[SO HYPED ABOUT CMAK]

Why do you 'have' to wait til it comes out in retail? Just curious.

[CMAK line of sight issue]

Well I've seen the effect to a limited degree at various times. I was wondering mostly about the distance - 50 yards seems too short a distance to have an affect on targeting something as large as an AT gun. But I didnt know for sure.

[CMAK line of sight issue]

In my various pre-CMAK reading, I came across this from Rommel's Greatest Victory (Mitcham) referring to North Africa climate:

Due to the hot-air layer immediately above the ground, even large guns could not be seen clearly, even at a distance of fifty yards. Everything was distored and apparently reduced in size, as if one were looking through the wrong end of a pair of binoculars.

1) Is this statement true

2) Will it be added to CMAK. I assume it would be strongest during the day hours.

[Nationality differences - not based on materials]

I'm starting to wonder if we aren't getting into splitting finer and finer hairs here. Yes, it is fun to speculate about all these things, but just how much difference would it actually make to gameplay?

Im sure not much difference in game play.

To try to get away from the current discussion about pre-military activities, I am interested in hearing if differences in “branch characteristics” would be appropriate to try to model – or if they are all just stereotypes. Should US army rangers/marines/airborne/regular infantry only be priced differently in a QB based on armament and squad size (exp level being constant)? Obviously you could set the bonus for one branch higher than another, but that leaves out a very large portion of games – QBs.

Also, going back to the differences in combined arms methodology that I mentioned before - but was either forgotten, ignored, or considered not worthy to respond to – here are some excepts from Rommel’s Greatest Victory (Witcham):

British tactical doctrine, which had been developed in the 1920s and 1930s, evolved around the basic idea that heavy “infantry” tanks should assist the infantry in conducting the deliberate assaults against the enemy’s continuously held front lines, as they had done during WWI; then, once a breakthrough had been achieved, they would commit their pursuit tanks into the enemy’s rear areas. . . It contributed to the dangerous idea which developed in the Royal Tank Corps that it was an army within an army – that it was an elite formation that should do battle only with the German panzers. . . [The Germans] worked their tanks, antitank guns, artillery, and infantry in harness, so that none was without the protection of the others. They especially liked to use their armor against the infantry and soft-skinned vehicles of their enemies, and their antitank guns against the British tanks. British tanks at this time could not adopt these tactics, as they had only armor-piercing shells.

The German 88 did have a serious weakness: it was designed as an antiaircraft gun, not as an AT gun. It was therefore very vulnerable to enemy artillery, but the Allied commanders (especially their tank commanders) were slow to appreciate this weakness.

He later claims that the Allies rarely called in artillery against the German 88’s in tactical situations.

I’m not proposing any game changes for this, but it seems like to get an accurate battle simulation, combined arms tactics would need to be discouraged for the Allies. Also if you will be fighting a ‘April 42 NA’ scenario, will it be considered gamey to use combined arms tactics?

Just food for thought.

[Best Defensive Force Against Soviet SMG plt]

Originally posted by mPisi:

A forward defensive screen of conscripts to soak up the 1 minute of ammo the SMG guys carry.

That seems pretty gamey

[Russian war economy & attrition vulnerabilities]

jasonC - thanks for the meaty response - as always.

I also just today read that the OKH's first operational proposal for the war with France was not one that was expected to conquer France quickly, but one that would lead to a long war. So I guess I had a bad conception (as usual) about the German High command's wariness for a long war.

[Nationality differences - not based on materials]

And how exactly would you put this into the game, other than the already existing command delays as per experience level?

Well, if that statement my original post was largely accepted as true, you could make a difference between German and French/British units when their platoon HQ has been eliminated (and not in CC of a higher HQ) in response time and loss & restoration of morale. That is, if the British/French squads lost their platoon HQ and were not in contact with the Coy Hq, then their command delays increase some degree, and they become broken/panicked/routed quicker compared to Germans having the same thing happen.

