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c3k

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Everything posted by c3k

  1. Obviously this was done by BF.C, or at their behest. What better way to stop the carping about hypothetical battles than to precipitate a real one? The problem would be in creating international tensions in _just_ the right way to result in actions mimicking their already created scenarios. Regards, Ken
  2. Gents, One more quick example of what I'm trying to get across. Typically, to counter enemy (U.S.) air threats, you'd rely on AAA and SAM assets. The Iraqis knew what happens to those units. They always seem to get destroyed. The US Army sent in an Apache Regiment (30 or 32 helos) to conduct an assault on an Iraqi unit. The Iraqis used primarily small-arms (to include up to heavy machineguns), as well as light AAA, to destroy the attackers. (Only one was shot down, but ALL were damaged, some requiring WEEKS to be repaired.) The assault was a failure. The Iraqis used low-tech, widely dispersed, shoulder fired small arms and machineguns to stop a heavy attack helicopter regiment. That was not anticipated. Thereafter, Army aviation assiduously avoided built-up areas. Why wouldn't the Syrians put a man or two on EVERY SINGLE roof in a town? How effective would a Hellfire be in stopping the incoming fire? Better yet, would that tactic deny Helo support to US ground forces in and around that town? Just something to think about... Regards, Ken
  3. Gents, Umm, a few points. (I am more than ready to be corrected on all of these, but I would ask that you post FACTS, not opinions.) Counterbatter radar: limited numbers of systems, limited detection azimuth. Unknown how many incoming trajectories can be tracked and turned into targets at a time. Admittedly, any conventional artillery use by Syrians would be suicidal. (Doctrinal battery layout, etc.) A better (?) tactic may be individual guns in hidden, hardened emplacements; rolled out for single shot missions. (See the North Korean model.) Less effective for sure. Sound based detection systems: they seem to be good, and getting better. However, they also seem to be best utilized in a low-intensity role. Multiple contacts throw them off. (The sniper finder; a microphone, videocamera, computer setup, works great on individual shooters. Not so well in a firefight.) UAV's: In the entire OIF, the Army had A SINGLE HUNTER UAV for the entire corps. (Yes, there are other types of UAV's, but they are extremely specialized for extremely narrow uses, both technically and doctrinally. We are not at the point where a platoon leader can zoom into any overhead view he wants.) Electronic Warfare/Intel: Large antenna farms and static HQ's will be destroyed. Distributed comms are the name of the game. Cellphones are great. The US is having LARGE coordination problems in Iraq with conficting demands in the EW field. Jamming blocks friendly frequencies. Monitoring, to take advantage of enemy comms, allows their use. Other more technical issues. EW is not a magic panacea. Remember, just because a manufacturer can show that a given system is capable of something, doesn't mean it will work that way in combination with others, or in actual use. There are plenty of shortcomings in the modern US arsenal for a motivated, intelligent opponent to take advantage of. Admittedly, most of these areas are at the extreme ends, in the seams, or otherwise limited. But they do exist. Regards, Ken
  4. A counterbattery question: how many counterbattery radars does a U.S. force have? What is its area of coverage? How many targets can it track? (In "On Point", a book by on OIF, the U.S. counterbattery radar seems to be a very limited use device.) Ken
  5. Gents, Thanks for the responses! My post on civilian vehicles was merely to highlight a successful tactic of moving infantry without response. (No air interdiction, no long range fires. Very different situation than using them in a mounted assault role.) Why would the Syrians be concerned about their weapons surviving return fire? Take Peter Cairn's D-30 idea: a cannon in a house. (Nice idea.) If all it does is get off one or two rounds, how many does it take to destroy a Stryker? How many U.S. casualties? Would the goal be to see a single dead U.S. soldier on CNN? How many Syrians would that be worth? Ken
  6. Phillipe, Excellent example! Regards, Ken
  7. Okay, Peter, for exercise purposes I will try to list all your assumptions. Below is your original post: For starters: ...Michaels (sic) Kanucks,(sic) would blow away all your forces in civilian vehicles,... Assumption: Michael's forces have the ability to "blow away all" my forces. Assumption: Michael's forces are able to target all my forces. Assumption: Michael's forces have been given the freedom to fire on all my forces. Assumption: The permission to fire on all my forces has been communicated to all of Michael's forces. Assumption: All of Michael's forces are willing to initiate fire on civilian vehicles. Whew! Let's continue, shall we? ...because they would be easy to spot, given that all the real civilian traffic would be getting the hell away from his guys as fast as they could while yours would be moving towards them... Assumption: the civilian traffic and my traffic are moving in different directions. Assumption: