[MLRS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

You call 125 lbs smallish? Let me put it this way, could it have been a Hellfire instead of a Maverick? Hellfires, though good missiles in their own right, are quite a bit smaller.

i think they have been officially confirmed to be Maverick hits.

doesn't 125 lbs refer to the whole warhead, not the penetrator itself?

i wouldn't be totally surprised if the designers would have thought that Maverick would be very likely to hit weakly armoured parts of vehicles (because it is air-to-ground) so that a powerful penetrator would not be necessary. or perhaps they used a variant with a small penetrator. or perhaps it was just bad luck.

[MLRS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

And Maverick ATGMs. Anything hit by one of those will die.

has anyone seen any evaluation of Maverick regarding their performance in Iraq? i have read of cases in which Maverick failed to penetrate T-72 turret front or Abrams side and i wonder if those were just some individual odd cases. </font>

[MLRS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

And Maverick ATGMs. Anything hit by one of those will die.

has anyone seen any evaluation of Maverick regarding their performance in Iraq? i have read of cases in which Maverick failed to penetrate T-72 turret front or Abrams side and i wonder if those were just some individual odd cases.

[M1A2..how tough?]

Originally posted by Splinty:

Didn't the auto-loader have a tendency to try and load the gunner? Also the T-72's generally spectacular demise when hit is a result of the auto-loaders need to have rounds out in the open.

auto-loader eating arms is a myth. for example Leopard-2 would throw the turret just the same.

[M1A2..how tough?]

Peter,

of course one needs to do one's best to make combat favorable to oneself. the thing with unmodernized T-72s with bad crews is that you have very poor accuracy. if i was a Syrian commander i would use T-72s only against light targets and let ATGMs and tank-hunters deal with enemy tanks.

[M1A2..how tough?]

Originally posted by Peter Cairns:

URC,

First round hit at over 500m makes it no better than late WW2, when stationary against a moving target, which I find a bit extreme.

The UK Cheiftan had better than that in the sixties.

with standard T-72M1 you get laser rangefinder, analog calculator and a stabilized gun, but that is pretty much it. you still need to use your own brains to adjust the sight to hit moving targets (you don't aim at the target itself) and you need to know how to operate the calculator correctly (and have the tank running OK in general). for a crew that hasn't received good training (or who have bad equipment) it will be a challenge to get first round hits at moving targets at 1000 meters. you can see this in AARs from Gulf Wars - Iraqis manage to achieve perfect ambushes but they have hard time hitting anything.

it's all about the FCS, otherwise the equipment is good. for example fully trained Finnish conscript gunners with modernized T-55 get nearly 100% hit chances to stationary targets at almost 4000 meters.

i don't know anything about Chieftain so no comments about that.

[M1A2..how tough?]

T-72 with unmodernized FCS is quite inaccurate. if crew doesn't have good training i wouldn't expect good first shot hit percentage at ranges above 500 meters.

[Those (not so) backward Syrians--and their powerful friends]

Originally posted by John Kettler:

http://missilegate.com/rfz/index2.htm

thanks for the link, looks interesting.

[A bunch of bones for y'all]

i was thinking more about friendly AI than enemy AI. stuff like the "dance of death", the horror of making vehicles follow roads, IS-2s that decide to reverse instead of taking a shot at a Panther's side and so on.

my worry is that with all the added complexity (i mean in general, not just the new bones), 1:1 representation and real-time, CMSF might be a micromanagement horror to play if the AI of friendly units isn't significantly improved.

[Should there be buildings in CM:SF]

i second Sergei's request.

[US Army: long intersting "Economist" report]

thought some of you might find this interesting.

JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - JANUARY 25, 2006

China develops anti-ship missile

TED PARSONS JDW Correspondent

Virginia, US

* China's missile development programme has been confirmed by both US government and Asian military sources

* The anti-ship ballistic missile may be operational by the Chinese People's Liberation Army by 2009

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is in the advanced stages of developing a revolutionary anti-ship ballistic missile to supplement its well known Ying-Ji family of anti-ship cruise missiles.