9 out of 10 nationality difference statements are silly prejudices masquerading as thought.

Is that true about this one? I found that thought by Deighton quite interesting. In your opinion is it just a silly prejudice?

We are talking about nations of 50 million people and upward, about armies of millions of men. They aren't going to fit in cartoon outlines. Name any national stereotype and I will find someone that exemplifies it and someone else who shows it is a crock, from the same country. There is way too much variation within each for such generalizations across several to mean anything.

Obviously you can find exceptions to any generalization. But that doesn’t make the generalization untrue. And if it is almost always true, then it doesn’t seem irrational to simulate if you are trying to make a realistic war simulation. Especially if the option was just based on an average, like fanaticism is currently.

Maybe "ad-hoc-leadership" should be a parameter like fanatic.

Exactly, an option like this wouldnt blanket punishing every person in the nationality, but would give a chance for some of these differences to be played out.

That would only be if the difference wasn’t just a silly stereotype – but that should go without saying.

There is no good reason to instead introduce fundamentally arbitary stereotyped differences between one regular unit and another.

Sure I agree with that, accept if the differences aren’t just arbitrary stereotypes, but accepted differences.

Another nationality difference was the German vs the Brit/French theories of combined arms – at least through the fall of Tobruk in ’42. (I have read more than a couple people who mentioned this, but if that is just another stereotype, please let me know). I would be interested to hear your thoughts on that - specifically any differences that would show up in tactical engagements. One example I can think of – I’ve read that the Commonwealth did not, in general, use art against AT guns in the desert, much to their detriment.

[ October 06, 2003, 10:56 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

["Battlefield shock" - real phenomenon or my misconception]

The effect in that case is simple due to limited intel. Did one LAW team stop the column? The column did not know it was one LAW team.

Limited intel certainly played a very big part. As well as only one route of advance. But IMO you cant attribute the stopping of the column just to limited intel. It seems like the rational thing would have been to get more intel. But they just stopped. I attribute that to my – perhaps imaginary – “battlefield shock”. But I agree that the example is not compelling to somebody who disagrees.

What you are really after is a *confusion* effect.

I think that “confusion” is definitely a very large part of it. Definitely the effect I am trying to describe/define is based on a lack of full knowledge. But it seems more than just a confusion. It seems like confusion that is accompanied by a sudden panic – not panic in CM terms – but at least a short term panic that leads to some degree of battle ineffectiveness. Sometimes this results in just a quick panic reaction and then unit regains control. Sometimes the panic leads to running away or surrender.

Here is another example.

Congressional Medal of Honor

VAN T. BARFOOT

Rank and organization: Second Lieutenant, U.S. Army, 157th Infantry, 45th Infantry Division.

Place and date: Near Carano, Italy, 23 May 1944.

Entered service at: Carthage, Mississippi.

Born: Edinburg, Mississippi.

G.O. No.: 79, 4 October 1944.

With his platoon heavily engaged during an assault against forces well entrenched on commanding ground, 2d Lt. Barfoot (then Tech. Sgt.) moved off alone upon the enemy left flank. He crawled to the proximity of one machinegun nest and made a direct hit on it with a hand grenade, killing two and wounding three Germans. He continued along the German defense line to another machinegun emplacement, and with his tommygun killed two and captured three soldiers. Members of another enemy machinegun crew then abandoned their position and gave themselves up to Sgt. Barfoot. Leaving the prisoners for his support squad to pick up, he proceeded to mop up positions in the immediate area, capturing more prisoners and bringing his total count to 17.

Came across this in another thread, and thought this was another modest example of the kind of reaction I am referring to. Obviously I don’t know for sure why they surrendered (referring to the part in bold), but the way I picture it they saw their buddies in the next MG nest get attacked from an unexpected location, and they just panic and surrender. I just don’t see it being a process where they rationally consider their alternatives, but rather were “shocked” – for a lack of better term – into surrendering. And –it goes without saying -but it definitely is in the timeframe of a CM battle, but is something that would never happen in a CM battle – at least not the way that image that I get from reading that.

