Vanir Ausf B
-
Posts
9,599 -
Joined
-
Last visited
-
Days Won
7
Posts posted by Vanir Ausf B
-
-
-
11 minutes ago, kevinkin said:
with its territory intact
Much left unspoken there. If Ukraine regains it's pre-2014 borders on the battlefield there is very little left to negotiate.
-
24 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:
What's the worst that could happen if other countries decide to send their Leopard tanks anyway, no matter what Germany says? That Scholz will write them a strongly worded letter?
I suppose there is a concern that in the future countries may be reluctant to sell weapons to other countries that have demonstrated a willingness to ignore re-export agreements.
But the more immediate problem may be with sustainment. So Poland sends Leopard 2s to Ukraine. Okay. Can Poland produce all the ammunition and spare parts for those Leopards?
-
42 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
One might think the US and Ukraine are doing integrated planning or something.
Combat Mission LAN party this weekend.
"This week, top U.S. and Ukrainian commanders will hold a high-level planning meeting in Germany to game out the offensive planning, another senior U.S. official said. The drill, the official said, is meant to align Ukraine’s battle plans with the kinds of weapons and supplies NATO allies are contributing."
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/18/us/politics/ukraine-crimea-military.html
-
4 hours ago, The_Capt said:
My point is that if the bar is low for the Russians than it is clearly also low for mainstream experts. Saying something like "the latest Russian strategic missile campaign is ONE OF THE most effective and dangerous" is weasel wording and essentially useless in assessment of the progress of the war.
Since this particular statement attributed to Michael Kofman has for some reason become controversial it should be pointed out that he never actually said it. That was @The_MonkeyKing paraphrasing the host of the podcast, Ryan Evans, who in turn was paraphrasing comments Kofman wrote in an article two weeks ago.
_____
The Russian strike campaign, targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure, is part and parcel of this strategy. Timed to coincide with onset of cold weather, Russian strikes are steadily degrading Ukraine’s electricity, and water management infrastructure. This campaign could grow in significance, and is one of the better organized Russian efforts since the strikes conducted in the first days of the war. An additional effect is draining Ukrainian air defense of ammunition, which could result in Ukraine having to choose between covering the front line, and defending its cities. Acquiring Western air defense, and a stable supply of air defense missiles, is therefore a near term priority for Ukraine.
Fortunately, the Russian military exhausted a large percentage of its long-range precision guided weapons over the course of the spring and summer. There is growing evidence that Russia is using recently made missiles, and much older missile types with dummy warheads to stimulate air defenses, which could suggest dwindling stocks. What this means in practice is that eventually waves of Russian missile strikes may diminish to the amount that its industry can produce monthly. Consequently, Russia is also growing in dependence on imports of Iranian strike drones to supplement its missile inventory.
________
https://ridl.io/the-russo-ukrainian-war-ten-months-in-taking-stock/
-
Slightly less useful comments on the T-90M.
-
Comments on the Marder IFV.
QuoteThe most relevant version for Ukraine is most certainly the A3 model. In order to keep the Marder in use until 2030, there is an increase in combat effectiveness, which is only just coming up for the Bundeswehr with new optronics and engine, among other things.
The Marder was developed to replace the failed HS 30 and to compete with the then new Leopard 1 in the terrain. Although his mobility has dropped over the years due to the increase in weight, it is still very good. Of particular note when compared to eastern tanks is the reverse speed, which is almost identical to the forward speed. As a result, the position can be changed more quickly in firefights or delayed more effectively
The Marder's armor has been upgraded with the A3 variant to withstand 30x165mm ammunition from, among others, BMP-2, BMP-3 and BTR-82 at certain distances. But there are also newer 30mm ammunition with more power. The side armor is not that strong.
The Marder in the A3 variant has an unstabilized (!) 20x139mm cannon, a MG3 in coaxial arrangement and can fire a MILAN anti-tank guided missile from the commander's hatch (this takes see below) to fight main battle tanks. Newer variants can fire the much better Israeli Spike LR/MELLS missile, but Israel does not authorize exports.
The Marder fires sabot ammunition against armored targets and explosive incendiary against "soft targets". A double belt feeder allows you to quickly switch between the types of ammunition to always use the right type. However, the 20mm is very outdated and not stabilized, which means that fire from the move is an exception. Likewise, battle tanks cannot be fought head-on with this caliber, but armored personnel carriers, with the exception of the BMP-3, are no problem up to around 2,000m
The ergonomics are significantly better compared to Soviet armored personnel carriers and this means that you once again have the opportunity to fight through the hatches. So-called fight over the ship's side. This gives him a clear advantage in difficult terrain. Another benefit of ergonomics is faster dismounting (and generally a willingness to get into the vehicle and not ride behind or on top of it), which allows faster incursions into enemy positions.