The development programme has been confirmed by both US government and Asian military sources, with the latter estimating that the PLA may be able to deploy the space targeting systems needed to make its anti-ship ballistic missile operational by 2009. Commenting in a 2004 unclassified Worldwide Maritime Challenges report, the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) noted: "Chinese writings state China intends to develop the capability to attack ships, including carrier strike groups, in the waters around Taiwan using conventional theatre ballistic missiles (TBMs) as part of a combined arms campaign."

PLA efforts to provide terminal guidance capabilities to both its 600 km-range DF-15 (CSS-6) short-range ballistic missile and DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,150 km, or 2,500 km for the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), have been known since the mid-1990s. The existence of a terminally guided DF-21C has long been reported. Asian military sources said that the PLA will be using a version of the DF-21 for its ballistic anti-ship missions.

However, the PLA would need to make substantial advances in missile guidance and countermeasures in order to achieve the very high precision required to attack a moving target. To do so, the ONI noted: "The current TBM force would be modified by changing some to the current missiles' re-entry vehicles (RVs) to manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or infra-red seekers to provide the accuracy needed to attack ships at sea."

In an illustration for its 2004 report, the ONI postulates that the PLA's anti-ship MaRV will use both active and passive radar, in addition to a manoeuvring capability, to achieve successful terminal guidance to its target. To do this, the PLA would have to accomplish significant miniaturisation and stress hardening for RV-sized radar packages. In addition, the PLA would have to significantly improve its surveillance system in order to adequately target its anti-ship ballistic missiles. The ONI said: "China may be planning ultimately to use over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor the target's position."

Asian sources note that the PLA will not have its new system of surveillance satellites in place until 2009 to make its anti-ship ballistic missiles fully operational.

Both Chinese and Russian sources noted that China is now co-producing versions of the NPO Machinostroyenia Kornet-series of electro-optical and radar surveillance satellites. Chinese sources said the first constellation would consist of two electro-optical and one radar satellite, to be expanded to four electro-optical and four radar satellites.

China also has OTH radars in place and is known to be developing both medium- and long-endurance UAVs that could supplement satellites and radars at ranges consistent with the DF-15 or the DF-21.

The US is not expected to deploy any effective sea-based defence by 2009 that could counter a DF-21 class anti-ship missile.

Additional challenges could follow should China elect to sell this technology to select client states. For example, should Pakistan purchase this MaRV technology for its Shaheen-2 ballistic missile, it would be able to effectively counter India's naval power with a relatively small investment. Also, should China be able to even further reduce the size of the MaRV, it might be able to employ smaller missiles, like the DF-11 or the smaller B-611, to potentially provide an inexpensive weapon to deter much larger navies.

[A bunch of bones for y'all]

CMSF sounds extremely good so far. very exciting system. i am a bit worried about all the added complexity: will AI be able to handle all the stuff? in my opinion the single weakest part of CMx1 is the relatively weak AI of the units, which often leads to lots of micromanagement. i hope things will be better in CMSF, especially considering it has real-time play.

[How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?]

Originally posted by JasonC:

URC at least started by acknowledging that Hitler screwed the pooch by underestimating the Russians. He just thinks that was somehow easy to do or rational.

a great many things were screwed up, but the reasons you give for the failures (lazyness, insanity and colossal stupidity), and the way you emphasize them, are in my opinion incorrect.

i remember when you found out the reasons why Soviet Mechanized Corps just melted away in 1941. it was not because they didn't bother to try hard enough or because they would have been so crazy or stupid. there were more concrete reasons, more concrete failures and mistakes. these reasons weren't as dramatic as the tales of Slavic subhumans, but they were the real reasons nonetheless.

in my honest opinion it's just the same with many military failures of Nazi Germany we have been talking about. sure there's all the stupid crap, but there are more concrete reasons behind some of the key failures than just simple stupidity, insanity and lazyness. it doesn't cease them from being mistakes and failures, many on colossal scale. causes are just a bit more down-to-earth.

all nations made huge stupid mistakes in WW2. one doesn't have to be a monstrous megalomaniac to be able to make a row of stupid mistakes. on the contrary, it is to be expected from humans, especially in warfare.

in my opinion German invasion of USSR was rational and based on sound ideas. the real stupid pigheadedness came later in the war. saying that USSR won just because Hitler was as crazy as he was takes away quite a load of well deserved credit from the Soviets.