By the way - my sympathy is with the NVA tank crew. Especially as I believe that even a LAAW will, technically, overmatch a T55 flank!

Not according to this author. Although they did have some capacity to knock out a tank, he describes them as practically useless.

[Nationality differences - not based on materials]

The recent "Italian" thread, along with something I recently read, made me wonder about the merit of adding more peculiarities to the game based on non-material differences between nations. In CMBO, the only non-material differences I can think of are platoon/squad sizes. In CMBB, there is the early Russian command delay (are there others?).

What I read was from Blitzkrieg From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (Deighton). He says:

According to Liddell Hart, both German and British senior commanders agreed that German soldiers were more individualistic than their opponents. General von Blumentritt went so far as to complain of this, saying the Germans’ rank and file had too many ideas of their own and were not sufficiently obedient. However surprising this might be to British readers, studies of the desert fighting supported the contention that the German soldiers were better able to improvise in emergencies than their British opponents. Another finding was that British units commonly ceased fighting after losing all their officers, but Germans remained effectively organized right down to the last few NCOs.

Assuming that this “finding” is true, that seems to be something that would be worth trying to simulate.

Deighton says that this “finding” can at least partly be attributed to:

the way in which German commanders were prepared to change plans minute by minute in the face of enemy opposition. . . The French and the British Army was trained to fight systematic set-piece battles. . . This systematic approach to war was exactly what the German generals usually tried to avoid.

Regardless of this particular issue, it seems feasible that the various training methods and differing armed forces’ methodologies between the nations would produce non-material differences at the battalion level and down that would be important and interesting additions to the simulation.

[Russian war economy & attrition vulnerabilities]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Russians got through the period of their worst loss rates with winning chances alive, only because the German replacement rate was practically zero over that same period.

Why? Overconfidence. Victory disease. Trying to win on the cheap. Military gambling. Too much faith in superior technique, not enough emphasis on being prepared for the downside and on sheer numerical strength.

Concerning this "Why" question. What, if any, political repercussions would there have been from moving Germany to "maximum military production" before attacking Russia?

To elaborate on my question:

Do you think Hitler and the Nazi’s were in a strong enough position politically in 1941 to move the country to a state of maximum military production? I have always had this conception that the German army (don’t know about the public, but I assume them too) was very wary to go to war, at least with Poland and France. Did that change before Barbarossa? Do you think the German Army/public would have accepted “total war” at that point?

I hope this is interesting.

Very interesting.

[ October 06, 2003, 02:12 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[Suggestions for the next time out]

Ok well since we're going up in the scope let's also tack on the bottom of the barrel. I'd like to double clcik on any unit and then drill down to where I'm the actual guy or tank cerw. Use either the BF1942, or DOD engine (better) for infantry combat and the Steel Beasts engine for tank combat and while you're at it, interface it with il2 Sturmovik Forgotten battles too.

There ya go, now you can be a general or a private!

I like that. You could get about 200 friends together and interface into a game like battlefield 1942 - but much more realistic version - and fight it out that way. Why stop there? Why not get into some of those Star Trek Virtual Reality machines (what are they called -im not a treky) and just fight it out there.

["Battlefield shock" - real phenomenon or my misconception]

Originally posted by Los:

Keep in mind also that NVA armor at that point did not have a tremendous amount of experience or training level, as they were used very seldom before that, so that unit may have been green.

I am just wondering if you know that for a fact, or if that is just an assumption of yours.

A better issue where CM could use an adjustment in morale is this:

You are moving a whole company across a front of several hundred meters, there's a platoon of tanks leading with the grunts behind. A hidden 88 rips into the lead Sherman and it explodes in a spectacular fireball. Sqauds within the blast radius either take casualties or hit the dirt. (as they were physically effected by the attack).