Due to the short cannon, which does not protrude over the hull, it can be aimed freely in all directions even in narrow terrain without the risk of bumping into anything (in contrast to the Puma with the 30mm cough cough). So very well suited for local and forest combat
But the most important advantage is: It is delivered. The Bundeswehr and other countries still have a large number of Marders that can be supplied if necessary, in contrast to many other armored personnel carriers in Europe such as the Warrior and CV90. Since the Marder is still in use, there are still enough spare parts, ammunition, mechanics and trainers to take care of it. In the same way, the Bundeswehr has already introduced the successor and can therefore, as with the AMX-10 RC, deliver material if a replacement is procured.
The Marder impresses above all with its number, availability, mobility, armor and ergonomics. But has deficits in its main armament due to its age and in its anti-tank capability due to the blockade of Israel.
After almost half a century, the Marder is now being used for what it was developed and built for. Although the decision to deliver took far too long and wasted time, the first step has now been taken.
https://twitter.com/KampfmitKette/status/1611094917983490074
-
32 minutes ago, kevinkin said:
The US and the West is at war with Russia. Would a blockade instigate a WMD attack? If not, there really is no downside. Those accepting Russian energy or other favors are becoming more and more complicit with Ukraine's hardships. Enough is enough already.
Again, the no-fly zone argument. If the premise is that there is no downside to direct conflict all sorts of possibilities open up. Indeed one would then have to ask why not begin airstrikes on Russian forces immediately. That's where you'll end up eventually. Might as well cut to the chase.
But we had this discussion six months ago. No matter what you or I think of it's merits there is a zero point zero percent chance of it happening.
-
2 hours ago, kevinkin said:
Sure. But given the assistance NATO is providing already, combined with modern day blockage techniques (sanctions/freezing money flow etc..), war has been declared on Russia de facto. Today, a Declaration of War has really become semantics. But with US HIMARS raining death on Russians, does it really matter? Politicians will often use the excuse of needing a Declaration of War to provide any assistance - not just troops. I think formal Declarations of War are a thing of the past. Warfare does not fit into a defined box anymore. If the money flow into Russian can be stopped without a blockade so be it. But it could be used as the final nail in the coffin.
You can cut and paste the no-fly zone debate. Bottom line is that NATO is a collective action organization, i.e. a blockade would have to be agreed to by all member nations. There is no chance of that.
-
Some type of T-80, I believe. Much faster reverse gear than the T-72.
1 hour ago, dan/california said:Good video, pretty solid tank infantry coordination.
-
Keeping the nukes was not a realistic option for Ukraine.
__________
Ukraine never had the ability to launch those missiles or to use those warheads. The security measures against unauthorized use were under Moscow’s control. The Ukrainians might have found ways around those security measures, or they might not have. Removing the warheads and physically taking them apart to repurpose them would be dangerous, and Ukraine did not have the facilities for doing that. Nor did Ukraine have the facilities to maintain those warheads. For only one example, the tritium in those warheads has a 12-year half-life and needs to be replaced regularly.
Ukraine did not have the technical infrastructure to maintain a nuclear arsenal. It would have had to spend billions to build that infrastructure.
__________
https://nucleardiner.wordpress.com/2022/02/06/could-ukraine-have-retained-soviet-nuclear-weapons/
-
Nice to see the "5 bar" off-road rating in Combat Mission is accurate.
1 hour ago, FancyCat said:Mud!
-
-
11 hours ago, FancyCat said:
A limited campaign to strike a tanker aircraft, or 1-4 strategic bombers, and that’s it, Russia would have to stop or risk further unsustainable damage to the strategic air fleet.
I mean we already helped sink the Moskva. Is the Admiral Makarov off limits due to being able to fire missiles against land targets? Russia has already virtually ignored the drone attack on the Engels air base. Wiki says it’s the only base where the Tu-160 is based at so another limited strike via ATACMS could force Russia to relocate or stop using it for missile strikes, certainly a important goal worth pursuing.
Something to keep in mind is that Dyagilevo and Engels-2 air bases are well outside of ATACMS range.
-
Good thing Ukraine is developing alternatives to ATACMS.