[How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?]

Originally posted by Krautman:

Obviously, besides John Kettler and me, the majority shares your viewpoint that Hitler was merely stupid and that he did not utilise social improvements to charm the populace [differing theories are Nazi apologetics, after all].

JasonC is intelligent and well read person who unfortunately prefers lecturing and endless prose to productive discussion. most times he is right on the spot, but sometimes he really blows it. his main weaknesses are that he can't admit to having flaws in his arguments (even when he knows he is wrong) and that he doesn't appear to have much sense of what is far too offending talk.

i myself find it funny that he calls me a neo-Nazi and i suggest you take it with a laugh as well.

his main argument on the subject is itself correct to some extent, but he incorrectly tries to make it a Final Solution that Explains It All against known facts and logic (time machine thinking).

[How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Effective intelligence equals cleverness minus self-importance, and his was negative because the second term was infinity. And no he didn't understand the economic factors the generals supposedly didn't, he just used that as an excuse to shut them up, while in fact he was screwing it up royally.

*snort* am i the only one?

[US Marines]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

There are a lot of contingents so I can't speak for all of them, but for the ones besides the Ukrainians where I've done some reading or had cause to get information about them (Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria) all are pretty much the same.

i guess it applies to most of the "small" nations who took part in the operations, though i think only Poles made a big fuzz about it. they really seemed to be seriously pissed.

[Artillery depolyed antitank/antipersonnel mines.]

US forces aren't bound to roads, but the logistical tail is. there is no question about it that US needs to control the roads. if you look at the Soviet maps you can see that it will not be easy. you have roads moving by mountain ranges and in valleys. it's perfect terrain for light special forces. even relatively small units that have modern equipment can make things damned awful.

besides, i don't see any reason why Syrians shouldn't put up resistance where ever possible. it is realistic to expect to put up resistance even at places they don't have advantages. it's their nation, they are going to defend it.

it would be nothing but stupid to not take advantage of favorable terrain. e.g. at north there are several rivers going north-south wise. it would be a bitch to cross these and still you wouldn't be anywhere near Aleppo.

judging from the Soviet maps the desert isn't all flat at least at the western end. there are mountain ranges that will channel enemy movements.

i totally agree that unexpected is to be expected from US forces. US forces have traditionally managed to achieve strategical surprise again and again. very smart thinkers.

the problem is that Syria doesn't offer that many choises. you can come from east, land from mediterranean or come from north.

north -> south move would make things hard, because you would have to take multiple large Syrian cities one after another.

mediterranean approach is hard because there terrain is perfect for defence.

simple thrust from Iraq straight to Damascus would make most sense. you could hope to finish the war quick by taking Damascus, without having to have tough battles at Aleppo, Hama and others - just one big urban battle. IF Syrians aren't willing to defend their nation.

because Syrian campaign seems so straight forward it puts some limitations to US strengths. for example airborne troops can't achieve too much. they might be most effective in the mediterranean scenario.

[A bit of news on MGS production]

before jumping to conclusions regarding Russian MOUT tactics it should be taken notice that the mechanized unit that got slaughtered in Grozny thought that paratroopers had secured their route as was planned. what they didn't know was that the commander of the paratroopers had refused to attack Grozny and thus paratroopers hadn't secured the route and the whole plan fell to pieces.

BTW Brits tested Soviet MOUT tactics in 1980ies and found them to be more efficient than Western ones.