But what about the rest of the company which is in LOS of this event but not in direct threat of flying shrapnel. Do they just ignore it as if nothing has happened and just trudge along? DO they hit the dirt too and stay under taking cover action until the player reorders them forward? Or do they potentialy even suffer further suppression results based on a temporary lowering of morale based on viewing such a catostrophic event so close and knowing they may be next?

I think that may be a better example of a "battlefield shock" effect to be considered for future implementation. Suppression doesn't always effect just the guy getting shot at, sometimes it effects everyone around him on LOS. This effect of course would be modified by various factors such as leadership, unit experience level and fitness, as well as terrain, whether the enemy is spotted, and other circumstances.

Here is another example similar to what you are talking about:

If two squads in a platoon became panicked and took off running, how often in real life would the 3rd squad become panicked also - even if the 3rd squad wasnt under fire and didnt even see what caused the other two squads to panic. And I'm not talking about just rationally thinking, "Our buddies are gone. It isnt smart to stay here tactically, so lets withdraw." I mean how often do they think, "Our buddies are running, I dont know exactly why - probably has something to do with half of them being bloody and dismembered - I am running too." Surely seeing your comrades in arms take off running has got to cause a pretty good morale hit.

IMO, this example seems pretty plausible, but it would never happen in CM (or did they make a change to CMBB for something like this) where a squad not under fire would become panicked because their buddies do.

[ October 03, 2003, 01:11 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

["Battlefield shock" - real phenomenon or my misconception]

I don't think yuor examle of hte Sth Vietnamese infantryman vs the NVA tank is relevant tho - the advance stopepd because the lead tank knew there was a threat out there, couldn't identify it, and so (quite reasonably IMO) decided it would be foolish to continue the advance.

First off, I think the example with the tank describes nothing more than something the AI already does today in CM. An individual unit is attacked, whether it suffers casualties or not it might become suppressed or even attempt to withdraw.

I agree that this tank stopped and retreated with a rational purpose. It didn’t know what hit him so withdrawing is fine. But this was not just one tank trying to cross a river. This was an armored advance, with eventually over 100 tanks (not sure how many were present at this time) and supporting infantry. There was a preparatory artillery barrage by 5 regiments of artillery (over 100 guns). And taking this bridge was extremely important for the NVA. When it was blown (which it was), they had to go 9 miles west to get to the next bridge.

What doesn’t seem very rational is that the entire advance stopped, because 1 tank got hit by a rocket that didn’t destroy it. IMO, it seems like the appearance of the enemy affected the advance much greater than it should have.

Furthermore, something like this would never happen in CM. Don’t get me wrong – I do NOT, repeat NOT (it always makes me laugh when I read McArthur’s memos using that phrase ), want to change the game so that you lose control of all your forces from one shot. But I have read about lots of occurrences similar to this one, and I think, “that would never happen in CM.” Admittedly, many of those are outside the scope of CM, but not all of them are.

A better issue where CM could use an adjustment in morale is this:

You are moving a whole company across a front of several hundred meters, there's a platoon of tanks leading with the grunts behind. A hidden 88 rips into the lead Sherman and it explodes in a spectacular fireball. Sqauds within the blast radius either take casualties or hit the dirt. (as they were physically effected by the attack).

But what about the rest of the company which is in LOS of this event but not in direct threat of flying shrapnel. Do they just ignore it as if nothing has happened and just trudge along? DO they hit the dirt too and stay under taking cover action until the player reorders them forward? Or do they potentialy even suffer further suppression results based on a temporary lowering of morale based on viewing such a catostrophic event so close and knowing they may be next?

Yours is a good example of morale affecting other units that are not under direct fire. However, an 88 is a very legitimate threat to an advancing force. I am more specifically wanting to talk about threats that are more perceived than real. Said another way, threats that are perceived greater than they really are, and therefore have an affect - or cause a reaction - greater than what would be considered rational. And it seems like this happens most often when the threat comes in an unexpected location/manner, etc. I think my example does do a good job of showing that.

