David Chapuis

Why do you 'have' to wait til it comes out in retail? Just curious.

Well I've seen the effect to a limited degree at various times. I was wondering mostly about the distance - 50 yards seems too short a distance to have an affect on targeting something as large as an AT gun. But I didnt know for sure.

In my various pre-CMAK reading, I came across this from Rommel's Greatest Victory (Mitcham) referring to North Africa climate: 1) Is this statement true 2) Will it be added to CMAK. I assume it would be strongest during the day hours.

Im sure not much difference in game play. To try to get away from the current discussion about pre-military activities, I am interested in hearing if differences in “branch characteristics” would be appropriate to try to model – or if they are all just stereotypes. Should US army rangers/marines/airborne/regular infantry only be priced differently in a QB based on armament and squad size (exp level being constant)? Obviously you could set the bonus for one branch higher than another, but that leaves out a very large portion of games – QBs. Also, going back to the differences in combined arms methodology that I mentioned before - but was either forgotten, ignored, or considered not worthy to respond to – here are some excepts from Rommel’s Greatest Victory (Witcham): He later claims that the Allies rarely called in artillery against the German 88’s in tactical situations. I’m not proposing any game changes for this, but it seems like to get an accurate battle simulation, combined arms tactics would need to be discouraged for the Allies. Also if you will be fighting a ‘April 42 NA’ scenario, will it be considered gamey to use combined arms tactics? Just food for thought.

That seems pretty gamey

jasonC - thanks for the meaty response - as always. I also just today read that the OKH's first operational proposal for the war with France was not one that was expected to conquer France quickly, but one that would lead to a long war. So I guess I had a bad conception (as usual) about the German High command's wariness for a long war.

Well, if that statement my original post was largely accepted as true, you could make a difference between German and French/British units when their platoon HQ has been eliminated (and not in CC of a higher HQ) in response time and loss & restoration of morale. That is, if the British/French squads lost their platoon HQ and were not in contact with the Coy Hq, then their command delays increase some degree, and they become broken/panicked/routed quicker compared to Germans having the same thing happen. Is that true about this one? I found that thought by Deighton quite interesting. In your opinion is it just a silly prejudice? Obviously you can find exceptions to any generalization. But that doesn’t make the generalization untrue. And if it is almost always true, then it doesn’t seem irrational to simulate if you are trying to make a realistic war simulation. Especially if the option was just based on an average, like fanaticism is currently. Exactly, an option like this wouldnt blanket punishing every person in the nationality, but would give a chance for some of these differences to be played out. That would only be if the difference wasn’t just a silly stereotype – but that should go without saying. Sure I agree with that, accept if the differences aren’t just arbitrary stereotypes, but accepted differences. Another nationality difference was the German vs the Brit/French theories of combined arms – at least through the fall of Tobruk in ’42. (I have read more than a couple people who mentioned this, but if that is just another stereotype, please let me know). I would be interested to hear your thoughts on that - specifically any differences that would show up in tactical engagements. One example I can think of – I’ve read that the Commonwealth did not, in general, use art against AT guns in the desert, much to their detriment. [ October 06, 2003, 10:56 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

Limited intel certainly played a very big part. As well as only one route of advance. But IMO you cant attribute the stopping of the column just to limited intel. It seems like the rational thing would have been to get more intel. But they just stopped. I attribute that to my – perhaps imaginary – “battlefield shock”. But I agree that the example is not compelling to somebody who disagrees. I think that “confusion” is definitely a very large part of it. Definitely the effect I am trying to describe/define is based on a lack of full knowledge. But it seems more than just a confusion. It seems like confusion that is accompanied by a sudden panic – not panic in CM terms – but at least a short term panic that leads to some degree of battle ineffectiveness. Sometimes this results in just a quick panic reaction and then unit regains control. Sometimes the panic leads to running away or surrender. Here is another example. Came across this in another thread, and thought this was another modest example of the kind of reaction I am referring to. Obviously I don’t know for sure why they surrendered (referring to the part in bold), but the way I picture it they saw their buddies in the next MG nest get attacked from an unexpected location, and they just panic and surrender. I just don’t see it being a process where they rationally consider their alternatives, but rather were “shocked” – for a lack of better term – into surrendering. And –it goes without saying -but it definitely is in the timeframe of a CM battle, but is something that would never happen in a CM battle – at least not the way that image that I get from reading that. Not according to this author. Although they did have some capacity to knock out a tank, he describes them as practically useless.

