onodoken

Mod Slut..LOL! Thanks for the info...

Gentlemen: Greetings once again. In re-kindling my love of CM I recently started mod whoring at the local mod databases (CMMD etc.). I must admit that it has becomed a daunting task, I was left equally perplexed by a search of the forums (which I admit have been absent on and off for the past few years...) by the vastness of choices. I am looking for the best mods or modpacks for winter combat goodness to include terrain, armor and infantry (1942-43). I dl the tarkus GUI mod and I am duly impressed. Please post any list of mod files that would help me expedite this, thanks a bunch in advance.

Thanks for the replies, I will check them out both!

Hello all: Long time since my last post. I am looking for a Meta Campaign that has not started yet. Any help would be appreciated, please post links and/or info, thanks. Happy New Year.

Gents: Great Wargames and great service. Battlefront is true excellence and dedication to the wargaming community. Merry Xmas.

That is Guderian not Rommel.

Lou: Thanks for the tip, I have been looking for something like this for a few weeks. Can't beat the price either! Cheers

Indeed, Ericson, Beevor, Clack and Glantz are much better sources. However In my very personal opinion, and based on the readings of Panzer Leader and other articles, Guderian was a tactician at heart. His political involvement was limited to presenting and advocating his tactics to OKW and OKH officers and to Hitler himself when necessary. Indeed it is well documented that Hitler was at times enraged when Guderian did not yield to Hitler's points of view. Guderian was nontheless and advocate of war and did not make any apologies for it in his writings.

Alan Clark's BARBAROSSA is a must for starters, and any of Prof. Ericson's books are also excellent. You can pick them up at any local Borders or Barnes and Noble.

Hi there: Here are a few... German Army Handbook, James Lucas Barbarossa, Alan Clark (MUST HAVE) The German Army 1933-1945, Mathew Cooper Kursk 1943, Osprey Books Their War, Wil Fowler & Mike Rose Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland, Signal Publications Hilter's Army, Combined Books World War II encyclopedia of Facts & Figures, John Ellis The Second World War, West Point series. Ostfront, Charles Winchester The Eastern Front, Steven Zaloga Atlas for the Second World War, West Point Atlas of the Second World War, Harper Collins Panzer Commander, Hans Von Luck Fighting in Hell, Peter Tsouras Blood tears and Folly Vol. I & II, Len Deighton Soldiers of Destruction, Sydnor Das Reich, James Lucas Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian Stalingrad, Anthony Beavor Hitler's Panzers East, Stolfi Frontsoldaten, Fritz Ostfront 1944, Alex Buchner Panzerwaffe at War Volumes I & II, MBC When Titans Clashed, Glantz and House Barbarossa - Hitler's Invasion of Russia, David M. Glantz Stalingrad, Erickson Road to Berlin, Erickson The Siege of Leningrad, AlanWykes Lost Victories, Manstein On the German Art of War (Truppenfuhrung), Bruce Condell and David Zabecki. Germany's Spanish Volunteers, Osprey Publishing

Sorry for the tardy reply but I see that Silvio came to the rescue.

Yes, someone posted a website for them a about two weeks ago. If you still cannot get them email me.

There was a particular medical problem that MD’s encountered during the Stalingrad siege. Soldiers would suddenly die with no apparent reason (as they casually spoke or ate etc.). Forensic examinations of the bodies revealed that their hearts had "shrunk and shriveled". It was a medical oddity in Stalingrad that had not been seen before and it was linked to lack of proteins (i.e. starvation).