I think you're trying to use "battlefield shock" to encompass far too many different and unrelated battlefield phenomena, frankly. A soldier suffering combat exhaustion is a much different case than an entire division who has had its headquarters destroyed. They are seperate occurences.

You are probably right. But, correct if I am wrong, the results of the separate occurrences often look like the same thing.

Given a self-admittedly poor definition of the term, I'm not sure there is much utility in trying to discuss what is ill-defined?

It is ill-defined – sorry. But I’m hoping some of you that are more knowledgeable could help me refine my definition. So maybe when I post some more examples, which I plan to, it will become more clear.

[ October 03, 2003, 12:17 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[Sneak Attacks - are they worth it?]

Adam makes a manful attempt to clarify the point in dispute, and instantly a key term he used is misread to mean something entirely different from what he intended.

Thank you for clarifying that for me. Now that I re-read his post, it does make more sense the way you describe it.

I created the other thread in the CMBB forum, and mentioned "firepower shock", but I also mentioned that he might not be meaning the same thing I was. Is their a more common phrase used for what I am calling "battlefield shock"?

["Battlefield shock" - real phenomenon or my misconception]

This was brought up marginally in the “Sneak Attack” thread on the “Tips and Tricks” forum. However, that thread has wandered off in so many directions from the original that I thought it would be better to start fresh – especially since “battlefield shock” wasn’t even part of the original question (not intentionally anyway).

My question is actually a three-tiered question:

1) Is “battlefield shock” (that is my term for it – is there another term for this that is more commonly used) a realistic combat phenomenon, or is it just a misinterpretation by me of events in various readings that I have done?

2) If “battlefield shock” is a realistic combat phenomenon, does it only happen at the operational level, or is it also seen at the tactical level (ie the CM battlefield level)

3) If “battlefield shock” does happen at the tactical level, how could it be added to a future CM release in a way that enhanced the game?

First let me try to explain what I mean by battlefield shock (which will be hard since I don’t even know for sure – but maybe you can help me refine it). Somebody else in the “Sneak” thread made a comment about maneuver theory and “firepower shock”. But I am not sure if they are referring to the same thing I am, since often there isn’t really any firepower (at least not significant amounts of firepower) involved.

Lets start with this definition for now - By “battlefield shock”, I am referring to events where soldiers, from units as small as 1 soldier to entire divisions, will seem to be shocked into a state of combat ineffectiveness for some amount of time from perceived threats as opposed to legitimate threats.

It seems like this “battlefield shock” occurs most often from encountering an enemy at an unexpected time/location/place/manner, ie being “surprised” in some form or the other by the enemy. However, the reaction is greater than what I would call a “surprise reaction”. It seems like “battlefield shock” occurrences start with a surprise reaction – all units can get surprised by an enemy – but then will continue past the point of what I consider reasonable from just being surprised. The reason I refer to it a phenomenon is because sometimes the reaction is brought under control, but sometimes it spins out of control.

From my readings, this seems like a fairly common occurrence on the battlefield.

An example. From the The Easter Offensive (Turley) during the April ’72 NVA invasion. This occurred at the Dong Ha Bridge over the Cua Viet River.

While Dong Ha was undergoing the final NVA preparatory fires, and before the enemy’s armor and infantry moved on the city, Sergeant Luom and his rocket team of the 3d Marine Battalion remained in their assigned positions. As the enemy barrages ceased, the first T-54 tanks arrived at the north end of the bridge. The classic confrontation between an Asian “David” and a 40-ton steel “Goliath” was about to begin.

Sounds like the perfect briefing for a CM scenario.