[Artillery depolyed antitank/antipersonnel mines.]

yeah, main defences should be at and around the few big cities.

in my opinion there are locations that are good for defence, even if they aren't major cities. there are only a few logistical routes coming from Iraq and some of these need to pass rivers, most seem to pass valleys at some points. Syrians should set up defences along these routes. invading force needs to clear these defences in order to have proper logistics.

yeah those Soviet maps of Syria at the Berkeley server are great. too bad they don't cover all of Syria and that they are 20 years old.

[night operations?]

has there been any word about night operations? US forces can be expected to make full use of their huge advantage in night operations. how will it be simulated in CMSF? does CMSF keep track of what kind of night vision stuff all units and teams have? will they be able to pass information gained by night vision stuff to units/teams that do not have night vision or have lesser quality equipment? what about friendly fire? e.g. Iraqis consciously tried to cause blue on blue situations. friendly fire is already in CMx1, will CMSF have any improvements? what about the differences between active and passive night vision stuff, will they be simulated? EDIT: for example consider differences between how a warm and a cold tank show up with different night vision stuff - e.g. with some there is no difference, while with others it makes a huge difference.

and finally, will there be flares?

[ January 11, 2006, 05:26 PM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[Artillery depolyed antitank/antipersonnel mines.]

i just reread my above three posts and i think i emphasized a bit too much how US forces are likely to avoid casualties and i think it is easy to read it in a way which i do not mean it.

i do not mean that US forces wouldn't be prepared to fight hard for key locations, even if it would mean high number of friendly casulties. when reading Iraqi AARs especially Marines seem to be up to their reputation. tough bastards.

what i was trying to say in my above posts is that the US side is probably going to be very careful in MOUT, trying to do everything in the most safe way reasonable, and it is likely to be something that a aggressive defence is able to exploit.

[Artillery depolyed antitank/antipersonnel mines.]

Peter,

very interesting post about defensive footprint.

i think 150 000 is far too small. even the active forces are larger than that and Syrians are going to have a mobilization if it seems like there's going to be confrontation.

allied air campaign shouldn't cause significant losses to the forces. air campaign will mainly target static installation, infrastructure and try to paralyze and blind the Syrian forces at the highest level. there will be losses, but not in tens of thousands. Syrians should try to prepare for the strategic level paralyzis and blindness. units should have clear missions that doesn't require large repositioning. of course this is the traditional weakness of Syrian forces - they are very rigid and commanders aren't to have own initiative. on the other hand they have been at least trying to change all this for some years now. still, Syrian forces shouldn't need to make big strategical repositionings once the war has begun.

i think smallest units setting up defences should be battalions. anything smaller would just get run over. invading forces would likely just pass these battalion sized defences, but they would tie some invading forces and would cause grief later if the invasion isn't an immediate success.

i think any serious defence aiming to actually stop enemy advance would take at least a regiment level forces. strategic victory locations would be defended by corps-sized units.

i would think Syrians wouldn't even try to hold the desert or other unimportant locations. though i don't have a detailed topographical map of Syria so it is unknown to me if for example the Syrian Desert contains terrain that offers good positions for defence.

an exception to the force sizes would be very small special forces units used to delay the attacking forces by using guerilla tactics. these would likely be scattered companies.

perhaps we should make an estimation of Syrian order of battle? then we could make wild estimations on how Syrian forces might be used.

[Artillery depolyed antitank/antipersonnel mines.]

Originally posted by Drusus:

First, I don't agree that the Syrians should try to use highly mobile defence. At least in the way you are suggesting. Lets go through this...

sounds good.

1) Eliminating the use of enemy air force because they are slow to react and can't use weapons near friendly units.