Gentlemen: Throughout the forums we keep reading, why a crew did this, or a squad of infantry did that or a vehicle ran away when it was not suppose to or why (my favorite) a German 37mm “doorknocker” took out a KV-1 with an AP round. Anyone with military experience knows that plans undoubtedly never occur exactly as planned and that units, individuals and hardware may react very differently under various circumstances. Keep in mind that although CMBB is an excellent, if not the best wargame made, it cannot “simulate” cannibalism in Stalingrad or the strange sudden death syndrome of German soldiers that died due to a strange shrinkage of their hearts as well as other oddities of war and particularly on the eastern front. Below is an extract of a college paper I did years ago and part of a research conducted on one of military histories greatest thinker: Carl Von Clausewitz. This is a rather “short” explanation of the concept of FRICTION, which is basically an explanation of why things do not always go the way we planned them. The Combat Mission engine does a great job of simulating the “unsimulationable”. All analysis is from Carl Von Clausewitz: On War, I hope you find it useful. Definition of Friction. Clausewitz defines friction of war as the random and unpredictable events within a given conflict that cannot be foreseen. The basic definition of friction does not apply to Clausewitz; it is rather a series of events that inherently complicate even the simplest of tasks. Furthermore Clausewitz describes friction in war as the only concept that distinguishes war in theoretical terms from the experience of real war. Thus in theory the friction cannot be simulated as individuals within the war contribute their own unique friction, each making constant contact with the element of chance. Friction can be best described as an unseen “force” that turns what seems ordinary and simple into a series of complicated events. How friction affects war. The effects of friction in war are the center of Clausewitz friction theory. The military structure, although rigid and complex, can be easily understood and adopted. However friction brings into this structure the elements of chance (Weather, mistakes, miscalculations etc.) that cannot be foreseen, therefore the commander must correct these errors as they arise, thus affecting war at the tactical and strategic levels. Other effects are seen on the individuals and how they form a part of the friction. Personnel are the primary element in the military complex therefore making them an important part of friction. The actions they execute, or failure to do so, play an important role when considering friction. Military hardware causes friction as it relates to technology, equipment can, and will break down… Friction also creates particular problems in strategic planning, making commanders aware of possible problems in seamlessly simple tasks that may involve supply, command and control among many. Although friction cannot be placed into the planning formula it must certainly be discussed in the form of alternate instructions and other contingency plans… Friction as it relates to the three elements of war. The three elements of war are, according to Clausewitz, violence, chance and politics. In violence friction becomes apparent as it relates directly to people and the friction that the individual exerts on the particular action. It is because of the element of chance, and how it relates to friction, that cannot be easily measured in relation to planning because it involves abstract things such as morale, will and other factors that cannot be neatly categorized. In friction, as it relates to politics, Clausewitz disassociates the military from the government making it an integral part of politics… How may friction be overcome? The commanding general must posses a complete understanding of friction. Clausewitz compares it to a “sense of warfare” that must be obtained from actual war. Clausewitz provides a single element for the reduction of friction in his book “On War”, and is simply stated as, combat experience. However Clausewitz offers an alternative to real combat experience in the form of (Good) officers that have served in war(s), and who can instruct the ones that have not have being involved in real combat, in the intricacies and factors of combat that are particular to a conflict… Conclusion …although friction may be perceived as an abstraction (as it probably is) it is nonetheless an important part of strategic and military thought. Friction exercises the mind of the commander into thinking the "Unthinkable", and adapting to new developments that may arise in the ever changing battlefield in order to achieve the objectives of combat. [ November 28, 2002, 01:59 PM: Message edited by: onodoken ]

Hello folks: Just wanted to post this from the GAMESPY review, short but staright to the point: "This is, quite simply, one of the best games of any genre available for the PC (and even the Mac!" Read the full review here: http://www.gamespy.com/reviews/november02/combatmissionbbpc/ Congratulations Battlefront! At last moving our beloved genre into the spotlight.

Use www.fileplanet.com

This isn't quite true - for battle, infantry usually shed their rucksacks. A full set of German web gear usually weighed only 20 pounds or so, and this is what was worn during actual combat. (I have a complete set of German web gear and have measured it with a full water bottle and cartridge carriers). The British Army had different names for the different orders - the two most common ones were Marching Order - full pack and webbing Fighting Order - webbing only The Germans had their own names for this. The fur covered tornister, and later the rucksack that replaced it, was not carried in action. Most Russian infantrymen, come to that, rarely had a full set of equipment. Even things like cartridge carriers or e tools were sometimes not issued out to entire units due to shortages. As one can imagine, most infantry preferred to fight lightly equipped. Even today this has not changed - the Princess Patricias in Afghanistan were carrying 100 pound loads up and down the hills, but they would not have fought with their rucksacks on.</font>

A quick note on tiring infantry... On an avarage a modern infantryman carries approximately 75-85 pounds (35-40 kilos+-) of equipment. A machinegunner, mortar crew and any other crew served weapon crew must carry the harware and ammunition. Steel ammo boxes and mortar rounds are very heavy. Multiply this by days and weeks of marching (heat and cold), constant brutal combat (a la Eastern Front), scarce rations, lack of sleep, combat fatigue, enemy fire, worries about family, ignorance of strategic status (are we winning?) fear of capture, being crippled or maimed...well you get the idea. It is quite amazing that infantrymen in WWII got anything done!