Sergeant Luom . . . extended his M-72 LAAW (basically an ineffective AT weapon) into the firing position. From a prone position on the bridge’s roadway, he could not get a clear shot at the tank, but fired anyway. The projectile passed high over the tanks round turret and exploded harmlessly. . . His assistant handed him another LAAW and, tanking more careful aim, he fired a second time. The small anti-armor rocket struck the T-54 at the junction where the turret joins the chassis. . . For several seconds everything remained still. Then, the commander’s head appeared at the top of the turret of the NVA tank as he looked across the bridge to see what had attacked their vehicle. Obviously, he could see little and thus hesitated at the unknown. Then, rather than exploit the psychological shock-action, mobility, fire power of his tank and its 100MM gun, he backed the lightly damaged T-54 off the bridge. Incredibly, the enemy’s armor column came to a halt with that single non-lethal hit. Luom’s action had temporarily stopped the NVA main ground attack. The extraordinary bravery of this one South Vietnamese Marine had caused an armored attack, which until that moment had been almost certain of success, to lose its momentum.

Now this seems like a pretty good, perhaps not perfect, example of “battlefield shock” during a tactical battle. The NVA did not think there would be resistance at this bridge, but thought it would be just across the bridge (there was a combat base approx 1500 – 2000 m behind the bridge). It seems like the mere appearance of the South Vietnamese willing to resist shocked this tank commander so much, the entire attack was abandoned for some time. The book doesn’t say how large the NVA force at the time of this incident was, but later it says there were confirmed to be over 100 tanks in the battle for the Dong Ha bridge, which lasted until the bridge was blown a couple hours later.

That is just one example, there are more in this book that I will post later.

[Sneak Attacks - are they worth it?]

quote]It would include acknowledging that maneuver warfare is about *shock firepower* and necessarily, involves *movement* of shock-based forces. (That is afterall, how they work.)

[El Alamein-The Article]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

The initial landings in Sicily were actually bigger than the Normandy invasion, by the way.

Since you brought it up, do you mind expounding on that just a bit more?

On a side note, in my mind I've likened Monty with the ACW General George Brinton McClellan - but that is based on limited reading about McClellan, and even less on Monty.

[Tank and SP Gun Medium and Long RangeTargetting]

A 400m/sec average velocity can mean 5 seconds to go 4 km for a direct fire shot, while a long range indirect shot can easily be in the air for 30 seconds. The first will rise and fall about 100 feet, the second on the order of half a mile. Definitely "golfing". So the range estimate becomes much more important.

Is that a typo that should say 10 seconds (the part in bold)? Or is there another factor that makes that more complicated than meets the eye.

[Suggestions for the next time out]

Originally posted by Horncastle:

I would like to see some form of campagin linking of battles, not in the present form where a battle is spread over a few days, but maybe a "career" mode. It would be a series of battles over say the course of a year or maybe a number. For instance start off on the East front in battles with the commies, then get reposted to the west for some R&R and have to fight to drive the D-day landings back! You could then see platoons rise to say crack then get decimated, filled with OAPs and drop back down to green etc. Im sure adding some tracking or report screen to give details of all the battles a unit has been in and some say generated figure of original members would be music to everyones ears. Give a field day to all the grogs too to create the careers of various Rgts or Division through the war.

A nice idea would be to also link the career files together with other players so say I played a 2 SS PZ career file, I could find all the players who have units that fought them in one of the "career files" and then fight them one by one, they of course would continue with their own indpendent "career file" and move onto another opponent after etc. Of course there are parts of the war when entire Divisions were destroyed so you would obviously have to come to an end maybe if the career designer has made it so, but the idea would be to maybe in preceding battles build up a strong group of units and go out in a blaze of glory. This is obviously very utopian and I dont expect any of it to be put in place as it sounds rather complicated!

I like these ideas, but more in conjunction with a hypothetical/hope-somebody-will-make-it CMX2 campaign extension than with a future release of CM. By campaign extension, I mean an operational game that would interface with CM to make tactical battles. Something similar to what Shogun: Total War and Star Wars Rebellion tried to do - but much much much much better.

