor of the US. It's just that the US considers every soldier in high regards while the other side does exactly the opposite for the overwhelming vast majority. Leaders and trainers are protected, the rest are cannon fodder.
with Afghanistan you have such a small number of forces that it is not comparable. with Iraq you had good safe logistical routes. you don't have either with Syria.Again, see above comments about reading SOMETHING (anything credible will do) about what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US forces there have been in occupation for 3+ years in two much larger geographical areas. Logistics? Strategically, Operationally, and usually Tactically there have been no significant problems. To think that the US would suddenly forget and/or become incapable of supplying forces in the field is a stupid position to take. In fact, Syria would be MUCH easier to deal with than Afghanistan for so many reasons, and Iraq for lesser but similar reasons.i am not saying that the war would turn either side because of logistics, i am just opposing the idea that US forces could just stop before Damascus (and other similar key areas) and wait for them to collapse because of logistics.
if Syrians would lack morale & cohesion like the Iraqis did, then no doubt Damascus would fall just like Baghdad did. if they have morale & command and if the invading forces are overly careful on taking casulties, then it might take longer than weeks. and that is enough in my scenario, where domestic US & world pressure mounts too high at that point.As for Damascus, there was a thread dedicated to that. The evidence suggests Damascus would be tough but would fall sooner rather than later. Weeks, not months.
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that's why they would prefer Metis-M.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:These guys would have the heavy stuff (the Kornet is NOT very portable) already deployed and ready to go.
EDIT: though of course after the first (missing) shot they would be carpet bombed by the circling B52s.
[ December 19, 2005, 09:54 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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Bradleys & M1s lighten up just like Strykers. Syrian players need not be desperate.Originally posted by MikeyD:Small dumb question about U.S. armor equivalents.
If something like a Bradley is able to absorb a big KE hit in-game, will the AI then drop that area's protection level under the assumption that the protective ceramic tile didn't survive? Same goes for hits on reactive armor. That would make much of U.S. armor 'one-hit-wonders', and might give someone playing the Syrian side a bit of hope in the game afterall.
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it's strange how so many of the "but it could never happen in real life" has actually happened.
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almostOriginally posted by aka_tom_w:sort of like this:
there are a number of separate things mixed in this discussion, which seems to have confused you.
Was it a victory? You decide!
in Combat Mission Shock Force 1
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i don't think it's realistic. i have read far too many reports of Arab infantry fighting on when they have faced certain death. perhaps some of it has been because of lacking battlefield awareness but i don't think that's all there is to it. Westerners tend to label such enemy behaviour as fatalism.on the other hand there appears to be a slight tendency for a minor/marginal part of US forces to panic when they experience a friendly casulty and more importantly there's the doctrinal imperative to avoid casulties.
the current Syrian doctrine is that of low-signature light forces, or "regular irregular forces" as one poster commented. i don't think that mobs with AKs and some RGPs are capable of such operations. no doubt occupied territory would face insurgency, but certainly Syrian forces would do their best to first prevent an occupation from taking place.