the civilian traffic is moving away from his guys. Assumption: the civilian traffic somehow knows where his guys are before they get there. Assumption: the civilian traffic takes Michael's presence as a threat. Assumption: the civilian traffic decides to move away from Michael. Assumption: the civilian traffic is able to move away. Assumption: my vehicles are moving directly towards Michael's forces in an obvious manner. We'll wrap this up because I'm not used to typing "Assumption" so many times! ...And besides since when has a mechanised force moving to contact ever moved in convoy for gods (sic) sake.... Assumption: Michael has a mechanized force. Assumption: Michael's forces and my forces are moving towards each other in a meeting engagement. Assumption: Michael's forces are aware that an attack is imminent. Assumption: The terrain allows for non-convoy movement of Michael's forces. Assumption: The ROE allow for non-convoy movement of Michael's forces. Assumption: The ops tempo allows for non-convoy movement of Michael's forces. Now, I'm not saying that driving to battle in taxicabs is better than driving to battle in a Bradley! What I'm trying to do is get some intelligent thinking on how a battle in Syria could be shaped by the Syrians to their advantage. After all, that is what military professionals are paid to do. Isn't it? Regards, Ken
  8. Oh my, Michael, are you going to allow Peter Cairns to speak for you? Peter, would you rather edit your post, or do you wish for me to list all the assumptions in your scenario? Personally, I relish the opportunity to use weapons and personnel in a non-linear manner against any Western force (in a game!). I'd hate for CM:SF to be constructed with a number of pro-Western assumptions. How has Syria modified the weapons it's purchased? How will they be used? Why should they use them the same way YOU would? What could they use as a weapon that YOU haven't considered? Ken
  9. Michael Dorosh, How is concealed movement not a tactical issue? Here's an example for you: My country, Kenistan, is at war with Canada. You're the tactical leader. You move your forces to engage me. Of course, you use Canadian military vehicles in a convoy. You have outriders who attempt to stop all the traffic from being near you. My forces spot you and engage you. (Choose your remote, long-range, precision weapon of choice.) You suffer losses. My forces now need to move to engage you. I use civilian vehicles and mix in with the existing highway traffic. You never spot my forces. They unload at various streetcorners and coffee shops. Using cell-phones I coordinate the attack from out of a near-normal civilian background. I gain the element of surprise. CMx1 attempted the most primitive of this by allowing scenario designers to give more entrenchments than were needed. These were spotted before other units were. How many times did you stop you CMBO/CMBB/CMAK advance to fire some HE into a tree-line in which you'd spotted an entrenchment? Contrary to your opinion, in a conflict with Syria, ALL of these matters would be possible and could be faced by a company commander. If they're not possible in the game, then it falls short of what it's simulating. You seem well-read on HISTORICAL military matters. Apply that knowledge to HYPOTHETICAL military matters. Of course some of the ideas discussed would fall short of their goals. But the others could work, and BF.C should incorporate some abstraction of them into the game. Regards, Ken
  10. Gents, Other facts: in OIF, spearhead forces were confused by Iraqi forces in civilian clothes. U.S. forces were confused by Iraqis waving white flags in VERY close proximity to Iraqis firing upon the U.S. forces. Iraqis successfully coordinated attacks using cellphone communications. Iraqis successfully employed civilian transportation (taxis, POV's, ambulances) to transfer tactical units across battlefields. These are just a few examples of intelligent Iraqi leaders thinking "outside the box" in an attempt to inflict losses on U.S. forces. I do not think a single one of the above examples were foreseen by U.S. mission planners. What surprises would the Syrians have in store? How about parking fuel trucks at major intersections. Something to slow down the ops tempo. Why not issue U.N. armbands to elite forces? What would a Stryker company commander do when a U.N. roadblock tells him to stop? To make this game more interesting, these ideas should be discussed and a way of porting them into the game should be included. Ken
  11. Dillweed, Yes, I just read "Ambush Alley". According to the book, most of the KIA (19? total in the battle) were in a single vehicle destroyed by an A-10. Ken
  12. Michael, How many "derelict tanks" do the Syrian have? I have NO idea. I'm sure a Syrian OOB grog can post a detailed list of all vehicles. How would I simulate them in CM? For the Sryian, as pre-game forces that can be positioned just like regular vehicles. However, once positioned, they are unusable. The U.S. player wouldn't know that. He would see/find an AFV, subject to normal fog-of-war rules. I don't care that YOU don't think it's a worthwhile suggestion. Apparently, with nearly 12 years to prepare for a war with America, the Iraqi's thought it was a good idea. Excellent nit-picking with no analysis. If you were a Syrian commander, how would you try to equalize the battle? Regards, Ken