__________
The U.S. secretly modified the advanced Himars rocket launchers it gave Ukraine so they can’t be used to fire long-range missiles into Russia, U.S. officials said, a precaution the Biden administration says is necessary to reduce the risk of a wider war with Moscow.
The U.S. has refrained from supplying Ukraine with long-range ATACMS missiles. But the modifications ensure that Ukraine couldn’t use the Himars launchers the U.S. has provided to fire ATACMS missiles if Kyiv were to acquire them from other sources, such as foreign nations that have purchased the weapons from the U.S. Nor could Ukraine use those launchers to fire other types of longer-range missiles if Kyiv somehow managed to produce or acquire them, officials say.
__________
Probably paywalled, but... https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338
-
3 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:
"Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades."
How many guns would that be?
2 hours ago, JonS said:Probably 50-80
They expand on these numbers in the report.
- Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain large scale operations.
-
12 minutes ago, dan/california said:
Still reading, but this report is well worth your time.
It's a gold mine of information and lessons learned. Required reading.
- At the height of the fighting in Donbas, Russia was using more ammunition in two days than the entire British military has in stock. At Ukrainian rates of consumption, British stockpiles would potentially last a week. Of course, given that the UAF fielded more than 10 times as many operational artillery pieces as the British Army at the beginning of the conflict, it might take more than a week for the British Army to expend all its available ammunition. All this demonstrates, however, is that the British Army lacks the firepower to deliver the kind of blunting effect that the UAF achieved north of Kyiv. The oft-cited refrain of the UK Ministry of Defence that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in Finland. Nor – as Ukrainian troops discovered to their surprise – are ammunition, charge bags and other essential consumables consistent between NATO artillery systems; there is an inadequate capacity to draw on one another’s stocks.
-
I would not have guessed this.
-
10 minutes ago, Taranis said:
Could be sensitive for some ↓
I was triggered.
Because it reminded me that grenade launchers are still direct fire only in CM
-
12 hours ago, dan/california said:
On a similar note, an interesting interview with someone from the Russian side.
__________
There is a thesis that the lion's share of drones used by soldiers are supplied by humanitarian orgs. Is that true? Many experts say that our military-industrial complex has "missed" small drones. Yes - the bulk of small UAVs are supplied by volunteers, including our org. The problem with the (quadcopter) drone is the fact that these are consumable products, and the life of a drone on the front line is very short - literally a few weeks from the first flight to its destruction. This is true even if the drone is piloted by a trained operator. And if the operator has not had the appropriate training, does not have relevant combat experience, then this is 1-2 sorties - and the drone will be lost. But at the same time, it is necessary to clearly understand the whole story with drones, and its not exactly true that our Armed Forces were not ready for the very appearance of this type of weapon.
We are witnessing a unique situation - the first mass use of small drones in history. I agree that up to this point, small drones have been used in various military conflicts, for example, in Syria, Yemen, and during the military conflict of 2014-2022 in the Donbass. Our military-industrial complex periodically paid attention to this, but it either did not have resources, or did not have direct orders from the government (to mass produce small drones). As a result, our military-industrial complex was engaged in the production of heavier drones with a narrower specialization, such as Orlans, Zala Aero products and the like. They (Russian military drones) just have a different purpose, are more narrowly specialized, are more expensive and require a different attitude to their use. Do small drones exist in the US Army? No, they don't exist there in larger numbers either. Their (American) military-industrial complex missed this (drone) moment in the same way, and by and large, none of the modern armies of the world was ready for the Mavic phenomenon. To say that only we missed that is fundamentally wrong. The bottom line is that there was no such massive drone as the Mavic in any army, and not a single military even imagined that it would be needed in such volumes.
To what extent has this war changed the idea of small drones - should we expect them to appear in all armies now? Speaking philosophically, this war has changed many views on the Armed Forces, not only in terms of drones, but also in terms of command and control. Flaws in the organization of communications, high-precision weapons became visible. I'll give you an example. For example, the American HIMARS themselves are rather mediocre multiple launch rocket systems, they don’t shoot well, they don’t hit so far, but when satellite-guided precision munitions are used in this system, it turns from mediocrity into a first-class tool for suppressing and destroying enemy rear lines. All this works when it can hit the given targets with high accuracy. We also have similar systems, like Uragan and Smerch, which have precision-guided munitions, satellite guidance, and so on. The problem is that the Americans, in addition to high-precision guidance, have a satellite reconnaissance complex. It allows real-time tracking of targets on the surface of the earth. We have the components of multi-domain integration, communications and control, but, unfortunately, the components of multi-spectral spatial reconnaissance have not been given due attention. We thought that the Americans were spending crazy money, sawing the budgets into some kind of meaningless toys. But we proudly open the 1980s ground force combat manual and everything is "fine" with us. But it turned out that these gadgets actually work.