Only parts of the 2nd Battalion were deployed. Regrettably these same people later used the training (and possibly weapons) against our own troops.

The 101st Airborne was deployed in 1985 to Somalia in order to train the Somali Defense force in the use of US weapons (small arms).

US Army Infantry doctrine dictated (18 years ago:) that for example, when ambushed at close range to charge in the direction of the ambush and get immediately out of the kill zone. In open terrain, it depends on range, direction of fire etc. An infantry squad/platoon/company utilized the Bounding Over watch technique where one element would provide suppressive fire while the other would advance or retreat. Smaller units such as scouts and LRP's would use smoke and the "banana peel" while egressing under fire. This all is dependent on training and experience. You cannot expect a “green” unit or FNG’s to do what elite or specialized and experienced units are conditioned and drilled to do. Both considerations are modeled in the game. [ November 18, 2002, 08:24 PM: Message edited by: onodoken ]

Gentlemen: After reading the numerous threads and posts regarding the behavior of infantry units under fire, I felt compelled to start this "short" diatribe. First a little background on my military experience. I was an infantryman in the US Army for four years in active duty. I served as a rifleman and Scout/Sniper in the 2/502nd Infantry Regiment 101st Airborne Division and later in the division’s LRSD (Long Range Surveillance Detachment) unit before being transferred to the 25th Infantry Division. I saw service in forward areas such as the Sinai, Honduras and Somalia (1985) and later in South Korea. When Infantrymen (or anybody else for that matter) are shot at, the very first thing that you instinctively do in hit the ground in the prone position in order to become a smaller target. The second thing that you automatically do is seek cover (preferably staying in a prone position). You do not have to be a seasoned soldier to act that way, both actions happen instinctively, specially when men are being fired (and mauled) upon by heavy machineguns, firearms, artillery, tanks, air attacks or by ambush. Infantry units are modeled very well in the game, they advance when they are not under fire, and may or may not under fire depending on realistic factors such as suppression, morale etc. and of course the size and/or rate of fire being unleashed upon them. We sometimes do not like that they get down and seek cover instead of charging that MG or get close to a tank to put a magnetic mine to it. This most unnerving action is part of infantry basic, where they have an M60 tank roll over you and then you “fire” at the rear of it with a training LAW, believe me, even in training having a 40 ton monster coming at you is a scary sight. I believe that Infantry behaves realistically and is simulated well in the game and drastic alterations to the model may put in jeopardy the “real” feel of infantry under fire. Regards. “Ono Doken” [ November 18, 2002, 07:46 PM: Message edited by: onodoken ]

Gentlemen: Weapons and Tactics go hand in hand, diesel engines, transmissions, sloping armor etc. all have their points and counter-points but the fact is that Germans possessed two very important things during the opening campaign in 1941 and later. 1) German tanks were equipped with radios. 2) German Panzer units operated in unison and NOT in support of infantry units. The radio communication allowed for better target acquisition, faster employment of offensive and defensive methods and strategies, thus increasing their tactical effectiveness. Panzers trained to work as an independent arm and thus were able to achieve highly proficient tactics (German crews were better trained and had more experience i.e. France and Poland). So it is not just armor thickness and muzzle velocity, the placement of shots and the ability of a tank crew to communicate and utilize winning tactics were just as important. Cheers [ October 18, 2002, 12:27 PM: Message edited by: onodoken ]

slight PUCKER factor when I saw the 1st KV-1 over the hill, took out 1 PzIII but I quickly knocked it out with one of my PzIV (right flak shot). The KV series had a very high profile (specially the turret) thus making it easier to kill even from a hull down position.

Hello everyone, What a treat! The demo is a very detailed and accurate representation of the kind of action that took place during the Battle of Kursk. The Soviets developed an intricate and complex "anti-tank in depth" defenses that mauled the German panzer advance. The combination of AT guns and infantry AT hunter killer teams proved deadly. Only 6 of my panzers survived to see the objectives (had I used smoke maybe 2 more may have made it...). Anyways, congratulations to Battlefront, looking forward to buying and playing this excellent Eastern Front simulation...at last!