The recent "Italian" thread, along with something I recently read, made me wonder about the merit of adding more peculiarities to the game based on non-material differences between nations. In CMBO, the only non-material differences I can think of are platoon/squad sizes. In CMBB, there is the early Russian command delay (are there others?). What I read was from Blitzkrieg From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (Deighton). He says: Assuming that this “finding” is true, that seems to be something that would be worth trying to simulate. Deighton says that this “finding” can at least partly be attributed to: Regardless of this particular issue, it seems feasible that the various training methods and differing armed forces’ methodologies between the nations would produce non-material differences at the battalion level and down that would be important and interesting additions to the simulation.

Concerning this "Why" question. What, if any, political repercussions would there have been from moving Germany to "maximum military production" before attacking Russia? To elaborate on my question: Do you think Hitler and the Nazi’s were in a strong enough position politically in 1941 to move the country to a state of maximum military production? I have always had this conception that the German army (don’t know about the public, but I assume them too) was very wary to go to war, at least with Poland and France. Did that change before Barbarossa? Do you think the German Army/public would have accepted “total war” at that point? Very interesting. [ October 06, 2003, 02:12 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

I like that. You could get about 200 friends together and interface into a game like battlefield 1942 - but much more realistic version - and fight it out that way. Why stop there? Why not get into some of those Star Trek Virtual Reality machines (what are they called -im not a treky) and just fight it out there.

I am just wondering if you know that for a fact, or if that is just an assumption of yours. Here is another example similar to what you are talking about: If two squads in a platoon became panicked and took off running, how often in real life would the 3rd squad become panicked also - even if the 3rd squad wasnt under fire and didnt even see what caused the other two squads to panic. And I'm not talking about just rationally thinking, "Our buddies are gone. It isnt smart to stay here tactically, so lets withdraw." I mean how often do they think, "Our buddies are running, I dont know exactly why - probably has something to do with half of them being bloody and dismembered - I am running too." Surely seeing your comrades in arms take off running has got to cause a pretty good morale hit. IMO, this example seems pretty plausible, but it would never happen in CM (or did they make a change to CMBB for something like this) where a squad not under fire would become panicked because their buddies do. [ October 03, 2003, 01:11 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

I agree that this tank stopped and retreated with a rational purpose. It didn’t know what hit him so withdrawing is fine. But this was not just one tank trying to cross a river. This was an armored advance, with eventually over 100 tanks (not sure how many were present at this time) and supporting infantry. There was a preparatory artillery barrage by 5 regiments of artillery (over 100 guns). And taking this bridge was extremely important for the NVA. When it was blown (which it was), they had to go 9 miles west to get to the next bridge. What doesn’t seem very rational is that the entire advance stopped, because 1 tank got hit by a rocket that didn’t destroy it. IMO, it seems like the appearance of the enemy affected the advance much greater than it should have. Furthermore, something like this would never happen in CM. Don’t get me wrong – I do NOT, repeat NOT (it always makes me laugh when I read McArthur’s memos using that phrase ), want to change the game so that you lose control of all your forces from one shot. But I have read about lots of occurrences similar to this one, and I think, “that would never happen in CM.” Admittedly, many of those are outside the scope of CM, but not all of them are. Yours is a good example of morale affecting other units that are not under direct fire. However, an 88 is a very legitimate threat to an advancing force. I am more specifically wanting to talk about threats that are more perceived than real. Said another way, threats that are perceived greater than they really are, and therefore have an affect - or cause a reaction - greater than what would be considered rational. And it seems like this happens most often when the threat comes in an unexpected location/manner, etc. I think my example does do a good job of showing that. You are probably right. But, correct if I am wrong, the results of the separate occurrences often look like the same thing. It is ill-defined – sorry. But I’m hoping some of you that are more knowledgeable could help me refine my definition. So maybe when I post some more examples, which I plan to, it will become more clear. [ October 03, 2003, 12:17 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

Thank you for clarifying that for me. Now that I re-read his post, it does make more sense the way you describe it. I created the other thread in the CMBB forum, and mentioned "firepower shock", but I also mentioned that he might not be meaning the same thing I was. Is their a more common phrase used for what I am calling "battlefield shock"?

