LongLeftFlank

Sicilian vines. Yup, those stumps can get pretty thick and hang up a tank.

IMHO it was the emergence of Red China that really sealed it more than anything the French did or didn't do. Even after DBP the PAVN was not capable of overrunning the lowlands absent Chinese intervention. Massacring strung-out GM columns in the highlands was one thing, and DBP was conducted 200 miles from the French air bases. The next sieges wouldn't have been so easy. Kind of like the American revolution; Saratoga 1777 was the British DBP but Washington still couldn't eject them from the coastal cities until the French intervened at Yorktown in 1781. Stalemate can cut both ways. As Mao himself recognized (see that lessons learned paper), if a movement is forced totally underground and cannot show progress toward "liberation", the people will eventually weary of ongoing violence and back the powers that be, however corrupt. That's what largely happened in Latin America. And a semi-competent republican regime and army could certainly have been brought into being over time in an unpartitioned Vietnam, with massive US backing. But since the VM were able to maintain a Chinese-protected and sustained buffer zone in the Vietbac, it didn't matter how competent the ANV became -- they simply couldn't deliver the knockout blow either and drive the VM totally underground. Uprooting the VM infrastructure in the villages, which had effectively become a parallel government, was still not impossible but required far more resources and patience than either the French or the Americans after them were willing to commit.

Perfect. Those guys are thrilled to get a student with genuine passion for their subject. As long as you footnote properly and thoroughly using mainstream sources (sounds like you know that already); there's a lot of wiki stuff out there and even old school profs are good at sniffing out original thought from plagiarism.

North Africa was the last point at which the Axis and Western Allies fielded evenly matched forces; so from a wargaming perspective that is appealing. For the rest of the war, German superiority was strictly local and fleeting.

Wow, great post. Yes.

Your comments are moot -- wrong month. As one might expect, by day 2 of the bombardment (Mar 14), the Bearcats had been destroyed or evacuated. I think one of the Morane (Storch) spotters managed to last about 5 more days. Sublime - try a Barnes & Noble. Even if you can't afford it, you can browse a few quick refs to bulk out the ol' bibliography and ensure your A+. This better be a seminar paper or something (i.e. most of the course grade) for all the effort you're putting in.

Jules Roy talks a lot about the policy context and got facetime with many of the major players. On the other hand, he also editorializes a lot and takes sides, so he cannot be considered authoritative. There is a recent book out on the French Indochina war but I can't recall the title. I suspect there's a lot of stuff out there in French if you parlez... JK: Thanks for the thoughts on the tanks, RCLs and fighter-bombers. Owing to the distance from Hanoi airfields and weather problems, Tacair participation in battles at CM scale was purely accidental. The only incidence I recall offhand of bombers being explicitly part of an attack plan was the failed 2BEP attack across the airfield, although there were other occasions where FBs showed up to strafe VM positions at the time of a French attack. As to tanks and RCLs, the fights I'm depicting are infantry vs fortification fights -- old fashioned trench warfare. Those gun platforms are supporting players in those actions, with a few exceptions.

Start simple (a few Groups and a few Orders), then work your way up. I generally follow two principles -- (a) coordinated actions by a fixing Group and a flanking Group, and ( a "jellyfish" movement when large forces must cross fairly open ground. That is to say, you reconcentrate your Group in a smallish (preferably covered) zone every other Order before having them immediately "spread out" to advance on a larger/wider zone in the next Order. Otherwise, because each unit in the Group selects its next destination squares in the zone randomly, if your objectives are a series of wide phase lines, you get units moving (hazardously) across the enemy front from left flank to right flank etc. After lack of Triggers/Flags and units only having two speeds (Quick banzai charge and agonizingly Slow crawl), this is the most annoying feature of the AI, IMHO. In effect, single AI Groups can't advance on a broad front. Units in a Group ought to select the closest squares to their current location excepting those already "taken"; the algorithm is fairly straightforward.