  13. Gents, How many reloads of ATGM do the vehicles carry? How long to reload? I don't care what's back at the logistics base. I don't care what's in a convoy slated to meet up with me at 0800 tomorrow. How many ready rounds do I have left? Ken
  14. Gents, I'd like to start a discussion on what an intelligent Syrian commander would do to negate the U.S. advantages in a conventional battle. Okay, I'll go first... Massive use of decoy positions and equipment: Using older/unusable tanks, set them up in ambush positions. This would trigger the US units to use a lot of high precision weaponry on useless targets. If the US spearhead uses its allotment of precision weaponry, when it hits the REAL defense the US spearhead will have a disadvantage. In game, this could be simulated by giving a Syrian defender multiple inop vehicles to set up. The US player wouldn't know about that. Anyone else have any ideas and how they could apply to a better game? Thanks, Ken
  15. Steve, If you're reading "Ambush Alley", regarding Air Force CAS and integration with ground forces, the communications and clearance and target identification procedures are written about and highlight the problems still facing effective CAS. Interesting book. Regards, Ken
  16. Hmmm, Of course, having a spool on the LAUNCHER would have a benefit. Imagine you see a group of 100 or so enemy ahead. Quickly, you launch your missile to the RIGHT of the group, dragging a wire bundle behing it. Then, as the missile passes the group, you command a hard LEFT turn, sweeping the wire bundle BEHIND them. You keep turning the missile until it has passed all the enemy and comes back towards you. Now, as the missile heads back towards you, you give another hard LEFT turn... As the missile crosses over it's initial track, a veteran missileer could give a series of commands resulting in the missile tying a slip-knot in its wire bundle. As the missile flies off, the wires tighten on the enemy. This is a very effective way to capture and secure large numbers of prisoners... Ken
  17. Gents, Never fired a TOW, but don't the guidance wires spool off of the tail of the missile? They're definately NOT dragged across two miles of ground from a spool on the launcher. With missile mounted spools (MMS ), the wire will be stationary where it falls. Hence, I wouldn't think it mattered what the missile passes through. At least, as far as the wire is concerned. I agree with John Kettler that the damage to the missile would be the controlling factor. Just my opinion/sense. Thanks, Ken
  18. Winecape, As the ONLY singled out member to be named in Hofbauer's post, you really don't want to trade places. It's been really tough lately. Hell, I've even begun to drown my sorrows and seek solace in alcohol. Do you know anyone who could spare a bottle or two? Regards, Ken
  19. Hello, I'd like it to be publicly noticed that I, and ONLY I, was singled out by M Hofbauer in his post. Indeed, he didn't even mention himself. Thus, if anyone copies it and posts it elsewhere, I will be the one who basks in all the reflected glory. To M Hofbauer: thank you. I'd also like to congratulate you on posting something with no egregious mis-spellings which is critical, nay, inflammatory, on so many levels. Thanks for a bringing a smile to my face. Regards, Ken
  20. Other Means, Thanks for the link. THAT is EXACTLY what I'd hope for in CMx2. Regards, Ken
  21. Gents, I've lobbied in the past, and continue to hope for, an improved POST impact model fidelity. As Dan mentioned above, the CMx1 statistical model was fine in its day, but for CMx2 a physical model would be better. The internal layout of a vehicle would need to be modelled, using damage tolerance levels for each system. As a round penetrates the vehicle, it would lose energy as it damages/destroys/wounds the items it passes through. "Panzer Elite" by Wings Simulations was a game that used such a behind armor system. Every vehicle system was simulated with a 3-D shape (for in-game calculations only; the visuals were quite good), and as they took damage, your vehicle was degraded accordingly. I'm not suggesting to turn CM:SF into a tank simulator. Rather, just a fine-tuning of the model. BF.C, any word on this subject? Thanks, Ken
  22. Gloves: think about flash burns; handling hot items (gun barrels/receivers come to mind); tearing a nail or two; saving fingers (one of the guys in my unit jumped down and his wedding ring caught on sheet metal - too bad for him his ring-finger was unable to stop a 200lb body in mid-fall); as previously noted, the sense of protection lets you move quickly without caring about abrasions and cuts. Is that enough or do we need more reasons? Thanks, Ken
  23. Steve, What are the various icons in area 4? In area 5, under the "SL" and "TL" column, what is the cylinder? Ditto for the next column, headed by the single "TL". Thanks, Ken
  24. Dinger, Not piling on, but for the rest of the audience, why do you suppose that YOUR radio is compatible with MY radio (in my F-16/15/18/22/23)? Why are you assuming YOUR map coordinates are the same as MY map coordinates? Why are you assuming YOUR map coordinates can be input by me into MY weapons? Now do you see why I'm asking these questions? Ken
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