The response of Air Forces in the area of operation could be suprisingly quick. And using weapons like the 30mm gun in A-10 can be used near friendly units and will destroy any Syrian armor in the open easily and effectively given a clear shot. Getting a clear shot isn't necessarily easy in urban enviroment, but still doable.

this is MOUT, Syrian armor isn't in the open. according to US experiences in Iraq fixed wing CAS is so slow to make it pretty useless against anything but very static defences. i doubt A-10 could effectively use 30mm against a moving target in urban terrain, especially when it will take AA fire, but i agree that it is doable.

2) Negates their combined arms force and any technological advantage.

Would you specify _why_ that would happen? An M1 is still a lot better than T72 even if suprised. Combined forces remain to have the advantage of being a combined force even if suprised.

it would happen precisely because you won't use T-72 against M1 (unless you are sure you are going to get a flanking or rear shot). you would use T-72 against enemy infantry positions (blow up buildings etc), to form a mobile overwatch for advancing infantry, to get rid of inconvenient walls, to waste enemy AFVs, to carry infantry and so forth. against an advancing M1 you would use engineers and AT-teams.

you are not going to surprise the enemy - he knows you defend the city. this is not a 5 minute ambush, this takes hours or days. the plan is to not just blow up a couple of vehicles or cause a handful of casulties. the plan is to hold this town/city.

you have the advantage because enemy has only three options; advance, go on defence, withdraw. you already have the place, you are the defender, he is trying to take the place, he is the attacker. when he advances you use that part of your combined arms group which is suitable for dealing with his move, or if you can't deal with it here&now then you simply withdraw and flank. if he sets up a defense you maneuver until you can hit his positions with suitable equipment. if he withdraws, well, then he withdraws. it is just basic combined arms tactics.

3) The only advatage the attacker is going to have is communications and it is not a big advantage.

First, even if I would assume that air forces, technology and combined forces would not be useful because of something, the US will still has many advantages. They are better trained. They have a lot better intelligence. That means they propably can see the large Syrian force moving in to attack. And good communications is a major advantage in a situation like this. You can call in reserves. You can understand what is happening around you. Actually without communications it is very well possible that you don't have command&control at all.

i totally agree that US has plenty of advantages. but in my opinion their only real advantage in a battle like this is better small-unit communications and to a lesser degree their better training.

their weakness is that they won't have the intelligence they are used to have. there are no UAVs circling (will get shot down) and they can't take their time and advance with care. their weakness is that they are doing their best to avoid casulties. if it gets too hot they abort the plan and withdraw. they will return but they are going to be a bit shy because they want to have their systematical surgical MOUT and they just can't have it here. this is fast stuff, the defender is not static, he is moving and seeking contact. when you go after him he withdraws and if you continue going after him you will get hit when you get around the next corner. if you don't go after him, he will flank and you are back at the starting positions.

The problem the Syrians are going to have is that they should be able to make a coordinated counter attack in urban enviroment, do it quickly, without exposing themselves before the attack, and then be able to withdraw in coordination. All this should be done in reaction to what the enemy is doing. If you don't have good communications I don't believe this is possible to do at all. They should withdraw before 30min has gone from the start of the battle else they are going to be annihilated by enemy air forces. This kind of attack is also extremely hard to make in the level of command&control which isn't the strongest part of the Syrian forces.

yes, i agree with you. the individual combined arms teams need to be small units.

I must admit that these ways of defending are actually quite similar.

yes, i agree. i was talking about two different things which was confusing. it the MOUT part all would happen within a city or town. the second scenario is a totally different scenario and not the optimal way but rather something that most likely needs to be done because enemy will try to pass hard urban defences.

But there are some differences. The most notable is propably that what I suggest is done on the company level.

yeah, individual groups maneuvering in the city/town can't be bigger than company level. i would not oppose it if they would be more like a reinforced platoon. it's important these groups function well as a team. they need to react fast like you wrote.

several combined arms teams like these would need to work together. communications would still be fine because the enemy is most likely trying to advance carefully and systematically.

there would naturally need to be a larger level organization behind these groups of teams. there would also need to be some troops having static defences besides these maneuver groups. so i think this type of defence needs at least a reinforced battalion.