Because the base vehicle is a halftrack and unfortunately all US halftracks carry bazookas. Bazookas were still in limited supply in the PTO in late 1943 and I didn't want 15 more floating around -- they're too handy for bunker-busting and would unbalance the scenario. So you have Canadian halftracks instead, carrying Brit ammo. Sorry Charlie, no small arms resupply. I considered that but decided against. You should have enough forces to manage without that.

Nope, the M8HMC packs a 75mm howitzer, not a flat trajectory tank gun. That would give it a far greater HE punch than a Chafee, plus a bigger HE load and indirect fire capability, none of which the Chaffee offered. And as I said before, to get historical results I need to "bump up" the tank's armour, since I'm using a 57mm ATG to represent a RCL. The Brit 2lber shells will make mincemeat of a HMC or a Stuart. Using the much thicker armour of a medium tank restores the historical balance (and doesn't have an open top). Matching the historical specs is not the issue. But for DBP, tanks are the least important weapon among those I mentioned above.

Good eye, John, well done. The THC/TMC documentary doesn't include anything factually new, and as you observe, it basically lifts footage from the Vietnamese documentary. The producers are more concerned with a rapid fire series of action-packed images that supports the dramatic narration than with strict authenticity, so this kind of "evidence" needs to be carefully sifted. A snip of the film clip in question is displayed from 19:23-19:26. I'd guess those explosions in the foreground are smoke grenades -- if you look at the still, it looks like at least one figure is throwing a grenade as they come over the crest. A slightly longer clip (still broken into bits) goes from 45:15-45:34 of the VN documentary. It shows (1) The French first scrambling around in plain view of bo doi (!) for several seconds on the blockhouse (?), then rapidly ducking under some incoming rounds -- they vanish in a split second, amazing to watch! My best guess is that they've just stormed the blockhouse after ascending the forward slope. (3) then charging in a broad skirmish line over the crest (per the famous still above) -- those white puffs are definitely smoke grenades, not counterfire -- a continuation shown here. Their skirmish line enters enfilade of the VM in the foreground (4) then going to ground under heavy fire and finally retreating in the haze (you can dimly see figures running backwards in the last second), The editing makes it look like the bo doi then advanced in turn and retook the position, but that isn't totally clear. Keep in mind that the VM generally attacked only at night and the French by day. Viewing these clips several times does seem to me to strengthen the case for its authenticity as combat footage. However, the graininess of the footage and jittery camerawork doesn't itself testify one way or the other IMHO; there is equally grainy footage elsewhere in the program that was clearly "replay" for propaganda purposes, even if some of it was on the same day by the actual participants, as opposed to the detailed reenactment. Kind of like the two flag raisings at Iwo Jima. That's my take FWIW.