This was brought up marginally in the “Sneak Attack” thread on the “Tips and Tricks” forum. However, that thread has wandered off in so many directions from the original that I thought it would be better to start fresh – especially since “battlefield shock” wasn’t even part of the original question (not intentionally anyway). My question is actually a three-tiered question: 1) Is “battlefield shock” (that is my term for it – is there another term for this that is more commonly used) a realistic combat phenomenon, or is it just a misinterpretation by me of events in various readings that I have done? 2) If “battlefield shock” is a realistic combat phenomenon, does it only happen at the operational level, or is it also seen at the tactical level (ie the CM battlefield level) 3) If “battlefield shock” does happen at the tactical level, how could it be added to a future CM release in a way that enhanced the game? First let me try to explain what I mean by battlefield shock (which will be hard since I don’t even know for sure – but maybe you can help me refine it). Somebody else in the “Sneak” thread made a comment about maneuver theory and “firepower shock”. But I am not sure if they are referring to the same thing I am, since often there isn’t really any firepower (at least not significant amounts of firepower) involved. Lets start with this definition for now - By “battlefield shock”, I am referring to events where soldiers, from units as small as 1 soldier to entire divisions, will seem to be shocked into a state of combat ineffectiveness for some amount of time from perceived threats as opposed to legitimate threats. It seems like this “battlefield shock” occurs most often from encountering an enemy at an unexpected time/location/place/manner, ie being “surprised” in some form or the other by the enemy. However, the reaction is greater than what I would call a “surprise reaction”. It seems like “battlefield shock” occurrences start with a surprise reaction – all units can get surprised by an enemy – but then will continue past the point of what I consider reasonable from just being surprised. The reason I refer to it a phenomenon is because sometimes the reaction is brought under control, but sometimes it spins out of control. From my readings, this seems like a fairly common occurrence on the battlefield. An example. From the The Easter Offensive (Turley) during the April ’72 NVA invasion. This occurred at the Dong Ha Bridge over the Cua Viet River. Sounds like the perfect briefing for a CM scenario. Now this seems like a pretty good, perhaps not perfect, example of “battlefield shock” during a tactical battle. The NVA did not think there would be resistance at this bridge, but thought it would be just across the bridge (there was a combat base approx 1500 – 2000 m behind the bridge). It seems like the mere appearance of the South Vietnamese willing to resist shocked this tank commander so much, the entire attack was abandoned for some time. The book doesn’t say how large the NVA force at the time of this incident was, but later it says there were confirmed to be over 100 tanks in the battle for the Dong Ha bridge, which lasted until the bridge was blown a couple hours later. That is just one example, there are more in this book that I will post later.

quote]It would include acknowledging that maneuver warfare is about *shock firepower* and necessarily, involves *movement* of shock-based forces. (That is afterall, how they work.)

Since you brought it up, do you mind expounding on that just a bit more? On a side note, in my mind I've likened Monty with the ACW General George Brinton McClellan - but that is based on limited reading about McClellan, and even less on Monty.

Is that a typo that should say 10 seconds (the part in bold)? Or is there another factor that makes that more complicated than meets the eye.

I like these ideas, but more in conjunction with a hypothetical/hope-somebody-will-make-it CMX2 campaign extension than with a future release of CM. By campaign extension, I mean an operational game that would interface with CM to make tactical battles. Something similar to what Shogun: Total War and Star Wars Rebellion tried to do - but much much much much better. ::Edited because I cant remember the exact name of that Shogun game - oh well.:: [ October 02, 2003, 01:30 PM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

Are just talking about "borg spotting", because I distinguish that from the "all-knowing commander" problem? Some people like the "all-knowing commander" situation, but I hope that the next CM engine has some options to limit what information the player (the "all-knowing commander") receives. Or are you talking about Sauron?

As I stated before, I find this discussion quite interesting. I have been reading Blitzkrieg – From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (Deighton), and came across some information that is related to this discussion – so I thought I would post it. Deighton has this to say about Fuller and Hart in reference to their theories after WWI. The book then talks about a few other theories and then says this (although I cant tell if it is referring the all the theories - including Fuller's and Hart's - or just the other minor theories): I also found interesting that Fuller rejected Hart's "Indirect Approach" when his "Plan 1919" would have seemed to use the "Indirect Approach" The details of Fuller’s “Plan 1919” are described in this book as: Sounds like the same argument/discussion that is going on here. [ October 02, 2003, 02:45 AM: Message edited by: David Chapuis ]

I am really enjoying this little debate - I find it quite interesting. Especially with words like "horsefeathers" & "horsepukey" making an appearance - lol

hummm - I'm beginning to wonder if that guy escaped and made it to the 'waffle' thread

There is always hope for CMX2

Well, maybe every forum is different, but on the one forum I admin, it takes about as long to create a new forum as it does to create a new thread - which is only about two clicks and a title. btw, I am not complaining. Just stating my opinion that I am ready for the dedicated CMAK forum.