::Edited because I cant remember the exact name of that Shogun game - oh well.::

[ October 02, 2003, 01:30 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[Suggestions for the next time out]

Yes thats what I have had issues with before this "all knowning eye" that makes everyone aware of a unit.

Are just talking about "borg spotting", because I distinguish that from the "all-knowing commander" problem? Some people like the "all-knowing commander" situation, but I hope that the next CM engine has some options to limit what information the player (the "all-knowing commander") receives.

Or are you talking about Sauron?

[Sneak Attacks - are they worth it?]

As I stated before, I find this discussion quite interesting. I have been reading Blitzkrieg – From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (Deighton), and came across some information that is related to this discussion – so I thought I would post it.

Deighton has this to say about Fuller and Hart in reference to their theories after WWI.

Liddell Hart firmly rejected the brainless human battering-ram tactics of General Haig and his fellows and reintroduced the notion that battles are won by ideas. There was always an indirect approach, he argued, always an unexpected place or unexpected way to hit the enemy. His book The Strategy of Indirect Approach exemplified such ideas in a history of warfare that started with the Greeks and Persians. . . Hart was chosen to revise the British infantry training manual, and , like Fuller, he used German tactics as his starting point. He added many ideas of his own, stressing the advantage of reinforcing success rather than sending aid to where the fighting was hardest. Turn opportunism into a system he advised. . . Boney Fuller was unconvinced by the indirect approach theory, calling it “the strategy of evasion.” . . . it was Liddell Hart who extended what were essentially tactical movements . . . into the philosophy of “the expanding torrent,” which spread disorder up through the army commanders to the enemy government.

The book then talks about a few other theories and then says this (although I cant tell if it is referring the all the theories - including Fuller's and Hart's - or just the other minor theories):

These writings were more often used in support of vested interests than as a basis for rational discussion. And the theorists were too ready to go to extremes in their writings so that predictions became fantasies set in a science-fiction world.

I also found interesting that Fuller rejected Hart's "Indirect Approach" when his "Plan 1919" would have seemed to use the "Indirect Approach" The details of Fuller’s “Plan 1919” are described in this book as:

Fuller’s ideas had come to maturity in March 1918, at a time when German infiltration tactics were threatening British Fifth Army rear areas. Divisional, Brigade, and Army HQs were ”panic stricken”; chaos spread through the whole command system as it lost contact with the fighting troops. [Fuller predicted that] using tanks and close air support, the Allies should have no great problem in attacking the HQs of the enemy’s commanding generals. Deprived of its “brain,” the enemy front line would collapse within “a matter of hour.”

Sounds like the same argument/discussion that is going on here.

[ October 02, 2003, 02:45 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

[Sneak Attacks - are they worth it?]

I am really enjoying this little debate - I find it quite interesting. Especially with words like "horsefeathers" & "horsepukey" making an appearance - lol

[An idea for Italians in CMAK]

Originally posted by Quintusarrius:

I remember reading about one of the philosophers of the early Italian Fascist movement vehemently advocating the abandonment of pasta as part of the national diet and the adoption of rice, due to the obvious martial prowess of the Japanese and the apparent love of peaceful contentment endemic in the Italian psyche.

hummm - I'm beginning to wonder if that guy escaped and made it to the 'waffle' thread

[CMAK Artillery]

There is always hope for CMX2

[When will there be a dedicated CMAK forum?]

Originally posted by Firefly:

IIRC, we didn't get a CMBB forum until the game was released. I'd guess the same will apply to CMAK, probably because the guys are too busy finsishing the game to mess around with the board.

Well, maybe every forum is different, but on the one forum I admin, it takes about as long to create a new forum as it does to create a new thread - which is only about two clicks and a title.

btw, I am not complaining. Just stating my opinion that I am ready for the dedicated CMAK forum.