Armour way too thin. A 57mm would swiss cheese it. And then there's the open top

After battle equipment reviews from the outstanding French document cited above. Very comparable to the SLA Marshall review of US weapons in Korea, one of his better works. "The MAS 36 rifle has proven to be of disastrous inefficiency against a massive attack such as the Viet-Minh attacks. Being too heavy to be used as an individual weapon, it is totally ineffective for combat, both because of its lack of accuracy and its rate of fire....[At typical combat ranges, which are less than 100m due to vegetation and/or darkness], the essential factor was the number of bullets which could be fired within a few seconds. The MAT 49 machine pistol is unanimously praised as to its value. Nevertheless, two criticisms are made of it: - the fragile nature of some parts: peep-hole protector, shutter, cartridge clip spring, - the difficulty in refilling the cartridge clips. "This difficulty", writes Commander X, "is probably the cause of the success of Chinese-style attacks". The first wave causes an emptying of the cartridges, the second wave passes unharmed. The 1924-1929 machine rifle "is an accurate, sturdy, powerful and light weapon, remarkable in its simplicity. But our good-old machine rifle has a weak point: its cartridge clips are heavy, burdensome and rather fragile. It is these cartridge clips which cause most of the firing accidents.... " The 31A machine gun (Reibell) "permits... firing at night. In an established position it is advisable to use the round cartridge clip. The 40-round cartridge clip is very satisfactory when moving....[but] the tripod mount is heavy and difficult to handle.... The U.S. 30 machine gun is not better than the 31 A, and, besides, it requires more complicated supplying of ammunition". "the 57 mm. S.R. cannon has been greatly valued.... (in flat regions in particular).... Others, however, object to the fact that it is too heavy and too easy to be spotted. They believe that the 73 mm. antitank rocket launcher would replace it quite well. "The 60 mm mortar, which is ineffective in humid rice-fieldý, has proved to be quite interesting on the defensive. It can be fired in one minute and should be used #or reconnoitering fire or-for immediate explosiVe fire in front of the position of the unit: 80 to 100 meters. The 81 mm. mortars of the Battalion and the artillery should be used for more distant missions". Battery operation was difficult on wet terrain and the enemy often appeared at a very short distance. "It is preferable to have only one mortar available with a good supply of ammunition than two mortars with only a few shells". For distances greater than 400 meters it was quicker to use a 105 mm. fire, which is almost always well adjusted, than to adjust a 60 mm. fire and, even more so, than to adjust an 81 mm fire". "When I took command of the battalion, I was surprised by the slight confidence which the cadre had in their 81 mm. mortars which systematically required artillery fire whereas mortar fire was often sufficient to reach the objectives.... the lack of training: everything which does not have to do with direct view flat-trajectory fire should be the domain of the specialist.... Nevertheless...the 81 mortar is the salvation of a unit which is not provided with artillery." "American 105 H. M. 2 and 155 H. M. 1 howitzers have proven entirely satisfactory because of their sturdiness during movements and the case of repairs on damage resulting from enemy fire". The M24 tank and the T.D. M36 tank (converted into a medium tank) had unit [ground] pressures which were just about the same and which gave them a mobility which was generally considered to be satisfactory.... Their protection proved to be sufficient and pierced armor was an exceptional occurrence. The response of this equipment to mines can be considered as being satisfactory. Losses in personnel sustained by the tank crews were low and generally were not very serious despite the size of the explosives used by the enemy. This feature can be explained by three facts: - the location of the track as regards the body (along the armor and not under it), - sufficient armor on the floor-board, which was sometimes put out of shape but was not pierced, - holds to the ground effectively. Wear and tear, however, was often considerable: several double rollers, the suspension bracket and the shock absorbers were frequently out of order.... The M24 tanks underwent thick and numerous artillery fire at Dien-Bien-Phu. Their behavior was satisfying because only two of them (out of ten) were seriously damaged by 105 mm. fire which hit the target. The metal caterpillar tracks proved their superiority. "They alone resisted the shell bursts and the 57 mm. S. R.'s direct fire." To fight an enemy who was primarily a foot soldier, the crews only had flat-trajectory fire cannons and nondelay fuse sholls. Thus, they found it impossible to continue their action in covered terrain which could not be penetrated by armored equipment. NOTE: Since I'm using the more powerful Brit 2lber ATG (reskinned) to represent the 57 RCL and the Panzerschrek for the VM 90mm "super bazooka", in light of the above statement that armour penetrations were rare (consistent with the DBP combat record), I'm leaning toward using a (thick-skinned) Panther "reskinned" as a M10 (closest resemblance to Chaffee in terms of silhouette). I don't think the Sherman will be sturdy enough. sticking point is the absence of a AAMG on top -- that weapon figured prominently in the fight for Eliane 2 and elsewhere. Thoughts?