It suddenly became obvious that our army also needed them. This is also a matter of worldview. It is necessary that generations of officers, generals, those who promote military science, change their worldview in terms of applying new modern technologies. We need gadgets that allow us to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons, the speed of information processing, and combat control. Old weapons that could no longer be upgraded and effectively used, once equipped with "gadgets", can be very effective. In this sense, the war made it possible to look at these approaches with different eyes, to show that those approaches that dominated military science and the military-industrial complex for decades turned out to be outdated and inappropriate. Now it is necessary to develop new solutions that will allow Russian Armed Forces, our military-industrial complex to come together, and to rethink the national security...
...I would advise you to pay attention to communications, because traditionally (I can’t say why) our army is always bad with them. Buying some kind of radio station, albeit an analog one, is probably helpful in this conflict.
https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1595788630206849024
-
Years of playing CM have taught me that LOS through trees is less static than the LOS tool indicates. What trees in CM really seem to do is reduce spotting chances rather than prevent spotting altogether. When the tools says "no LOS" that is true at that moment but it could change at any time. I have had vehicles suddenly spot enemy vehicles through trees (and vice versa) when both vehicles have been stationary and out of LOS of each other (according to the target line) for several turns. You can't trust trees for concealment unless there are A LOT of them. It's kinda random and unpredictable but it's not a bug.
__________
The game does make some gross generalizations about foliage in order for it to work. The big one is the same one that is pervasive throughout the game. Specifically that LOS is not pixel by pixel, millisecond by millisecond. There is no home computer on Earth that can do that and be a viable game. Which means the LOS is determined by more-or-less the same sort of rules that one expects to see in a paper and dice game. More sophisticated and nuanced, for sure, but inherently similar.
The way it works is the LOS line is "degraded" as it is drawn from point to point. The more cumulative crap in the way the less strong the line becomes. The quality of the spotter, the less restrictions on view, etc. give the line a higher starting value than a LOS line drawn from a unit with negative factors. Some of the factors are specific (restrictions on range of view or height for example), others are general (optics of X type vs. eyeballs is the best example). Each piece of terrain has ratings which determine how much the line is degraded when it comes to that piece. At some point the line is so degraded that it is considered "blocked".
-
Stephen Biddle paints a target on his forehead. Fire away.
__________
First, offensive maneuver is apparently far from dead. Even in the face of modern weapons, breakthrough is still possible, and especially so when astute offensive operations on interior lines pose dilemmas for thinly stretched defenses like those of the Russians in Kherson and Kharkiv since mid-summer. Those offensives would have been even more successful with improved Ukrainian training and equipment, but Ukraine’s ability to succeed with what they have is a powerful demonstration that offensive maneuver has not been rendered impossible by new technology.
But second, while offensive breakthrough is still possible under the right conditions, it remains very hard to accomplish against deep, prepared defenses with adequate supplies and operational reserves behind them. This is not a novel feature of new technology — it is an enduring consequence of the post-1900 lethality of ever-evolving weapons that has been observed repeatedly over more than a century of combat experience. Exposed defenders are increasingly vulnerable to long-range weapons and sensors, but covered and concealed positions remain highly resistant to precision engagement. Shallow, forward defenses can be ruptured with well-organized combined arms attacks, but deep defenses with meaningful reserves behind them still pose much harder problems for attackers. Overextended positions without secure supply lines can be overwhelmed, but consolidated positions with viable logistical support are still much harder and more costly to overcome.
Third, neither shallow, vulnerable defenses nor deep, robust ones are universal features of modern war. Both have occurred regularly since 1900, and both have occurred, at various times and places, in Ukraine since February.
And this in turn casts doubt on the advisability of redesigning modern militaries around an assumption that new technology has made effective offensive maneuver either impossible or available on demand. Successful offense has long been very difficult, and it has normally required both demanding preparations and a permissive defender. But it offers decisive outcomes when conditions allow it, and such conditions recur with enough frequency to suggest that its demands are worth meeting.
https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/ukraine-and-the-future-of-offensive-maneuver/
-
-
Short interview with a Ukrainian drone operator.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
My guess is they will be taken from the Abrams tanks slotted for Poland. The question is will they be new-built M1A2s or refurbished M1A1s? Poland has both on order.