Also I don't think that the Syrians should rely on high mobility.

yes, only when they are defending a city or town.

I think they should rely on infantry close by and which is prepared to fight in this way. Wire communication + some preplanned counter attack routes is enough. They might be supported by some concealed T-55s or something, but I don't know if they should move at all.

yeah, stuff like this, except that you can't stay static if you are defending. you will lose if you try to take a US attack head on. you shouldn't try to achieve surprise by hiding, because it is very hard to achieve against carefully advancing US force. it is better to counter attack than try to ambush. the counter attacking team can set up an ambush if situation makes it possible, but the idea is to move instead of sitting and waiting.

High mobility means that you are easily spotted once you start moving. Not necessarily so for infantry moving short distances.

i don't think spotting is a problem if were are still talking about urban defence. in general it is not that important because these things happen in such a low level.

it would be different if we would have battalions, regiments or worse making significant repositions (e.g. 10-100 km). even at that level it is quite possible that the information about possible spotting doesn't get to ground level units or that the interpretation of the spotting is wrong.

Ofcourse the thruth is that whatever the Syrians pull out of their bag of tricks, they will lose the war if the USA and NATO forces are commited to win the conventional war. The question is how quickly and how badly they will lose. The only way to victory is many years of high support from the populace and guerilla tactics. But that is not what CMSF is about.

yeah, i agree.

in this less realistic scenario of mine the Syrians are trying to make the war last long enough and be painful enough so that the politicians of the invading side start looking for a diplomatical solution to the conflict. i find it unlikely that they would succeed, but it is not totally impossible.

I must admit that I don't know that much about Syrian forces or their doctrine and most of all I am not familiar with the higher levels of commanding a battle. So it might be that I am badly wrong...

they are crap, but they are trying to reform their forces to be suitable for low-signature light force doctrine.

[ January 11, 2006, 03:42 PM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]

[Artillery depolyed antitank/antipersonnel mines.]

Peter,

i don't oppose using towed or SP arty in direct fire as such. the reason why i oppose using them in direct fire role is simply because in my opinion it is inefficient, Syrians have better equipment for that stuff and because they desperately need all the indirect fire support they can get.

US forces will systematically destroy all static defences, no question about it. it really is as simple as that. of course it would be awesome to just camp in some town with your tanks & guns and wait for the Strykers to drive to your sights, but unfortunately the enemy is not going to do it.

the only time i have written that Syrians should counter attack outside urban areas is when enemy forces are trying to break through at important key passage towards a strategical goal area and their line of advance is not going to go thru a town. it was meant to be a regiment level operation, so that ~2 battalions of infantry was holding static defences to block the key passages. once enemy makes contact to pass thru the static defences you send the scattered mechanized/armored battalion, supported with all available indirect fire (in the scenario it was along some towed batteries, a SP battery and perhaps MRL as well) and the small special forces AT teams already holding positions near the static defence, to counterattack the enemy advance. this isn't expected to be a huge success, the idea is just to hurt the enemy and stop their advance thru this important passage for now. it is not an attack, it is a counter attack to make the static defences hold at the key passage.

in defensive MOUT a combined arms group that seeks initiative thru maneuver is not going to get flattened. it has all it takes to destroy anything the enemy has, there is nothing that is going to flatten it, it chooses when & where & how to confront the enemy. the very point in having a mobile combined arms group is to NOT have a T-55 duel M1A2SEP. it is a paper-rock-scissors when you get to see enemy choise before you make yours. the exact fundamental weakness of static defences is that you end up having your T-55 duel out with a Javelin or M1A2SEP, or better yet have a D-30 duel out with a 2000 lb bomb.

[How Germany could of defeated the S.U. during Barbarossa?]

Originally posted by NameUsedBefore:

Look into the Finnish campaign...?

what do you mean?

it is a well established historical fact that Germans did not know the full Soviet strength. JasonC is just being anal and doesn't want to admit that his revisionist version of history is based on a fundamental logical error.