The men by whose fault battles are lost are not those whom they kill. - Jules Roy General Navarre: "[Operation Mouette, Oct-Nov 1953] demonstrated... that if we sent out infantry, given its present quality, outside the (six mile) radius in which it enjoyed artillery support, then if it encountered Viet Minh infantry, it would be beaten.... A few parachute battalions remained the only units of superior value." I am now trying to reconstruct a tactical TOE for the CEFEO forces, understanding that the true bayonet strengths of units engaged at DBP will be quite different..... Per Martin Windrow's book: Battalions: - HQ/Services company, including heavy weapons. 2 man FOOs were attached to battalion CPs. - 3-4 rifle companies of 150-200 men in 3 platoons led by sublieutenant or senior sergeant. - Each platoon: 3 sections of 10-12 "copains" (squaddies), including an LMG. - CEFEO battalion establishment 18 officers and 60-80 French NCOs. Actual strengths seldom exceeded 12 officers / 40 noncoms. Many infantry battalions had half the officers they needed, many were transferees from other arms and many company COs were older men. A couple of the North African units at DBP had only one officer per company. - Many NCOs were themselves raw recruits, selected in training. - French ranks were entirely volunteers; tours were extended to 30 months. Avg age 29! - 30-50% Vietnamese personnel. More Vietnamese than Frenchmen would be killed on the French side at DBP. - Some squads had Vietnamese "supplementifs" -- many began as Vietminh PoW porters, graduated to scouts and translators and finally became full-fledged and often distinguished squad members ("autocthones"). Weapons: - Tardy standardization in arms: MAS36, FM24 LMG, MAT49, and Browning .30; also Thompsons, Stens and German weapons. - Para Cos had 2 x 60mm, 1 x .30 MG and 1 x 57mm, and at Bn 4x81mm and 2 x .30s. - The French at DBP had no 75mm RCLs or bazookas (unlike the Viet Minh); tank guns were their only long range flat trajectory weapons. At night, the French made extensive use of snipers and listening posts (mortar FOs) to detect and harass the enemy. This data from the "Free Indochina" miniatures wargaming site: "Far East" Pattern Infantry Battalion Apart from the Moroccan Tabors and Static Battalions, all infantry battalions had a standard paper structure as: 1 HQ and Service Company 4 Rifle Companies, each with CHQ, Support Platoon, plus 3 Rifle Platoons (each of 3 Squads) The H&S Company was allocated four 81mm mortars (though often only two were taken on mobile operations), and later four 57mm recoilless rifles (manned by the pioneer platoon, but often handed down to the rifle companies). The rifle companies were often re-organised into four platoons in early operations, to provide more flexibility. However, this reduced their combat ability which became a problem later in the war. Platoons were often formed into "fire" and "shock" elements. The company support platoons had a machine-gun squad and a 60mm mortar squad on paper, but this was often reduced to a single MG and 60mm mortar with large stocks of ammunition (due to personnel shortages). Throughout the war, the main problem for infantry battalions was one of manpower shortages. Battalions were often at 300-400 men, with companies of 90 men or less. Foreign Legion Paratroops 1er Bataillon Étrangers de Parachutistes (1948-55): HQ Company (HQ Platoon and Service element; Support Platoon with 81mm Squad, .30 MG Squad, and 57mm RCL Squad) 4 Para Companies, each with: HQ Platoon (60mm mortar squad, .30 MG squad, 1x57mm RCL) 3 Rifle Platoons (HQ Squad, plus 3 Rifle Squads at about 15 men each) 1er CIPLE (from April 1951 - Vietnamese Coy, as Para Coy. above) 2e Bataillon Étrangers de Parachutistes (1948-55): As 1er BEP, but with only 3 paratroop companies, and the 2e CIPLE (from April 1951). This from that French "lessons learned" document: The structure of airborne battalions: - Headquarters Company equipped with 4 light machine guns and four 81 mm mortars. - Four Paratroop Companies comprised of: - A Headquarters platoon with two 60 mm. mortars, one light machine gun, a 57 mm. recoilless cannon. - Four combat platoons, consisting of a firing force (two automatic rifles, a grenade launcher) and a shock element. [Compared] to the Indochina-type Infantry Battalion, the Airborne Battalion presented the following differences: -it was better staffed: 22 officers, 110 NCOs. - the total numerical strength was larger: 979. - the ethnic belance was different: 50% Frenchmen or Legionnaires and 50% indigenous. - the weapons were better adapted to shock combat: only half as many rifles but twice as many automatic pistols and a large number of carbines. - the radio transmitting means were twice as numerous. On the other hand, the firepower of the heavy weapons was the same. Mortarmen of 1BEP prior to siege. Good shot of uniforms and gear.

Violating the rules I just laid down here (i.e. this subtopic isn't directly germane to CMBN design for DBP), but this is actually quite interesting as a point of military history John Keegan and Gwynne Dyer among others have hailed this shot of a French counterattack near one of the Huguettes as the only 20th century live combat photo to show both attacking and defending troops in the same shot (NOTE: if you know of others, PLEASE don't slap them up here. Links will do!) However, some doubt has also been cast as to the authenticity of the shot, given that the Viet Minh also filmed a detailed onsite recreation of the battle for propaganda / historical purposes some months later, using (mostly North African) prisoners. For example: Interestingly, a Vietnamese scholar who has done a lot of research on DBP claims that the (first) shot is not only real but is a still from a live action film (JK, if you can come up with that film, I will be impressed ): The photograph was taken from Vietminh position when period fighting at airport, French paratroops counterattack at DBP, not in Elian 2. French spray smoke to isolate Vietminh in warzone then assault. It was a real battlefield photograph. And, this photo was cut from a film. After that photograph, a mortar shell exploded nearly French solder and they lieing the ground. I posted this photograph with mean: "humanwave" is actual tactic, all side used it. And kill a solder who have skill and tactic in action never easy. So what do you think? For me, one personal reason for skepticism: most of the "French paras" don't seem to be wearing helmets (consistent with PoW reenactors). But I could be wrong.

Re AI, PaperTiger is generally correct, but IIUC, the VC for this battle is driven by securing a bunch of hilltops, a limited objective set. And the German counterattacks could be timed to occur later in the game, so that if the US hadn't yet taken the objectives, the game would be already lost anyway. Based on a quick readthrough of the AAR, the German CO would be unlikely to fail to try, even against the odds, as it appears they had "hold at all cost" orders for these strategically dominant features.

Except the Germans, who promptly sent captured weapons back to the Fatherland for rapid reengineering and improvement.....

Still switching back and forth between the background research and modding (while hoping BFC releases the 2.0 Upgrade soon so I can get that Editor upgrade and do the master map).

Hmm, you sure you can't do a simple AI plan for the Germans to make this a 1 player? I quickly read through the historical account and they seem fairly static.... Seems like their counterattacks were about as skilled and successful as the AI's would likely be on this ground. JAC

Wow, you're almost as crazy as I am. Great map! Be careful with "fanatic" though, wrt the Germans. That term tended to get tossed around a lot by American writers, when they really meant "stubborn" or "fought harder than we would have in their situation". I haven't skimmed your document yet, but barring strong evidence of them repeatedly conducting suicide attacks or fighting "to the last man", I'd recommend you top off their morale at High or maybe Extreme. Fanatic in the game really is fanatic - they literally don't give up until killed and recover quickly from Pins. Be hard to see why they'd behave that way when so much of the DAK had already surrendered.

Yet again John, what on earth does this kind of ephemera have to do with Dien Bien Phu and CMBN scenario design? Nothing, that's what. If you must know, "la Cuvette" means "the toilet bowl" -- that's what the French transport pilots began calling the valley, and that name caught on as things started going downhill. Well aren't you just awesome. I suppose I'll start being impressed when you actually do something useful with those mad research skilz. Here, read something interesting: Declassified ARPA translation of 1957 French "lessons learned" paper on Indochina War. Those bo doi and dan cong (coolies/porters) were some busy beavers..... And I have no idea how this guy could possibly assert a copyright over a snipped portion of a NIMA map section, so I am going to ignore that, although I'm not reproducing the map itself here, just a link.

PM me with an email and I'll send you my research notes to date, which include extensive quotes from Jules Roy's and Windrow's books (you'll have to look up page numbers yourself, sorry). I also PDFed Windrow's maps, although I'm not posting them here out of respect for copyright.

Link to excellent French miniatures site containing additional imagery I won't repost here.

OK, in a desperate last ditch effort to clear the fruits and nuts out of here, I'm going to saturation bomb my own thread with a bunch of maps and imagery that will bore everybody to tears but will be helpful to me as I pin out my master map of the GONO central fortified zone. ZULU KILO, feu sur ma position. Vive la Légion! Out.